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HISTORY OF LANGUAGE

BY

HERMANN PAUL

PROFESSOR OF THE GERMAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG

*TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND EDITION
OF THE ORIGINAL.*

BY

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P R E F A C E.

AN attempt has been made to assist in making Professor Paul's great work better known to the English public, by translating it into English. In the original, by far the greater number of illustrative instances are drawn from the German language. In cases where English examples served precisely the same purpose as those drawn from German they have been frequently substituted. Additional examples, mainly drawn from English, have been inserted in brackets. It is hoped that it may be possible on a future occasion to add an Appendix fully illustrating the principles laid down by Paul from the English and other languages. Several references have been made to works which have been published since the appearance of Paul's work, such as the most recent productions of Darmesteter, Skeat, and Regnaud.

The versions of Chapters xvi., xviii., and part of Chapter xx., have been contributed by Professor C. H. Herford of University College, Aberystwyth, who has also revised the whole.

To Dr. Kuno Meyer the thanks of the Translator

are due for valuable help, and to Mr. A. M. Johnstone for aiding in the compilation of the Index.

Thanks are due to Professor Paul and Herr Niemeyer for their kind approval of the intention to publish a translation of the *Principien der Sprachgeschichte*.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

EVEN before the first edition of this work had issued from the press, I could not doubt that my explanations greatly needed supplementing, as many important sides of the life of language were but very scantily touched on. I therefore considered the form which such supplement should take, and was uninterruptedly employed in getting together whatever matter seemed to me serviceable for the purpose. The demand, however, of my publisher for the preparation of a second edition came upon me too quickly and unexpectedly to permit me to carry out my intentions. I should even now have preferred to postpone bringing it out, in order to permit much to come better to maturity. But I was finally obliged to yield to the justifiable pressure put upon me by the publisher, owing to the large demand for the book.

This second edition will not find much more favour in the eyes of many of my professional brethren than the first. Some will find it too general, some too elementary. Many will wish for something more cleverly expressed. I declare, once for all, that I write for those alone who are convinced with myself that science is not forwarded by complicated hypotheses, however cleverly and sagaciously they may be puzzled out ; but by simple fundamental thoughts, which are evident in themselves, but only prove fruitful if they are brought to clear consciousness and carried out with strict consistency.

The following chapters have been taken with some unimportant changes from the first edition :—Chapter xiii. (= viii.), xiv. (= vii.), xxi. (= xiii.), xxiii. (= xiv.), also ix. (= x.), with the exception of the

omission of the last section, the object of which has been treated at greater length in chapter vi. The following chapters have received changes or additions of greater importance : the Introduction (= chap. i.), chap. ii. (= xii.), iii. (= iii.), more still xix. (= ix. from p. 160), xx. (= xi.), x. (= the chief parts of v. and vi.). The following chapters are entirely new or answer to merely short indications in the first edition—iv. vi. vii. viii. xii. xv. xvi. xvii. xviii. and xxii.

It was originally my intention to add a methodological chapter on the distinction between sound-change and those changes of sound which are determined by the influences of function. I do not, however, wish to repeat what I have already set forth at length in my *Beiträge zur Gesch. d. deutschen spr. u. lit.* vi. i. sqq. I certainly see, not merely from the philological methods pursued, but also from the theoretical doctrines laid down in recent years, that the positions there maintained have met with little recognition. In particular they have been ignored by all those who have denied that any considerable advance has been lately made in the method of morphological research.

H. PAUL.

FREIBURG I. B., June 1886.

CONTENTS.

<i>INTRODUCTION.</i>	<small>PAGE</small> xxi
----------------------	-----------------------------------

Necessity for a general theoretical science or system of principles to accompany the History of Language, not less than other branches of the Science of History—Closer definition of its task—The doctrine of principles at the same time the basis for the doctrine of method—Transference of the method of observation usual in natural science to the science of culture—The science of language admits of more perfect methodical treatment than other historical sciences—Co-operation of psychical and physical factors in all development of culture—The science of culture always a social science—Criticism of the ‘popular psychology’ of Lazarus and Steinthal—Reciprocal influence of mind upon mind only indirectly possible by physical aid—Transformation of indirect associations into direct—Peculiarities of the science of language as contrasted with other sciences—Scientific treatment of language only possible by means of historical observation.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE.

Subject of the science of language—Organisms of idea groups the basis of all linguistic action—Such organisms the true media of historical development—Requisites for the description of a condition of language—Change of usage is the result of the ordinary exercise of speech—Language develops by gradations—Classification of the changes—Grammar and Logic,

CHAPTER II.

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF LANGUAGE.

PAGE

Analogy from organic nature—Statement of the problem—Linguistic change and differentiation—Varying states of intercourse—Individual spontaneity and social influence—Mutual independence of each differentiation—The image of a genealogical tree inadequate—Dialectical divisions graduated—The essential mark of a dialect its sounds—Technical and poetic language,	21
--	----

CHAPTER III.

ON SOUND-CHANGE.

The active factors in the production of sound—Slight consciousness of the element of a word—The word a continuous series of infinitely numerous sounds—Limits to power of distinguishing sounds—Deviations from the prescriptions of the motory sensation inevitable—Modification or displacement of the motory sensation—Causes of the divergence—'Convenience' a secondary cause, the motory sensation the primary cause—Control through the sound-picture—Relation of the individual speaker to his linguistic <i>milieu</i> —Sound-changes which do not depend on a displacement of the motory sensation—Uniformity of the laws of sound-change,	37
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

CHANGE IN WORD-SIGNIFICATION.

Change of meaning consists in a widening or narrowing of its scope—Distinction between 'usual' and 'occasional' meanings—Distinction between 'abstract' and 'concrete' meanings—Plurality of meaning—Means by which abstract words may receive in their occasional uses a concrete meaning—Means by which meaning is specialised—The occasional meaning does not necessarily include
--

all the elements of the 'usual' meaning—Transference to things spatially, temporally, or causally connected with the original denotation—Change of usage effected by 'occasional' modification—Classification of changes of meaning—Specialisation—Increase of connotation—Limitation to a part of the original connotation—Transference to things spatially, temporally, or causally associated—Combination of the above classes—Change of meaning in groups of words—Scope of meaning conditioned by the state of culture of the individual speaker—Scope of meaning conditioned by the state of culture of the whole society,

65

CHAPTER V. ———

ON ANALOGY.

Material- and formal-groups—Proportion-groups—Material-Formal influence of proportional groups upon speech (analogical creation)—Analogical creation in syntax—Analogy in inflexion and word-formation—Divergence of analogical formation from usage—Analogy in sound-substitution,

92

CHAPTER VI.

THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTS OF SYNTAX. ———

A sentence is the linguistic expression of the combination of several ideas—Means of denoting the combination—Means of distinguishing subject and predicate—Emphasis, position, etc.—Concrete and abstract sentences—Sentences of apparently one element only—Impersonal verbs—Negative sentences—Sentences of assertion and demand—Interrogative sentences—Extension of the sentence—Double subject—Double object—Use of a sentence as subject or predicate—Union of dependence and independence—Indirect speech—Sentence in apposition to a noun—A noun in apposition to a sentence—Parataxis—Graduated approximation to hypotaxis—Transition from demand or interrogation to hypotaxis,

112

CHAPTER VII.

CHANGE OF MEANING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SYNTAX.

Comparison of syntactical with verbal change of meaning—The genitive	PAGE
—The accusative—The prepositions—Apposition and partitive genitive—Subject of a verb—Substantive and adjectival predicate—Participial constructions—Conjunctions,	147

CHAPTER VIII.

ON CONTAMINATION.

Definition—Contamination (1) Phonetic—(2) Syntactical contamination	
—Anomalies (1) Momentary—(2) Usual—Pleonasms arising from contamination,	160

CHAPTER IX.

ORIGINAL CREATION.

The conditions of new creation still present—Creation has never wholly ceased—Application to original creation of the results won in other departments of the history of language—Interjections—Nursery language—The first creations belonged to no grammatical category, denoted complete intuitions, and were uttered with no thought of communication—Incapacity of primitive man to produce speech at will—Reproduction necessary to the conception of language,	174
---	------------

CHAPTER X.

ON ISOLATION AND THE REACTION AGAINST IT.

Possibility of a regularly observed system of grouping in each linguistic period—System conditioned solely by correspondence in form and meaning—Causes of isolation—Destruction of groups—(1) Etymologico-phonetic groups—(2) Syntactical groups—(3) Formal and material groups (a) by change of meaning, (b) by change of sound—

Reaction by aid of unification—Unification of differences which result from difference of position in the sentence—Unification of phonetically differentiated forms which belong to the same stem—The qualities of unification owing to favouring and hostile conditions—(2) Varying cohesion of the etymological groups—Influence of the formal grouping—Conversion of a merely formal difference into a difference of meaning—Conversion of elements of the stem into inflexions—All phonetic changes involuntary,	PAGE 190
--	-------------

CHAPTER XI.

FORMATION OF NEW GROUPS.

Obliteration of distinctions by sound-change—Union of unrelated words in material groups (simplest form of popular etymology)—Phonetic transformation (complex kind of popular etymology)—Union in formal groups (<i>a</i>) where function is the same—Union in formal groups (<i>b</i>) where the function is different,	229
---	-----

CHAPTER XII.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF FUNCTIONAL CHANGE ON FORMATION BY ANALOGY.

Transference into another group changes the direction of analogical formation—Consequences of the mutation of an appellative into a proper name, of a case into adverb, of the fusion of a syntactical combination into a verbal unity—Crystallisation—Operation of change of meaning on the construction—Construction differently understood owing to the influence of a synonym,	251
--	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

DISPLACEMENTS IN THE GROUPING OF WORDS ETYMOLOGICALLY CONNECTED.

The grouping of etymologically connected words diverges in the course of time from that required by their formation ; hence springs analogical creation on a new basis—Examples—Fusion of two suffixes—Displacement of relations in compounds,	261
--	-----

CHAPTER XIV.

ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF MEANING.

	PAGE
Causes of superfluity in language—Tendency to eliminate it—Elimination and utilisation—Phonetic differentiation for the purpose of differentiating meaning, only <i>apparent</i> —Works on <i>doublets</i> —Cases of apparent differentiation—Examples of real differentiation—Cognate processes as a result of partial identity of meaning—Syntactical differentiation,	272

CHAPTER XV.

CATEGORIES, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND GRAMMATICAL.

The original harmony between psychological and grammatical categories is in course of time disturbed ; tendency to remove the discrepancy—Gender—Number—Tense—Voice,	288
--	-----

CHAPTER XVI.

DISPLACEMENT OF THE SYNTACTICAL DISTRIBUTION.

The divergence of psychological and grammatical distribution—Duality and multiplicity of elements—The psychological predicate—Psychological subject and copula—Elements which are regularly psychological subject or predicate—The discrepancy avoided by periphrasis—The discrepancy eliminated—Psychological treatment of adverbial determinants—Rarity of discrepancy in languages of slight formal development—Change of functions between the determinant and the determinate—Separation of elements grammatically connected—Genitive and adjective—Genitive and substantive—Verb and adverb—Infinitive and an element dependent on it—Origin of connecting words—Indirect reference becomes direct—An element equally related to two other elements is attracted to the <i>first</i> —Compound sentences—Transition from dependence to independence—Inversion of the relation of principal and subordinate sentence—Impossibility of drawing a hard and fast line between principal and subordinate sentences,	31
--	----

CHAPTER XVII.

ON CONCORD.

Concord started from cases in which one word came to agree with another without regard for the latter, and was then analogically extended to other cases—Cases in which the secondary growth of concord is historically traceable—Variation of concord between two parts of a sentence—First rudiments from which concord proceeded. 339

CHAPTER XVIII.

ECONOMY OF EXPRESSION.

Relative economy of expression depends on the *need*—Ellipse either to be assumed in a minimum of cases, or else to be recognised as part of the essence of expression—Words or phrases *supplied*—*Absence of links*—A psychological subject or predicate may be drawn from the situation—Isolated sentences in form dependent, 351

CHAPTER XIX.

RISE OF WORD-FORMATION AND INFLEXION.

Original new creation in word-formation secondary in its nature—Growth of composition—Transition from syntactical juxtaposition to true composition of a verb with an adverb—Of a verb with an objective-accusative—With a prepositional determinant—Verbal complexes which have the character of compounds—Co-ordination between the elements of a compound and an independent word—Sound-change with isolating effect—Limits within which the compound appears as such—Origin of derivative and inflexional suffixes—Formation of suffixes constant and unceasing—Rise of new suffixes—Rise of inflexional suffixes—Criticism of the analysis of Indo-European 'grund-formen,' 367

CHAPTER XX.

THE DIVISION OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

The division of the parts of speech due to consideration not of any logical principle, but of three points—Meaning, function, and inflexion—Criticism of the usual division—Finite verb—Connecting-words, conjunctions and prepositions—Intermediate stages between classes of words—Substantive and adjective—Adverbs—Adjectives used as a predicative attribute—Origin of prepositions and conjunctions—The preposition—Conjunctions—Difference between preposition and conjunction in the simple sentence,

PAGE

403

CHAPTER XXI.

LANGUAGE AND WRITING.

Advantages and shortcomings of writing as compared with spoken language—Alphabets in use not as useful as they might be made—Dialectical differences concealed by writing—Incapacity of writing to communicate alterations of pronunciation—Effect of fixity of orthography—Natural tendency in orthography towards greater fixity—Analogies between the development of writing and that of language—Abolition of variations in sound-signs of identical value—Effect of etymology,

433

CHAPTER XXII.

ON MIXTURE IN LANGUAGE.

Mixture in the wider and the narrower sense—Mixture of distinct languages, dialects, and stages of language—Mixture originates in individuals—Bilingualism—The chief modes of influence—A. Adoption of foreign material—B. Usage of native material after a foreign model—Causes of the adoption of words—Stages in the process of adoption—Treatment of foreign phonetic material—Assimilation of words already adopted—Competition among languages in the contribution of loan-words—Pleonastic combination of a native with a

	PAGE
foreign suffix—Borrowing of derivative suffixes—Influence on the <i>inner linguistic form</i> of language—Mixture of dialects—Borrowing from an older period,	456

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE COMMON-LANGUAGE.

Intercourse between areas lying separate from each other—For a common- language to be created the necessity for it must be felt—A common- language must be based upon an existing dialect—Circumstances which must necessarily precede the formation of a common-language —Development necessary even in an artificial language,	475
INDEX,	503

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

- A.S. = Anglo-Saxon.
 Andr. *Völkset.* = Andresen, *über deutsche volksetymologie.* 4th edition. Heilbronn, 1883.
 Andr. *Spr.* = Andresen, *Sprachegebrauch und sprachrichtigkeit im deutschen.* 3d edition. Heilbronn, 1883.
 Delbrück SF. = Delbrück, *Syntaktische forschungen.*
 Diez. = Diez, *Grammatik der romanischen sprachen.* 4th edition.
 Draeg. or Draeger = Draeger, *Historische syntax der lateinischen sprache.* 2d edition.
 DWb. = *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jac. und Wilh. Grimm.*
 Goe. = Goethe.
 I.E. = Indo-European (the Indo-Germanic of the author).
 Le. = Lessing.
 Lu. = Luther.
 M.H.G. = Middle High German.
 Madvig, *AZ. schr.* = Madvig, *Kleine skriften.*
 Mätzner engl. = Mätzner, *Englische grammatik.* 2d edition.
 Mätzner franz. = Mätzner, *Syntax der neufranzösischen sprache.*
 Michaelis = Caroline Michaelis, *Romanische wortschöpfung.*
 Morph. Unt. = *Morphologische untersuchungen auf dem gebiete der indogermanischen sprachen von Osthoff und Brugmann.*
 N.H.G. = New High German.
 O.F. = Old French.
 O.H.G. = Old High German.
 O.N. = Old Norse.
 Schil. = Schiller.
 Sit. = Shakespeare.
 Steinthal, *Haupttyp.* = Steinthal, *Charakteristik der haupttypen des menschlichen sprachbaus.*
 (or *Typen.*)
 Wegener = Wegener, *Untersuchungen über die grundfragen des sprachlebens.* Halle, 1885.
 Ziemer = Ziemer, *Junggrammatische streifzüge im gebiete der syntax.* Colberg, 1882.
 Ziemer, *Comp.* = Ziemer, *Vergleichende syntax der indogermanischen comparison.* Berlin, 1884.
 Zschr. f. Völkerps. = *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, herausg. von Lazarus und Steinthal.

ERRATA.

- P. 382, line 2, *delete* there is a tendency.
P. 414, line 15, *for t̃ykorëis read t̃ykorëit.*

INTRODUCTION.

LANGUAGE, like every other production of human culture, falls under the cognisance of history; but the history of language like every other branch of the science of history has, running parallel with it, a *science, which occupies itself with the general conditions of the existence of the object historically developing, and investigates the nature and operations of the elements which throughout all change remain constant.* This science lacks as yet a title generally applicable and admittedly suitable. The name 'philosophy of language' implies something rather different. And in any case there seem to be good grounds for preferring to avoid this expression. Our unphilosophical age readily suspects under such a title metaphysical speculations of which the historical investigation of language needs to take no count. The truth is that the science of which we are thinking is philosophy in the same way as physics or physiology is philosophy, neither more nor less. Least of all are we justified in opposing the historical portion, as empirical, to this general portion of the science of language. The one portion is just as empirical as the other.

Necessity of a general doctrine of principles side by side with the history of language.

It is very seldom that a knowledge of the laws of any single simple experimental science suffices to enable us to understand the process of historical development: it is rather in the essence of all historical movement, especially where this is connected with any department of human culture, that very numerous

Its special function defined.

forces come simultaneously into play—forces which act and react on each other ; and it is the task of very different sciences to investigate their essence. It is thus natural that any such general science, standing as an exact correlative to any given historical science, is unable to present such an isolated entirety as the so-called exact sciences, like mathematics or psychology. It is truer to assert that it forms a conglomeration of different pure exact sciences, or, as a rule, of different segments of such sciences. It may be that we shall be disposed to suspect any such compound result which always bears the stamp of chance upon it, and hesitate to apply to it the name of science at all. But whatever we may think of it, the study of history undeniably demands, as an indispensable auxiliary, that such various elements should be dealt with as a whole ; if it can dispense with independent investigation, it cannot dispense with the appropriation of results attained by others. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the mere setting together of fragments of different sciences would result in the kind of science which we have in view. On the contrary, tasks are imposed upon it with which the exact sciences which it employs as auxiliaries do not concern themselves. The exact sciences no doubt compare the single processes, disregarding, however, their temporal relation to each other, and merely caring to discover where they agree and where they differ ; and by their aid to find what is unchanging and constant amid every change. The conception of development is absolutely strange to them—nay, it seems irreconcilable with their principles ; and they thus stand in sharp antithesis to the historical sciences. To bridge over this antithesis some method of treatment seems required which would deserve the name of historical philosophy more truly than what we commonly denominate as such. We will, however, abide by custom, and prefer

to avoid the word 'philosophy,' employing the phrase 'science of principles' instead. This science has to solve the difficult problem: How, under the assumption of constant forces and relations, is a historical development still possible, or a progress from the simplest and most primitive to the most complicated groups? Its method of procedure differs in still another important way from that of the exact sciences, as I have already hinted. The latter make it their object to follow nature, and to endeavour perpetually to isolate the operation of each single force from the general drift of forces, so as to take cognisance of each in its simple nature, and then by co-ordinating similar with similar to build up a system. The historical doctrine of principles, on the other hand, has to investigate exactly those points in which the single forces mutually interfere, and to inquire how even the forces most differing in nature, about whose reciprocal relations the exact sciences hardly concern themselves at all, are able to steer to a common goal by means of perpetual reciprocal operation. It is evident that in order to understand the interpenetration of the manifold factors we ought to have as clear views as possible about the single forces which are in operation, and of the nature of their operations. Analysis must precede synthesis. For as long as we reckon with unsolved complications we cannot be held to have arrived as yet at a scientific way of treating our material. It is thus clear that the science of principles, in the sense in which we employ the phrase, rests on the base of the experimental exact sciences, under which head I also reckon of course psychology; it contains, however, an important addition which entitles us to assign it an independent position by the side of the former.

This large science falls naturally into as many branches as there are branches of special history, the word 'history' being

used in its widest sense, and not confined to the development of the human race. It is presumable *a priori* that certain general conditions of fundamental importance will be found to constitute the necessary basis for every kind of historical development ; it is, however, more certain still that the development of each object must be in a special manner conditioned by its particular nature. Whoever undertakes to lay down the principles of any historical course of study must never lose sight of the other, especially the most closely allied branches of the science of history, so as thus to grasp the most general leading features, and not lose sight of them again. On the other hand, however, he must beware of losing himself in mere generalities, and thereby failing to notice the special application to the special case. He must beware, too, of transferring metaphorically the results attained in different departments, a process whereby the real circumstances which form the strict object of investigation are merely hidden.

The doctrine
of principles
the basis of
the doctrine
of method.

It is not until such sciences of principles are founded that the special investigation of history finds its true value. Not till then does historical research rise above the mere process of stringing together apparently accidental dates, and in the general applicability of its results approach the exact sciences, which would fain dispute the validity of its title. Now if the science of principles appears to be the highest goal to which all the endeavours of special sciences are directed, we must remember, on the other hand, that the former is the indispensable guide of the latter, without whose aid it cannot advance a step with certainty beyond what is simply laid down, and which never appears in any other way than, on the one hand, as fragmentary, on the other hand, in confused confiscations which have previously to be solved. *The effectual scrutiny of the conditions of historical growth, taken in conjunction with general logic, gives at the same time the basis for*

the doctrine of method which has to be followed in the verification of each single fact.

It cannot be maintained that, up to the present time, a spirit of equal earnestness and equal thoroughness has been displayed with respect to questions of principle in all the departments of historical research. This spirit has been displayed in a far greater degree with respect to the historical branches of natural science than to that of the history of culture. One main reason for this difference is that the difficulties that present themselves in the latter case are much more serious than in the former. It has, as a rule, to deal with far more complicated factors, and the confused thread of these as long as it remains unravelled renders an exact knowledge of the causal connexion an impossibility. We have further to remember that its most important basis, viz., experimental psychology, is a science of very recent date, and has only lately begun to be brought into any kind of relationship with history. On the other hand, however, in the same proportion as the difficulty has shown itself a greater one, the necessity has become less, or at any rate less sensible. The history of the human race has always regarded data as to facts proceeding in each case from cotemporary witnesses (though it may be arrived at through several intermediate links) as its proper source, and has only regarded as of secondary importance memorials, the products of human culture, which have approximately maintained the form given to them by the latter. In fact we even hear the expressions a 'historical' and a 'prehistorical' date employed, and the limit is fixed by the commencement of historical tradition. For the former, therefore, the picture of a historical development is already given, distorted as this picture may be; and it is easily intelligible that science may deem itself fully occupied with a critical process of correcting this picture, and even proceed deliberately to reject all

Application to the science of culture, or civilisation, of the treatment common in the natural sciences.

speculation which ventures beyond it. The question is very different with the prehistoric period of human culture, and even with the history of the development of nature, organic and inorganic, which reaches back to epochs infinitely more remote. In this case, too, hardly the least historical element is given as such. All attempts at a historical apprehension—with the exception of the scanty traditions handed down by older times—depend upon inferences alone. And there is absolutely no result to be attained without confronting the questions of principle, and fixing definitely the general conditions of historical growth. These questions of principle have therefore always stood in the very centre of research; they have ever been the rallying point in the conflict of opinions. At present the domain of organic nature is the scene of the fiercest struggle; and it must be acknowledged that it is here that the thoughts most fruitful for the understanding of all spiritual development, not excluding that of the human race, have first attained to a certain lucidity.

The tendency of science is at present apparently to extend this speculative method of regarding subjects to the history of culture as well, and we are persuaded that this tendency will assert itself more and more in spite of all opposition, active and passive, that may be brought to bear against it. We have already fully conceded that such a method is not so indispensable a need for the science of culture as it is for natural science, and that for the former we have no right to expect any such far-reaching results as for the latter. But this does not exempt us from the duty of testing exactly what results we can attain; and even the possibility of a negative result of this testing process does not prevent the exact definition of the limits of our knowledge attainable from possessing what may turn out under certain circumstances of considerable value. Besides, we have as yet no cause to despair

of actually attaining positive results, at least for certain departments of knowledge. In any case we should be wholly unjustified in thinking lightly of *the methodological gain* accruing from a distinct statement of the questions of principle. We merely deceive ourselves, if we seek to prove the most simple fact in history without some accretion of speculation. Indeed we do speculate, even unconsciously, and we have to set it down to a fortunate instinct if we hit the right mark. We may, very probably, maintain that hitherto even the methods of historical research in vogue have been found out rather by instinct than by any many-sided reflection penetrating the inmost essence of things. And the natural result of this is that a quantity of personal fancies obtrude themselves, giving rise to an endless strife of opinions and schools. There is only one way out of the difficulty: we must earnestly apply ourselves to carry these methods back to the first fundamental principles, and cast aside all which cannot be deduced from these. Now these principles, as far as they are not actually in the nature of logic, result precisely from the examination of the essence of historical development.

There is no branch of culture in which the conditions of its development permit of being apprehended with such exactness as that of the science of language, and it follows that there is no science of culture whose method can be brought to such a degree of perfection as that of the science of language. No other has as yet been able to transcend so far the limits of tradition; no other has proportionately proceeded at once speculatively and constructively. It is mainly owing to this peculiarity that it appears to be closely related to the historical natural sciences; and this has led to the misdirected attempt at excluding them from the circle of the sciences of culture. In spite of this position which the science of language has occupied from its very foundation, we

The science of language is the most capable among the historical sciences of perfect method.

seem far removed from the time when we can say that its method is worked out to the degree of perfection of which it is capable. Even now a tendency has set in which makes for a thorough subversion of that method. In the course of the arguments which have been brought forward on both sides, it has clearly come out how great is the confusion in the minds of many investigators of language, even as to the elements of which their science is composed. It is precisely these arguments which have immediately prompted this treatise. Its object is to contribute its best to infuse lucidity into these views, and to aim at attaining an understanding at least among those who bring to their task an unprejudiced sense for truth. It is to this end of main importance to set forth the conditions of the life of language, scrutinising them from as many sides as possible, and thus to draw the fundamental lines for a general theory of the development of language.

Continuation
of psychical
and physical
elements in
all culture.

We divide the historical sciences, taken in their widest sense, into the two main groups of *historical natural sciences* and *sciences of culture*. The characteristic mark of culture must be defined as the presence of the activity of psychical factors. This seems to me to be the single possible delimitation of its area as against the objects of natural science pure and simple. In the same way we must be prepared, doubtless, to recognise a certain culture in the animal world, and we must reckon the history of the development of the art-impulses and of social organisation among animals as belonging to the sciences of culture. Such a course can only be beneficial to the right appreciation of these facts.

The psychical element is the most essential factor in all movements of culture: everything turns on it: and it follows that psychology is the most important foundation of the whole science of culture taken in its highest sense. It does not, however, follow that the psychical

element is the only factor : no culture is possible on a purely psychical basis : and hence it seems, to say the least of it, very inaccurate to define the sciences of culture as mental sciences. The truth is that there is only one pure mental science, that is, Psychology regarded as an exact science. As soon as we enter the area of historical development we have to deal with *physical* side by side with psychical forces. The human mind must always work in harmony with the human body and with its environing nature in order to bring forth any product of culture ; and the secret of its growth, the way in which it comes to its completion, depends upon physical no less than on psychical conditions ; and both these sets of conditions must necessarily be known in order to gain a perfect appreciation of historical growth. A necessity is thus imposed of mastering not merely psychology, but also the laws according to which the physical factors of culture move. The natural sciences besides, and mathematics, are a necessary foundation for the sciences of culture. If we are not commonly conscious of this, the reason has to be sought in the fact that we generally speaking content ourselves with an unscientific observation of daily life, and hence it fares ill with what we commonly understand under the name of history. The psychical side has fared in much the same way, and notably up to the most recent times. But it is inconceivable that, without the aid of a number of experiences made as to the physical possibility or impossibility of a process occurring, any one should be in a position to understand any event of history or to practise any kind of historical criticism. It seems therefore to follow that *the main task for the doctrine of the principles of the Science of Culture is to expound the general conditions under which the psychical and physical factors, following their own special laws, succeed in co-operating for a common purpose.*

The task of the doctrine of principles presents itself in a some-

The science
of culture
is always
a social
science.

what different light from the following point of view. *The science of culture is always a social science.* Not till society is formed is culture possible; society gives the first impulse to make man a historical being. It is no doubt true that a human mind in a state of entire isolation has an historical development of its own, and this too with respect to the relation to its body and its environment; but even the most gifted human mind could only succeed in arriving at a very primitive degree of development; and this would be cut short by his death. It is not until what an individual has gained has been transferred to other individuals, and till several individuals co-operate to the same end, that a growth beyond these narrow limits is possible. Not merely the art of agriculture, but every kind of culture depends upon the principle of the division of labour and upon co-operation. The most special task imposed upon the doctrine of principles regarded as a social science—the task whereby it maintains its independence as against the exact sciences which lie at its base—seems to be that of showing how the single individual is related to the community; receiving and giving; defined by the community and defining it in turn; and how the younger generation enters on the heritage of the elder.

For the rest, the history of the development of organic nature approaches very closely the history of culture. Every higher organisation comes to perfection by the agency of a quantity of cells which co-operate according to the principle of division of labour, and are differentiated in their configuration according to this principle. But this principle is active even within the single cell, the most elementary organic formation; and it is owing to this that maintenance of the form is found possible amid the change of material. Each organism breaks up sooner or later; but each may leave behind it remnants detached from its own essence, in

which the formative principle, to which it owed its own formation, actively operates, and to which every step forward which it has succeeded in making in its own formation contributes ; always assuming that no disturbing influences coming from without interfere.

It might seem as if the doctrine of the principles of Social Science as set forth by us were identical with what Lazarus and Steinthal denominate 'Völkerpsychologie,' which they seek to represent in their journal. But the two are far from coinciding. From our remarks already made it is quite evident that our knowledge has to interest itself to a great extent in what does not belong to psychology at all. We are able to bring the effects which the individual experiences from society, and which he on his side, in conjunction with the rest, makes felt, into four main categories. In the first place, psychical groups, or collections of ideas are called into being in his mind to which he would never have attained at all, or at all events much less readily if others had not prepared the way for him. In the second place, he learns to carry out certain appropriate movements with the different parts of his body, which eventually serve to set in motion foreign bodies or tools: it holds true in the case of these also that without the example given him by others he would have been much slower in learning them, and perhaps never have mastered them at all. We thus find ourselves upon physiological but at the same time upon psychological ground. Movement in itself is physiological ; but the attainment of the necessary power to control it at will, which is the point here concerned, involves the co-operation of psychical factors. In the third place, natural objects worked by the aid of the human body, or merely transferred from the spot where they were produced with the view of serving some practical purpose and thus becoming tools or capital, are transferred from one individual to another, from an elder to a younger generation ; and

*Criticism of
Lazarus and
Steinthal's
Völker-
psychologie.*

there is a common participation of different individuals which takes place in the process of working or shifting these objects. In the fourth place, individuals exert a moral force on each other which may undoubtedly operate as much to the disadvantage as to the advantage of progress, but which is inseparable from the nature of culture.

Of these four categories the first is at all events the only one in which 'völkerpsychologie,' in the sense in which it is used by Lazarus and Steinthal, is interested. It is therefore conceivable that the part of our doctrine of principles, which has reference to this first category, might be supposed to fairly tally with this. But setting aside the fact that this category cannot be regarded merely as isolated from the rest, it remains true that what I have in my mind is very different from what Lazarus and Steinthal, in the introduction to their periodical (vol. i. p. 1, 73), lay down as the object of 'völkerpsychologie.'

Much as I appreciate the important services rendered by both these writers to psychology, and especially to the psychological method of treating history, still it appears to me that the definitions proposed in this introduction are untenable, in part misleading, and tending to conceal the real circumstances. The fundamental thought pervading the whole work is that popular psychology bears exactly the same relation to the single people, and to humanity as a whole, as that which we denominate by the simple name of psychology bears to the individual. Now precisely this thought seems to me to be based on a series of logical confusions; and I am compelled to see the reason of these confusions in the fact that the fundamental difference between an exact and a historical science has not been held fast,¹ but the two are continually invading each other's domain.

¹ It is no doubt true that this difference is hinted at on p. 25 *supra*., where a distinction

The conception of popular psychology itself fluctuates between two essentially different ways of viewing the subject. On the one hand, it is regarded as the doctrine of the general conditions of mental life in society ; on the other hand, it is regarded as the characteristic of the mental peculiarity of different nations, and as an inquiry into the reasons from which this peculiarity took its origin. On p. 25 *sqq.* these two views of science are presented as two portions of universal science, of which the first forms the synthetic foundation of the second. Now according to neither of these views does popular psychology stand in the assumed relation to individual psychology.

If we turn, in the first place, to the second view, there can be drawn between the 'synthetic or rational' and the 'descriptive' studies of natural science, and a corresponding division of popular psychology is attempted. But complete confusion reigns, e.g. on p. 15 *sqq.* From the fact that there exist only two forms of all being and growth, viz., nature and spirit, the authors conclude that there can be found only two classes of real sciences—one having for its object nature, and the other spirit. In this, therefore, no account is taken of the circumstance that it is possible for sciences to exist whose task it is to examine the reciprocal effects of nature and spirit. It seems even more questionable when they proceed . . . 'Accordingly we find opposed to each other natural history on the one hand, and the history of humanity on the other.' In this case, in the first place, 'history' must be taken in a sense very different from that which we commonly connect with the word, viz., as the science of events and processes. But how does the 'humanity' come to stand all at once in the place of 'spirit'? The contents of the two words are far from tallying. Further, it is laid down as a distinction between nature and spirit that nature moves in a perpetual round of her processes according to fixed laws, in which the different courses remain isolated and independent, in which it was always the past that was repeated, and nothing new could arise ; while spirit, it is said, lives in a series of interconnected creations, and displays progress. This distinction, thus abstractly stated, is unquestionably inadequate. Nature as well as spirit—organic nature at any rate—moves in a series of interconnected creations ; and in nature there is such a thing as progress. On the other side it is maintained by the authors that spirit moves in one regulated course, in a perpetual repetition of the same fundamental processes. Now here we have a confusion of two contrasts which must be kept completely apart : that between nature and spirit on the one hand, and between procedure according to fixed law and historical development, on the other. We can only ascribe it to this confusion that the authors have been able at all to call in question whether psychology is to be accounted a branch of the science of nature or of spirit, and that they finally decide on giving it a place between the two. This confusion is, to be sure, the traditional one ; but it is time that we broke away from it after the instances of progress made by psychology on the one hand, and the science of organic nature on the other.

surely be nothing but the characteristics of different individuals to answer to the characteristics of different nations. This, however, is not called psychology at all. Psychology has never anything to do with the concrete shaping of any individual human spirit, but with the general conditions of spiritual processes. What then justifies us in employing the name of this knowledge for the description of the concrete form assumed by the mental peculiarity of a people? What the authors are thinking of is nothing but a portion, and no doubt the most important portion, but one that admits of no isolation, of what has been elsewhere called the history of culture or 'philology,' placed however on a psychological basis, a demand which must necessarily be made at the present day for all researches based upon the history of culture. It is, however, no exact science like psychology, and no doctrine of principles, or, to employ the expression of the authors, no synthetical basis of the history of culture.

The incorrect parallels thus drawn have led to further consequences not easily admitted. 'Popular psychology,' say the authors, 'has to deal with the mind of the entire community, which is again different from all the different minds which belong to it, and which sways them all' (p. 5). Further, we read (p. 11): 'The facts which fall under the view of popular psychology exist partly in the popular mind, conceived as a unity, and in the relations between its several elements (as, for instance, religion and art, the state and morality, language and intelligence, etc.), and partly in the relations between the single minds which make up the people. Here, therefore, the same fundamental processes appear as in individual psychology, only in a more complicated and extensive way.' Surely this is to conceal the true nature of the processes involved by assuming a series of abstractions. All psychical processes come to their fulfilment in individual minds, and no-

where else. Neither the popular mind, nor elements of it, such as art, religion, etc., have any concrete existence, and therefore nothing can come to pass in them and between them. Away, then, with these abstractions! For 'away with all abstractions!' must be our last word if we wish to attempt in any place to define the factors of that which actually happens.¹ I will not very seriously reproach the authors with a fault often met with at every step of science, and which even the most careful and profound thinkers do not always avoid. Many an inquirer who feels himself at the high level of the nineteenth century smiles with lofty contempt at the strife of the nominalists and realists of the middle ages, and fails to understand how people can have been led to explain the abstractions of the human understanding as actually existing things. But the race of unconscious realists is far from extinct, even among the students of nature. And among our students of civilisation they flourish and thrive most markedly, and especially among the very class which piques itself on talking in Darwinian metaphors. But quite apart from this abuse, the epoch of scholasticism—indeed the epoch of mythology—is far from lying as far behind us as seems to be thought; our sense is too much entangled in the toils of both, because they control our language, which cannot break loose from them. The man who fails to employ the necessary effort of thought to liberate himself from the despotism of the mere word will never rise to an unprejudiced contemplation of things as they are. Psychology became a science at the moment when she ceased to acknowledge

¹ Misteli, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, xiii. 385, has, curiously enough, so misapprehended me as to suppose that I would hear of no abstractions at all being made. Of course I mean merely that no abstractions must be allowed to interpose an obstruction between the eye of the observer and the actual things, so as to prevent him from grasping the connexion of cause and effect among the latter. The instruction which he imparts to me on the value of abstracting is therefore just as superfluous as his critical remark thereupon, to the effect that I actually make more extensive abstractions than others.

the abstractions of mental powers as something really existing. Thus, perhaps, it will come into our power to gain important conquests in many domains, solely by setting resolutely aside abstractions bearing the stamp of realities, which obtrude themselves between the eye of the observer and the concrete phenomena, and disturb his vision.

I beg that these remarks may not be regarded as a mere digression.¹ They refer to what we ourselves have in the following pages to observe with regard to the development of language, and what, on the other hand, the exposition of Lazarus and Steinthal does not permit us to recognise as likely to be of any service. We pass naturally from this point to the criticism of the first appreciation of the conception of *folk-psychology*.

As we, of course, cannot here reckon with a general mind, and with elements of this general mind, it follows that in popular psychology we cannot possibly have any concern except with relations existing between single minds. But the assertion that in this the same fundamental processes display themselves as in individual psychology is, for the reciprocal operation of these single minds, only permissible if understood in a certain sense, and this would require a closer explanation than we can give. At any

The natural
influence of
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only possible
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influence.

¹ In spite of this express request, L. Tobler, in the *Lit. Blatt. für germ. und rom. Phil.* 1881, *sp.* 122, remarks upon my introduction: 'All these introductory definitions of conceptions are rather proper to a philosophical review, and exercise no influence upon the further course of the exposition.' And Misteli, *u.s.* p. 400, supports him, and thinks he might have added 'fortunately.' I must confess that it is disappointing to me that two savants who, in spite of their special knowledge, profess to take interest in general questions, have so completely failed to recognise the real point on which my whole work turns. The very essence of it, in my view, is to trace the development of language from the reciprocal effects which individuals produce on each other. Thus a criticism of the views of Lazarus and Steinthal, whose fault consists precisely in their inattention to this reciprocal influence, is closely bound up with the general tendency of my book. Misteli especially is of the view that my general theoretical positions needed no attention on the part of the philologist, and that the latter would find sufficient material in the traditional categories of grammar. He thus gives his approbation to the old dualism of philosophy and science, which it is our duty at the present day most strenuously to oppose.

rate it is not the case that the ideas pass beyond the limits of the single mind, and operate upon the ideas of other minds, as they operate upon each other within the limits of a single mind. And just as little can we speak of the entire groups of ideas in individual minds acting upon each other, as single ideas do in the mind of an individual. It is rather *an axiom of fundamental significance which we must never lose from sight, that all purely psychical reciprocal operation comes to its fulfilment in the individual mind alone. All intercourse of mind with mind is merely indirect, and is rendered possible merely by physics showing the way.* If we therefore apprehend psychology in Herbart's sense as the science of the relation borne by ideas to each other, there can exist only an individual psychology, to which no 'popular psychology,' or whatever else it may be called, can properly be opposed.

We find, however, in the exposition of individual psychology, a second special part added to this general one, which treats of the history of the development of the more complicated groups of ideas which, in the process of experience, we find in an essentially similar way in ourselves, and in the individuals whom we have to contemplate. No objection can be taken to this, so long as we only remain conscious of the fundamental contrast which prevails between the two parts. The second is no longer exact science, but history. It is easy to see that these more complicated groups owe the possibility of their formation to the fact that an individual lives in society with a number of other individuals. And in order to penetrate more deeply into the secret of their origin, we must endeavour to picture clearly to ourselves the different stages which they have successively passed through in individuals that have lived before. It is from this point that Lazarus and Steinthal have evidently arrived at the conception of popular psychology.

But just as we have no right to give the name 'psychology' to a historical representation which exhibits the actual course of this development, so we have none to apply that term to the science of principles, which sets forth the general conditions under which such a development is possible. What is psychical in this development comes to its fulfilment within the individual mind according to the general laws of individual psychology. But everything whereby the operation of one individual upon another is rendered possible, belongs to another domain than that of psychology.

In speaking of the different stages in the development of the psychical groups, I have employed the ordinary metaphorical method of expression. In accordance with our previous explanations, we cannot suppose that an image-formation, as it has taken shape in the individual mind, can actually be the real foundation whence the formations in other minds take their rise. The fact is rather that each mind must start from the beginning. We can place nothing already formed in it, but everything must be created anew in each mind; the primitive ideas by means of physiological excitations, the groups of intuitions by relations which the primitive ideas have assumed towards one another within the mind itself. In order to evoke in one mind a train of ideas corresponding to one which has taken its rise in another mind, the mind can do nothing but create by the action of the motor nerves a physical product, which on its side calls forth the corresponding ideas, correspondingly associated in the mind of the other individual by exciting his sensitive nerves. The most important of the physical products which serve this purpose are precisely the sounds of language. Besides these, there are the tones of other kinds, facial expressions, gestures, pictures, etc.

The means by which these physical products are qualified to

serve as a medium for transmitting ideas to another individual is either *an inner and direct reference* to the ideas in question (as for instance, a cry of pain, a gesture of passion), or *a connexion depending on an association of ideas*, in which process the idea standing in direct relation to the physical instrument forms the connecting link between this and the idea imparted; this is the case with language.

Now, the matter of ideas, which is the point in question, can never be created in the mind by this kind of communication. It must, on the contrary, be already existent in the mind, through the agency of physiological excitations. The effect of communication can be no other than this, that certain masses of ideas reposing in the mind are awakened thereby, and raised to the threshold of consciousness, by which process under certain circumstances new connexions between them are created or old ones cemented.

The matter of ideas then as such is incommunicable. All that we imagine that we know about the ideas of another individual depends exclusively upon conclusions drawn from our own. We assume in this statement that the mind of the other individual stands in the same relationship to the exterior world as our own, that the same physical impressions produce on it similar ideas to those in our own, and that these ideas connect themselves in a similar way. A certain degree of correspondence in mental and bodily organisation, in surrounding nature, and in the circumstances of life, is accordingly the condition precedent for the possibility of an understanding between different individuals. The greater the correspondence, the easier the understanding. Conversely, every divergence in this relation makes not merely possible but necessary, either a failure to understand, or an imperfect understanding.

The power of understanding is carried furthest by those

physical means which stand in direct relationship to the ideas communicated ; for it proceeds often from the general points of correspondence in human nature. On the other hand, where the relation is an indirect one, it is presupposed that in the different minds the same association is united, and this presupposes a correspondence in experience. Accordingly we must presuppose as an axiom, that all communication among mankind began with the former kind, and that it only passed over to the second when this was attained. At the same time, it must be insisted on that the resources of the former kind are definitely limited, while in the case of the second, a wide scope for action presents itself, seeing that when association is voluntary countless combinations are possible.

transformation of indirect into direct association.

If we now ask on what the fact depends that the individual, in spite of the fact that it is compelled to create for itself its own range of ideas, still receives by means of society a defined direction for its mental development, and a far wider extension than it could attain to in isolation, we must fix as the essential point on *the conversion of indirect into direct associations*. This conversion fulfils itself within the individual mind ; but the result attained is transferred to other minds, of course owing to physical mechanism in the way described. The gain then consists in this, that in these other minds the groups of ideas do not require to make the same *détour* in order to come together, as in the case of the first mind. This is, therefore, especially a gain in cases where the connexions, which serve as the immediate links, are of minor importance compared with the connexion finally resulting. It is owing to this economy of labour and time to which one individual has assisted another, that the latter is in his turn in a position to employ the result of this economy to set up a further connexion, for which the first individual had no time at his disposal.

With the transference of a connexion converted from an indirect one into a direct, it does not follow that the movement of ideas which has originally conducted to the origin of this connexion is transferred as well. If, for instance, the Pythagorean maxim is transmitted to any one, he does not learn from this transmission the way in which it was originally discovered. He may then simply come to a standstill at the direct connexion imparted to him, or he may, by means of his own creative combination, arrive at the maxim by the agency of other mathematical maxims already known to him, in which process he has a much easier task than the original discoverer. If, however, as is here the case, various means of arriving at the result are possible, it does not necessarily follow that he must light upon the same as the original discoverer.

It appears, therefore, that in the course of this important process, seeing that the starting and final points of a series of ideas are transmitted in direct connexion, the connecting links which originally aided in setting up this connexion must, to a large extent, be entirely lost for the following generation. This is in many cases a healthy riddance of useless ballast, whereby the space necessary for a higher development is secured. But the difficulty of arriving at a knowledge of the genesis of the ideas is, of course, very much increased.

After these remarks, which hold good for the entire development of culture (the special application of which to the history of language has to engage our attention at a later time), we will now endeavour to bring out the most important peculiarities whereby the science of language differs from the other sciences of culture. As we take close cognisance of the factors with which it has to reckon we shall at once be in a position to justify our assertion that the science of language, of all historical sciences, is able to give us the surest and most exact results.

Peculiar
character-
istics of the
science of
language.

Every science depending on experience attains greater accuracy in proportion as it succeeds *in observing*, in the phenomena with which it has to deal, *the operation of the single factors when isolated*. It is precisely in this that the difference between the scientific and the popular method of looking at things lies. Isolation is, of course, more difficult to effect, the more intricate the complications are in which the phenomena, as such, are presented. In this respect we are singularly favoured in respect of language. This certainly does not hold true if we compare, in our view, the whole material contents deposited in language. For we, no doubt, find there that all which has in any way touched the human mind, the organisation of the body, its environing nature, the entire range of culture, all the experiences and circumstances of life, have left behind effects on language, and that language, therefore, when looked at from this point of view, is dependent upon the most manifold factors, indeed on every kind of factor imaginable. But the peculiar task of the science of language is not to observe these material contents. It can only offer its contribution to this end in conjunction with all the other sciences of culture. Its task, strictly speaking, is to observe the relations which this subject-matter of *idea* assumes towards definite groups of sound. Thus we find that of the four categories of social influence given above (p. xxxi.), only the two first come into consideration. We need also, as of main importance, only two exact sciences as the basis of the science of language, viz., psychology and physiology, and of the latter certain portions only. What we commonly understand by the physiology of sound or phonetics certainly does not comprise all the physiological processes which belong to linguistic affinity, **not**, for instance, the excitement of the motor nerves whereby the organs of language are set in motion. Further, acoustics considered as a branch of physics, as of physiology, will come under

its purview. Acoustic processes, however, are not directly influenced by physical processes: they are so influenced only indirectly by the processes connected with the physiology of sound. They are defined by these to this extent: that after the impulse once given, their course, generally speaking, receives no further impulses to deviation, at all events none such as are of importance for the essence of language. Under these circumstances any deeper research into these processes is, at any rate, not so indispensable as the knowledge of the movements of the organs of language. I do not mean to assert by this that there may not be many conclusions to be drawn from acoustics as well.

The relative simplicity of linguistic processes comes out plainly if we compare with them, say, those of economic science. In this case we have to deal with the reciprocal operation of the entirety of physical and psychical factors with which mankind enters into any relation whatever. The most earnest endeavours will never succeed in expounding with absolute accuracy the part played by each single one of these factors in the process.

Another point of great importance is the following. Every linguistic creation is always the work of one single individual only. Several no doubt may create similar products, but neither the act of creation nor the product is affected by that. It never happens that several individuals create anything by working together with united forces and divided functions. This is quite different from what we see in economic or political sciences. In the development of economics and politics it grows ever more difficult to observe closely the different relations, the more that the union of forces and the distribution of duties proceeds; and thus the very simplest relations in these departments are at once less evident than the linguistic ones. No doubt, so far as a linguistic creation is transferred to another individual and transformed by him, and

as this process goes on repeating itself ever anew, a division of labour and a union of labour is apparent here ; and indeed without such, as we have seen, no culture is conceivable. And where in our transmission a number of intermediate stages are wanting, there the student of language is also compelled to resolve perplexed complications arising from the co-operation no less than from the successive labours of different individuals.

It is further of great importance, from this point of view also, to remark that linguistic formations are created without pre-conceived intention, at all events without any intention of establishing anything lasting, and without any consciousness on the part of an individual of his creative activity. In this respect, the formation of language is distinguished especially from all artistic production. The involuntary character which we here attribute to linguistic creations is certainly not so generally recognised, and still needs proving in detail. We must, however, while considering this characteristic, draw a distinction between the natural development of language and the artificial which comes to be formed by means of a conscious directing interference. Such voluntary efforts are almost exclusively connected with the foundation of a general language on an area split up into dialects. In what follows, we must in the first instance put such efforts entirely out of consideration, in order to acquaint ourselves with the simple course of natural development, and then and not till then we must deal with their operative power under a special head. This course of procedure is not merely legitimate but necessary. We should otherwise be acting like a zoologist or botanist who, in his endeavours to explain the origin of the animal and vegetable world of the present day, should in every case proceed on the assumption of artificial breeding and improvement. This comparison is indeed in the highest degree appropriate.

Just as the cattle-breeder or the gardener can never create anything absolutely at his own will from nothing ; as these are confined in all their experiments to an alteration of natural growth possible only within certain definite limits ; just so does an artificial language rise only on the foundation of a natural one. Just as no artificial grafting or breeding can neutralise the operation of the factors which determine the natural development, so no voluntary regulation can produce similar effects in the department of language. These factors, interfere as we may, work constantly and consistently, and everything which is formed artificially and adopted into language gives way to the play of their forces.

It would now be natural to show how far the involuntary nature of linguistic processes facilitates our examination of their nature. The first conclusion again to be drawn is, that these must be relatively simple. In the case of each change, a short step only can be taken. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, seeing that each change is secured without any previous calculation, and commonly speaking without any suspicion on the part of the speaker that he is producing something not produced before? No doubt we are next called upon to trace the evidence whereby these processes make themselves felt as closely as possible, step by step. It follows, however, also from the simplicity of linguistic processes that there is no room for individual peculiarities to make themselves prominent therein. The most simple psychical processes are similar in the case of all individuals, their peculiarities depend only upon varieties in the combinations of these simple processes. *The great resemblance of all linguistic processes in the most different individuals is the most essential foundation for an exact scientific knowledge of these processes.*

It is thus then that the process of learning language falls into an early period of development, in which, generally speaking, in

all the psychical processes there is very little voluntary effort and consciousness, and very little individuality displays itself. And the case is much the same with the period in the development of the human race which originally created language.

Were not language so completely reared on the basis of the common properties of human nature, it would not be the fitting instrument for general communication that it is. Conversely, the fact that it is so entails the necessary consequence that it rejects everything of a purely individual character which seeks in any way to force itself upon it, and that it accepts and retains nothing but what is sanctioned by the agreement of a number of individuals in connexion with each other.

Our position that the involuntary nature of the processes favours the attainment of an exact scientific knowledge is easily confirmed from the history of the other branches of culture. The development of social relations, of law, of religion, of poetry, and generally speaking of the other arts, exhibits the greater uniformity, and makes a stronger impression of natural necessity, in proportion as the stage of development concerned is the more primitive. While in these departments voluntary design and individualism have become increasingly conspicuous, language in this respect has remained far nearer to the original state of things. And this circumstance is one more proof that language is the original basis of all higher mental development in the individual as in the entire race.

I have briefly to justify my choice of the title '*Principles of the history of Language.*' It has been objected that there is another view of language possible besides the historical.¹ I must contradict this. What is explained as an unhistorical and still scientific observation of language is at bottom nothing but one

¹ Cf. Misteli, *N.S.*, p. 382 s/99.

incompletely historical, through defects partly of the observer, partly of the material to be observed. As soon as ever we pass beyond the mere proof of single facts and attempt to grasp the connexion as a whole, and to comprehend the phenomena, we come upon historical ground too, though it may be we are not aware of the fact. No doubt a scientific treatment of language is possible, not only in cases where different stages of development of the same language are before us, but also where the materials at our disposal occur side by side. The most favourable case for our purpose is, when several related languages or dialects are known to us. In that case it is the task of science not merely to determine what reciprocally corresponds in the different languages or dialects, but as far as possible to reconstruct the fundamental forms and meanings which have not come down to us from those which have. But in this process comparative immediately passes into historical observation. But also in cases where only one definite stage of development of a single dialect is before us, scientific observation is a possibility up to a certain point. How? it may be asked. If we compare, for example, the different significations of a word with each other, we attempt to establish which of these is the fundamental one, or to what fundamental signification, now obsolete, they point. If, however, we define a fundamental signification from which the others are derived, we lay down a historical fact. Or we compare the related forms together, and deduce them from a common fundamental form. In this case again, we lay down a historical fact. Indeed, we cannot even assert that related forms are derived from a common basis without becoming historical. Or we lay down a phonetic sound-shifting (*lautwechsel*) between related forms and words. If we would explain these we are necessarily drawn to the conclusion that such change is the after effect of a phonetic change (*lautwandel*), in

other words, of a historical process. If we attempt to characterise the so-called inner form of language in the sense in which it is employed by Humboldt and Steinthal, we can only do this by going back to the origin of the forms of expression employed, and to their fundamental meaning. And so I cannot conceive how any one can reflect with any advantage on a language without tracing to some extent the way in which it became historical.] The only element which might still claim exemption from historical observation would be general reflexions upon the individual employment of language, and about the relation of the single to the general usage of language. However, the following pages will prove that precisely these reflexions are to be closely connected with the observation of historical development.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE.

IT is of main importance for the historian that he should clearly and precisely appreciate the extent and nature of the subject ^{Subject of the Science of Language.} he has undertaken to investigate. This remark seems a truism, and yet the Science of Language is only now beginning to realise its truth, and to remedy the neglect of many past years.

2. Historical Grammar took its rise from the older Descriptive Grammar, and retains even now much from its predecessor. It has maintained, in the arrangement of its grouping at least, absolutely the old form. It has merely laid down a series of descriptive grammars parallel to each other. In fact comparison, and not explanation of development, is regarded as in the first instance the proper characteristic of the new Science. Indeed Comparative Grammar, concerning itself as it does with the reciprocal relations of cognate families of speech whose common source is lost for us, is actually opposed formally to Historical Grammar, which traces from the starting-point given by tradition all further development. And even now many philologists and scholars hardly think that both of these are merely a single science, with the same task and the same method, only that the relation between the given material and the combining intelligence takes different forms. But the same kind of comparison has been applied

in the department of Historical Grammar in the narrower sense ; descriptive grammars of different periods have been tacked together. Practical utility has dictated this method of procedure, which is necessary for systematic exposition ; and this utility will always, to a certain point, assert its claims. But it cannot be denied that the entire conception of the development of language is directly influenced by this method of exposition.

3. Descriptive Grammar has to register the grammatical forms and grammatical conditions in use at a given date within a certain community speaking a common language ; to take note, in fact, of all that can be used by any individual without his being misunderstood and without his utterances striking him as foreign. Its contents consist not in facts, but merely in abstractions from observed facts. If we make such abstractions at different times within the same linguistic community, we shall find the results different. It is through comparison that we obtain the certainty that revolutions in the language have occurred ; we discover too, perhaps, a certain regularity in the reciprocal relations of such revolutions ; but this method sheds absolutely no light on the true nature of these. The connexion of cause and effect is hidden as long as we calculate by means of these abstractions only, as if one had actually taken its rise from the other. For there is no such thing as a connexion of cause between abstractions ; cause and effect exist only between real objects and facts. As long as we are content with descriptive grammar in the case of abstractions, we are far indeed removed from a scientific apprehension of the life of language.

4. The true object of philological study is rather the entire sum of the products of the linguistic activity of the entire sum of individuals in their reciprocal relations. All the groups of sound ever spoken, heard, or represented, with the associated ideas, whose

symbols they were ; all the numerous relations entered into by the elements of speech in the minds of individuals—all these belong to the history of language, and must, properly speaking, all be thoroughly apprehended to render a full apprehension of its development a possibility. It need hardly be said that to solve such a problem is an impossibility. It is good to state the ideal aim of a science in all its bareness of outline. By so doing we become aware of the gulf between our powers and our possibilities. We learn that we must in many questions content ourselves with an avowal of ignorance ; and that super-acuteness, which imagines that it can explain the most complicated historical developments by a few ingenious *aperçus*, is humbled. But it is for us an inevitable necessity to get a general idea of the play of the forces at work in this huge complex—forces which we must always keep before our eyes, if we would endeavour to arrange correctly the few scanty fragments which we can really claim to possess out of it.

5. A part—and a part only—of these operating forces is visible to us. Speaking and hearing are not the only processes bound up with the history of language. Nor, again, does this history stop at the ideas awakened by language and the language-pictures which pass through consciousness in unspoken thought. No ; probably the greatest progress made by modern psychology consists in the recognition of the fact that numerous psychical processes fulfil themselves unconsciously, and that everything which has ever been in consciousness remains as an efficacious factor in unconsciousness. The recognition of this fact is of the greatest importance for the Science of Language as well, and has been used by Steinthal on a large scale for the purpose of that science. All the utterances of linguistic activity flow from this dark chamber of the unconscious in the mind. All the linguistic material at

Organisms
Idea-Groups
the basis of
all Linguistic
Action.

the disposal of any individual is there to be found ; in fact, we might say, even more than he can dispose of under ordinary circumstances. It is to be found as a highly-complicated psychical formation, consisting of many groups of ideas, confused and interpenetrating with each other. It is no business of ours here to examine the general laws under which these groups are found. We may refer our readers for this to Steinthal's *Introduction to Psychology and the Science of Language*. We are merely concerned to set forth their contents and their activity.

6. These groups are the product of all that has entered into our consciousness whether through listening to the utterances of another, through our own speaking, or through thought clothed in the forms of language. Through these groups what has once been in consciousness can again, under favourable circumstances, be recalled to consciousness, and also what has been once understood or uttered can again be either understood or uttered. We must, according to the general rule already laid down, accept as truth that no idea which has once been introduced by linguistic activity into consciousness disappears and leaves no traces, though these traces may often be so weak, that certain special circumstances, which maybe never occur at all, are needed to impart to this idea the conscious faculty of acceptance. Ideas are introduced in groups into consciousness, and hence as groups remain in unconsciousness. Ideas awakened by sequences of sound associate themselves into a series ; and ideas called up by movements of the organs of language associate themselves into a sequence. Series of sounds associate themselves with series of movements of the organs of speech. The ideas for which they serve as symbols associate themselves with both alike ; not merely the ideas of meanings of words, but likewise those of syntactical relations.

7. And not merely do single words, but larger sequences of sound—nay, entire sentences, associate themselves immediately with the constituent parts of the thought which they clothe. These groups, furnished at least originally by the exterior world, now proceed to organise themselves in the mind of each individual into far fuller and more complicated combinations, which come to their fulfilment for the most part unconsciously, and then proceed to operate unconsciously—which in by far the greater number of cases never arrive at clear consciousness, and which still effectually operate. Thus it is that the different uses, in which we have come to be acquainted with a word or a phrase, associate themselves with each other. Thus, too, the different cases of the same noun, the different tenses, moods, and persons of the same verbs, the different derivatives from the same root, associate themselves, thanks to the relationship between their sounds and their meaning; further, all words of similar functions—*e.g.* all substantives, all adjectives, all verbs; further, derivatives formed from different roots with the same suffixes; further, forms of different words with similar functions—*e.g.* all plurals, all genitives, all passives, all perfects, all conjunctives, all first persons; further, words similarly inflected—*e.g.* in NIG. all weak words as contrasted with all strong words, all masculines which form their plural by means of umlaut as contrasted with those that form it otherwise, also words only partially inflected, may group themselves in contrast to such as depart more violently from the regular use; and further, clauses alike in form or in function similarly associate themselves. And thus there are besides these a quantity of associations connected by manifold links—associations of greater or less importance for the life of language. These associations may one and all rise and operate without consciousness, and they must by no means be confounded with grammatical categories, which are the result of conscious

abstraction, though they not unfrequently cover the same ground.

8. It is not less significant than natural that this organism of groups of ideas is in a state of perpetual change in each individual. In the first place, each impetus which receives no accession of strength by repetition of its impact, or by a fresh introduction into consciousness, loses force, and this perpetually. In the next place, every activity of language, hearing, or thought adds something new. Even in the process of the exact repetition of an earlier activity certain impulses at least—of the organism already existing—are strengthened. And however rich be the record of an individual's past activity, still the occasion for something new to arise is perpetually occurring, at least in the form of new variations of old elements (irrespective of the fact that something hitherto unusual may make its appearance in language). In the third place, the relations of association within the organism are constantly displaced, by the weakening as by the strengthening of the old elements, and finally by the addition of new ones. Thus, if the organism of the adult, when contrasted with the stage of development of earliest boyhood, exhibits a comparative degree of stability, it still remains exposed to many oscillations.

9. Another point equally natural and equally important is the following: The organism of the group of ideas which depend on language takes a peculiar development in the case of each individual, and thus in each takes a peculiar form; should such organism be compounded of different elements drawn from similar sources, still these elements will be introduced to the mind in different sequence, differently grouped, with different intensity, in some cases more, in others less frequently; and the reciprocal relation of their force, and thus the manner of their grouping, will result differently, and this even though we take no account of the

difference in the capacities common to all, and those peculiar to the individual.

10. The mere consideration of the boundless variability, and of the peculiar conformation of each single organism, is sufficient to make us realise the necessity of a boundless variability of language as a whole, and of a growth of dialectic varieties not less vast.

11. The psychical organisms here described are the true *media* of historical development. What has been actually spoken has no development. It is misleading to say that one word has arisen from another word spoken at some previous time. The word—as a product of our physical organs—disappears, and leaves no trace when once the organs it has set in motion have returned to their state of repose. And in the same way the physical impression on the hearer passes away. If I repeat the same movement of the organs of speech which I have once made, a third, a fourth, or a fifth time, there is no physical connexion of cause between these four similar movements; but they are connected by the psychical organism, and by this alone. In this alone remains the trace of the past, whereby further procedure of the kind can be caused: in this alone lie the conditions of historical development.

(Organisms
Idea-Group
the true
Media of
Historical
Develop-
ment.

12. The physical element of language has exclusively the function of communicating the effects of the single psychical organisms to each other; but it is for this purpose indispensable, because, as has already been insisted on in the Introduction, there is no such thing as a direct influence of mind upon mind. In itself but a transitory phenomenon, it still, by its co-operation with the psychical organisms, enables these to leave effects even after it is past and gone. As its effect ceases with the death of the individual, the development of a language would naturally be

confined to the duration of a single generation, were it not that new individuals gradually supervene in whom new organisms of language are produced under the influence of those already in existence. The vehicles of the historical development of a language always disappear, and are replaced by new ones after a comparatively brief space of time. This is a simple truth, but not the less important, and not the less often overlooked.

Requirements
for the
Description
of States of
Language.

13. Let us now consider—the nature of the object being what it is—the task of the historian. He cannot avoid describing *states* of language, seeing that he is concerned with large complications of elements which lie simultaneously near each other. If, however, this description is ever to become a really useful basis for historical contemplation, it must attach itself to the real objects—*i.e.* the psychical organisms just described. It must give as true a picture of these as possible; it must not merely give an exhaustive list of the elements of which they are composed, but must also realise their relation to each other, their relative strength, the numerous connexions they have formed with each other, the degree of the closeness and durability of such connexions; it must, to express ourselves in more popular fashion, show us how the instinct of language is setting. To describe the condition of a language adequately, it would be, strictly speaking, necessary to observe with full accuracy every individual belonging to one community of speech, to note the character of such groups of his ideas as depend upon language, and to compare with each other the results gained in each individual case. As a matter of fact, we have to content ourselves with something far less perfect than this—something falling short of our ideal more or less—always, however, considerably.

14. We are often confined to the observation of some few individuals—sometimes even to that of a single one; and we are able

only partially to become acquainted with the organism of language of these few or of this single one. By comparing individual organisms of language, we obtain a certain average, by which the strictly normal part of language—namely, its usage—is defined. This average is, of course, more infallible the more individuals studied, and the more fully each can be observed. The less perfect the observation, the more doubts remain as to what is to be set down to individual peculiarity and what is common to all or most. In any case, usage—to the exposition of which the efforts of the grammarian are almost exclusively directed—governs the language of the individual to a certain degree only; but side by side with this there is always much which is not so defined—nay, which actually is in direct opposition to usage.

15. Even in the most favourable cases, the observation of an organism of language is beset with the greatest difficulties. In no case can it be observed directly. It is an unconscious something reposing in the mind. It is cognisable by its effects only—the single acts of linguistic activity. A picture of the groups of ideas lying in unconsciousness can only be obtained by the aid of many inferences.

16. Of the physical phenomena of linguistic activity, the acoustic are the most readily accessible to observation. Still, no doubt the results of our aural apprehension are for the most part hard to gauge and to define, and it is even harder to give an idea of them except again by means of direct communication to the ear. The movements of the organs of speech are less immediately accessible to observation, but are capable of a more exact definition and description. No proof is needed at the present day that no exact representation of the sounds of a language exists except that which teaches us what movements of the organs are necessary to produce

them. The ideal of such a manner of representation can only approximately be obtained when we are able to make observations on living individuals. When we unfortunately cannot do this, we must always keep this ideal before our eyes, and endeavour to realise it as nearly as we can by restoring the living sound to the best of our powers from the substitute of writing. This endeavour, however, can only result successfully for one who is in some degree versed in phonology, and has already made observations on living languages which he can transfer to dead languages ; and also, further, has conceived a correct idea of the relation between writing and language. Thus here already we have a wide field open for power of combination ; here already familiarity with the conditions of the life of the object is an indispensable demand.

17. The psychical side of linguistic activity is, like everything psychical, to be directly learnt by self-observation only. All observation of other individuals supplies us in the first instance with physical facts only. We can only succeed by the aid of analogical inferences in referring these to psychical facts on the basis of observations made on our own mind. Thus, self-observation ever applied anew, and scrupulous analysis of our individual instinct of language, are indispensable for the training of the philologist. Then analogical inferences are naturally most easy in the case of objects which approach most nearly to the actual *ego*. Thus the true nature of linguistic activity is more readily apprehended in the case of the mother-tongue than in any other. Further, we are naturally in a better position when we can employ observations on the living individual than when we are referred to the casual remains of the past. Only in the case of the living individual can we obtain results free from every suspicion of adulteration ; only in this case can we at

pleasure verify our observations and make methodical experiments.

18. Thus, to describe a linguistic condition, which may give a thoroughly trustworthy basis for historical investigation,¹ is no easy task, and may, under certain circumstances, be a very difficult one. To fulfil this task adequately, we must have clear views as to the conditions of the life of language, and this is the more necessary in proportion as the material at our disposal is less full and less trustworthy, and as the resemblance there is between the language to be described and the mother-tongue of the describer is less. We cannot, therefore, be surprised if the ordinary grammars fall far short of our claims. Our traditional grammatical categories are most unsatisfactory as a means for enabling us to realise the way in which the elements of language are grouped. Our grammatical system is far from being finely enough differentiated to meet the requirements of the psychological groups. We shall again have frequent occasion to show in detail the inadequacy of this. It tempts us, besides, to transfer, when the circumstances are not applicable, what is abstracted from one language to another. Even if we confine ourselves to the circle of the Indo-European languages, the employment of the same grammatical watchword causes numerous discrepancies. The picture of a particular condition of language is often blurred when the beholder happens to be acquainted with a language nearly related to the object of his consideration, or with an older or more recent stage of its development. The greatest care is, in this case, necessary to prevent the intrusion of any foreign material. Historical Philology has fallen markedly short in this very par-

¹ What we have claimed as indispensable for Scientific Grammar is no less indispensable for Practical Grammar, subject always to the necessary restrictions imposed by the capacity of the learner; for the aim of practical grammar is nothing but to familiarise the learner with the instinct of a foreign language.

ticular ; it has transferred wholesale its philological abstractions, drawn from researches into an older stage of language, into a more recent one. Thus, for instance, the signification of a word is made to depend upon its etymology even though all consciousness of this etymology has long since vanished, and an independent development of the signification has set in. Thus, in the doctrine of inflexions, the grammatical divisions applicable to the most primitive period have been maintained through all later times ; a proceeding thanks to which the after effects of the original conditions are doubtless brought out, but not the new psychical organisation of the groups.

19. When descriptions of different epochs in the life of a language are drawn up conformably to our requirements, a condition is fulfilled which renders it possible, from the comparison of the various descriptions, to form an idea of the processes which have taken place in the past. This will naturally enough be the more successful the nearer the circumstances which enter into comparison. But even the slightest variation in usage is commonly found to be the result of the co-operation of a series of single processes which, in great part, or indeed entirely, escape our observation.

20. Suppose that we now endeavour to answer the question, What is the real cause of the change of usage in language? Changes produced by the conscious intention of single individuals are not absolutely excluded [*cf.* the history of the words *gas*, etc.]. Grammarians have endeavoured to reduce written languages to regularity. The terminology of sciences, arts, and trades is settled and enriched by teachers, investigators, and discoverers. Under a despotism, it may happen that the caprice of the monarch has in a single point prevailed. But it has not in most cases aimed at an absolutely new creation, but only at the settlement

of some point on which usage had not yet decided ; and the significance of such capricious decisions is as nothing compared with the slow, involuntary and unconscious changes to which the usage of language is perpetually exposed. The real reason for the variability of usage is to be sought only in the normal linguistic activity. From this all voluntary influence on usage is excluded. No other purpose operates in this, save that which is directed to the immediate need of the moment—the intention of rendering one's wishes and thoughts intelligible to others. For the rest, purpose plays in the development of language no other part than that assigned to it by Darwin in the development of organic nature,—the greater or lesser fitness of the forms which arise is decisive for its survival or disappearance.

21. If usage is displaced by linguistic activity without any one's voluntary interference, this, of course, depends on the fact that usage does not perfectly dominate linguistic activity, but always leaves a certain measure of individual freedom. The part played by this individual freedom reacts on the psychical organism of the speaker, though it acts as well on the organism of the hearer. The result of the sum of a series of such displacements in the single organisms, assuming that these displacements tend in one direction, is a displacement of usage. A new usage forms from what was in its origin individual only, and this, in certain cases, succeeds in expelling the other. Side by side with this we find a quantity of similar displacements in the single organisms which have no such thorough-going success, simply because they do not mutually support each other.

22. The result of this is that all the doctrine of the principles of the history of language centres round the question, What is the relation between linguistic usage and individual linguistic activity?

How is the latter defined by the former, and how does this conversely react on it?¹

Language
develops by
continuity.

23. It must, then, be our object to bring under the head of common categories the different changes of usage which occur in the development of language, and to examine each single category according to its growth and the different stages of its development. To arrive at this goal we must confine ourselves to the cases in which these stages of development display themselves to us with the greatest possible fulness and precision. It thus happens that, generally speaking, modern periods of language afford us the most useful materials. But even the smallest variation in usage is already a complicated process, which we do not comprehend without taking count of individual modifications of usage. Where ordinary grammar makes it its business to divide or to draw lines of demarcation, we must exert ourselves to detect every possible intermediate step and connecting process.

24. A graduated development is possible in every department of the life of language. This gentle graduation manifests itself on one side in the modifications undergone by individual languages; on the other, in the relations borne by individual languages to each other. The object of this work is to manifest this in detail. It is well to point out at once in this place, that the single individual may possibly have, with reference to the linguistic material of the linguistic community of which he is a member, a relation partly

¹ It is hence clear that philology and linguistic science must not define their several territories in such a way that the one might properly concern itself with merely the finished results of the other. The only tenable distinction between linguistic science and philological handling of language would be this, that the former deals with the general and permanent facts of speech, the latter with their individual application. Yet the work of an author cannot be properly estimated without a just view of the relation of his productions to the whole complex of his linguistic perceptions, and of the relation of this complex to general usage. And conversely, the modification of usage cannot be understood without a study of individual speech. For the rest I refer to Brugmann, *Zum künftigen Stand der Sprachwissenschaft*, p. 1 sq.

active, partly only: passive—*i.e.* he does not himself employ all that he hears and understands. Besides, we must notice that, of the linguistic material employed by many individuals conjointly, one prefers one part, another prefers another. It is on this that the variation mainly depends, even between the individual languages which stand nearest to each other, and the possibility of a gradual displacement of usage.

25. The changes in language fulfil themselves in the individual, partly through his spontaneous activity, by means of speaking and thinking in the forms of language, and partly through the influence which each individual receives from others. A change in linguistic usage can hardly be brought about without the co-operation of both. The individual always remains exposed to lasting influences from others, even when he has thoroughly absorbed what is the common usage of language. But the main period for the exercise of such influence is the time of the first acquisition—of the learning of language. This is in principle not to be separated from any other kind of influence; and it, generally speaking, follows in the same way; and it cannot be said that there is in the life of any individual a particular point after which we could reasonably maintain that the power of acquiring language is excluded. But the difference in different stages is, after all, very great. It is quite clear that the processes in the course of learning language are of the highest importance for the explanation of the variations in the usages of language—that they afford the weightiest reason for these variations. If we compare two epochs divided by a long space of time from each other, and say that the language has changed in such and such points, we are not describing the true state of matters: the case stands rather thus—the language has undergone a new creation; and the new creation is not quite identical with the former, which has now perished and disappeared.

Classification
of the
Changes.

26. In the classification of the changes in the usage of language we may proceed from various points of view. There is one important difference of general application which should be noted. The processes may be either positive or negative—*i.e.* they consist either in the creation of what is new, or in the disappearance of what is old; or, in the third place, they consist in a replacement—*i.e.* the disappearance of the old and the appearance of the new are due to the same act. The last is exclusively the case in sound-change. The semblance of this displacement shows itself in other departments as well. The semblance is occasioned by the fact that the intermediate stages are disregarded, an appreciation of which would show that in truth we have to deal with a succession of positive and negative processes. The negative processes always rest on the fact that there is some creation not new in the language of the younger generation which was in existence in the language of previous ones; thus, to speak accurately, it is not with negative processes, but with the non-occurrence of processes that we have to deal. But this non-occurrence must be conditioned by the fact that what later disappears altogether has already become a rarity in the case of the older generation: a generation, which has a merely passive relation to it, intervenes between one with an active relation and one with none at all.

27. On the other hand, the changes in usage might be classified with respect to whether sounds or the signification were affected. Thus we meet at once with processes affecting the sounds without the signification coming into consideration at all; and we meet with processes affecting the signification without the sounds being similarly affected—*i.e.* we thus obtain the two categories of sound-change, and of change in signification. Every change in meaning presupposes that the group of ideas which has reference to the

distribution of sounds is felt as the same ; and in the same way every change of sound presupposes that the signification has remained unchanged. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of change occurring in the sound as well as in the meaning. But the two processes do not stand in any relation of cause and effect with each other ; the one is in no way caused by the other, nor are both the result of the same cause. In the case of other changes the distribution of sounds and signification together comes into consideration. Under this head we may at once class the very primitive combination of sound and meaning, which we may designate as 'original creation.' It is, of course, with this that the development of language began, and no other processes are possible excepting on the basis of what this original creation has produced. Under the same head, however, will come different processes which have this in common, that the sound-elements of language already existing enter into new combinations on the basis of the signification they have received. The most powerful factor in this process is analogy, which plays indeed a certain part in the department of pure sound, but finds its main scope where signification co-operates with it as well.

28. If our method of observation be correctly carried out, it will follow that its general results will be applicable to all languages and to all stages of their development ; and, indeed, generally speaking, to the first beginnings of language. The question as to the origin of language can only be answered on the basis of the doctrine of principles. There are no other means of answering the question. We are unable to give a historical picture of the origins of language on the basis of tradition. The only question that we can answer is, How was the origin of language possible? This question can only be satisfactorily answered if we succeed in deducing the origin of language exclusively from the activity of

those factors which we still see in activity in the further development of language. Besides, no tenable contrast can be drawn between original creation of language and its mere further development. As soon as the first start has been made, we have language and its further development. There exist merely graduated differences between the first origins of language and later epochs.

Grammar
and Logic.

29. There is one point to which attention must be drawn. In their opposition to the former customary method of dealing with language, in which all grammatical relations were simply derived from logical relations, some have gone so far as to wish to exclude those logical relations which find no expression in grammatical form. This is not to be approved of. For, necessary as it is to mark the difference between logical and grammatical categories, it is equally necessary on the other side to define the relations of either to the other. Grammar and logic do not coincide, because the formation and application of language does not proceed on the basis of strict logical inquiry, but by the natural and untrained movement of the groups of ideas, which either follows or not the agency of laws more or less logical according to the natural or acquired capacity of each individual. But the linguistic form of the expression does not always tally with the true movement of the groups of ideas with their now greater, now less, logical consistency. Besides this, psychological and grammatical categories do not cover the same ground. It follows from this that the philologist must keep the two apart; but it does not follow that in analysing human utterances he is at liberty to disregard psychical processes which fulfil themselves in speaking and hearing, without, however, manifesting themselves in linguistic expression.

30. It is not until he has made a full consideration of what does not indeed actually lie in the elements of which individual utterances are composed, but which the speaker still has before his mind,

and which is understood by the hearer, that the philologist can arrive at an acquaintance with the origin and transformations of linguistic forms of expression. Whoever considers grammatical forms as merely isolated, without marking their relation to individual mental activity, can never arrive at an understanding of the development of language.

CHAPTER II.

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF LANGUAGE.

Analogies
from Organic
Nature.

IT is established past all doubt by Comparative Philology that several different languages have often developed out of a single essentially uniform language, and that these again have not remained uniform, but have split up into a series of dialects. It would be natural to expect that the observation of this process would, more than any other possible circumstance, force on our notice the analogies to be drawn from organic nature. It is surprising that Darwinian philologists have not specially thrown themselves into this view. The parallel, when not pressed beyond fixed limits, is indeed justifiable, and instructive as well. If we would press this parallel a little, we must compare the language of the individual—in other words, the entire materials of language of which he disposes—to the individual animal or plant; and the dialects, languages, families of language, etc., with the species, genera, classes, etc., of the animal and vegetable world.

32. There is another important point in which it is of moment to recognise the absolute justice of the parallel. The great revolution through which zoology has passed in modern times depends to a great extent upon the recognition of the fact that nothing has a real existence except single individuals—that the families, genera, and classes are nothing but comprehensions and divisions formed by human understanding, which may result according to individual

caprice ; that divisions between species and those between individuals differ not in essence, but only in degree. In judging of dialectic differences we must put ourselves on a similar basis : we have, strictly speaking, to differentiate as many languages as there are individuals. If we comprehend the languages of a definite number of individuals in one group, and exclude those of other individuals as contrasted with this group, we abstract in this process on each occasion something from certain differences while we set value upon others. Thus some room is always left for the arbitrary arrangement. We have no right to start by assuming that individual languages, speaking generally, must admit of being brought under a classified system. We must be prepared to find that into however many groups we may divide languages, there will always remain a number of individuals which we shall be uncertain to ascribe to one or to the other of two nearly related groups. And the same dilemma becomes really formidable when we try to combine the smaller groups into larger, and to mark these sharply off from each other. A sharp and well-marked division is not possible until the community of intercourse has been broken off for several generations in succession.

33. If, then, we speak of the severing of an originally uniform language into different dialects, the phrases ill express the true nature of the process. The truth is that at any given moment within any given community there are as many dialects spoken as there are individuals to speak them ; and, what is more, dialects each having its own historical development, and each being in a state of perpetual change. Severance into dialects means really nothing more than the growth of individual variations beyond a particular limit.

34. Another point in which we may establish a parallel is this—the development of an individual animal depends on two factors.

On the one side it is conditioned by the nature of its parents, whereby it receives a definite impulse imparted by inheritance ; on the other side we have to set the chance effects of climate, food, way of life, etc., to which each individual is exposed in its own existence. One of these entails an essential resemblance to the parents ; the other the possibility of a certain departure from this within definite limits. And thus the language of each individual shapes itself on one side according to the influences of the languages of the several companions with whom he holds commerce, which, from our point of view, we may regard as the progenitors of his own ; on the other side, according to peculiarities wholly independent of these, and the special motives supplied by his spiritual and bodily nature. Here, too, we find agreement in this respect—that the first-named factor is always by far the more powerful of the two. A violent change in the type is not manifest till after a lapse of time, and is only produced by the fact that each modification of the nature of the individual, which varies from the original drift imparted to it, aids in imparting the drift to the following generation. It is just so in the history of language. We may further make this statement about language as about every animal organism : the lower the grade of development, the stronger will be the second factor in comparison with the first.

35. On the other hand, we must not overlook the great differences which exist between linguistic and organic generation. In the latter the direct effect of the parent ceases at a definite point ; after this we have merely the tendency imparted, which operates afterwards. In the generation of the language of an individual, the surrounding languages maintain their share till his end, though it may be true that their influences are most powerful in the earliest childhood of the language in question, and grow weaker and weaker

the more this grows and gains strength. The generation of an animal organism is due to an individual or to a pair. In the generation of the language of an individual, the languages of a great quantity of other individuals are concerned ; in fact, of all with whom he has in the course of his life come into linguistic contact, though, of course, in different degrees. And, what makes the matter more complicated still in this process of generation, it may happen that the different individual languages may be active and passive at once in their relations to each other ; the parents may be the children of their own children. Finally, we must remark that, even if we speak of the language of an individual, we have to deal not with a concrete being, but with an abstraction, except when we understand by the expression the entirety of the groups of ideas combined in the mind, with their manifold and complicated relations, and depending upon linguistic activity.

36. It is by intercourse, and nothing else, that the language of the individual is generated. The family origin claims our notice only as far as it influences the physical and mental capacity of the single individual. This, as has been remarked, is no doubt a factor in the form taken by language, but a very secondary one as compared with the influences of direct communication.

37. If we start from the undeniable truth that each individual Statement of the Problem. has his or her own language, and that each such language has its own history, the problem is not so much how from a language essentially uniform different dialects arise—the rise of variations seems a mere matter of course. The problem which challenges solution is this: How comes it that while the language of each individual has its own special history, this degree of agreement—a certain greater or less—maintains itself within this miscellaneously constituted group of individuals?

Linguistic
Change and
Differentiation

38. The increase of dialectic varieties depends, of course, on the change in linguistic usage. The more violent the change, the greater the opportunity afforded for the growth of variations. But the degree of this growth is not conditioned merely by the violence of the change, for no change necessarily entails a lasting differentiation; and the circumstances which operate towards the maintenance of the agreement, or towards the speedy restoration thereof, may exist in very different degrees.

39. The life of a language cannot be conceived of apart from continuous differentiation. If it were conceivable that in one linguistic centre every individual language were absolutely identical, in the very next moment the impulse would be given for the formation of varieties among them. The spontaneous development of each individual must strike out a particular path, according to peculiarities in the natural bent and experiences of the being who serves as its vehicle, and the circumstances of his life. The influence exercised by or upon the single individual never extends to more than a fraction of the whole, and within this fraction we find important graduated variations. Correspondingly, no doubt, there is a continuous tendency to cancel the differentiations which have appeared—a tendency operating thus: departures from a former usage are either rejected or are transferred to individuals who have never developed them spontaneously. This process of cancelling, however, is never quite perfect. It only becomes approximately so within a circle in which a continuous interchange of communication takes place. The less active the intercourse the more differences arise, and are maintained. The possibility of differentiation goes still further if all direct communication has ceased, and there is only an indirect connexion by means of connecting links.

40. If the activity of intercourse were perfectly uniform in

degree at all points in one linguistic centre, we should have nothing but individual languages, of which those which stood in close connexion with each other would differ in each case from each other but slightly, while between the furthest points of contrast strongly marked differences might have arisen. It would then be impossible to comprise a number of individual languages in a single group which we might set over as a whole, perfect in itself, against any other such comprehension. Each individual language would necessarily be apprehended as a connecting link between several others. But such a state of matters has nowhere existed, and never does exist in fact. It would be conceivable only if no natural boundaries existed, no political and religious unions—if, let us say, the whole people lived in a plain without any large river, in isolated houses, at approximately identical distances from each other, without any central place of assembly. Even under these circumstances the process of grouping into family languages would take place. But in reality we find either a collective life as in towns and villages, or perhaps, in the case of nomadic tribes, in hordes ; or, where the system of isolated homesteads prevails, we find at least smaller or greater political and religious unions with places of assembly. In mountainous countries single valleys are more or less completely shut off from each other. Islands are divided by the sea. Even where no such barriers exist, uncultivated stretches of land, woods, moors, swamps, etc., lie between the single settlements. Individual languages, therefore, are driven to form groups according to the natural environing circumstances which determine the relations between them, as well as according to their political and religious circumstances. These groups are, comparatively speaking, uniform, and are sharply marked off from others outside of them. Thus, such groups are in the first instance formed by the smallest unions—by single townships. Where the

inhabitants of the place live together, each single individual will stand nearer to the other than to those who belong to another place. It is thus possible for a real border to form here—a boundary-line not obscured by any connecting grades. Under no other circumstances can variations, at once plainly marked and enduring, take their rise, such as cannot maintain themselves, at least permanently, between inhabitants of the same place. As long, however, as neighbouring places keep up a vigorous communication with each other, it may also be that no plainly marked and enduring difference arises between them; in any case the differences will remain comparatively insignificant. If we, however, endeavour to group round each local dialect such local dialects as are in lively intercourse with it, we shall find as a result a quantity of groups which reciprocally intersect each other. It is possible that the process of grouping may have a slightly different result for each single place. Places may be added or subtracted, and the communication may be to some extent modified with respect to those which remain.

Individual
Spontaneity
and Social
Influence.

41. Every change in linguistic usage is a product, on the one side, of the spontaneous impulses of single individuals, and on the other of the conditions of intercourse above described. In cases where a spontaneous tendency is diffused evenly over an entire linguistic area, affecting the majority of the speakers, it will be found to affect the generality in a comparatively short time. It may be, however, that in different divisions this impulse is distributed with different strength. Under such circumstances, in districts lying far from each other, and connected by no communication, the cancelling, as far as it is necessary, must conduce to different results. Between these the strife will continue to rage, and will not be easily settled, because one side has a more vigorous influence upon one part, the other side on the other. This 'no man's land' forms a boundary

wall through which the influences cannot pass from one side to the other, or only when so weakened as to be practically ineffective.

42. A border-land like this must be forthcoming, if the continuity of the communication through the whole linguistic area were uniform—if no bars were placed to free communication by distance in space, by natural obstacles, or by political border-lines. As the reciprocal influence of areas divided by such barriers is reduced to a small proportion, distinct limits may also form for dialectic peculiarities. An entire cessation of intercourse is not necessary for the purpose. It need necessarily be only so weak that it remains ineffectual without a certain degree of spontaneous reciprocity. Thus it is, too, that a dialectic frontier which has long existed may be gradually again removed if the spontaneous reciprocity, which was at first wanting, manifests itself later, or if, again, similar circumstances proceed from different sides.

43. Each linguistic change, and, further, the origin of every linguistic peculiarity, has its own special history. The limit which marks the prevalence of one is not decisive for the limit of the other. Were the relative activity of intercourse alone decisive, no doubt the borders of the different dialectic peculiarities would necessarily coincide absolutely. But the spontaneous tendencies to change may distribute themselves in a fashion essentially different, and the result of the reciprocal power of influence must accommodate itself to this. If, for instance, a linguistic area divides itself in respect of a dialectical difference into the groups *a* and *b*, it may happen, and, in fact, will often do so, that a division made in respect of another peculiarity coincides with it; but it may also happen that a part of *a* unites with *b*, or *vice versa*; or even a part of *a* and *b* may conceivably stand in contrast to another part of *a* and *b*.

Mutual
Indepen-
dence of
each Differ-
entiation.

44. If, therefore, we draw border-lines for all the dialectic

The image
of a Genea-
logical Tree
is inadequate.

varieties which may occur in one continuous linguistic area, we get a very complicated system of manifold lines crossing each other. A neat partition into main groups, which we might divide again into so many sub-groups, is not possible. The simile of a genealogical tree, commonly adopted to enable learners to apprehend the facts, is always inexact. We can only employ this by voluntarily seizing on certain differences as essential, and by overlooking others. If the prominent characteristics are actually seized upon, we cannot perhaps deny that a genealogical tree may aid us to realise the actual circumstances, only we must beware of encouraging the delusion that an exact representation of the facts is thereby given.

45. The difficulty of representing the facts by means of a genealogical tree is enhanced if we endeavour, by its means, to give the chronology of each development, as is natural for a genealogy to do.

46. Since communication and the power of reciprocally influencing each other, as between neighbouring districts, has not been abolished by the appearance of certain differences, should changes set in at a later period, the development may still be a common one. Thus changes may make their way in an entire linguistic area after it has been already strongly differentiated, or they may set in in several parts already characterised by peculiarities. Thus, for instance, the lengthening of the short root vowels (*cf.* *MIIG. lisen, giben, riden*, etc.) is, in the case of the Low and Middle German dialects, carried out in an essentially uniform manner, whilst many older changes have attained a much less extent. We must keep this always before us in our consideration of the older linguistic periods, which we are enabled to endeavour to picture to ourselves by inferences alone. We are too much accustomed to consider all such changes of an original condition of

language as pervade an entire area as older than such as are confined to single portions of this area: and from this point of view we assume something like a common European period, a Slavo-Germanic, a Slavo-Lettic, an original Germanic, an East and West German original language. Certainly it is not to be disputed that, commonly speaking, the wider extent of a linguistic peculiarity justifies the assumption of its higher age, but nothing more than a mere assumption. Further, besides the cases in which we can positively prove it, there will be various others in which the more widely diffused change is more recent than that which is confined to a more limited area.

47. It likewise does not always follow that the peculiarities which seem most striking are necessarily the oldest. The fashion now in vogue, of dividing German into the three main heads of Upper, Middle, and Low German, depends upon the conditions of sound-change. This change probably did not set in before the seventh century A.D., and continued to operate till the ninth, and indeed in certain points even longer. But actually before this date striking differences were in existence which are thrown into obscurity by the present classification. For instance, under the head of Low German, three not unessentially different groups are comprised—the Frisian, the Saxon, and a part of the Franconian; the Franconian is divided between Low and Middle German.

48. Further, we cannot lay it down as a principle of universal application, that the groups which have earliest begun to differentiate themselves as against each other must therefore be most strongly differentiated, or, conversely, that in the case of the most strongly differentiated groups the differentiation must have begun earliest. The degree in which communication is maintained may change. The geographical position of the groups in reference to each other may alter. Even apart from this, spontaneous agree-

ment may cause new changes to make their way past older limits, while they themselves perhaps find a limit where before none existed. Or it may be that a special district, whose development has been essentially identical with that of an adjoining one, while differing from all the others, is affected by specially violent changes, while the district which hitherto has followed the same track remains with the rest in the earlier stage.

**Dialectical
Districts
graduated.** 49. Since the levelling effect of communication forbids the operation of too violent changes between districts closely situated which enjoy a regular communication, each small group shows an intermediate stage between the groups which bound it on different sides. It is a false idea, which is still very prevalent, that intermediate stages owe their origin to a secondary contact between two dialects hitherto separated. We cannot, of course, maintain that such has never been the case. A transitional stage may be formed by a group, either by the fact that it represents the actual connecting link between two distinct formations already existing in neighbouring groups, or that it represents them side by side, or by the fact that it has certain dialectic peculiarities in common with one group and another set with the other. When the relations of dialects stand thus with respect to each other, the mutual understanding between neighbouring districts need never be stayed, because the divergences are too trivial, and because people accustom themselves to these too easily; and there may thus nevertheless exist differences between those more remote which make mutual understanding impossible.

50. This relation can be observed in the most widely differing languages. It is specially obvious in German. A Swiss finds it impossible to understand a Holsteiner—nay, even a Hessian or a Bavarian, and yet he is indirectly connected with these by unchecked streams of communication. The gradual shading off

of the German dialects on a large scale may be seen to great advantage in the so-called High German process of sound-shifting.¹ The same process of gradual shading off can be easily observed by a casual examination of Firmenich, *Germaniens völkerstimmen*. A clearer idea still of the wonderful multiplicity of this shading-off process, may be obtained by the *Atlas of Languages* prepared by G. Wenker. The circumstances are much the same not merely within the single Romance languages, but actually within the entire Romance linguistic territory. The territories of the separate nations are to be defined with any accuracy by the written languages, and by these alone, and not by the dialects. Thus, for instance, the North Italian dialects have some very important peculiarities in common with the French; and are nearer the neighbouring dialects of France than to the Italian written language or the dialect of Tuscany. The Gascon dialect again in many respects is the transition stage from the Provençal (South French) to the Spanish; the Sardinian shows the transition step from the Italian to the Spanish, etc.

51. This sketch of the development of languages presupposes that the individuals are settled. Each change of an individual—still more so, of groups of individuals—produces modifications which we have to treat in Chapter XXII. as mixtures. The existence of a written language operates equally as a moderating factor; of which we shall have to speak in Chapter XXIII.

52. The case may also, of course, present itself that the communication between the several parts of a linguistic community is completely broken by strongly marked natural or political limits, by the emigration of one part, by the interposition of a foreign people, etc. From this moment the language of each single part develops itself likewise independently, and violent contrasts arise

Separation of
Languages.

¹ Cf. Braune, *Beiträge*, i. p. 1 sqq., and Nörrenberg, *ib.* ix. p. 371 sqq.

without transition stages to connect them. It thus happens that several independent languages arise out of one, and this process may repeat itself several times.

53. It is scarcely conceivable that no noteworthy changes should have occurred through the whole linguistic territory down to the moment when such a division of a single speech into several has taken place. It is inconceivable that a language should exist ranging over a fairly wide district, and having a fairly long development behind it, without some dialectic variations. We must therefore regard, as a rule, the independent languages which have developed out of a common original language as continuations of the dialects of the original language; and we may assume that a part of the differences prevailing between them dates back to the period of their continuous connexion. The same would hold true of this part as holds true, generally speaking, with respect to dialectic differences in an unbroken linguistic area. It might therefore happen, if we designate the dialects which have developed into independent languages by the letters of the alphabet, that *a* might have something in common with *b* in contrast to *c* and *d*, something else in common with *e* in contrast to *b* and *d*, and again something else with *d* in contrast to *b* and *c*, etc.; and these agreements might rest upon a real causal connexion. From this point of view the relations of the Indo-European families of language, for instance, ought to be regarded. But in single cases it is hard to decide whether reciprocal influence has really and truly contributed to the agreement in the development. The impossibility of a coincidence even in the case of quite independent development can hardly ever be proved.

54. The separation, further, need not necessarily tally with ancient dialectic limits, and particularly not when it is caused by migration. It is possible for a portion of a group which agrees

in the most essential points to separate, while the other portion remains in connexion with the other groups which are further removed from it. It is possible again for portions of different groups to detach themselves at once. For instance, *Anglo-Saxon* is originally closely connected with *Frisian*,—indeed, it seems improbable that it ever existed on the Continent as a separate dialect; but it seems to have owed its origin to the time when Frisian hordes broke from their homes, and united with themselves certain elements of other Teutonic stocks. But Anglo-Saxon then received its own special development, while the Frisian has remained connected with other German dialects. There is a sharply-defined limit between English and German, while no such limit exists between Frisian and Low Saxon.

55. The character of the sounds remains, and always must remain, the characteristic factor in the dialectic distribution of a district linguistically united. The reason of this is that in their formation everything depends upon the direct influence gained by immediate personal intercourse. Vocabulary and signification, the formal and syntactical parts of language, may be transferred without difficulty. Whatever has here arisen that is new may wander far and wide without any essential alteration, supposing that it strikes a responsive chord. But sound, as we shall see in the following chapter, is never exactly handed on as it is received. Where a wide gulf exists, the influencing power in regard to changes of sound entirely ceases. Here then far more violent differences develop themselves than in the case of the vocabulary, inflexions and syntax, and these differences pass more uniformly through long spaces of time than in the case of sounds. On the other hand, if a real severance of language has set in, the differences between the different languages may make themselves felt as characteristically in other departments as in that of sound.

The Essential Mark of a Dialect is its Sounds.

56. The least characteristic feature in language is the vocabulary and its application. In this case, more than in any other, we find elements transferred from one dialect into another, just as we do from one language into another. In this case there are more individual variations than in any other. Nay, differences may actually occur here which have nothing to do with dialectic differences, and which even cross with these and interpenetrate them. In each higher stage of culture, technical expressions arise for the different trades, arts, and sciences, which, mainly or indeed exclusively employed by one particular professional class, are hardly understood, or not understood at all, by others. In the case of the formation of such technical languages, similar relations are observed as in the case of the rise of dialects. Under this head will come also the difference between the language of poetry and that of prose, which likewise extends to what is formal and syntactical in language. Peculiar circumstances in the case of ancient Greece actually led to a purposely artificial employment of differences of sounds. There may, however, be such a thing as a poetical language (and this is the most common case), which in the most different dialectical combinations of sound contrasts uniformly with the language of prose.

57. All natural development of language conduces to a continual unbounded growth of dialectic differences. The reasons which impel to this are given with the common conditions of the life of language, and are completely inseparable from these. The idea is unfortunately still met with in philological works which enjoy a high reputation, that the earlier centrifugal movement, by the operation of which dialects were said to have arisen, was counteracted in a higher stage of culture in a time of more lively intercourse, by a backward centripetal impulse. This idea rests upon imperfect observation. The formation of a common language,

which writers have in view when using this language, does not come about by a gradual assimilation of the dialects to each other. The common language does not proceed from the single dialects by the same process as that by which a later form of the dialect arose from a previous one. It is rather a foreign idiom to which the dialect is sacrificed. On this head more will be said in Chapter XXIII.

CHAPTER III.

ON SOUND-CHANGE.

The Active
Factors in
the produc-
tion of
sound.

IN order to understand the phenomenon which we usually designate as sound-change, we must get a clear idea of the physical and psychical processes which operate in the production of groups of sound. If we disregard—as in this case we ought, and indeed must do—the function which these subserve, the following points challenge our consideration:—In the first place, the movements of the organs of language, as originated by the excitement of the motor nerves, and the muscular activity thereby awakened; secondly, the series of sensations by which these movements are necessarily accompanied—the ‘motory sensation’ (*bewegungs-gefühl*, as Lotze and, following him, Steinthal have named it); thirdly, the sensations of tone produced in the hearers, among whom, under normal circumstances, the speaker himself must be reckoned. These sensations are, of course, not merely physiological processes, but psychological as well. Even after the physical excitement has passed away, these sensations leave a lasting psychical effect, viz., in the shape of memory-pictures, which are of the greatest importance for sound-change. For these are the only means of connecting the single physiological processes, and these set up a connexion of cause and effect between the earlier and later production of the same combination of sounds. The memory-picture left behind by the sensation of the move-

ments carried out before is that which renders possible the reproduction of similar movements. Motory and sound sensations need necessarily stand in no intimate connexion with each other. But both enter into an external association, since the speaker hears himself speaking at the same time. The mere act of listening to others gives no motory sensation, and thus gives no capacity of reproducing the combination of sounds once heard. For this reason, an effort and a certain amount of practice is necessary, in order to enable us to reproduce in speaking any sound which we have not been hitherto accustomed to utter.

59. The question naturally presents itself—What is the analysis of the motory and sound sensations respectively, and to what grade are the special factors in their analysis consciously perceived? Probably nothing has hindered a correct appreciation of the nature of sound-change so much as the fact that the extent and the distinctness of consciousness in this subject has been over-rated. It is a great mistake to suppose that for the apprehension of the right sound of any word in its peculiarity—in fact, for the possibility of an excitement of the ideas bound up with it—the single sounds composing the word need come into consciousness at all. Indeed, it is not always indispensable to the apprehension of an entire sentence that even the single words composing it should come into consciousness according to their sound and their signification. The self-deception under which grammarians labour depends on their having regarded the word not as a portion of the living language—audible for a moment, and then passing away—but as something independent to be analysed at leisure, with a view to its leisurely dismemberment. A further source of deception lies in the habit of starting not from the spoken, but from the written word. In writing, no doubt, the word seems separated into its elements, and it may appear requisite that every one who writes

Slight Consciousness of the Element of a Word.

should presuppose this dismemberment. But in real truth the matter is somewhat different. No doubt when writing was discovered, and each time that it was applied afresh to a language not hitherto expressed by its aid, such dismemberment must necessarily have been presupposed. Further, it must continuously happen that each time that handwriting is learned anew, an exercise in the spelling of spoken words must go hand in hand with it. But after a certain facility has been attained, the process in writing is not exactly in the first place the dismemberment of each word into its single component sounds, and then for each single sound the setting down of its proper letter. The speed with which the process is carried out excludes the possibility of the single factors coming clearly into consciousness, and demonstrates at the same time that it is unnecessary that they should do so for a regular and normal course. But a really abbreviated process comes in, whereby writing is to some extent emancipated from language—a process which we shall on a later occasion have to consider rather more closely. And if we observe a little more accurately the facts connected with this dismembering faculty of the man who can write, it will clearly force itself on our notice how little consciousness intrudes into the elements of word-sound. We can daily make experience of the fact that the manifold discrepancies between writing and pronunciation pass to a great extent unheeded by the members of any given linguistic community, and strike the foreigner first, though he can give himself no satisfactory explanation of what these discrepancies repose on. Thus every German who has not enjoyed a training in the physiology of sound is convinced that he writes as he speaks. Suppose, however, that he really is justified in entertaining this conviction as against the Englishman and the Frenchman, still, to omit niceties, there are plenty of striking instances in which the pronunciation differs greatly from the

writing. It occurs to few that the final consonant in *tag*, *feld*, and *lieb* is a different sound from that caught in *tages*, *feldes*, *liebes*, or that the *n* in the German word *anger* represents a sound essentially different from that of the *n* heard in *lund*. In the common pronunciation of *ungnade* we have a guttural nasal, in that of *unbillich* a labial nasal; but no one thinks of this. It excites actual surprise to assert that in the German word *lange*, *g* is not heard; that in the second syllable of *legen*, *reden*, *ritter*, *schütteln*, *c* is not heard; that the final consonant of *leben* in the ordinary pronunciation contains no *n*, but is an *m* with no *c* preceding it. Indeed, it is safe to assert that most people will dispute these facts, even after their attention has been drawn to them. This holds true in many cases, even of good scholars. We see from this how entirely the analysis of the word is learnt with the writing, and how small is the consciousness of the actual elements of the spoken word.

60. A real analysis of the word into its proper elements is not merely extremely difficult, but is actually impossible. A word is not a united compound of a definite number of independent sounds, of which each can be expressed by an alphabetical sign; but it is essentially a continuous series of infinitely numerous sounds, and alphabetical symbols do no more than bring out certain characteristic points of this series in an imperfect way. The remainder, which remains undenoted, no doubt necessarily reveals itself from the definition of these points, but reveals itself only up to a certain point. The continuity of sound is seen with the greatest clearness in the case of the so-called diphthongs, which exhibit such a series of very numerous elements (*cf.* Sievers' *Phonetik*, § 19, i. a). Sievers was the first to expressly bring out the significance of the transitional sounds. But it follows from this continuity of the word that an idea of the individual parts cannot be a self-yielded result, but must be the fruit of scientific reflection, however primi-

The Word a
continuous
Series of
infinitely
numerous
Sounds.

tive this may be, and it is the practical need of writing to express sounds which has conduced to this.

61. What is true of the sound-picture is also naturally true of the motory sensation. Indeed, we must go further in this point. No one can maintain that the individual ever has any idea of the different movements made by his organs in the act of speaking. It is plain that these can only be ascertained after the most careful scientific observation, and that scientific men are not agreed upon many points in connexion with this question. Even the most superficial and roughest views as to these movements are not possible without a voluntary habit of careful and protracted observation. They are superfluous, and not needed to produce sounds and sound-groups which we are trained to produce. The process seems to be the following. Each movement excites in a definite manner certain sensitive nerves, and thus evokes a feeling which associates itself with the direction of the movement of their centre by means of the motor nerves. If this association is sufficiently established, and if the memory-picture left by the feeling is sufficiently strong—a condition which, as a rule, is not reached without practice (*i.e.* without frequent repetition of the same movement, varied, it may be, with many vain attempts)—then the memory-picture of the sensation may have power to reproduce the movement associated therewith as its reflection; and if the sensation called up thereby corresponds with the memory-picture, then we may also rest assured that we have carried out the same movement as formerly.

62. But we might concede that the degree of consciousness which the single factors of the sound-picture and of the motory sensation attain by dint of mastery of writing, and, further, by reflection, was even greater than it is;—we might concede that an absolutely clear consciousness of these elements was absolutely necessary for a

mastery of the mother-tongue as of any foreign language (and certainly a higher degree of clear consciousness is necessary than in the application of what has been learnt by practice); but from this it would not follow that the same degree of clearness must be attained in common daily discourse. It rather lies in the nature of the psychical organisation that all ideas which originally operated merely by consciousness receive by practice the capacity of operating automatically; and that this automatic operation is the first and indispensable condition of the speedy course of ideas demanded in every position of daily life and in language as well. Even the professed student of the physiology of sounds will speak much and hear much without a single sound revealing itself distinctly to his consciousness.

63. For the proper judgment, then, of the natural life of language, regulated by no species of pedantry, we must cling to the fundamental maxim that sounds are produced and taken cognisance of without any clear consciousness. This statement contradicts all such explanatory theories as presuppose in the minds of individuals an idea of the sound-system of language; under which head come several hypotheses as to the German sound-shifting process [as, for instance, that of Max Müller].

64. On the other hand, however, the unconsciousness of the elements does not exclude an exact control over them. We may utter or hear a group of sounds to which we are accustomed without ever thinking that it is in fact precisely this group, made up in such and such a way; but as soon as in a single element a departure from the usual is observed—which departure needs to be but very slight—it is noticed, unless indeed any extraordinary obstacles supervene to prevent it; and each departure from the accustomed unconscious course of ideas naturally forces itself upon our consciousness. Of course it does not follow that, with

Control of
Speech.

the consciousness of the departure, the consciousness of its nature and cause is also given.

Limit to
Power of
Distinguishing
Sounds.

65. The possibility of control extends as far as the power of perceiving differences. This, however, is not limitless, while the possibility of gradual transitions in the movements of the organs of speech, and of course also in the sounds produced thereby, is certainly limitless. Thus, between *a* and *i*, as well as between *a* and *æ*, there lies an unbounded number of possible transitions of vocal sound. In the same way the places of the articulation of all the lingual-gum sounds lend themselves to representation by the picture of a continuous line in which each point may be the one preferred. Between them and the labial sounds certainly such an imperceptible transition is impossible; still the denti-labials stand in close relationship to the denti-linguals (*th*, *f*). In the same way the transition from final sound to fricative, and *vice versa*, may be gradually brought about; for complete closure and the greatest possible narrowing process go closely together. All differences of quantity, of pitch, of energy in articulation, as in expiration, are conceivable in all possible transitions. And so with much besides. It is this circumstance specially which renders sound-change intelligible.

66. Now, if we reflect that it does not depend merely upon the differences in those sounds into which we commonly, though inaccurately, divide the word, but also upon the differences in the transition sounds, in the accent, the time, etc.; and further, if we reflect that unequal portions may always be brought into combination with a series of equal portions,—it must then be clear that a manifold variety is possible in the groups of sound, and this even in the case where the actual difference is comparatively small. For this reason it is possible that strikingly different groups may be still conceived of as essentially identical, thanks to

their, on the whole, superior resemblances ; and this is what renders an understanding possible between speakers of different dialects, so long as the differences do not pass beyond a certain grade. But for this very reason a number of variations may set in whose difference it is hard to note, or indeed impossible, until attention has been specially drawn to them.

67. Early childhood is for every one an experimental stage, in which the individual gradually learns by manifold efforts to imitate what has been spoken before him by those who surround him. When the greatest amount of success has crowned his efforts a period of comparative rest ensues. The former important vacillations cease, and there exists from this time forward a great uniformity in the pronunciation and freedom from disturbing causes, unless indeed the evident influences of foreign dialects, or of a written language, come between. This uniformity, however, can never become absolute. Less important vacillations in the pronunciation of the same word in the same place in the sentence are inevitable. For, speaking generally, in the case of every movement of the body, however much such movement may be the result of training, however fully the impulse may have been developed, there still remains a certain amount of uncertainty ; it still remains left to chance (in a certain degree, however small), whether the pronunciation be uttered with absolute exactness, or whether a slight deviation from the correct path towards one side or the other manifests itself. Even the most practised marksman misses his mark sometimes, and would miss it in most cases if it were a mere point with no extension, and if his weapon had only a single point which could touch the goal. Any one's handwriting may be as defined and characteristic as you please, and his general peculiarities may be at once recognisable, still he will not reproduce, each time he writes, the same letters and the same

Deviations
from the
Prescriptions
of the Motory
Sensation
inevitable.

combinations of letters in absolutely the same way. It must be the same with the movements whereby sounds are produced. This variability of pronunciation, which remains unnoticed because of the narrow limits in which it moves, gives the key to our comprehension of the otherwise incomprehensible fact that a change of usage in the sounds of a language sets in and comes to its fulfilment without the least suspicion on the part of those in whom this change is being carried out.

Modifica-
tion, or Dis-
placement, of
the Motory
Sensation.

68. If the motory sensation were always to remain unchanged as a memory-picture, the insignificant deviations would always centre round the same point with the same maximum of distance. In fact, however, this sensation is the product of all the earlier impressions received in the course of carrying out the movement in question, and, according to a common law, the impressions, not merely those which are absolutely identical, but also those that are imperceptibly different from each other, are fused into one. Correspondingly to their difference, the motory sensation must be somewhat modified with each new impression, to however insignificant an extent. It is, in this process, of importance that the later impressions always have a stronger after-influence than the earlier. It is thus impossible to co-ordinate the sensation with the average of all the impressions received during the whole course of life ; rather, the numerically-speaking inferior may, by the fact of their freshness, outbalance the weight of the more frequent. It must, however, be observed that supposing the distance of the possible divergence to remain the same, a displacement of the limits of this divergence' is brought about with each alteration of the sensation.

69. Let us now take a line in which every point is exactly fixed as the proper normal path of movement to which the motory sensation leads ; then, of course, the distance from that point

which is possible as maximum when the movement is really carried out without conflicting with the sensation, is commonly as great upon one side as upon the opposite. But it does not follow from this that the deviations which really set in must be uniformly divided on either side according to number and extent.

70. These deviations, which are not defined by the motory sensation, have, as is natural, their independent causes—causes, moreover, wholly unconnected with the motory sensation. If such causes act at the same moment, with exactly the same force, in opposite directions, then their operations cancel each other, and the movement is carried out with absolute exactness. This case will occur very seldom indeed. In by far the most numerous cases the balance will incline to one side or the other. It is, however, possible for the relation of the forces to undergo manifold changes according to circumstances. If this change is as favourable for one side as for the other; if a deviation towards one side always alternates with a corresponding deviation towards the other side, in this case the very smallest displacements of the motory sensation will be immediately arrested. Matters are, however, very different when the causes which impel to one side have the preponderance over those which have an immediately opposite tendency, whether this be in each particular case or only in the generality. The original deviation may have been ever so insignificant, the motory sensation having suffered thereby the slightest possible displacement, still for the next time a somewhat greater displacement from the original is rendered possible, and with this coincidently a displacement of the sensation. There thus gradually arises, by adding together all the displacements (which we can hardly imagine small enough), a notable difference—whether it be that the movement progresses steadily in a special direction, or that the advance is regularly

interrupted by relapses, if only the latter are less frequent and smaller than the first.

Causes of the
Discrepancy.

71. The reason why the inclination to deviation is greater on one side than on the other must be probably sought in the fact that the deviation towards the side to which it tends is in some respect more convenient. The examination of the nature of this greater or less degree of convenience is a purely physiological task. It must not, however, be supposed that it is not at the same time conditioned by psychology. Accent and time, which are of such decisive significance in the process, and also the energy displayed in muscular activity, are essentially dependent on psychical conditions, but their operation upon sound relations is nevertheless physiological. In the process of progressive assimilation it can be nothing but the idea of the sound yet to be uttered which operates upon the preceding one; but this is psychical relation of a very simple kind manifesting itself uniformly throughout, while all special definition of the process of assimilation must be based upon an examination of the physical generation of the sounds in question.

72. For the task which we have set ourselves, it is sufficient to point to certain general points of view. There are a great number of cases in which we may say quite simply, This sound-group is more convenient than that. Thus the Italian words *otto* and *cattivo* are without any doubt easier to pronounce than the Latin *octo*, and the NIG. *empfangen* than a form **entfangen*, unaffected by assimilation, would be. Assimilation, either partial or entire, is a phenomenon occurring in all languages. When, on the other hand, the single sounds come into question, hardly any general principles can be laid down as to the greater or less facility of pronouncing one rather than another, and all theories on this point based on abstractions from narrow grounds show themselves worth-

less when confronted with a fuller experience. And, further, no perfectly general definitions can be given for the combination of several sounds. Facility depends to a great extent upon conditions of quantity and upon the accentuation, expiratory as well as musical. One sound-group is convenient in the long syllable another in the short, one in the syllable which bears the stress another in that which has no stress; while the circumflex makes other demands than the grave or the acute. But, further, the measure of convenience adapts itself to a quantity of circumstances which may be different for each individual, but which may attach themselves to larger groups as well in the same or in a similar way without being shared by the others. One point requires specially emphasising in this case. A certain harmony of the sound-system is found existing in all languages. We see from this that the direction in which a sound deviates must be partially conditioned by the direction taken by the other sounds. Much depends, as Sievers has shown, in this case on the so-called neutral position of the organs. Each variation in this entails, of course, also a variation in relation to the convenience of single sounds. A gradual displacement of this neutral position will have to be judged precisely after the analogy of what we have said above about the similar displacement of the motory sensation.

73. It is of great importance never to lose sight of the fact that the consideration of convenience in each production of sound affords in every case only a very subordinate and secondary cause; the motory sensation always remains the really decisive motive power. One of the commonest errors is the supposition that a change which has arisen in a long period by numerous small displacements is to be referred to a single act resulting from a desire for convenience. This error partly results from the method in which rules for sound are apprehended in practical grammar, and

Convenience 'a
Secondary
Cause: the
Motory
Sensation
the Primary
Cause.

even in grammars which claim to teach on scientific principles. For instance, it is commonly said that if a sonant consonant appears as a final, it takes the form in this language of the corresponding surd (*cf.* *MIHG. mſde—meit, rſbe—reip*), just as if we had to do with a change occurring each time occasioned by the fact of the surd being better adapted to the close of the word. The truth is that it is in this case the motory sensation developed by tradition which produces the surd, while the gradual reduction of the voice-tone to absolute annihilation, and strengthening of the pressure of expiration connected therewith, belong to a period perhaps long past and gone. It is equally mistaken to refer the appearance of a sound-change in each case to some particular manifestation of laziness, weariness, or neglect, and to ascribe its non-appearance in other cases to some special care and observation. It may well be that the motory sensation is not in every case developed to the same degree of certainty. But there is no such thing as a conscious effort made to prevent a sound-change. For those who are affected by the change have no suspicion that there is anything to guard against, and they pass their lives always in the simple belief that they speak to-day as they spoke years ago, and that they will continue to the end to speak in the same way. Were any one able to compare the movements which his organs made in the utterance of a word many years before with those which he makes at present, he would most likely find a striking difference. But to make any such real comparison would be an impossibility. The only possible test is in each case the motory sensation; and this is correspondingly modified—in fact, exists no more in the mind as it existed at the previous time.

74. There is, however, a controlling source which opposes a powerful barrier to the development of the single individual just described—that is, the sound-picture. Motory sensation is formed

Controlled
through the
"Sound-
Picture."

from the movements of the speaker only ; the sound-picture, on the other hand, takes shape not merely from our own utterances, but also from all that we hear from those with whom we enter into communication. Now, if it were the case that a notable displacement of the motory sensation were to occur, accompanied by no corresponding displacement of the sound-picture, a discrepancy would be felt between the sound produced by the first and the sound-picture obtained by the previous sensations. Such a discrepancy is avoided by the motory sensation correcting itself after the sound-picture. This happens in the same way as the motory sensation directs itself at first in childhood according to the sound-picture. It belongs to the very essence of language as a means of communication, that the single individual should always find himself in agreement with the companions with whom he communicates. Of course no such thing as a conscious effort at this result exists, but the demand for such agreement remains, as something self-intelligible, unconscious. This demand cannot either be complied with with absolute exactness. If the motory sensation of the individual cannot fully master his movements, and is actually exposed to slight deviations, the free room for the movement which finds play within a group of individuals must of course be still greater, for it will certainly never be in the power of the motory sensation of each individual to satisfy completely the sound-picture which floats before him. And there is this further consideration, that this sound-picture as well must take a somewhat different shape in the case of each individual, thanks to the differences which exist in sound-sensations, and is likewise subject to perpetual vacillations. But these vacillations, within a group connected by active communication, cannot pass beyond rather narrow limits. They are in this case unnoticed, or, even should they be noticed on nearer observation, they still hardly admit

of definition, or indeed of expression, even by the aid of the most perfect alphabet. This is not merely a matter of *a priori* suspicion, but lends itself to objective observation in the case of living dialects—of course not in the case of those which show a graduated influence of the written language. If deviations more or less violent in the case of an individual are found—for instance, as the result of an organic fault—this makes little difference in the result of the whole.

Relation
of the
individual
speaker
to his
linguistic
milieu.

75. As long, then, as the single individual with his tendency to deviation stands alone opposed to his companions in intercourse, he can only yield to this tendency in a very limited measure, seeing that its operations are always counteracted by counter-operations, which regulate the result. A displacement of greater extent can only appear if it prevails throughout the entirety of the individuals in a group which is to some extent secluded from all external influences, at least in comparison to the activity of the communication prevailing within its circuit. The possibility of such a process needs no demonstration in cases where the deviation suits the convenience of all, or almost all, the organs of speech better than the strict conservancy of the direction of the motory sensation. It must be specially noticed in this connexion that the already existing correspondence in accent, time, etc., gives an impulse towards the same path. The same holds good of correspondence in the neutral position. But this is not nearly sufficient to explain the whole proceeding. We see, of course, that manifold developments proceed from the same starting-point, and this without necessarily in every case being conditioned by changes in accent or other circumstances of any kind which claim as their exciting cause psychology; and we must ever put the question anew—How comes it that precisely the individuals composing this group undergo in common the influence of such and such

change? Similarity of climate, of soil, of life has been cited to explain the difficulty. We have, however, to state with reference to this that up to the present date not even the first steps have been taken for methodically collecting materials relating to those which might tend to prove dependence of the development of language on such influences. What is advanced in favour of this theory in individual cases may be easily reduced to a *reductio ad absurdum*. It hardly admits of doubt that peculiarities in the organs of speech are transmitted by inheritance, and hence a degree of relationship, closer or more remote, is to be reckoned among the other factors which condition a greater or less correspondence in the construction of the organs. But this is not the only cause on which the latter depends. And just as little does the development of language depend solely on the construction of the organs. In addition, however, dialectic separation and dialectic reconciliation seem in very many instances to run counter to the corporeal relationship. It will then be labour spent in vain to endeavour to explain the fact of the agreement of all the individuals in a single group as a spontaneous result, and therein to overlook the other factor, which is operative side by side with this spontaneity, viz., the force of community of intercourse.

76. If we start from the assumption that each individual has his special bent and his special development, the possibility of very numerous variations is certainly admitted. But if we take each factor which comes under our consideration as isolated, then the number of the possible variations is indeed very limited. If we observe the changes of each single sound taken singly, and if we again differentiate in this process the displacement of the locality of articulation, transition of closure to narrowing, and *vice versa*, strengthening or weakening of the pressure of expiration, etc., we shall often be in the position of obtaining two possible cases,

and only two, of deviation. Thus, for instance, the *a* sound may gradually change into that of all possible vowels ; but the direction in which it moves can still in the first instance be only that towards *i*, or that towards *u*. Now it can certainly easily occur that the two or three possible directions may, in a large linguistic area, all things considered, be fairly balanced. But it is very unlikely that this should occur in all the different points at every time. The case that, in an area held together by an extremely active intercourse, one tendency should gain the upper hand may easily occur, solely by the caprice of chance—*i.e.* even if the agreement of the majority is not conditioned by a more close inner connexion as against the individuals who stand outside the group, and if the causes which impel to this definite direction are different, as they may be, in the case of different individuals. The fact of the prevalence of a tendency in such a narrow circle suffices to prevail against the opposing barriers. The active cause is, that the displacement of the motory sensation to which the majority leans entails a displacement of the sound-picture according in the corresponding direction. The individual is, in fact, not dependent on the entirety of the members of the whole linguistic community with respect to the arrangement of his ideas of sound, but only, as an invariable rule, on those with whom he enters into intercourse, and again not on these uniformly, but in very different degrees, according to the frequency of the communication, and according as each individual brings his activity to bear in the process. It does not matter from how many persons he hears such and such peculiarity of language; the whole consideration is how often he hears them. We must, while on this topic, observe that the speakers who deviate from the commonly adopted standard may again differ among themselves, and that their several influences reciprocally may thus neutralise each other. If, however, a definite

displacement of the motory sensation has set in owing to the removal of the retarding influence of communication, we then find that in the course of this tendency a further slight deviation is rendered possible. Meantime, however, the minority as well is swept into the current by the movement. Precisely the same causes which prevent the minority from departing too far from the common usage in their progressive movement, forbid also that it should lag much behind the advance of the majority. For the superior frequency of any pronunciation is the only measure for its correctness and fitness to serve as a standard. Thus the movement progresses in this way—there is always a part somewhat in front of the average and another part somewhat behind it; but the whole advances with so little difference between its parts that a striking contrast never occurs between individuals who stand in equally close communication with each other.

77. In this way it will always be found that the displacements which occur within the same generation are slight and scanty. More notable displacements do not occur until an older generation has been thrust aside by a new one springing up. In the first place, if a displacement has already penetrated to the majority, while a minority still opposes it, it will be found that the coming generation will naturally adapt itself to the majority, especially when the majority has the more convenient pronunciation. Even if the minority in these cases should cling to the old custom, it must yet die out. It may, however, be the case that the impulse of the younger generation may set in a special direction differing from the elder one. The same motives which in the case of the elder generation impel to a particular kind of deviation, from the impulse already formed, must in the case of the younger generation operate at the very outset upon the shape to be taken by their language. It may therefore be properly said that the main occasion

of sound-change consists in the transmission of sounds to new individuals. For this process, then, the expression 'change,' if we would remain true to facts, is quite inapplicable ; we have rather to deal with a new creation deviating from the old form.

78. In the process of mastering language the sounds alone are transmitted, and not the motory sensations as well. The agreement of the sounds which are self-generated with those heard from others gives the individual the assurance requisite that he is speaking correctly. That the motory sensation has taken an approximately identical form can only be assumed on the supposition that approximately similar sounds can only be produced by approximately identical movements of the organs of language. If it is possible to produce an approximately identical sound by means of different movements, it must also be possible that the motory sensation of any learner of language may take a different shape from that of the persons from whom he learns it. For a few particular cases such deviation of the form taken by motory sensation must be conceded as possible. Thus, for instance, the dorsal *t* and *s* sounds are not very different from the alveolar in sound, although their articulation is essentially different. Lingual and uvular *r* are still fairly easy to distinguish, and it seems that in different German dialects the one or the other prevails all through ; but the transition of the one into the other can hardly be explained in any other way than by the fact that deviating utterances were not corrected because the sound-deviations were not sufficiently marked.

Sound-changes which do not depend on a displacement of the Motory Sensation.

79. There are other sound-changes which do not depend upon the displacement or deviating form taken by the motory sensation, which, therefore, have to be separated from sound-change in the narrower sense hitherto described. These changes, however, have this much in common with that, that they proceed to their fulfil-

ment without any regard to the function of the word. The effect of these processes is not the change of the elements of which the sentence is composed, by substitution, but merely an interchange of these elements in certain definite cases.¹

80. The first of the changes which fall under this head is that of metathesis. Of this there are two main divisions. The first of these is when two sounds immediately following are transposed, as in the case of AS. *fix* = OHG. *fisc*; *first* = *frist*; *irnan* = *rinnan*. The second is when two sounds not immediately following change their places; cf. the case of OHG. *erila* by the side of *clira* = NHG. *erle* and *eller*; AS. *wcleras*, the lips, as against the Gothic *wairilos*; OHG. *eszih*, which must have had the sound of **etik* before the sound-shifting process set in = Lat. *actum*; Ital. dialectically *grolioso* = *glorioso*; *crompare* = *comprare*; MHG. *kokodrille* = Lat. *crocodilus*.

81. Under this head, too, must be ranged assimilations between two sounds not related, as Lat. *quinque* from **pinque*; original German *finfi* (five) = **finhwi*, etc.

82. We more commonly find dissimilations between two similar sounds not in contact; cf. OHG. *turtiltûba*, from the Lat. *turtur*; *marmul*, from Lat. *marmor*; MHG. *martel* with *marter*, from *martyrium*; *priol* with *prior*; and conversely, MHG. *pheller* with *phellel*, from Lat. *palliolum*; OHG. *fluobra*, 'consolation,' as against OS. *frôfra* and AS. *frôfor*; MHG. *kaladrins* with *kara-drins*; Middle Lat. *pelegrinus* from *peregrinus*.²

83. Further, the falling out of a single sound may be regarded as assimilation, if this be caused by the fact of the same sound occurring in its neighbourhood: cf. Greek *δρύφακτος* 'wooden

¹ Cf. Brugmann, *Zum heutigen Stand der Sprachwissenschaft*, p. 50.

² Cf. Bechtel, *Ueber gegenseitige Assimilation und Dissimilation der beiden Zitterlaute*. Göttingen, 1876. I cannot, however, accept all Bechtel's examples as properly referred to this head.

barrier,' derived from φράσσω, and ἑκπαγλος from πλήσσω. It is just so with the disappearance of an entire syllable occurring near a similar one closing with the same consonant: cf. ἡμέδιμνον, a double of ἡμιμέδιμνον, ἀμφορεύς of ἀμφιφορεύς, κελαινεφής instead of *κελαινονεφής; Lat. *semestris* for **semimestris*.

84. These processes seem to admit of no other explanation than that they are based upon repeated mispronunciations affecting spontaneously a considerable part of the linguistic community. It is a well-known circumstance that in the act of speaking the order of the words, syllables, or single sounds becomes displaced, owing to one element forcing itself prematurely into consciousness. It is equally well known that of two similar elements one is easily dropped. It is further notoriously difficult to pronounce with accuracy a succession of similar and yet different sounds uttered quickly. It is on this that the joke depends about *If Peter Piper picked a peck of pickled pepper*, etc.; *Round about the rugged rock the ragged rascals ran*, etc. It will also be impossible to deny that conditions favourable to certain mispronunciations exist, and that hence these mispronunciations occur in the mouths of quite different persons, and this repeatedly. The mispronunciations may then pass by inheritance as a normal form to the younger generation. These processes are most easily understood when they affect foreign words which contain series of sounds repugnant to the genius of the language which adopts them. In these cases inexact perception and defective recollection will likewise occur. The phenomena often therefore resemble those which will be discussed, under the head of Sound-substitution, in Chapter XXII. below. It suggests itself also often for our consideration if popular etymology is not also at work in producing them. Everything is not yet clear in these processes.

85. We have now to answer the important question, which

has been in recent times the subject of so much dispute: Can we assert uniformity of sound-laws? In the first place, we must fully understand what we mean, generally speaking, by a sound-law. The word 'law' is itself used in very different senses, and this very fact induces errors in its application. The idea of sound-law is not to be understood in the sense in which we speak of 'laws' in Physics or Chemistry, nor in the sense of which we were thinking when we contrasted exact sciences with historical sciences. Sound-law does not pretend to state what must always under certain general conditions regularly recur, but merely expresses the reign of uniformity within a group of definite historical phenomena.

Uniformity
of the Laws
of Sound-
change.

86. In the statement of sound-laws the rule has been to start with a comparison. The circumstances of one dialect have been compared with those of another; those of an older stage of development with those of a more recent. Abstractions have been made by comparing the relations of one dialect with those of another, those of an older stage of development with those of a later one. Sound-laws have also been formed by abstraction by comparing the different relations within the same dialect existing at the same time. The rules commonly adopted even into practical grammars are of the latter kind. Thus, to cite a sentence taken word for word from Krüger's Greek Grammar:—A τ -sound, followed by another, passes regularly into σ . Examples: $\alpha\nu\sigma\theta\eta\nu\alpha\iota$ from $\alpha\nu\tau\omega$, $\epsilon\pi\sigma\theta\eta\nu\alpha\iota$ from $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\delta\omega$, $\pi\epsilon\sigma\theta\eta\nu\alpha\iota$ from $\pi\epsilon\iota\theta\omega$. It has been before remarked that we must not allow ourselves to be led away by such rules to adopt the view that the sound transitions in question are each time effected anew by the creation of the one form out of the other. The forms in question which stand in such a relation to each other are either both taken up by the memory, or one is formed

from the other by analogy (*cf.* Chapter v.). This relation will be designated not as sound-change (*laut-wandel*), but as sound-substitution (*laut-wechsel*). Sound-substitution is not identical with sound-change, but is merely an after-effect of it. Accordingly we ought never to apply the term 'sound-law' to sound-substitution, but only to sound-change. A sound-law can no doubt reflect itself by means of the effects left behind in the relations of a language as they exist side by side; but as sound-law it never applies to this, but invariably to a historical development carried out in a definite period.

87. If we, therefore, speak of the uniform efficacy of sound-laws, this can only mean that in the case of sound-laws occurring within the same dialect, all the separate cases, in which the same sound-conditions occur, are treated uniformly. It must either happen, therefore, that where the same sound existed previously, the same sound always remains in the later stages of development as well; or, where a separation into different sounds has occurred, there must be a special reason to be assigned; and, further, a reason of a kind affecting sound alone—such as the effect of neighbouring sounds, accent, place of syllable, etc.—for the fact that in one case one sound has arisen and in another a different one. No doubt we must take into account in this all the different factors in the production of sound. Especially we must regard the word not as isolated, but in the light of its place within the sentence taken as a whole. Not till then is it possible to recognise the real uniformity of sound-changes.

88. It is not difficult, after the enunciation of these principles, to show the necessity of this uniformity as far as it turns on actual sound-change depending on a gradual displacement of the motory sensation; to speak more accurately, we should no

doubt rather say, not 'uniformity,' but the occurrence of all deviations from it within limits too fine for our detection.

89. It must be plain to every one who acknowledges in all phenomena the operation of general laws, that the process of development works uniformly to its fulfilment. A motory sensation does not form itself specially for every word, but in every case where the same elements recur in language their production is guided by the same sensation. Should, then, the motory sensation suffer displacement by reason of the pronunciation of an element in any word, then this displacement is also a precedent for the same element in another word. Thus the pronunciation of this element in the different words vacillates just as much as does that of the same word within the same narrow limits. Vacillations of pronunciation caused by quicker or slower, louder or gentler, more careful or more negligent utterance, will always affect the same element in the same manner, no matter in what word it may occur, and these must always move in corresponding distances from the normal.

90. As far as the development of a single individual goes, it is always an objection which is urged against the uniform working of sound-laws. It is maintained that our etymological consciousness—our regard for related forms, stands in the way of the operation of a sound-law. Whoever maintains this must, in the first place, clearly understand that it involves no denial of the continuous activity of the factor which impels to sound-change—only the supposition of a factor of an entirely different nature which operates against this. It is decidedly not a matter of indifference whether we assume that a factor is at one time operative, and at another time inoperative ; or whether we maintain that it is under all circumstances operative, and that its operating power is counteracted by that of another factor. But how are we to con-

ceive of the chronological relation in the operation of these factors? Do they both operate simultaneously, so that it comes to no change, or does the one operate after the other, so that the operation of the latter is always again cancelled? The first could only be conceivable on the assumption that the speaker knew something of the threatened change, and sought to guard himself against it beforehand. I think that I have made it sufficiently clear that there can be no question of this at all. If we, however, allow that the effect of the factor of sound makes its influence first felt, but is then counteracted by the other factor, which we shall have in a following chapter to characterise more closely, the uniformity of the sound-laws is hereby admitted. We can advantageously dispute this point at most: Whether it is the rule that the analogy makes itself felt immediately after the appearance of a very slight difference between the etymologically connected forms, or if it does not show itself operative until the gap has declared itself more unmistakably. In principle, this is no difference. That the latter is in any case very frequent, we can see by experience, on which we shall speak at greater length later. But it lies in the nature of the case that differences which are not yet felt as such cannot diminish the feeling for etymology, and are not diminished by this.

91. Equally inadmissible is the supposition that considerations as to the clearness and intelligibility of a form stand in the way of a transition of sound. We come sometimes upon relations which seem to prove the affirmative. Thus, for instance, in NGII. the intervening *e* of the weak perfects and participles after *t* and *d* is maintained as in *redete*, *rettete*, while it is in other cases rejected. But if we revert to the sixteenth century we find that double forms are the rule in every verb; on one hand we find *seigete* by the side of *zeigte*; on the other, *redte* by that of *redete*. Sound-change

has thus made its appearance with no consideration of utility; and the greater utility of the one set of forms has decided merely their continued existence.

92. Thus the question can only remain whether the communication of the different individuals among each other can occasion breaches of uniformity. This would only be conceivable under the supposition that the single individual were to be exposed simultaneously to the influence of several groups of persons who had plainly parted from each other by a different system of sound-development, and that he learnt some words from one, and others from the other group. This, however, presupposes a wholly exceptional state of things. Commonly speaking, there exist no such differences within the linguistic community within which the individual grows up, and with which he stands in far more intimate connexion than with more distant associates. Where it does not happen that, in consequence of special historical causes, larger groups are detached from their original dwelling-place, and thrown together with others where the population is, at most, modified by slight accessions or departures, but remains constant as far as its main body is concerned, no differences can be developed, which are apprehended as such. Even if A pronounces a somewhat different sound from B in the corresponding place, still the apprehension of the one sound as well as that of the other fades into the sound-picture which the hearer already carries in his mind; and thus it follows again that only the same motory sensation can correspond with them. It is absolutely impossible that, owing to two differences so slight, two different motory sensations should form in the same individual. As a general rule it would be impossible, even supposing that the extremes which occur within a small linguistic domain were the only existing ones. But even if the hearer were in a position to apprehend the differ-

ence between these two, still the series of fine transition-steps, which he always hears without any break, would render it impossible to keep a frontier line unbroken. And so, even assuming that he hears one word more frequently and earlier from people who tend to this extreme, and the other more frequently and earlier from people who tend to the other extreme, still this can never produce the result that, in his efforts to repeat the word, the production of a sound in one word should be guided by a different motory sensation from the production of a sound in the other word, if the same individual would set an identical sound in both places.

93. Thus within the same dialect no irregularity develops, excepting either as the result of a mixture of dialects, or, as we shall have to detail with more accuracy, as the result of the borrowing of a word from a foreign dialect. We shall have later to examine to what extent and under what conditions such borrowing appears. Of course in our statement of sound-laws we do not have to reckon with any such apparent irregularities.

94. The attempts which have been made to explain sound-change as dependent on individual caprice or on an inaccurate ear are hardly worth mentioning. A single inaccuracy of ear cannot possibly have any lasting results for the history of language. If I do not accurately catch a word from any one who speaks the same dialect as myself, or another with which I am well acquainted, but if I guess his meaning from the context of his discourse, then I supply the word in question according to the memory-picture which I have in my mind. If the connexion is not sufficient to explain clearly the meaning, it may be that I shall supply a wrong meaning, or I may supply nothing at all, and satisfy myself with understanding nothing, or I may ask again. But how I should come to think that I have heard a word of

different sound, and still to set this word in the place of the one I understand, is to me incomprehensible. Certainly it may more easily happen to a child who has never yet heard a particular word to apprehend that word imperfectly, and to reproduce it again imperfectly. But the child will also frequently reproduce imperfectly that which it has apprehended more correctly because, in its case, impulse is not yet adequately formed. Its apprehension, as its reproduction, will correct itself, if it always hears the word anew; if this be not so, it will forget it. Wrong apprehension of sound is only regularly seen when people who belong to different dialectic areas or different languages converse with each other, and the shape in which foreign words are adopted is no doubt much influenced by this circumstance, but certainly more by the want of motory sensations for the sounds which are wanting to their own dialect.

95. There remain now certainly some kinds of sound-changes in which uniformity of action cannot theoretically be proved necessary. These, however, make up a relatively small part of the entire sound-changes, and they admit of sharp delimitation. Thus, on the one hand, we have to reckon under this head the cases in which a sound is imitated by means of a deviating articulation. On the other side we must include the metatheses, assimilations, and dissimilations referred to on p. 55, *sq.* For the rest, even in this case, we find as a matter of fact, to some extent, that regularity is the rule, especially in the case of the metathesis of sounds immediately following each other, and further, *e.g.*, in the case of the dissimilation of the aspirates in Greek, as in *λέχυκα*, *πέφενγα*, and elsewhere.

96. The question, as to how far sound-laws are to be regarded as admitting of no exceptions, cannot be absolutely decided by the materials of language before us, because there are changes in

language which, although in their nature absolutely different from sound-change, still produce corresponding results with this. Thus our question is intimately connected with the second question: How far does the operation of these other changes extend, and how are they to be divided from sound-change? Of this we shall have to treat below.

CHAPTER IV.

CHANGE IN WORD-SIGNIFICATION.

SOUND-CHANGE is effected by repeated substitution of a sound or sounds almost imperceptibly differing from the original. In this process the disappearance of the old is simultaneous with the appearance of the new. In the case however of change in signification, the maintenance of the old is not excluded by the appearance of the new. It consists invariably in a widening or narrowing of the extent of the signification, corresponding to which we find an impoverishment or an enrichment of the contents. No signification absolutely different from the original can be formed but from the successive processes of widening and narrowing.

Change of
Meaning
consists in a
widening or
narrowing
of its scope.

98. Change in signification, however, resembles sound-change in this, that it is effected by a departure in individual usage from the common usage, which departure passes only by gradual stages into common usage. The possibility, we may even say the necessity, of change in signification, springs from the circumstance that the signification which attaches to a word each time that it is employed, is not necessarily coincident with that which by usage attaches to it considered in itself. As it seems desirable to adopt distinct names for this discrepancy, we shall employ the expressions 'usual' and 'occasional' signification; possibly 'general' and 'individual' might serve as well. We understand then by 'usual signification'

Distinction
of 'Usual'
and 'Occa-
sional'
Meanings.

the entire contents of the conception bound up in any given word as it presents itself to the member of any body of individuals speaking one common language: by the term 'occasional signification' we understand the contents of the conception which the speaker, in uttering the word, connects therewith, and which he expects the listener to connect with it likewise.

Distinction
of 'Abstract'
and 'Concrete'
Meanings.

99. The occasional signification is very commonly richer in contents than the usual one, and narrower in extent. In the first place the word in its 'occasional' sense may denote something concrete, while in its 'usual' sense it denotes only something abstract, *i.e.* some general conception under which different concrete ones may be ranged. By a 'concrete' conception I shall be understood to mean something pre-supposed as really existing, subject to definite limits of time and space: by an 'abstract' one I understand a general conception, the contents of a mere idea and nothing more, freed from all trammels of time and place. This distinction has nothing to do with the ordinary division of substantives into abstract and concrete. The substantive appellations which we call 'concrete' denote a conception as general as the so-called abstract nouns; and, conversely, the latter are occasionally used as concretes, as they are used to express a single quality or activity defined by limits of space and time.

100. By far the greater number of words are capable of bearing in occasional use abstract and concrete significations indifferently. There are indeed some which are by their very essence intended to denote something concrete, but which do not refer to something immediately and definitely concrete, this reference being given them by individual application. Such words as these are the personal, possessive, and demonstrative pronouns, the demonstrative adverbs, and such words as *now, to-day, yesterday*.

101. Words like *I, here, dieser*, serve no other purpose but to

define some one's position in the concrete world ;¹ but in themselves they contain nothing definite, and it requires the aid of individualising elements to give them such definiteness. Then take the case of proper names. These doubtless denote a single object or person ; but seeing that the same name may attach to different persons and different localities, the result is that there remains a variation between occasional and usual signification. Finally, a small number of words have to be considered expressing an object regarded as existing once, and once only ; such are *God, devil, world, earth, sun*. These are at the same time general and proper nouns, but only when understood in a certain way and regarded from a definite, not from a general, point of view. Conversely there are some words which from their very nature must be ranged with the general and not with the concrete : such are the adverbs and pronouns—*ever, any* ; the German *je, irgend* ; MHG. *iemān, dēhein* ; Lat. *quisquam, ullus, unquam, uspiam* ; but the *general* character even of such words as these suffers certain limitations in the occasional usage—*cf.* : *If he ever did, it at all ; If he ever really should do it ; Have you been at any trouble ?*

102. A further and very important difference between usual and occasional signification is the following. The 'usual' signification of a word may be various ; its 'occasional' meaning is always single except in cases where ambiguity is intentionally attached to the word, either to deceive, or to point a witticism. Attempts have been made, as by Steinthal, *Zschr. f. völkerpsych.* i. 426—though unsuccessful we believe—to prove that there are no such things as words with several significations. Under this head must be ranged first those words which correspond in sound, but differ in meaning, such correspondence being purely accidental ; such is

¹ Even our demonstrative pronouns—and the word *the*—may be employed as denoting abstract conceptions : *e.g.*, *The whale is a mammal*. In German *er* can be used in the same way, *e.g.*, *Er bringt lebendige junge zur welt*.

the German *acht*=*diligentia*—*proscriptio*—*octo*. These cases are naturally enough excluded by Steinthal, who maintains that here the words in question are not the same, but different words. In sound, however, they are identical, and whoever hears such a combination of sounds spoken without any connection is powerless to recognise which of the significations inherent in the word is in the mind of the speaker. We thus have, if we keep to the actual state of things, and add nothing which does not strictly belong to it, a word which usually receives several significations. But in the many cases in which we have identity not merely of sounds, but of etymology as well, we are driven to recognise actual plurality of signification. Take, for instance, the word *fuchs* in modern High German. It means, in the first and most common case, 'a fox'; then 'a horse of foxy colour'; 'a red-haired person'; 'a sly fellow'; 'a gold coin'; 'a freshman at college.' *Bock*, 'a he-goat'; *bock*, 'the outside seat of a coach,' and 'a mistake'; *futter*, 'food for cattle' and 'lining'; *mal*, 'a spot,' 'a token,' 'a point of time'; *messe*, 'a mass' and 'a fair'; *ort*, 'a place' and 'a shoemaker's tool'; *rappe*, 'a black horse' and 'a coin'; *stein*, 'a stone' and 'a weight,' and 'a disease'; *geschick*, 'fate' and 'dexterity'; *geschickt*, 'sent' and 'dexterous'; *steuern*, 'to pilot a vessel,' 'to pay taxes,' and 'to hinder'; MHG. *beizen* 'to bait' and 'to chase with a falcon'; *erbeizen*, 'to dismount from horseback'; *wiede*, 'pasture,' 'hunting ground,' 'fishery,' 'time' (as in *anderwiede*, 'another time'); Latin, *examen*, 'swarm' and 'examination.' Steinthal recognises the primary signification in such cases as the only one: to those which have in the course of history sprung from this he denies the title to independence. But his view is correct only as a statement of what exists at the time when the derived signification first springs from the primary meaning. This state of things is however merely transitory. In most

of the cases cited above it is impossible to recognise, without some historical knowledge, the original connexion between the various significations, and these bear the same relation to each other, as if the identity in sound were purely accidental. This is especially true when the primary meaning has disappeared. But in many cases also where the relationship of the derived to the primary signification is still recognisable, we cannot but acknowledge the independence of the former, especially in all cases where it has become the 'usual' one. There is one sure criterion of these cases, viz., whether a word 'occasionally' used in the derivative sense in question, can be understood without the aid of the primary meaning, *i.e.* without the necessity of the primary meaning forcing itself on the consciousness of the speaker or hearer. There are further two negative tests whereby we may judge that a word has not a simple but a complex signification; the first of these is that no uniform definition can be framed wherein the whole extent of the meaning, neither more nor less, can be included; and the second is that the word cannot, if employed 'occasionally,' be used in the whole extent of its signification. The reader may apply these tests to the examples cited above.

103. Even in cases where the usual signification may be regarded as simple, the individual meaning may vary from this, and still not become concrete, proceeding as it may on one of the different bye-meanings included in the general conception. Thus the simple word *nadel* can in single cases be understood as *stecknadel*, *nahnnadel*, *stopfnadel*, *stricknadel*, *hakelnadel*, etc.

104. All understanding between individuals reposes on the correspondence in their psychical attitude.¹ For the common understanding of the usual meaning no more correspondence is needed

¹ The following illustrations proceed much on the same lines as the views put forward by Wegener in his book, *Aus dem leben der sprache*; and to a certain extent resemble those of Bréal, *Les Idées latentes du langage* (Paris, 1868).

than such as naturally exists between all the members of a given number of individuals who speak the same language, assuming always that they have thoroughly mastered their language. When, however, in the 'occasional' use the signification attaching to a word is specialised and still claims to be understood, such claim can only be based upon a closer accord between the speakers. The same words may either be perfectly intelligible or unintelligible, or, again, may be liable to misconception according to the frame of mind of the person accosted and the chance environment of other circumstances, according as certain aids to understanding are present or absent. These aids do not need to be of linguistic nature at all. We must endeavour to form a clear notion of these in detail.

105. Words which properly have an abstract signification may be brought into relation with something concrete by connecting them with such words as those described (p. 66), whose function it is to express the concrete, more especially those with the article where it is developed. But the use of the article has generally developed in such a way that it is not confined to the function of individualising, but is also attached to the noun where it expresses the general conception. Languages which have developed no article employ abstract words (without any special mark of denotation) for the concrete.

106. Whether the reference to the concrete is expressly denoted or no, in any case other means must be adopted for its closer definition. The first of these is the perception common to the speaker and hearer. The latter recognises the fact that the former in speaking of *tree* or *tower* means a definite single tree or tower, that is, assuming that they both have before their eyes the object in question. The perception may be supported and defined by signs made by the eyes or hands, or by other

Words by
which Ab-
stract Words
may receive,
in their
'Occasional'
Use, a
Concrete
Meaning.

gestures. Such signs as these may likewise serve to point to objects not directly cognisable by the senses so long, as the direction in which they lie is known.

107. A second method whereby the word is made to refer to something definite and concrete is found in the past utterances of the speaker, or, it may be, in his special explanation. If it is understood that a word once bears a concrete sense, it is possible that this same sense may continue to attach to the word throughout the further course of the conversation. In this case the remembrance of the previous utterance takes the place of immediate perception. This reference to the past can again be supported by the demonstrative pronouns and adverbs. Originally employed to express a certain perception, the transference of their function to denote previous utterance serves admirably to render the individualising of the signification, intended by the speaker, clear and intelligible to the hearer.

108. In the third place, we have to take account of the special force which may attach itself to the representation of anything concrete, even when this force dispenses with the aid of perception or mention of a word previously used in a particular sense. This force may make itself jointly and commonly felt in the mind of the interlocutors. Such agreement or correspondence is dependent for its existence on the fact of common residence, common age, common position, business, and manifold common experiences of the speakers. An instance of this is seen in the use of the rhetorical usage commonly known as *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Countrymen talk of going *to town* without more definite specification, meaning thereby the town nearest to where they happen to live. Words like *the town-hall*, *the market*, are used by the inhabitants of a particular town for the town-hall or market of that particular town; *the kitchen*, *the dining-*

room, in the mouths of the members of a given family, refer solely to the kitchen or dining-room of their particular house. Thus again, when we speak of *Sunday* we mean the nearest Sunday to the day on which we happen to be speaking, and it only needs to be indicated, in order to fix the Sunday with perfect accuracy, whether the day referred to is past or future. Words expressing the relationship of one person to another are naturally referred to persons who stand in such relationship to the hearer and to the speaker alike: and, further, the singular, in such cases, is perfectly clear, as long as there is only one person who could be properly so described. Thus for the purposes of intercourse between the sisters and brothers of a family, the concrete reference of the words *father* and *mother* is sufficiently intelligible, as is the employment of such words as *the Queen* or *the President* to the British or the Americans respectively. Nay, even in cases where the relation exists on one side only—on that of the speaker, or on that of the hearer—it is still possible, under the influence of auxiliary circumstances, that the reference should be unmistakable. Such a question as *How is the wife?* may be as intelligible as *How is your wife?* If a concrete object have once at an earlier period in any way acquired a signification apprehended alike by the speaker and the hearer, it can be called into consciousness by the word that denotes it. This is especially true if it is still fresh in the memory, or when a situation recurs similar to that in which the object presented itself, as challenging special observation. Suppose, for instance, that two friends are out walking together, and they meet a lady previously unknown to either, about whom they have exchanged remarks. They take the same walk again, and one asks, *Shall we meet the lady again?* In this case the reference in the mind of the other is clear and unmistakable.

109. In the fourth place, a closer definition may be summoned to the aid of the speaker. But it is commonly found that such a definition *per se* produces no concrete sense, but only when used concurrently with the other factors already described. By means of such definition the word to which the definition is attached must either have received a reference to a group of concrete objects, out of which by definition a further selection is made; or a concrete reference must thereby be given to the defining word. Both processes may in fact happen at once. Thus the epithet *old*, if attached to *duke*, gives *per se* no concrete sense. But if the facts of the situation point the reference to some definite ducal family, the person referred to is distinctly defined. The word *castle* gains no concrete meaning by the addition of the word *royal* or *king's* unless the known facts have previously given the word *king* a concrete reference. But the phrase *the king's castle* comes to mean one object and no more when it can be assumed that a single castle of the royal personage in question exists, or if there are any facts in the situation which tend to single out an individual; for instance, if any one be referred to a particular place in which he must necessarily suppose the castle in question to lie.

110. Finally, concrete sense spreads from one word to others placed in relation to it. In sentences like *John never drew bridle*; *I never laid hand upon him*; *I took him by the arm*; *You hit me on the shoulder*,—the words *bridle* and *hand* gain a concrete meaning owing to the subject, and *arm* and *shoulder* owing to the object.

111. In the same way as general names receive a definite concrete reference, proper names which belong to different individuals come to denote but one. The simple appellation *Charles* is sufficient to identify an individual, supposing that he is in our presence, or that we have recently mentioned him. He is

sufficiently identified then, even apart from this, within the circle of his family, or of a small body of acquaintances who have no other *Charles* within their body. Under other circumstances we define him more closely—*e.g.*: *Charles the Sixth of France—Charles the First of England*. In the same way the same name is given to many places; but one name is sufficient to define it for the whole neighbourhood, and even for larger circles when the place meant is by far the most important of all the places bearing the same name (such as *Melbourne, London, Strassburg*): otherwise a nearer definition has to be used, as *Stony Stratford, Newton-le-willows*.

Means by
which
Meaning is
specialised.

112. The same factors which serve to impart to a word a concrete reference serve equally to specialise its signification. On hearing a word, the natural tendency is to think of the most ordinary of its various significations, or of its primary one. These tendencies sometimes coincide. Where, however, it happens that several meanings, each tolerably common, stand side by side, it will be found that the primary meaning will present itself to consciousness before those derived from it; and this will often be found true where the derived meaning is in the more common use. This is in accordance with an ordinary psychological law. But the matter is at once different if certain groups of ideas are awakened in the mind of the hearer before the word is uttered, or will be awakened simultaneously with its utterance, ideas which are more closely connected with a derived or comparatively unusual meaning. It makes a great difference whether I hear the word *sheet* in a haberdasher's shop, or on a yacht, or at a publisher's; as it does if I hear the words *to bind* at a bookseller's, or in a harvest-field. When different men of different trades and professions—as joiners, gamekeepers, medical men—meet and converse, they are given to apprehend each word as

it comes most nearly home to their profession. The connexion in which a word occurs is of great importance. By means of such connexion the different possibilities of the apprehension of a word are minimised. Take such instances as *a good point, a point of view, a point of honour; the bar of an hotel, the bar of justice; the foot of a mountain, the foot of the table; the tongue of a woman, the tongue of a balance; a well-attended ball, a football club; a bay and a grey; the cock is turned on; it costs a crown; the train starts, a train of thought; a clear voice, a clear day; clean linen, a clean heart; John is a donkey; the money goes, the milk goes; to stand still, to stand upon ceremony, to stand at ease.*

113. In the cases we have mentioned the variation of the occasional meaning from the usual one consisted in the fact that the former contained all the elements of the latter, and at the same time something beyond. There are, however, cases where the occasional meaning does not contain all the elements of the usual meaning, while it still may contain something which does not, strictly speaking, belong to the latter. The fundamental condition for the possibility of such partial utilisation of the usual signification of a word is given most ordinarily by the fact that the latter is in most cases made up of different elements which may be separated. Any idea of any substance must necessarily comprehend the idea of several characteristics. But there are also many ideas of qualities and activities which we can designate by a single word, which are likewise compound. For instance, the names of colours denote (of course speaking from a psychological point of view) perfectly simple qualities; *blue, red, yellow, white, black*. And even these may well be employed to denote qualities which, according to their proper meaning, are not fully adequate. For each colour may, of course, be mixed with each other colour

The
'Occasional
Meaning
does not
necessarily
include all
the elements
of the
'Usual'
Meaning.

at will ; and thus there arises an infinite number of transition stages which cannot possibly each receive a definite name. And the result is that we are content to leave unimportant admixtures without any name, so that the limit within which a name expressive of colour is applicable remains uncertain and shifting. But a much wider room for inadequate application is given us by words whose signification consists in a complex assembly of ideas.

114. Such, among others, are all so-called metaphorical expressions. We are accustomed to say that, for a comparison to be made, there must necessarily be, besides the two objects compared, a *tertium comparationis*, or third object with which they are compared. But this *tertium* is nothing new, nothing added to what we have already, but it is that part of the contents of the two combinations (groups) of ideas compared with each other which they have in common. If we say of a man *he is like a fox*, we do not identify the two qualities as in the case of a mathematical equation ; nothing more is meant than this, that one of the characteristic qualities of which the conception 'fox' is made up is likewise implied in the idea that we have of this particular man : *i.e.* as a rule, of his craftiness. And so we are able to say more accurately by expressing the *tertium* as well—*He is as sly as a fox*. On the other hand, we can say even more simply *he is faxy*, in which case the adjective again does not indicate the full extent of all the qualities of a fox, but only a selection of these ; and lastly, simplest of all, we can say *he is a fox*.

Transference
to things
Spatially,
Temporally,
or Causally
associated
with the
original
denotation.

115. There is another possibility which enables a word to pass beyond the limits of its own proper signification ; *i.e.* into a usage again of course at the outset purely occasional. It consists in this, that something which is according to ordinary experience connected with the usual contents by relations of space, or time, or

cause, is understood together with the word, or, it may be, understood alone, when the word is uttered. Under this head falls the figure of speech known in Latin treatises on style as *pars pro toto* [as where *trabs* or, again, *carina* stands for 'a ship'].

116. On each occasion when the word oversteps the limits of its usual signification, a directing impulse must lend its aid—that is, if the reference is to be rightly understood. Such an impulse is in this case more necessary than where nothing further is required than to ascertain which of several significations already recognised as usual is intended (*cf.* above, pp. 74-5). We never feel ourselves impelled to understand a word in a sense which does not include all the elements of its usual meaning, as long as we are not reminded by something that such a sense is impossible. It becomes then a matter of necessity if we would arrive at the right sense, that this reminder should set us on some positive right track. In such proverbs as *Speech is silver, but silence is golden*, we should not think of the predicates as used metaphorically, if they could be understood as connected with their subjects in their proper sense. When Shakespeare talks about the '*majesty of buried Denmark*,' we guess from the combination of *majesty*, *buried*, and *Denmark*, the right sense which we are to attach to each.

117. These departures of the occasional meanings from the usual meaning are starting-points of true change of signification. As soon as these departures repeat themselves with a certain regularity, what was individual and momentary becomes gradually generic and usual. The border line between what constitutes the occasional and usual signification of a word is shifting. In each individual case the beginning of the transition from an occasional to a usual meaning is made as soon as, on the employment or apprehension of the former, the recollection of an earlier employ-

Change
of Usage
effected by
'Occasional'
Modification.

ment or apprehension comes into play: the full transition may be deemed accomplished as soon as such recollection only is effective, and when employment and apprehension alike follow, without any reference to the usual signification of the word. Between these two we may have a manifold gradation. Within the circle of friends who hold inter-communication, the different individuals who compose it may find themselves at different stages in this transition process. It is quite impossible for the process to fulfil its course, in the case of any individual, while his interlocutors remain totally unaffected by its influence. For it belongs to the very essence of the process that it should pass to its fulfilment by repeated and regular employment of a signification which in its commencement was but occasional, and this must pre-suppose an apprehension on at least one side of the circle of interlocutors; and this apprehension is, for these again at least, a commencement of the process. The process will, however, in the case of one individual, not easily pass to its fulfilment, unless the influence which he exercises on his associates is reciprocated by these. Such reciprocal action will of course most readily arise where there is not only external influence at work, but where a spontaneous impulse exists to employ the word in the same occasional sense as it naturally follows from the common mutual relations of the individuals. One of the most powerful efficient in the change from an occasional meaning into a usual one is the first tradition to a new generation. The process of learning the meaning of words is not commonly assisted by any definition by whose aid the usual signification is specified in its contents and full extent; such defining process is in fact an impossibility until a fair knowledge of language is acquired, and must be considered even then exceptional. A child learns only occasional applications of a word, and, what is more, learns in the first place nothing but its relations

to a concrete object. In spite of this the child, when once it has acquired the application of the word, begins at once to generalise it. And this is quite natural. The reference to the single concrete object cannot in any case be permanent. For the mental impression left by such object contains in itself nothing whereby, on a new cognition of the object in question, its actual identity or non-identity with the object once taken cognisance of, can be recognised. The right appreciation of such object depends on a succession of conclusions drawn from a succession of instances, and cannot be gained without this process—nay, in many cases cannot be gained at all. For the simple and unreasoning mind of childhood it is sufficient if the contents of the idea presented to it agree, to warrant an identifying process on his part, whether real identity exists or not. And further, such agreement needs to be partial only—indeed under some circumstances merely trivial—to cause this identification;—that is, as long as the mental impression is still vague and confused. Thus it is that from the very commencement of the process of acquiring language, the custom grows of defining by the same word, not merely a single object but several—not merely objects which actually resemble each other, but such as bear even a remote resemblance. And this custom maintains its ground, even when differences, disregarded previously, are noticed, since it is strengthened and forwarded by the example of the adults. But this course of procedure implies that no clear conception can exist of the contents and extent of the usual meaning. The child makes numerous mistakes from the fact that it connects with the word a conception sometimes too wide, sometimes too narrow, and attaches to it an application correspondingly too narrow or too wide. He will more commonly err on the side of width than of narrowness of application, and the more

so according as his stock of words is more limited. A child will include a *sofa* under the name of a *chair*, an *umbrella* under that of a *stick*, a *cap* under that of a *hat*;—and this repeatedly. Another impulse to inexact appreciation of meaning proceeds from the fact that the objects indicated are frequently parts of a larger whole, or are indissolubly connected with other objects in the speaker's mind. In this case the child cannot but be uncertain how the part which the word is intended to define, when eliminated from the whole idea, should be limited. It will draw these limits now wider, now narrower, than use demands; not unfrequently omitting what of right belongs to the meaning, and including what does not so belong. Besides, the process of learning new words and new methods of applying old ones is far from confined to early childhood. Expressions of rare occurrence, or which denote complex ideas, or which pre-suppose a high or a special standard of culture, have to be mastered by the adult no less than by the child; and supposing that he learns them merely by their occasional application, he is exposed to the same errors as the child. All these inaccuracies in the apprehension of the usual meaning are, taken singly, of no account, and are, as a rule, cured by time. Yet it cannot but be that in particular instances the union of a large number of individuals in the same misapprehension, leaves behind it lasting traces. We shall thus have to recognise a kind of change of meaning depending on the fact that for the meaning which among the elder generation is usual, a meaning only partially corresponding with it is substituted. But we shall have to confine the domain of this change to the rarer sorts of conceptions which more easily defy exact determination, as, in the case of others, a gradual process of correction according to the actual use cannot fail to ensue.

118. In most cases the impulse to change of meaning proceeds

from the elder generation which holds already complete control of the usage. But the younger generation has likewise a special share in forwarding the process, from the fact that the different applications of a word-group themselves from the very outset somewhat differently from the way in which they do this in the case of the older generation. Each method of application, apprehended as it is for each immediate case, may be mastered for itself without regard to other possible ones; and hence each may receive a greater degree of independence than it enjoyed in the minds of the older generation. The derived is often learnt before the primary meaning: and this fact contributes not a little to fixing its independence. A child may for instance often hear a horse spoken of as *a bay*, or a stupid fellow as *an ass*. In such cases the primary meaning is from the very outset dispensed with as an aid to right comprehension. Until an individual has fully mastered the usage of a word, he is not often qualified to distinguish whether a particular manner of application which comes before him is usual or merely occasional, and will thus be inclined to adopt the occasional meaning,—if circumstances have strongly impressed that meaning on his mind—not less readily than the usual one.

119. Seeing that the change in the usual signification takes its rise from modifications in the occasional application, we find in both cases the same kinds of change. The first and main kind, accordingly, is specialisation of the meaning by narrowing the comprehension of the word, and the enriching of its contents. The German word *schirm* is an instructive instance of the difference between occasional and usual specialisation. The word can be used of any object employed as a 'screen.' In the occasional usage it may signify a 'fire-screen,' or 'lamp-screen;' a 'screen' for the eyes, an 'umbrella,' a 'parasol,' etc. But while it is only by some definite situation that we are led to think of the

Classification
of Changes
of Meaning:
1. Speciali-
sation.
Increase of
Connotation.

word as 'fire-screen' or 'lamp-screen,' it immediately occurs to us to conceive of it as 'umbrella' (*regen-schirm*), or 'parasol' (*sonnen-schirm*), and we then think less of the ordinary function of 'screening' than of an object of special shape and construction. Thus we must perforce acknowledge that this meaning has dis-severed itself from the more general meanings, and stands as a special and independent one; and it matters not whether it can logically be ranged under them or not. For this logical subordination is only possible by discarding factors not less essential to the meaning than what we immediately have in view. Other examples are the use of *frumentum* for 'corn' in Latin, of *fruit* for the produce of certain trees as compared with 'the fruits of the earth;' *corn* in English is restricted to wheat, while in German *korn* denotes any species of grain; *dach* was used in M.H.G. for any kind of covering; it is now restricted to the covering of a house [*fowl* in English means specially a 'barn-door fowl']. And a special usage of this kind is seen in the names of materials used for products of materials—as *glass*, *horn*, *gold*, *silver*, *copper*, *paper*, as when we talk of *paper money*, etc. It is the business of the lexicographer to distinguish, in the enumeration of the special usages of a word, between such as have become usual and such as are purely occasional: a distinction which is commonly neglected.

120. Proper names take their rise from the change of the occasional concrete meaning of certain words into usual meanings. All names of persons and places took their origin from names of species; and the usage *κατ' ἐξοχήν* forms the starting-point for this process. We are able to watch this process distinctly in numerous instances of place-names. Such commonly recurring appellations are especially instructive, as the following:—*Field*, *Hill*, *Bridge*, *Townsend*, *Hedges*, *Church*, *Stone*, *Meadows*, *Newton*, *Villeneuve*, *Newcastle*, *Nenchatel*, *Neuburg*, *Milltown*, etc. Such

appellations served, in the first instance, merely to indicate to dwellers in the vicinity the person or town to be indicated; and they were sufficient to distinguish the persons or places intended from others in the immediate neighbourhood. They passed into unmistakable proper names from the moment when they were taken over and apprehended by neighbours at a greater distance in this concrete sense; or when they were more sharply divided from the names of species originally identical with them, by agencies which isolated them still further. No doubt there are besides these a large class of names of places, which from the very outset resemble the nature of strict proper names, in the fact that they are derived from the names of persons, or are at least influenced by personal names.

121. There is also one kind of specialising process which begins to operate immediately that the word is used at all. This is especially found in the case of words which can be derived at will from other words in common use according to the laws of any language, but which do not come into actual use until a special need calls them into play. Such words as these are often only to be referred from the first stage in their career to the root-word, with a more special meaning than the derivative *per se* expresses. Thus the substantive formations in *er*, MHG. *ere*, coming from other substantives in English and German, denote properly a person who stands in some relation to the idea of the root-word, of whatever kind this relation may be; but in the case of single words thus terminated the most varied instances of specialisation are seen. In the case of the MHG. *ahtere*, from *ahte* (NIHG. *acht*, 'persecution'), the word denotes alike the 'pursuer' and the 'pursued'; but in the individual application the two can never be understood together. In the case of *scholar* (Latin *scholaris*) the idea of 'schoolmaster' might well have been included, but there is no trace of the word ever having been

employed in that sense, or in any other sense than that which it bears to-day. [Similarly a *poulterer* is never used otherwise than in the sense of a vendor of poultry; a *fisher* always denotes one who tries to catch fish; a *burgher*, the dweller in a burgh (or borough); a *falconer*, one who keeps falcons for the chase; while a *pensioner* denotes one who receives a pension.] It is the same with verbs like the German *bechern*, *buttern*, *haaren*, *hausen*, *herzen*, *köpsen*, *manern*, etc. In the case of many words we are not in a position to decide whether an application in a more general sense has preceded or not. This original specialisation must, of course, be itself in the first instance only an occasional one, seeing that the word, as such, only points to the general idea evolved by the combination of the root-word with the derivative suffix, and it is the common situation of the speaker and hearer which adds, for the first time, anything to the range of the meaning. It is, in this case also, only gradually that the usage can be formed, and according to the general fundamental necessary conditions of language.

a Limitation to a part of the Original Connotation.

122. In every case where the need of denoting a conception hitherto undenoted makes itself felt, one of the most obvious expedients is to choose a word easily formed, expressive of an important part of the contents of a conception; in fact, some prominent characteristic. Etymology teaches us that many substantives have thus proceeded from the appellations of more simple qualities. But the conclusion is certainly not warranted that all substantives took their origin in this way—for example, that all are necessarily derived from verbs.

123. The second main kind of change in signification—a change contrasting with the former—is its reduction to one part of the original contents; though commonly such reduction is accompanied by amplification on another side. It is hardly possible

to reduce the great mass of phenomena occurring under this head into definite groups. A few of marked peculiarity may be however mentioned. In many cases the appearance presented to the eye gives the motive to the appellation, *e.g.*, in the case of the *eye* of a potato; the *head* or *heart* of a cabbage, the *arm* of a river, the *cup* of a flower. A statue or a picture is named directly after what it represents, as an *Apollo*, a *Laocoon*, the *Adoration of the Magi*. We call a part of one object after the part of another object which by its position corresponds with it; for instance, we talk of the *neck* or *belly* of a bottle, the *shoulder* of a mountain, the *foot* of a mountain, the *tail* of a kite; we call a measure by the name of some object which has a size, or length, or breadth in some measure corresponding, as a *cubit*, an *ell*, a *foot*. The correspondence of the function fixes the name in the German word *feder* for 'steel pen.' The analogy between place and time renders it possible that we should transfer expressions formed to express ideas of conceptions of time to those of place; *e.g.*, *long* and *short*; *before*, *after*; *behind*, and numerous other adverbs and prepositions. The analogy between different modes of sense-perception renders possible the transference of the impression made on one sense to that made on another: take such instances as *sweet*, *beautiful*, *clear* (originally applicable to hearing alone), and the Latin *clarus* (originally applicable to the sense of sight alone). The words used to denote sensual and corporeal ideas are transferred to spiritual and intellectual [as in such cases as *apprehension*, *reflection*--nay, the word *spirit* itself, and the Latin *anima*]. Take also such words as *to feel*, *to see*, *sweet*, *bitter*, *lovely*, *taste*, *dirty*, *great*, *small*, *lofty*, *low*, *warm*, *fire*, *to sting*, *to thrill*, etc. Words again which, strictly speaking, denote one species only, are converted into symbols denoting a wider extension, as *cat*, *crab*, *apple*, *rose*. By confining ourselves to one prominent characteristic, we

may make proper names pass into class names, as when we talk of a man as a *Cicero*, an *Agamemnon*, a *Cato*; and we have such further developments as a *cannibal*, a *vandal*; *Tom*, *Dick*, and *Harry*; *John Doe* and *Richard Roe*. Such adjectives as *romantic*, *Gothic*, etc., may also serve as illustrations of the development.

124. The third main head of change in meaning is the transference of the idea to what is connected with the fundamental conception by local, temporal, or causal relations.

125. The simplest subdivision of this is where a part is substituted for the whole. The part is in such cases always a prominent characteristic, and is only as such capable of denoting the whole. Take such instances as *bow*, *blade*, *flèche*, and the MHG. *rant* (NHG. *rand*), 'rim,' used in epic poetry for shield. Persons and animals are often named after characteristic parts of the body and mind: as *grey-beard*, *curly-head*, *thick-head*; *red-breast*, *fire-tail*; a *good soul*, a *bright spirit*; in French, *blanc-bec*, *grosse-tête*, *rouge-gorge*, *rouge-queue*, *pied-plat*, *gorge-blanche*, *mille-pieds*; *esprit fort*, *bel esprit*. Similar to this usage is the application of names for objects commonly found in connexion with others instead of those with which they are connected. Such are names taken from garments, as *blue-stocking*, *green domino*, a *red-coat*, a *blue-jacket*. There are other appellations which are transferred from one object to that included or contained within it, such as 'the town' in such cases as *the talk of the town*; *the Cabinet*, *the Church*, *the Court*, etc. Conversely we find a transference of the idea from the object to its surroundings, as in *the Round Table*, *the Porch*, *the Mountain*. Very commonly it happens that the name of a quality is transferred to the person or thing possessing the quality, as in *age*, *youth*; *plenty*, *plain*, *desert*, *bitters*: in German a quantity of words in *-schaft*, as *mannschaft*, *verwandschaft* [a termination

3. Transference to things Spatially, Temporally, or Causally associated.

answering to *-ship* in English; and the usage may be paralleled by such expressions as *his worship* in speaking of a magistrate]. There are others in *-head*, originally denoting condition, as *God-head*; but there are many more instances in German of words ending in *-heit* or *-keit*, which are similarly employed, such as *christenheit*, *mehrheit*, *neuigkeit*; and the use of titles generally, such as, *your highness*, *his majesty*, *his excellence*, *his holiness*, etc. As the examples show, collective names take their rise in this way as well as names for single persons and things; but the words in question do not invariably form names for substantives. The same truth holds good about the so-called nouns of action as about the names of qualities. By nouns of action we mean appellations of activity and conditions which are derived from verbs—e.g.: *overflow*, *train*, *income*, *government*, *providence*, *gilding*, *warning*; in German such words as *rat*, *fluss*, *vortrab*, *zukunft*. In these cases the name of the action has been transferred to its subject; but it might equally well be transferred to its object, if object be taken in the widest sense. Thus it may be transferred to the inner object, the consequence of which is the denotation of the result—e.g.: *rift*, *spring*, *growth*, *a rise* (out of a plain), *assembly*, *union*, *education*; or to the exterior object which in any way is affected by the activity, thus, *seed*, *speech*, *doings*, *lamentations*, *bewailings*, *resort*, *excuse*, *dwelling*; add the German *einfahrt*, *ausflucht*: by this method names also are created for the place where anything happens, for the means whereby anything is brought to pass, etc. Here, too, we may classify the practice of denoting writings by the name of their author, as *Have you read Shakespeare?*—or works of art by the name of their painter or sculptor, as *a Raphael*, *a Michael Angelo*; further, that of calling a person by some nickname derived from some favourite word of his own, as *Heinrich Jasomirgott* [and *Cedo*

alteram in Tacitus]; the nursery names of animals, as a *bow-wow*, a *gee-gee*, etc.; besides these we may add the names of such plants as *noli me tangere*, *forget-me-not*, etc.

Combinations
of the above
Cases.

126. Of course the different kinds of change in meaning may follow each other, and so combine. Thus the word *abendmal* has in one sense gained in its comprehension, seeing that it is confined to the sacrament of the Lord's *Supper*, and the solemn ceremony derived from it: on the other hand, it has lost some of its meaning, seeing that it is used of a solemn festival which does not take place in the *evening*. *Rosary* is used of a special kind of necklace composed of beads, and used for a definite sacred purpose, but has lost in its meaning all connexion with roses. A *horn* is a wind instrument which may be made of horn; but the name may equally well apply to an instrument made out of other materials.

127. It is common enough to find that some idea foreign to the essence of a word, but only accidentally connected with it, gradually becomes absorbed into its signification as a mere accessory; and this is then thought of as the proper meaning, the primary meaning passing out of memory. Thus names of relations of place and time gradually pass into causal words: as *consequence*, *purpose*, *end* (in such phrases as *He did it to the end that*, etc.) *means*, *way*.

Change of
Meaning in
Groups of
Words.

128. Seeing that all language proceeds in sentences—in fact, that the unit of language, alike in thought and in sound, is the sentence and not the word—it is natural enough that the change in meaning should affect not merely the separate words, but also groups of words and entire sentences. These are capable, of course, of assuming a meaning at first occasional, which presently, however, by repetition becomes usual: a meaning which is not covered by the words which we receive when we

connect the meanings of the words which compose the whole group. A very few examples of this process may suffice, as we shall have to recur to this peculiarity in Chapter XIX. There are many combinations in German, in which the word *hand* plays a great part, in which, however, the signification *hand* is hardly thought of, unless special attention is drawn to it. Such are *auf der hand liegen, an die hand geben, bei der hand sein, unter händen haben*, etc. We might parallel these expressions in English by such phrases as *well in hand, offhand, hands off, at hand*, etc. We cannot say in these cases that special meanings of the word *hand* have been developed; they have rather been obscured by the attention which we have come to pay to the meaning of the phrase as a whole. English, like German, is full of such turns of expression. In many of these the sense can only be derived from the meanings of the several words by the aid of an historical knowledge of language. Take such phrases as *das bad austragen, einem ein bad zurichten, einem das bad gesegen* (from Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon in the bath), *einen bären anbinden, einen bock schießen, einen ins bockshorn jagen* (from the tall talk of sportsmen) *weder hand noch fuss haben, einem einen korb geben, manlassen feil halten, einem etwas auf die nase binden, einem das pelz waschen, einem ein x für ein u machen*, etc. [In English we may cite such cases as *to dine with Duke Humphrey, to tell a cock and bull story, all his geese are swans, to stuff one up, to give one the sack, to be half seas over*, etc.]

129. The entire store of ideas in the human mind strives to attach itself to the vocabulary of language. But the circle of the ideas of single individuals in any society differs widely from that of others in the same society, and what is more, the circle of the ideas of each individual is always liable to expansion or contraction. Hence it follows that a quantity of individual

Scope of
Meaning
conditioned
by the state
of culture
of the
individual
speaker.

peculiarities must necessarily be found in the ideas attached to the vocabulary ;—peculiarities which are not of the least account in the common definitions of the meaning in the case of the single words, and groups of words. For instance, it is doubtless true that the word *horse* has the same meaning for everybody, in so far as everybody refers it to the same object ; but it is equally true that each man in his own particular line, a rider, or a coachman, or a zoologist will connect therewith a richer quantity of conceptions than any one who has nothing to do with horses. The idea of the position of a father with respect to his own child is composed of a series of factors, which are not always present in their entirety when the word *father* is employed. We can propose a definition of the word *father* which may satisfy the claims of physical and juristic science ; but the very point which, according to this definition, makes up the very essence of the fathership, is not contained at all in the ideas which a little child connects with the word. The differences in the ground covered by feeling and ethical judgment are the most sensible and remarkable. What different individuals understand by *good* and *bad*, by *virtue* and *vice*, is impossible to bring under one definition, indisputable and undisputed.

130. As the circle of ideas of each individual connects itself with the store of words at his disposal, it follows that the meaning of the entire store of words in a language must arrange itself according to the entirety of ideas found in any people, and must change as these change. The meaning of the words adapts itself to the standard of culture attained from time to time by each nation. This comes to pass, not merely by the fact that new words are created for new objects and new relations, or that kindred though different meanings become attached to the old words (as in the instance of *stahl* and *feder*, 'a steel pen,' literally

Scope of
Meaning
conditioned
by the state
of culture
of the whole
community.

'a steel feather'), but there are a quantity of unobserved changes which are not commonly remarked as such at all, and which are the immediate result of a change in the whole culture of a nation. [Take such words as *humility*, *talent*, *spirituality*, and the numerous other words to which Christianity has given a deeper and more spiritual significance.] Then again, such a word as *ship* may have taken its origin when there were only the most primitive kind of ships in existence, and the word may have lived on after a time when ships are constructed of enormous size and complexity. We do not in such cases assume any change in meaning, but still it must be conceded that the ideas attaching to the word *ship* have changed considerably. And thus it fares with all the products of culture, whether they be objects cognisable by the senses, or purely mental or intellectual conceptions.

CHAPTER V.

ON ANALOGY.

Material-
and Formal-
Groups.

AS has been noticed in Chapter I., single words attract each other in the human mind, and the result is the appearance of a quantity of larger or smaller groups. The reciprocal attraction depends always upon a partial correspondence of the sound or of the meaning, or of the sound and the meaning conjoined. The separate groups do not always run in separate parallel lines. There are larger groups which comprise several smaller groups, and a constant process of reciprocal crossing is taking place among the groups. We must distinguish two main divisions which we will denominate as the 'material' and the 'formal.'

132. A material-group is formed by, for instance, the different cases of a substantive. This group again admits of division into smaller groups according to two different principles ; into cases on the one hand of the singular, dual, and plural ; or into the forms of nominative of the singular, plural, and dual, and genitives, datives, etc., of the same numbers ; and these two methods of grouping cross each other. A more complicated system of groups principal and subordinate is supplied us by the forms of the verb, especially in Greek. Larger material-groups with looser connexions arise next by the connexion of all words which correspond in their meaning. As a rule, partial agreement in signification is accompanied by partial agreement in the form taken by the sounds ; and

this again commonly depends upon the etymological connexion of the word. There are, however, material-groups based solely on meaning and not upon sound: such as *sein—werden*, *be—was*, *here—there*, *good—better*, *am—is*, *parvus—minor*, *ὁράω—εἶδον—ὄψομαι*.

133. We understand by formal-groups the sum of all nouns of action taken together, of all comparatives, of all nominatives, of all first persons of the verb, etc.

134. There are also in this case larger groups, which again comprise smaller; for instance, the last-named 1st singular indicative present may be grouped with the 1st singular subjunctive present. Further, the connexion may be of a closer or looser character as it may happen. The connexion of a functional correspondence with one of sound is in the case of the formal-groups not nearly so commonly formed as in the case of the material ones. Commonly the formal-groups fall into several smaller ones, each single one of which is held together by correspondence of its sounds, whilst they differ among themselves; *cf.*, the datives *libro*, *anno—mensae*, *resae—paci*, *luci*, etc. Then, according to the measure, greater or smaller, of correspondence in sound, there arises again a subordination of lesser groups to larger; *cf.*: *gab*, *nahm—bot*, *log—briet*, *riet—held*, *fell*, which correspond with each other, as contrasted with instances like *sagte*, *lichte*, etc. (and *said* and *loved*).

135. The material-groups are all the way through crossed with the formal.

136. Not merely is it the case that single words collect themselves into groups, but analogous proportions between different words do the same. The motive to the creation of such proportion-groups, which form at the same time an equation of proportions, is given by the interpenetration of material- and formal-groups just spoken of. The basis for the comparison is in this case the correspon-

Proportion-
Groups:
Material-
Formal.

dence of the signification of the material element in the one direction and the formal in the other ; so that we may call this division the material-formal proportion-groups. A correspondence in sound may possibly occur in both directions ; *cf. tag : tages : tage = arm : armes : arme = fisch : fisches : fische ; führen : führer : führung = erziehen : erzieher : erziehung*, etc. ; *cf. lead, leader, leading ; ride, rider, riding* ;—or with the permutation, which is possible in the case of all proportions, of the connecting limbs, *tag : arm : fisch = tages : armes : fisches*, etc. The correspondence in sound may, however, be confined to the material element ; *cf. gebe : gab = sage : sagte = kann : konnte* ; Lat. *mensa : mensam : mensae = hortus : hortum : horti = nox : noctem : noctis*, etc. ; *rauben : raub = ernten : ernte = säen : sat = gewinnen : gewinst* ; as against *gebe : sage : kann = gab : sagte : konnte*, etc. Equations, however, in which the correspondence of sound is limited to the formal element, are of much less importance, as *gut : besser = schön : schöner*, as are those in which no correspondence of sound occurs at all, as in the case of *bin : was = lebe : lebte ; ὁρᾶω : εἶδον = τύπτω : ἔτυψα ; am : was = live : lived = go : went ; do and did*.

137. It is possible for proportion-groups to form themselves inside the forms which belong to a material-group, as soon as an arrangement of these is possible from different points of view. Thus, in the case of the noun, the cases of the singular may be set in proportion with those of the plural, as in *hortus : horti : hortus = horti : hortorum : hortis*. A verbal system gives still more manifold proportions. We may, for example, propose equations like *amo : amas : amari : amavisti = amabam : amabas*, etc. There exists here then no difference of the material element in the corresponding members, as in the case of the material-formal proportion-groups ; but in its place a partial difference manifests itself in the function of the formal element by the side of the partial

correspondence. A correspondence in sound may possibly connect itself with the correspondence in the function; *cf. amabam: amabas=amaveram: amaveras* (the tense stem being *ama*).

138. Another kind of equation of proportions depends on the change in sound; *cf. klanges* (phonetically written *klannes*): *klang* (*klank*)=*singe: sang=hänge: hängte*, etc., or *spruch: sprüche=tuch: tücher=buch: büchlein* (change between guttural and palatal *ch*), [*cf. wife: wives=calf: calves*, etc.].

139. The members of each proportion here consist of words connected etymologically, and hence showing connexion in their material element with respect to their signification and the arrangement of their sounds; showing at the same time, however, a difference in sound, which manifests itself correspondingly in all other proportions. The connexion of the formal elements in this case does not enter into consideration. As long as we only consider cases like *klanges: kling=sanges: sang=dranges: drang*, we cannot definitely decide if we have not rather to do with a material-formal equation of proportions. The change in sounds must—if it is to be cited here—show itself in cases which as far as the relations of function are concerned have nothing in common, and must thereby show themselves as independent of the meaning. We distinguish this division of proportion-groups as the material-sound-groups, or etymological-sound-groups.

140. A further kind arises from syntactical connexions. This differs from those hitherto described, in the fact that the connexion of the members of which the single proportions are made up, forces itself on the mind from without, *i.e.* by hearing or speaking. The connexion of analogous proportions with each other must likewise be called into existence by attraction in the mind itself. For instance, sentences like *Rose a nurse of ninety years*, associate themselves with others like *Out spake the mighty Appius*;

the predicate in both cases preceding. Again, associations come about like that of *pater mortuus* with *filia pulchra* and *caput magnum* (where in each case there is agreement in gender, number, and case); and by such associations we get the equation *rose : nurse = spake : Appius*, and *pater : mortuus = filia : pulchra = caput : magnum*. The feeling for a particular function associates itself with the outer form of syntactic connexion, and this function then, in common with the exterior form, constitutes the bond which holds the proportions together. All syntactic functions can be abstracted from such proportions, and such alone. And hence it arises that the syntactical proportion-groups are in some degree the necessary antecedent for the creation of the formal-groups and of the material-formal relation-groups. For instance, it is impossible for genitives to group themselves together unless such connexions as *the house of the father*, *Charles' brother*, etc. do so antecedently.

Influence of
Proportional
Groups upon
Speech
(Analogical
Creation)

141. There is hardly a word in any language which can be said to stand completely out of the groups here sketched. Others are always to be found in some respects like them, to which they can attach themselves. But with respect to the greater or less variety of the connexions into which a word enters, and with respect to the intimacy of the connexion, there are notable differences. The process of grouping comes to its accomplishment so much more easily, and is so much the more durable, on the one hand, the greater the correspondence in signification, and in the shape taken by the sounds;—on the other, the more intensely the elements adapted to form groups are pressed on our notice. In the last respect we have to take into account for the proportion-groups on the one side, the frequency of the occurrence of single-words; on the other, the number of possible analogous proportions has to be taken into account. Where the single elements are not impres-

sive enough, or where their inter-correspondence is too weak, they either fail to unite at all, or their union is at best a loose one. There are again in this case numerous intermediary grades possible.

142. Those proportion-groups which have gained a certain degree of solidity are of supreme importance for all linguistic activity, and for all development of language. It is unjust to this important factor in the life of language to neglect to take it into any account, until it produces an actual change in the use of language. One of the fundamental errors of the old science of language was to deal with all human utterances, as long as they remain constant to the common usage, as with something merely reproduced by memory, and the result of this has been that we have not been in a position to form any right conception of the share taken by proportion-groups in the alteration of language. True it is that W. v. Humboldt insisted on the fact that speaking is a perpetual creation. But even down to the present day we find ourselves confronted by spirited and often unintelligent opposition as soon as we seek to draw the consequences of this view.

143. The fact is that the mere reproduction by memory of what it has once mastered is only one factor in the words and groups of words which we employ in our speech. Another hardly less important factor is the *combinatory activity* based upon the existence of the proportion-groups. The combination consists to some extent in the solution of an equation between proportions, by the process of freely creating, for a word already familiar, on the model of proportions likewise familiar, a second proportional member. This process we call *formation by analogy*. It is an incontrovertible fact that a quantity of word-forms and syntactic combinations which have never been introduced into the mind from without, are able not merely to spring into being by the

aid of the proportion-groups, but also from this time forward are confidently produced without the speaker having any consciousness that he is leaving the safe ground of what he had learnt. For the nature of this proceeding it is immaterial whether anything, during the process, comes out, which was usual in language before, or something which was not there before. Further, it makes no essential difference whether the new stands in any kind of contradiction to that which prevailed hitherto: it suffices that the individual who is uttering a word feels no contradiction with what he has already learned. In other cases it is doubtless true that a reception has taken place from outside; but the after-effects of this would be too weak for the matter received to be again recalled into memory, were it not that the proportion-group into which it has been ranged comes to its aid.

Analogical
Creation in
Syntax.

144. It will be readily conceded that a minimum of the *sensences* which we utter is learnt by heart as such—that most of them, on the contrary, are composed on the spur of the moment. If we try to master a foreign language methodically, rules are given us, according to which we join together the single words into sentences. But no teacher, who has mastered the rules of his profession, will fail, as he goes on, to give examples to illustrate the rules, *i.e.* with a view to the sentences which are to be independently framed. Rule and example mutually supplement each other in their activity, and we can see by this procedure of the teachers that certain advantages attach to the concrete example which are lacking to the abstract rule. In the process of naturally mastering one's mother-tongue no rule, as such, is given, but only a number of examples. We hear gradually a number of sentences which are connected together in the same way, and which hence associate themselves together into one group. The recollection of the special contents of the single sentences may grow less and less distinct in

the process ; the common element is always strengthened anew by repetition, and it thus comes about that the rule is unconsciously abstracted from the examples. Precisely because no rule is given from without, no single example suffices, but only a group of examples whose special contents appear a matter of indifference. For the idea of the general applicability of the examples cited, which gives each individual the feeling that he is authorised to compose sentences on his own account, becomes developed only by this process. As soon as a rule learnt by rote has been frequently enough applied, the time has arrived when it can begin to operate automatically. It is unnecessary to call either the rules or a particular example into consciousness, in order to still form perfectly correct sentences. In fact, as far as the common practice in practical exercise goes, the learner arrives by a circuitous route at the very same point attained by the man who has enjoyed no grammatical training at all.

145. One of the main disadvantages entailed on the individual who has received his ideas by example only, as opposed to him who has received the rule and example at once, consists in the fact that he is not, like the latter, fully instructed as to the applicability of his examples. For instance, whoever hears the German preposition *in* repeatedly employed with an accusative, will be easily led to apprehend this as the ordinary usage of *in* ; and whoever hears the same word employed sometimes with an accusative, and sometimes with a dative, will need at least a certain time before he has rightly found out the difference, and meanwhile will use one or the other promiscuously. In a case like this, a definite rule simplifies matters. Such a combination of two groups which by usage should be kept apart, becomes more possible the finer the logical distinction needed for the purpose, and the greater the room left thereby for subjective apprehension.

146. But a group is in the best position for extending its precedent over the area of a related group, if it decidedly surpasses the latter in respect of the frequency of the cases which occur. And besides, much that occurs in the usage of language stands isolated and alone, and neither fits in with any consciously abstracted rule, nor with a group that has unconsciously arisen. But all that part of language which lacks the support of an environing group, or which enjoys it only in a limited measure, proves, unless impressed by repeated usage intensely upon the memory, not strong enough to withstand the power of the larger groups. Thus, to cite one example, in German, as in other IE. languages, the rule is, that in cases where two objects depend on one verb, one stands in the accusative, the other in the dative. But there are accompanying this rule certain cases, and there were formerly more, in which a double accusative stands instead. These cases have to be learnt by heart, and always must have been. The instinct of language becomes hesitating in consequence of the contravention of the common rule, and this may finally lead to the disappearance of the construction as it becomes isolated. We hear at the present day almost as often the expression '*Er lehrt mir die kunst*,' as '*Er lehrt mich die kunst*;' and no one says any longer '*Ich verhehle dich die sache*,' after the MHC-model, but only '*Ich verhehle dir*.'

Analogy in
Inflexion
and Word-
Formation.

147. But the creative activity of the individual is very marked in the area of word-formation, and still more in that of inflexion. Very few of the verbal and noun forms that we pronounce are due to reproduction by a mere effort of memory; there are many which we have never before spoken nor heard; others so seldom, that without the aid of the groups with which they have connected themselves, they could never be recalled into consciousness. In any case the ordinary rule is that production and reproduction

operate together, and this in very different relative proportions to each other.

148. The operations of analogy force themselves on our attention with special clearness in the case of the grammatical adoption of the inflexional forms of a foreign tongue. A quantity of paradigms are committed to memory, and then of the single words only so many forms are impressed on the mind as are sufficient to fix the fact that they belong to such or such paradigm. Sometimes a single form is sufficient. The other forms are created at the moment when they are wanted, according to the paradigms—*i.e.* according to analogy. In the beginning the paradigm which has been committed to memory will be that which each will have before his eyes. But after a fairly large number of words has been formed after this model, and these have left traces in the mind, the act of creation follows even without the word which has served as paradigm coming into consciousness. The forms at an earlier period shaped from other words now co-operate, and the result is that only the formal element common to all alike comes into consciousness, while the different material elements reciprocally bar each other's way. And thus now the relationship of the speaker to the inflexion-forms at the moment of his application of them is much the same as that gained in the natural process of mastering the mother-tongue. This natural process of learning leads, by a less direct but in the end not less certain path, to the same goal. In this process there is no special adhesion of the formal elements to a special single material one, and the totality of the possible forms never ranges itself in a definite sequence into one series. The principle is never laid down that such a word must accommodate itself to another. The circumstance that a quantity of forms of different words have like relationships to each other is sufficient to produce the feeling that

we are justified in carrying this likeness still further. As soon as all the forms of a quantity of words have imprinted themselves on the mind and closed into groups, the instinct of language regards it as self-evident that the forms of other groups belong as well to such groups: *e.g.*, that the other cases of a substantive belong as a necessary complement to the nominative or genitive of a substantive. And hence it comes also that we do not apprehend each case and each verbal form as a special word, but that we comprise at once the whole series of forms under the ordinary titular form (nominative, infinitive) of a substantive or a verb. [*Cf.* Welsh *plant*, 'children.']

149. The circumstances attendant on *word-formation* resemble only partially those of inflexion. It is true that numerous methods of such formation come into being as easily and simply as the flexional forms, as in the case of the comparative and superlative from the positive. In other cases the words transmitted call forth creations by analogy only in a limited quantity, and again in the case of others they call forth none at all. This difference of relation is simply conditioned by the different adaptability of the material transmitted to group-formation.

150. Seeing that most of the forms common in language permit of being reduced to similarly related groups, it is natural enough that by the aid of proportions, groups should often be created which were before common in language. But if this was to be invariably the case, on the one hand, all forms which could have been formed according to proportion would have to be already once formed; and, on the other hand, such a perfect harmony of the form-system would have to exist as we nowhere find in fact; or at least, where different methods of formation existed side by side (different classes of declensions or conjugations, different methods of forming a noun of the agent from a verb, etc.), corre-

Divergence
of Analogical
Formation
from Unger.

sponding forms from different classes would never take analogous forms; but every single form would indicate, without the least ambiguity, to which of the existing classes the word in question belonged. As soon as a form is capable, in respect of its structure, of belonging to more classes than one, it becomes likewise possible to construct the other forms attaching to it upon more than one scheme. Which of the two alternative schemes shall then prevail depends solely upon their relative strength.

A proportional formation meets with no check in the mind where no expression for the function for which it is created is as yet in existence. Neither does it where a divergent expression is already in use, which has not, however, been transmitted to the person in question; and this is common enough in the rarer class of words. If, however, the ordinary form has once been received into the memory, it is a mere question of power if, at the moment when a particular function is to be exercised, a form for this purpose is raised into consciousness by means of simple reproduction or by the aid of a proportion. It may in this case happen that the proportion asserts itself in the first place, but that the connexion formed at an earlier period with the remembered image of the usual form is still strong enough to render perceptible the contrast between the new creation and the image in the memory. One begins then to reflect that one was going to say, or has already said, something wrong. This is, then, one of the various ways according to which one can commit an error in speech. We shall also have to admit such error when the speaker, after he has spoken, does not of himself become aware of the contrast with the picture on his memory, but immediately recognises it when his attention is called to it by a gentle hint. But the power of the memory-picture may be so small that it has no power to contend against the proportional formation, and the latter prevails unchallenged.

151. By the operation of the groups each individual has thus at once the power and the disposition to pass out of the usual in language, and both in a high degree.

152. We have now to notice that everything which is created in this manner leaves behind it a lasting effect. Should this not be from the very outset strong and tenacious enough to render an immediate reproduction possible, still it renders a future repetition of the same creative process more easy, and contributes towards the further pushing back of the possible opposing obstacles. By repetition like this, there can afterwards be added to the new formation such power as it wanted in order to be directly reproduced.

153. But each such transgression of usage, when confined to the case of an individual, where it adds something to the usual sense without contradicting it, gives the impression of a certain audacity ; where it does contradict it, it appears as an unmistakeable fault. It is possible for such fault to remain isolated, and not to pass into any sort of custom ; it is likewise possible for it, even after it has passed into a custom, to be laid aside again by the force of intercourse, whereby the usual is again appropriated, whether this be for the first time or anew. Assuming, however, that it is not laid aside, it commonly perishes with the individual, and does not easily pass to any other. It is much easier for a creation which conflicts with no previously existing one so to pass ; in this case it is far easier for a single individual to give the impulse. On the other hand, it fares just the same with the replacing of the hitherto-usual by the new as with the change in sound and meaning. It is only on an occasion when, within a limited area of intercourse, the same new creation makes its influence completely felt, and this spontaneously, in a large number of individuals, that a change of usage can shape itself. The

possibility of such a spontaneous correspondence in the case of several persons depends on the overwhelming agreement in the organisation of those groups of ideas which influence human speech. The greater the number of those among whom the new formation makes its appearance, the easier will be the process of transmission to others; in fact, the faster will what at first seemed an error gain in authority.

154. As with respect to the sound-relations, and with respect to the meaning attributed to the words, we find the most violent departures in new analogical formations from ordinary usage in the language of children. The less finished, and the weaker the impression made by the single words and forms, the less the restrictions put upon the new creation; the wider play, in fact, will it be found to have. Thus all children have a tendency to employ the regular and usual methods of composing words for the irregular and unusual modes, which do not yet adhere to their memory. In NIG. [or English], for instance, they are disposed to treat all verbs as weak. If, with the increasing development of the individual, the process of new formation grows more and more rare, this is of course not in consequence of any disappearance of a store of wealth which was originally there, but of the diminished necessity for such formation; since, to serve the very purpose for which they were at an earlier period called into being, forms caught up by memory tend to present themselves more and more. Commonly it will be found that in this particular area the aberrations of children's talk leave behind them no particular consequences for the further development of language in general; but here and there traces remain behind even of this. Particularly in cases where the adults are disposed to new word-formations will a corresponding inclination manifest itself even more strongly in the children; and these will give themselves free career in gratify-

ing the inclination as soon as ever the necessary restriction due to the language of the adults is removed.

155. An analogical new formation has no power to drive out of the field at a single blow a pre-existent form of similar meaning. It is scarcely conceivable that the picture of the latter should at one and the same moment become so faint in all the individuals of a community that analogical formation could proceed on its course without let or hindrance. On the contrary, it always happens that certain individuals persistently maintain the old form, while others avail themselves at once of the new formation. But as long as ever an unbroken intercourse is maintained between the two, there must be some kind of compromise as well, and thus, in a smaller or more numerous group of individuals both forms must necessarily become current. Not till after a long and obstinate struggle between both forms can the new formation be invested with undisputed sway.

156. Seeing that the new analogical formation is the solution of an equation between proportions, it follows that at least three terms must be present to enable such an equation to be instituted. Each must be capable of being compared in some point with the other—*i.e.* in this case an agreement must appear, with the one in the material, with the other in the formal element. Thus in Latin such an equation may be instituted as this,—*animus : animi = senatus : x*, but not *animus : animi = mensa : x*. And thus it happens that a word can only undergo any influence depending upon analogy, when it agrees with these in the formation of one form or of several. No doubt it is true that influence at times makes itself felt without such agreement, but this can then hardly be called formation by analogy in the strict sense of the word. A flexional termination may be felt owing to the special frequency of its occurrence as the regular and usual termination for a flexional form. It then extends

probably to other words even without the support of words similarly formed. Of this nature is, in Attic Greek, the extension of the genitive termination *-ου* from the second declension to the masculines of the first: we find *πολίτου* instead of *πολίτεω*, as we should expect, from the Homeric *-αο* and Doric *-ᾶ*; the coincidence of both in gender has in this case sufficed to set the influence at work. [There are many similar instances in modern Greek.] The genitive dual of the third declension in Greek has borrowed its termination from the second; *ποδοῖν* is formed after the analogy of *ἵπποιν*. In German the genitive ending in *s* is transferred to the feminine proper names with the termination *a*, as *Berthas, Claras*.

157. Of course new formations come into existence as well on the basis of the proportion-groups described before, which combine out of forms of a similar material-group. In MHG. the third persons plural run as follows:—Indic. pres. *gebent*, conj. *geben*; indic. pret. *gāben*, conj. *geben*. In NHG. the form *geben* has also been adopted in the indic. pres., after the analogy of the other three forms; in late MHG., *ent* has found its way into the other forms by a reverse process. The second person sing. indic. pret. of the strong verb, which was formed after a peculiar fashion in MHG. (*du gābe, wāre*) is altered after the analogy of the other second persons.

158. The creative effect of analogy in the region of sound-substitution has hitherto received very little attention. Sound-substitution is in the first instance, as we have seen, an effect of sound-mutation, which sets in when a similar sound or group of sounds has split into several, in consequence of different conditions of sound. As long as these conditions are maintained, and, besides this, no disturbance of the effects of the sound-transformation comes in through other influences, it is possible that the forms which have arisen through the process of sound-mutation may arrange themselves into proportion-groups (*see* examples, p. 95).

Analogy in
Sound-
Substitution.

In this case we may speak of the change in sound as a living one. If, however, the conditions disappear which caused the different treatment of the sound, then no more etymological sound-proportions are able to form themselves; in fact, the process of sound-change is petrified. Thus, for instance, the change between *k* and *g* in *ziehen*—*zug*, *gedeihen*—*gediegen*, is conditioned no longer by relations in the speech of the present day—the reason which originally called into existence this substitution, *i.e.* the changing Indo-European accent, has long been put out of account. The change between *hoher*—*hoch*, *sehen*—*gesicht*, *geschehen*—*geschichte*, coincides no doubt with a change of the position within the syllable; but seeing that in most cases where a perfectly analogous change of position takes place, no sound-change any longer occurs (*cf.* *rauher*—*rauh*, *sehen*—*sah* and *sicht*, *geschehen*, —*geschah*, and *geschieht*), this change is likewise dead. It is different in MHG., where it is an all-prevailing principle that the sound of a *ch* answers to an *h* in the beginning of a syllable where it stands after the sonant of the syllable. Thus we find *rüher*—*rüh*, *sehen*—*sach*, *geschehen*—*geschach*; before *s* and *t* in early MHG. we certainly find an *h* written as well (as in *sihst*, *sicht*); while in later MHG. we find it likewise denoted by *ch* (*sichst*, *sicht*).

159. The material-sound proportion-groups are productive, it will be observed, in the same way as the material-formal. It is for instance inconceivable that both the different pronunciations of the German *ch* are specially learnt by each individual to meet each special case; rather do memory-impressions and creation-by-analogy operate simultaneously; and, indeed, without the co-operation of the latter the invariability in the change between both could not be acquired which actually exists.

160. The operation of analogy in the case of *sandhi*-phenomena is past all doubt. What would on any other hypothesis be the

explanation of the fact that in French the final consonants *s, z, t, n* are treated differently according as the word connected with them begins with a consonant or a vowel? It is no doubt possible that a quantity of such combinations as *nous vendons—nous aimons, un fils—un ami*, have perpetuated themselves by memory from generation to generation, but certainly this cannot be the case with nearly all that come into use, and have at an earlier period done so. In spite of this, the change is accurately observed even by those quite unversed in grammar, and in the case of any new combination at will.

161. The action of etymologico-phonetic proportional groups commonly produces such forms as would also be produced by the fundamental sound-mutation. Still it sometimes happens that new forms are produced which would be impossible according to the strict law of sound-change. The reason of this is either a reversal of the proportions not properly justifiable, or a confusion of the relations by means of later sound-mutation.

162. The sound-law in many High and Middle German dialects holds good that *n* in the auslaut of syllables has disappeared, but has maintained itself at the end of the word, when the following word commences with a vowel, and it has transferred itself to this: thus in Swabian *ɛ ros (ein ross)—ɛ-n ôbət (ein abend), i duɛ (= M.H.G. ich tuon)—duɛ-n-i*. The speakers are therefore accustomed to find an *n* in many cases apparently intruding between a vowel-ending and a vowel-commencement; and in consequence of this, the *n* transfers itself to cases where in the older time no *n* existed. Thus in Switzerland we find combinations like *wɔ-n-i*, 'where I;,' *sɛ-n-iʃʃ*, 'so it is;,' *wɪɛ-n-ɛ*, 'how a;,' *sɔ-n-ɛ*, 'so a;,' *bɪ-n-ɛm*, 'by him;,' *tsüɛ-n-ɛm*, 'to him.' The same phenomenon meets us in Swabia, e.g. in the dialect of the country round Horb: *bɛi-n-ɛm*, 'by them;,' *zuc-n-ɛm*, 'to them;,' *dt md-n-i—dich mag ich, lô-n-ɛms—lass es ihm*, 'leave it

to him ;' *gei-n-ems—gib es ihm*, 'give it him ;' while similarly in Bavarian Swabia, and in a neighbouring portion of the regular Bavarian area *si-n-ist=sie ist*, *wie-n-i=wie ich*, etc. In the Carinthian dialect we also find *bd-n-enk=bei euch*. In the old Provençal we find the form *fon*, a variant of *fo*, formed after the analogy of *bon—bo*. Under this head comes also *ν ἐφελευστικόν*, so far as it is not etymologically justified.

163. [Familiar examples of this transference of *n* are seen in cases like *next* in English for *an est*, etc.]

164. The same law which holds good in the Alemannic and Swabian for *n* holds good in Bavarian for *r*. The Bavarian, therefore, says *der arm*, but *de jung* ; *er is*, but *ē hāt* ; *mei bruçder oder i*, but *i odē mei bruçdē*. In consequence of this, we see combinations arise like *wie-r-i=wie ich*, *ge-r-ē=gehe er*, *dā siç-r i=da sche ich*, *kāç-r-i=kann ich*, *aç-r-i=abhin=hinab*. Correspondingly we find MHC. *jārđ*, *nūrd* (from *jā*), *nū + d*, which must be explained after the analogy of the relation *dā* (from an older *dār*) to *dārane*, *wā* to *wāranc*, *hīc* to *hīranc*, *sā* to *sāric*.

165. Double formations in the phonetics of sentences are doubtless the domain in which this kind of analogical creation most commonly manifests itself. But it is not confined to these. If in late MHC. after the final *e* is dropped from *zæhe*, *geschæhe*, *hæhe*, etc., the forms *zæch*, *geschæch*, *hæch* take their rise, we must probably not suppose a transition of the *h* sound into *ch* : the forms have rather attached themselves to the analogy of the change which existed before between *hoch—hohes*, *geschehen—geschach*, etc. It will be precisely the same in cases like *sicht*, *geschichte* (written in olden times *siht*, *geschiht*), from *sihet*, *geschihet*.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTS OF SYNTAX.

ALL linguistic activity consists in the formation of sentences. A Sentence is the Linguistic Expression of the combination of several ideas. The sentence is the linguistic expression or symbol, denoting that the combination of several ideas or groups of ideas has been effected in the mind of the speaker; and is at the same time the means of reproducing the same combination of the same ideas in the mind of the hearer. Any narrower definition of the sentence than this must be rejected as insufficient. Among the common errors touching the essence of a sentence, we must reckon the notion that it must contain a finite verb. Combinations such as *omnia præclara rara; summum ius summa iniuria; träume schäume; I a liar?—I thank YOU?—YOU talk to ME?*—are in every respect sentences as good as *The man lives; he is dead.*

167. We possess the following means of expressing in language the combination of ideas: (1) The juxtaposition of the words which correspond to the ideas by themselves; (2) the order of these words; (3) the gradation amongst these in respect to energy of utterance, to the relative strength of emphasis, as, *Charles is not COMING—Charles is NOT coming*; (4) the modulation of the pitch—*cf., Charles is coming*, as spoken in a mere assertion, and *Charles is coming?*—as an interrogative sentence; (5) the time, which is commonly found to stand in close correspondence with the energy and the pitch; (6) link-words, such as prepositions,

conjunctions, and auxiliary verbs; (7) the inflexional modification of the words, whether (a) the method of the combination be more closely defined by the inflexional forms themselves (*patri librum dat*), or (b) the connexion between the words be denoted by formal agreement, as in *anima caudida*. It is self-evident that the two last methods have only been able to shape themselves gradually by means of a somewhat prolonged historical development, while the five first-named stand at the disposal of the speaker from the very outset. But (2) to (5) inclusive are not always directly determined by the natural course of the ideas and feelings they represent, but are capable of a traditional development [*cf.* the method of distinguishing homonyms in Chinese, by lowering or raising the tone].

168. The way in which the ideas are capable of being connected with each other is fixed with more or less exactness according to the frequency and definiteness of the methods employed. It is with regard to the method of combination, just as with respect to the single idea. The linguistic expression for this does not need to be equivalent to the psychical relation as it exists in the mind of the speaker, and as it is to be produced in the mind of the hearer. It may be much less definite.

Subject and
Predicate,
Psychological and
Grammatical.

169. It thus happens that every sentence consists of at least two elements. These elements are related to each other, not as exact equivalents, but are differentiated according to their function. They are termed subject and predicate. These grammatical categories repose on a psychological, a logical, relation. No doubt we have to distinguish between the psychological and the grammatical subject or predicate, as the case may be—since the two do not always correspond, as we shall presently see in detail. But still it remains true that the grammatical relation is built up solely on the foundation of the psychological.

170. The psychological subject is the group of ideas which is first present in the consciousness of the speaker or thinker; with this a second, the psychological predicate, unites itself. The subject is, to speak with Steinthal, the apprehending portion; the predicate the apprehended. Von der Gabelentz¹ is quite right in defining both elements from the point of view of the hearer. The psychological subject, according to him, is that on which the speaker wishes to make the hearer think, and to which he would direct his observation; the psychological predicate that which he wishes him to think about it. Still, such definition of the predicate might easily lead to an erroneously narrow conception, such as is commonly current in our grammars. We must abide by this principle, that it depends only upon this, that one idea is in consciousness connected with the other idea.

171. We are accustomed nowadays to attach a narrower sense to the relationship of the subject to the predicate. If the predicate is a noun, we demand for the normal structure of the sentence that it should either be identified with the subject, or that it should denote the wider conception to which the narrower one of the subject should be subordinated, or that it should announce a quality inhering in the conception of the subject. But in the case of proverbs and proverbial expressions relations of quite another nature are expressed by the grammatical form of the juxtaposition of subject and predicate; take such expressions as *one man one vote*; *much cry and little wool*; *first come first served*; *a word to the wise*; *like master like man*; *better aught than nought*; in German, *gleiche brüder gleiche kappen*; *viel feind' viel chr'*; *vieler köpfe viele sinne*; *alter fuchs alte list*; *klein geld kleine arbeit*; *neuer arzt neuer kirchhof*; *heisse bitte kalter dank*; *kurz gebet tiefe andacht*; *roter bart untrene art*; *gevatte übern zaun gevatter wider herüber*; *glück im spiel unglück*

¹ *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, vi. 378.

in der liebe; mit gevangen mit gehangen; früh gesattelt spät geritten; allein getan allein gebüsst: correspondingly in other IE. languages, as in French we find *bon capitaine bon soldat; bonne terre mauvais chemin; longue langue courte main; brune matinée belle journée; froides mains chaudes amours; fèves fleuries temps de folies; soleil à la vue bataille perdue; point d'argent point de Suisse*, etc. Certainly we are accustomed to apprehend such sentences as abbreviated hypothetical periods, and accordingly to set a comma between the two component parts: but the fact that they may be paraphrased by a hypothetical period (such as *where there is much cry there is little wool*) does not concern us. The grammatical form of such is precisely the same as that of *borrow sorrow; most haste least speed*. In the first sentences formed by children, the mere collocation of words serves for the expression of all possible relations.

172. Examples taken from experience are given by Steinthal (*Einkl.* pp. 534-6): *cf. papa hat=papa has a hat on; mamma baba=I will sleep with mamma*. Where a foreign language has to be employed, with which the speaker is only imperfectly acquainted, he turns in his need to the same primitive method of rendering himself intelligible, and is understood, supported as he is by the situation. He says, for instance, *wine table*, and is understood to mean that he wishes the wine to be placed on the table. The conditions which cause the production of such sentences, and which enable the hearer to guess the unexpressed relation of the conceptions, occur, of course, not merely in the commencement of each man's linguistic activity, or in that of mankind generally speaking, but at all times. If they come to be employed in the stages of higher development only in a limited degree, the reason of this is merely that more perfect means of expression are at hand.

173. Originally there was one method, and one only, of mark-

ing the difference between subject and predicate—i.e. stress of tone. In the case of the isolated sentence, the psychological predicate is always the more strongly accented, as the more important portion of the sentence, and as containing the new matter. This may be regarded as a law pervading all nations and all ages. The place in the sentence may have afforded a second means of distinction. Von der Gabelentz, in the treatise mentioned above (p. 376) lays it down that the order subject-predicate (both regarded as psychological categories) may be held as admitting no exceptions.¹ This view does not seem to me quite correct. In pronouncing judgment on this question, we must leave out of consideration the language, and the cases in which a strict rule has been laid down by tradition for the position of the grammatical subject and predicate. We may only cite cases in which both may change their place—cases therefore in which the position is conditioned, not by grammatical, but solely by psychological rules. The view held by Von der Gabelentz, that a preceding grammatical predicate is always the psychological subject, no doubt meets in many instances the case, as, for instance, in this passage from Goethe: '*Weg ist alles, was du liebtest, Weg, warum du dich betrubtest, Weg dein glück und deine ruh.*' If, however, we say '*A puff of wind caught the hat, and away it went,*' we cannot possibly take *away* as a psychological subject. In the same way there exists a correspondence between the psychological and grammatical subject if, in reply to the remark, '*John seems a sensible man,*' the answer should be given, '*'Tis an ass that he is;*' and so in many cases. The idea of the subject, no doubt, always precedes in the consciousness of the speaker; but as soon as he begins to speak, the more significant idea of the predicate may press so far into the foreground that it

Means of
distinguish-
ing Subject
and Predi-
cate:
Emphasis,
Position, etc.

¹ Wegener, on the other hand (p. 31 *opp.*), holds the precedence of the predicate to be the natural order, a view which I cannot adopt. [Cf. Herbert Spencer's *Essay on the Philosophy of Rhetoric* for a discussion of the question.]

must be uttered in the first place, and the subject not be added till afterwards. This often occurs when the idea of the subject was previously present in the conversation, as in the instances just mentioned. Then the person addressed has, as a general rule, while he is hearing the predicate, the subject belonging thereto in his mind, which, indeed, may as well remain unexpressed: *cf.*, 'What is John?'—'A merchant.' But even when the person addressed is not prepared for the subject, a desire to produce superior emphasis may cause the predicate to come to the front. The speaker, then, in his interest in the presentation of the main idea, holds the accurate guidance of his interlocutor as of secondary importance; and it does not occur to him till later that such guidance is necessary. It is a similar psychological process when the subject is expressed at first by a pronoun, whose relation is not self-evident to the person addressed, and is not expressed more definitely till later, as, *She is coming, my life, my dear* (TENNYSON); *Ist sie blind, meine liebe* (LESSING); *sie hindert nicht allein nicht, diese binde* (ib.); *was für ein bild hinterlässt er, dieser schwall von worten* (ib.); *MHG. wie jämmerliche es stät, daz hère laut* (WALTH. v. d. VOGELWEIDE); *si ist iemer ungeschriben, din frönde die si hāten* (HART. v. AUE); *Fr. elle approche, cette mort inexorable*. It is clear from the citations given above that the sentences with a psychological predicate preceding have a relationship with the sentences to be considered further, in which the predicate alone is expressed. They are an anomaly, as against the custom of placing the subject first, which obtains in less passionate narration or description; but they are an anomaly which still cannot be set aside, and an anomaly of not unfrequent occurrence. Thus the position of the words cannot be regarded as a means of marking the separation between subject and predicate given with the commencement of sentence-construction.

174. Just as single words may possess concrete and abstract significations, so may sentences as well. A sentence is concrete when one of the main members of it, the psychological subject or the psychological predicate, is concrete. Normally the subject which gives the sentence its concrete nature would be concrete. Concrete and abstract sentences do not need to be different according to the form of their expression. We can say generally with respect to the nature of a horse, *The horse is swift*, just as with respect to some particular horse we can say, *The horse is worthless*: and the different nature of the sentences can only be told by the connexion and the situation. In the first sentence we might employ a plural means of expression, *Horses* (or, *all horses*) *are swift*. But it cannot be said in that case to remain properly abstract; for 'all horses' must mean all horses which exist, and is consequently to be looked on as a concrete expression. If the subject is concrete, the sentence cannot be abstract. No doubt the different possibility exists that the predicate can be thought of as something simply attaching to the subject, something stationary or repeating itself, or as something attaching itself only at a particular time. In the first case there exists in some sense a middle step between an abstract and a concrete sentence, and it may be allowed in default of a better to employ for this kind of sentences the expression 'abstract-concrete.' This difference, however, does not require to be met by a corresponding difference in form of expression. *He speaks quickly* may denote 'He speaks quickly at this moment,' and 'He commonly speaks quickly;' *He is lazy*, may denote a fault on a given occasion, or a lasting characteristic.

175. Our assertion that two members at least go to make up a sentence seems to be contradicted by the fact that we find sentences consisting of only a single word or of a group forming a

Concrete and
Abstract
Sentences.

Sentences of
apparently
one element
only.

unit. The contradiction is explained by the fact that in this case one member of the sentence (as a rule the logical subject) is taken for granted, and finds no expression in language. It may be completed from what has been said before. We ought specially to notice that in the course of conversation it often needs to be taken from words of the other. The answer commonly consists of a predicate alone; the subject is either contained in the question, or the whole question is the logical subject. (1) '*Who struck you?*'—'*John.*' (2) '*Was it you?*'—'*Yes*' (*No, certainly, surely, of course*). Similarly remarks like the following may serve as predicate to a sentence spoken by another, *Alas, all right, very possibly, strange enough, no wonder, nonsense, stuff, balderdash*, etc. In other cases, it is the object of perception common to speaker and hearer alike—the *situation*—that forms the logical subject, to which the attention may be still more pointedly directed by gestures. This object of perception may be the speaker or the person accosted; *cf., your servant, most obedient servant; all right, welcome; so sad! why so sad?* Besides these we have many exclamations of astonishment and alarm and appeals for aid, like *fire!—thieves!—murder!—help!* and challenges, like *Friend or foe?* Questions, too, like *Straight on or not?—Right or left?* When the Prince in Lessing's *Emilia* begins with *Klagen, nichts als klagen! Bittschriften, nichts als bittschriften!*—these are mere predicates: the subject is formed by the letters which he takes up in his hand. In the case of such sentences, which as far as their mere expression goes consist of a single member, what for the speaker is the psychological predicate becomes for the hearer the subject instead. For the man who, on seeing a house on fire, calls out '*Fire!*' the situation is the subject, and the common idea *fire* is the predicate; on the other hand, for the man who hears '*Fire!*' cried before he him-

self sees a fire, the idea of fire is the subject, and the situation is the predicate. There may also occur sentences in which, for both sides alike, what is uttered is the subject, and the situation is the predicate. Supposing, for instance, that any one sees a child in danger, he naturally cries out to the person intrusted with its custody merely—‘*The child!*’ Hereby the object alone is denoted to which attention is intended to be called—*i.e.* the logical subject: the predicate, on the other hand, has to be gathered by the person addressed from what he sees, if he follows the direction to which his attention is called. Or, supposing that one of two companions in travel remarks that the other has forgotten his umbrella, the mere exclamation, ‘*Your umbrella!*’ is quite sufficient to make the latter complete the predicate. The vocative, pronounced as such, to summon or warn, or entreat any one, or to call his attention to his turn of action, is such another sentence—lacking a verbal predicate, but not a psychological one. On the other hand, by the side of a verb in the second person without subject pronoun, the vocative may be apprehended as the subject to this. We commonly punctuate ‘*Charles, come!*’ and ‘*Come, Charles!*’—but, on the other hand, ‘*You come!*’ and ‘*Come you!*’ and yet the relations are in the two cases the same.

176. This is the place to determine the position of the so-called impersonal verbs. It is a much-disputed question whether these are to be regarded as lacking a subject or not. A critical discussion of the current views upon it is to be found in Miklosich’s treatise, *Subjectlose sätze* (second edition, Vienna, 1883); a treatise by Marty in the *Vierteljahrsschr. f. wissenschaftliche philos.* viii. 56 sq., is chiefly based upon Miklosich’s material.

177. In order to answer the question properly, a strict division must be made between the grammatical form and the logical

Impersonal
Verbs.

relation denoted thereby. If we regard the first merely, it cannot be doubted that sentences like *es rauscht* ; *il gèle* ; Low Servian *ono se blyska* ('it lightens') have a subject. But all efforts have proved fruitless to treat this *es*, *il*, *ono*, as a logical subject, and to give it a definite interpretation. Again, in sentences like the Latin *pluit*, Greek *ŕei*, Sanscrit *varšati* ('it rains'), Lithuanian *suinga* ('it snows'), we may assume that the formal subject is not wanting ; for such subject may be contained in the verbal termination under which a personal *he*, *she*, or *it* may be understood. It might certainly be said for the opposite view that in the languages in question the third person can stand also by the side of an expressed subject [as *Jupiter pluit*, *ó Zeús ŕei*, etc.]. But it is impossible to prove that the impersonal did not arise before this form of applying it. It seems most natural in this case to recognise a formal subject. It is with the personal ending just as with the independent pronoun. The sentence, as it is brought into the normal form, has received a formal subject which has nothing to do with the psychological. We must presuppose an older stage, in which the simple verbal stem was set down ; a stage which is actually seen in Hungarian at the present day, where the third person singular has no suffix (see Miklosich, p. 15). And we can form a lively idea of this stage of language after the analogy of the sentences just discussed, which consist of a single (not verbal) word. These are really and truly, as far as the linguistic expression goes, subjectless.

178. We may then lay it down that the psychological subject is as little expressed in the sentence *it is hot* as in the sentence *fire*. But we must guard against being misled into the view that none exists. In this case too we have a junction of two ideas. On one side stands the perception of a concrete phenomenon, on the other the idea of burning or of fire ; an idea already reposing in the

mind, under which the perception in question may be ranged. The word *fire* can be a sentence only as an imperfect expression for the connexion of these two elements. It is conceivable that in the case of the verb in the corresponding application, the infinitive might have become usual instead of the impersonal. And indeed the infinitive is actually employed where an order or demand is in question. For instance, as a word of command, *aufsitzen* stands on the same plane as *marsch!* and psychologically speaking it may be regarded as the imperative to the impersonal, *es wird aufgesessen* [*cf.* the use of the infinitive in ancient Greek, and in modern French in such instances as *voir*, pp. 10 and 50].

179. Miklosich and Marty dispute the existence of a psychological subject for impersonal sentences. They hold these as true sentences composed of a single member in accordance with Brentano's psychology, and they see in these a proof of the theory that the logical judgment does not need to consist of two members. It seems that Marty was brought to this view partly by the consideration that for the expression of perception in a concrete sentence linguistically consisting of two members, something more needs to be demanded than the connection of the two members. If we say, for example, *This pear is hard*, we must have previously brought the object of which we wish to say anything under the common category of *pear*, and the quality which we have remarked as attaching to it under the common category of *hard*. We must thus, in order to pronounce our judgment, have formed two additional auxiliary judgments. Thus one might imagine from this point of view that the impersonal sentence really contains no more than the predicate of a normal sentence; and as the latter is denoted as consisting of two members, it then seems but commonly consistent to denote the former as consisting of one member only. According to this view, however, the fact

is overlooked that what in one case was nothing but an auxiliary judgment, in the other has become an end in itself. We might with equal right neglect the difference which exists between the member of a sentence *the mortal man*, and the sentence *man is mortal*. But under all circumstances a sentence like *Fire, it is hot*, is of two members. It is hard to form an intelligible idea of judgments consisting of but a single member, and logicians should not cite language as a proof of the existence of such: otherwise, they show that their very thoughts are dependent on linguistic expression—the very thing from which they ought to seek to emancipate themselves.

180. According to our investigations hitherto pursued, it is clear that impersonal sentences, consisting according to their linguistic expression of a single member, are always concrete, never abstract. For their very object and end is to produce a concrete intuition with a common conception.

Negative
Sentences.

181. If we have defined the sentence as the expression for the connexion of two ideas, negative sentences seem to contradict this, since they rather denote a separation. Still, such a separation finds no expression unless the ideas in question have met in the consciousness of the speaker. We may define the negative sentence of affirmation as the expression of the fact that the attempt to establish a relation between two ideas has failed. The negative sentence is in any case of later birth than the positive. Probably negation finds in every case a special expression in language. One might, however, very well imagine that negative sentences might be formed in a primitive stage of development of language, in which the negative sense might be indicated by nothing else than the stress and the accompanying gestures.

Sentences of
Assertive
and Demand.

182. What can only be laid down as a possibility in the case of the difference between positive and negative sentences is certainly

true of the difference between sentences of assertion and sentences of demand. The term 'sentences of demand' seems appropriate as the most neutral. Under the term *demand* we comprise of course requests, commands and forbiddings, advice and warning, encouragement, concession, declining, and deprecating. No examples are necessary to show that for all this the same expression of language can be employed, and that the different shades of meaning attaching to the word can be only recognised by the different tones indicative of feeling. We must however add to these, sentences implying a *wish*. A *wish* may be expressed with the expectation that its utterance may have an influence upon its realisation; then it is equivalent to a *demand*; but it can equally well be uttered without any such expectation at all. This is a difference which is not always remarked by the naïve consciousness of a child or uncivilised man. The language of poetry, and indeed that of untutored conversational language, finds it natural to raise mere wishes to demands, and to express these by the imperative. *Willing* and *demanding* touch one another even more in conjunctive or optative forms of expression.

183. We are at present accustomed to regard the affirmation as the only normal sentence. The sentence of demand is however as old, if not older than this. The earliest sentences which are uttered by children—the very earliest of course consist of a single word only—have reference to their needs. They serve to express demands or affirmations made to indicate a need which requires to be satisfied. It may be assumed that the circumstances were similar at the earliest stage of speech development. Thus no special linguistic resource was needed originally to characterise the sentence of demand; the simple correlation of subject and predicate sufficed for this case as well as for the sentence of affirmation; the stress of the voice was the only means by which the difference

could be told. Even now we employ such sentences of demand in numbers; sentences in which the demand is not characterised as such. These are sentences without a verb, such as: *Eyes right!*—*Attention!*—*Hats off!*—*This way!*—*All aboard!*—*Joking apart!*—*An eye for an eye!*—*Peace to his ashes!*—*A health to all good lasses!*—*Away with him!*—*Here with it!* etc. Then there are sentences composed of a single member, as far as their expression in language goes, such as: *Hush!*—*Quick!*—*Slow!*—*Forwards!*—*Up!*—*To work!*—*Confusion!* etc. Sentences of demand especially occur in this primitive form, which as a rule does not hold good for sentences. It is from this negative circumstance that the consequence springs, that these negative sentences may be immediately recognised by us as demands. Still there are instances which are capable of bearing either meaning, as '*Fire!*' as a cry of alarm and '*Fire!*' as a word of command.

184. Besides this, instead of a definite characteristic form of the verb, a form essentially indefinite may be employed for demands. Thus, the past participle, as in German *rosen auf den weg gestrent*, *alles harms vergessen* (HÖLTY), *In die welt, in die freiheit gezogen* (SCHILLER). The infinitive is more common still; cf. the German use of *absitzen*, *schrift fahren* [and that of the French *voir*, where we say *see* (see p. 121)]. In Italian the infinitive is usual in negative prohibitions—as *non ti cruciare*; and the same usage is common in Roumanian, Provençal, and Old French. [Cf. Diez, iii. 212; Gospel of Lyons: *Es biens dou monde ne te croire*; i.e. *Ne crois pas en les biens du monde.*] Jolly (*Geschichte des infin.*, pp. 158-209) would explain these infinitives by the original dative function of the infinitive, and this explanation must be held to account for the imperative use of the infinitive in Greek. But the usage in German and Roumanian is of modern origin, and must not be connected with conditions which took their origin in IE. times,

the consciousness of which had long passed away from the instinct of language. For the epoch in which this usage has grown up the infinitive is nothing more than the denomination of the verbal conception *per se*; and hence these infinitive sentences are to be placed upon the same plane as sentences like '*March!*' It is noteworthy that the second person singular of the IE. imperative exhibits the pure tense stem (*λέγε*).

185. The interrogative sentences are commonly ranged as a third class by the side of the sentences of affirmation and demand.¹ Interrogative Sentences. No single principle can, however, be found for such a triple division of sentences, and these three classes cannot be co-ordinated with each other. We must rather assume a double method of division into two. The sentences of affirmation, as well as those of demand, have their pendant in interrogative sentences; cf. the Latin *quid faciam* with *quid facio?* We employ the term 'deliberative questions' to express this use, but we might designate them simply as interrogatory-demand sentences.

186. Of the two main divisions of the questioning sentence, that in which a single member of a sentence is called into question is certainly of later origin than that in which the whole sentence is questioned.² The former requires a special interrogative pronoun or adverb which is not required by the second. The interrogative is in the IE. languages indefinite as well. There seems to be no criterion by which we may decide which is the original of these two functions. To suppose the latter to have taken its origin from the former causes no difficulty. But the reverse process

¹ Cf. for what follows, Imme, *Die Fragesätze nach psychologischen Gesichtspunkten eingeteilt und erläutert*. Cleve, 1870, p. 81.

² No one has yet succeeded in discovering a perfectly satisfactory terminology for these two kinds. Dellbrück, *SEL.*, p. 75, calls the former 'verdeutlichungsfragen'; the second 'bestätigungsfragen.' Imme, *u. s. l.* 15, adopts the second term, and replaces the former by 'bestimmungsfragen.' It appears to me, however, that the expression 'bestätigungsfragen' is unsuitable, as it includes the expectation of an affirmative answer.

is conceivable, and thus we should have a path from the older form of interrogative sentence to the later form. To the question '*Ist jemand da?*'—we may answer '*(Ja) der vater,*' or '*(Nein) niemand.*' Now if we discard our usual method of framing an interrogatory, '*Jemand ist da?*'—the point where this touches '*Wer ist da?*' is obvious. Questions with an interrogative pronoun stand even nearer to questions with an indefinite pronoun in cases where a negative answer is looked for as the natural one; *cf.*: *Who will do that?—Will any one do that?—What can I answer?—Can I answer anything?—Where is such a man to be found?—Is such a man anywhere to be found?*

187. The question to which the simple answer *yes* or *no* is expected is in many languages characterised by a special particle, in the Teutonic and Romance languages by the position of the words. Thus—*ne* in Latin [*li* in Russian] serves to mark an interrogation. But the interrogative position of words is not confined *ab initio* to the interrogative sentence. We find it, for instance, in OHG., OS., and AS., commonly in the sentence of affirmation; *cf.*: *werit denne stuatago in laut, holoda inan truhtin*, etc.

188. Accordingly the interrogation was not to be recognised by the position alone, and the interrogative stress was the only decisive characteristic whereby it differed from affirmation. We have at the present day interrogations in which this stress or tone is the only criterion, namely, those which contain no verb; *cf.*: *Any one there?—All ready?—A glass of beer, Sir?* (spoken by a waiter); in French, *Votre d'sir?* [*Monsieur d'sire?*]

189. We can thus easily imagine that there may have been long sentences before any other determining method was found for them besides the interrogative tone. It thus seems that the interrogative form of the sentence is possible even in a quite

primitive stage of language, though it must be regarded as more recent than the assertive and demanding forms.

190. The interrogation pure and simple occupies in some ways a half-way position between positive and negative assertion. It is neutral in the sense that it can make no essential difference whether it be cast in a positive or negative form, except that the positive form is naturally taken in preference as the simpler, and the negative form assumes the function of expressing a modification of the question pure and simple.

191. There are, in fact, various modifications, whereby the interrogation can be more or less made to approach the character of the assertive sentence. It may thus, for instance, become a dubious assertion, in which one is disposed, at the outset, to a definite assumption, and expects nothing but a final confirmation from another. In this case the negative interrogatory form comes in where a positive answer is expected—*Were you not there? I thought I saw you.* It makes no essential difference as far as the sense goes, if we employ instead of this the positive interrogatory form, with a tone of query—*You were there?—You are contented?* Thus we may arrive at this intermediate stage from both sides.

192. The circumstances attending the expression of admiration or surprise are similar to these. Surprise is the subjective incapacity to take in one collection of ideas by means of another, in spite of an external instigation to do so, whether proceeding from one's own observation or from the suggestion of another. For this again we may employ either the interrogative form, or the assertive form, with the interrogatory tone—*Is Francis dead?—Francis is really dead?—Are you here again?—You are here again?* Sentences without a verb are neutral in this respect:—*You my long lost brother?—What, THAT to ME?—Already*

here?—So soon? And infinitival clauses are similarly used, as, *He to turn out such a rascal!* Expressions of surprise also occur in which the psychological subject and predicate are connected by 'and,' as in German—*So jung und schon so verderbt?*—*A maid, and be so martial?* (SHAKESPEARE.) The expression of surprise is weakened into a mere formula wherewith to introduce a conversation; cf.: *Ausgeschlafen?*—*So vergnügt?*—*Noch immer bei der arbeit?* etc. [As we might ask in English, *A good nap?*—*Always in good spirits?*—*As merry as ever?* etc.]

193. A special case is to be noted in the surprised or indignant repudiation of an assertion. For this the primitive form of expression without any finite verb is specially common: *I a liar?* *Er und bezahlen?* Latin—*Ego lanista?* (CIC.) French—*Moi vous abandonner?* Italian—*Io dir bugie?* English—*SHE ask MY pardon?*—*How? not know the friend that served you?* Besides this the indignant repudiation of advice tendered occurs, as in such cases as, *Ich dich chren?* (GOETHE.) A sentence such as this must probably be reckoned amongst the interrogatory demands.

194. Of course the provocation to an interrogation is originally a need felt by the interrogator. There are, however, questions—of course of later origin—in which the proposer of the questions has no doubt about the answer which suits, and merely wishes to give the person addressed occasion to find out the answer for himself. Such cases are questions put by teachers to the taught. If a hint is added as to the nature of the answer expected by the interrogator, we have the class of questions commonly described by the vague term *rhetorical*. The interrogator by the process compels the person addressed to admit a truth on the strength of his own conviction gained after consideration; and thereby the process is brought home to him more emphatically and

energetically than it would have been if merely communicated to him.

195. The relation of subject and predicate in the wide sense indicated above is the relation from which the other syntactic conditions take their rise, with one sole exception, namely, the copulative connexion of several elements into a single member of a sentence. This connexion may in the case of developed languages be denoted by a particle, but the mere collocation in succession suffices, and thus we cannot be surprised that in a primitive stage of language it was found possible to dispense with any special linguistic expression for coupling. Extension
of the Sen-
tence.

196. Every other mode of extending sentences is effected by a recurrence of the relation between subject and predicate. Two main cases may be distinguished. It may either happen that two members unite themselves as contemporaneous with a third—*i.e.* that two subjects attach themselves to a single predicate or two predicates to a single subject, which might be represented by the formula $(a + (b) + c)$. Or a connexion of subject and predicate may present itself as subject or predicate in relation to a further member, a case which might be represented by the formula $(a + b) + c$. This further member may of course be compounded again. Suppose that in the first case the logical relation of the two subjects to the common predicate, or that of the two predicates to the common subject, is exactly alike, then such a sentence, consisting of three members, may be replaced without any essential change in the sense, by one of two members, one of which will be a copulative combination. From this there arise points of contact between these two kinds of sentence and confusions between the two. The double member of a sentence seems most neatly parted from the copulative combination forming a single member, when the pair of members take between them Double
Subject.

a member common to both without the employment of a copulative particle; this is the so-called construction ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, a construction common enough in *MIIG.*; cf.: *Dō spranc von dem gesidele her Hagene alsō sprach.* Should we however say, *Da spranc vom sitze Hagen und sprach so*, we have at once a transition stage from a double predicate to a single compound one. Not, however, that the two predicates are really conceived as one, as is manifest from the fact that the predicate regularly stands in the singular after such double subject, as in German: *Der mann ist tot und die frau* ('The man is dead and so is the woman'). In the older stage of the language they were apprehended as one if a further predicate still was subjoined; cf.: *Petrus aber antwortete und die Apostel und sprachen* (LU.), a case in which we now have to supply a new subject. The instinct of language is much less decided when the two members are not thus separated by any insertion. In that case it is just as possible to assume several members, successively connected with the different members of the sentence, as it is to assume a compound sentence united by a single act. The first-named way of apprehension is less obvious when the couple of members of the sentence is placed at the beginning than when they are placed at the end. The vacillation in the instinct of language manifests itself in the fact that where several subjects are present, of which the one standing last is a singular, the predicate can stand as well in the plural as in the singular. Where the predicate comes at the end we feel ourselves nowadays compelled to employ the plural, but in Latin the singular is equally permissible—cf.: *Spensippus et Xenocrates et Polemo et Crantor nihil ab Aristotele dissentit* (CIC.); *Consules, praetores, tribuni plebis, senatus, Italia cuncta semper a vobis deprecata est* (CIC.); *filia atque unus e filiis captus est* (CAES.); even *Et ego et Cicero meus flagitabit* (CIC. ad Att.). So in Italian, *Le*

ricchezze, gli honori e la virtù è stimata grande; in French, *Le fer, le bandeau, la flamme est toute prête* (RACINE); and thus in old Modern High-German, *Wolken und dunkel ist um ihn her* (LU.); *dass ihre steine und kalk zugerichtet würde* (LU.).

197. The logical relation, however, of two subjects to the same predicate may also be of different natures. In this case we have the foundation laid for the possibility of the differentiation, in the course of the development of language, of the double subjects into subject and object. We can best portray this process by one sentence, like *I smell the dinner*. We can say equally well, omitting the personal subject, *The dinner smells*; and we are thus able to transport ourselves in fancy back to a time in which, owing to the complete absence of all case-suffixes, and of anything to fix the position of the words in a sentence like *I smell dinner—A dinner smell I*—the words *I* and *dinner* fell under the same common category of the psychological subject. The affinity between subject and object is also evident from the fact that the object can be made the subject by turning the verb into the passive.

198. The object—to take the word in the widest possible sense—may again include very different logical relations. Here again many objects may be attached to the same predicate, either in the same or in a different logical relation. By this means the impulse is given to a grammatical differentiation of the object corresponding to the logical relation (Accusative, Dative, Genitive of the object, etc.).

199. The object may be conceived of by the side of the subject as a third member of the sentence of equivalent value with it. It may, however, equally well enter into a nearer relation to the predicate than that occupied by the subject, so that a sentence of two members takes the place of one of three members, the object forming one member in unison with the predicate, in such a way that it

stands in subordination to it and serves to define it. There is no sharply defined border-line between these two relationships.

200. Just as the predicate may receive a defining word subordinated to itself, so may the subject and the object which is developed therefrom. Substantival and adjectival attributes commonly stand us in the place of such defining words, and genitives of substantives, though substantives and adverbs connected by means of prepositions sometimes do the same. The aid of these different methods of definition renders it possible to express to some extent even in language the difference of the logical relation between the defining factor and the defined. A language which has yet developed no inflexion and no connecting words is not yet in a position to do this. Such a language has no other resource but the simple juxtaposition of the defined matter and the defining word. The fact that the determinant attached to the subject is not a predicate, can then, in case no fixed order of the words has become normal, be only discovered by the presence of a third word, which is detached from the two words which together make up the subject by a more decided stress, and it may be by a slight pause. The relation of the determining element to that determined is analogous to that of the predicate to the subject in the broad sense in which we have apprehended it above. And in truth the determinant is nothing but a degraded predicate, not uttered or spoken for its own sake, but merely in order that a further predicate may be assigned to the subject (or object). Just as the determination of the predicate has its origin in sentences containing a double subject, so the determination of the subject—and accordingly that of nouns in general—has its origin in sentences containing a double predicate.

201. We can most readily appreciate the degradation of the predicate to a mere determination in cases where a finite verb is

affected by them. We meet here with a process which has grown up spontaneously in different languages and at different epochs, and which is, indeed, to some extent to be traced historically. The starting-point is afforded by the construction *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* spoken of, p. 130.

202. In this process one of the two predicates may be logically subordinate to the other, so that it may be replaced by a relative sentence.¹ This usage is found in OHG. and in MHG.; *cf.*: *mit zihlten si ze huse bat ein frouwe saz darinne* (= 'a lady who had her dwelling therein'), *wer was ein man lac vorme Grâl?* (= who lay before the Graal), *die worhte ein smit hiez Volcân* (= named Vulcan); *nist man, thoh er unolle, thaz gumisgi al irzelle* (= there is no man, who, even if he wished it, could completely count the number of human beings). A case depending on the main verb may also serve as the subject of the dependent verb: thus *von einem slangen was gebunden* (the title of a fable of Bonar): *ich hab ein siint ist wider euch* (H. Sachs); *dar inne sach er glitzen von kolen rot ein glut wart auf sein fallen* (which waited for his fall, *ib.*). This construction becomes more frequent towards the close of the middle ages than before. The corresponding usage in English, Swedish, and Danish, has gained a far larger area; *cf.* the following examples from Shakespeare:—'There is a devil haunts thee,'

¹ On this phenomenon a considerable literature exists: (*cf.* especially J. Grimm, *Ueber einige fälle der attraction* (*Alt. schr.* 3. 312 *sqq.*); Steinthal, *Assimilation und Attraction* (*Zchr. f. völkerps.* i. 93 *sqq.* = *Alt. schr.* 107 *sqq.*; *cf.* especially p. 173 *sqq.*); Tobler, *Ueber auslassung und vertretung des pronomen relativum* (*Germ.* xvii. 257 *sqq.*); Jolly, *Ueber die einfachste form der hypotaxis im idg.* (*Curtius, Studien* vi. 217); Kolling, *Untersuchungen über den ausfall des relativpronomens in den germanischen sprachen*, Strassburg, 1872; Erdmann, *Syntax Ottfrids*, ii. p. 124 *sq.*; Behaghel, *Asyndetische parataxe* (*Germ.* xxiv. 167 *sqq.*); Lohmann, *Ueber die auslassung des englischen relativpronomens* (*Anglia*, iii. 115 *sqq.*). In some of these writings we find conclusions widely differing from those given above. I have deemed it unnecessary to state my reasons for disagreeing with these, as it seems to me that the correctness of the views which I have adopted, those of Jolly and Behaghel, must be sufficiently evident to all who are not slaves to their own instinct of language and traditional grammar.

'it is thy sovereign speaks to thee,' 'here are some will thank you,'
'I have a mind presages me,' 'it is not you I call for.'

203. In the examples hitherto cited, the common clause stood in the middle. There occur in OHG. cases as well, in which it takes precedence, or is inserted between the first predicate and its determinations. In this use it may serve as subject, or as object, or as any other kind of adverbial determination; and further, it need not necessarily bear the same relation to both predicates. Under this head will come cases like these passages quoted from Otfrid, where the second predicate is subordinated—*e.g.*: *thaz selba sie imo sagetun sie hiar bifora zelitun* ('They said the same thing to him that they had said before'); *uuer ist thes hiar thenke* ('Who is there that could here think such a thing'); *nist man nihein in uuorolti thaz saman al irsageti* ('There is no one in the world who could say all that together'). The first predicate is subordinated in the following case: *in selben uuorton er then man thô then triston giuan so uuard er hiar fon thesemo firdamnot* ('by the same words with which he overcame the first man, was he condemned by the other'). In a sentence like this, *so* resumes the words *in selben uuorton*, as it may resume any given element of a sentence. In another case the common element of the sentence is resumed by a pronoun: *allo nultu in uuorolti thir gotes boto sageti, sie quement sô gimcinit ubar thlu houbit*.

204. The construction *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* is most frequently found in OHG., in sentences containing general statements, especially where these are negative, with a conjunctive dependent verb. This construction is not unknown to the Romance languages;¹ *cf.*: Old Italian, *non vi rimasse un sol non lacrimassi*; prov. *nna non sai vas ves non si' aclina, anc non vi dona tan mi plagues*; Old French, *or n'a baron ne li envoit son fil*.

¹ Cf. Diez, iii. 381.

205. If we examine dispassionately the testimony of history, we shall find the view untenable that this construction, wherever found, is a traditional inheritance from the IE. original language. On the contrary, it seems probable that it has likewise sprung into existence spontaneously in later epochs, although other more perfect forms of expression had already been created. Outside the IE. family of languages it is found (for instance) in Arabic, where we meet with expressions like, 'I passed by a man slept;' *cf.* Steinthal, *Haupttyp.* 267.

206. If, then, the finite verb could be degraded to the value of an attributive determinant, how much more easily could a predicate be so degraded, which hitherto bore no distinguishing marks of its verbal character? The origin of the attributival relation is accordingly quite clear.

207. With regard to the function of the determination, we have to notice certain differences which commonly find no expression in language, but which are, nevertheless, logically of very great importance. The determinant may leave unaltered the extent of the meaning which the word serving as the subject has independently, or in virtue of a limitation, already imposed by other means, the determinant itself applying to this whole extent: *cf.*: *der sterbliche mensch, der allmächtige gott, das starre eis*; it may, however, on the other hand, if it applies to a part only of what is contained in the usual or already otherwise specialised meaning of the word, narrow and individualise it; *cf.*: *old houses, an old house, a (or the) son of the king, the journey to Paris, Charles the Great*: in the same way, 'the old house,' when the expression is used to contrast it with a new one: whereas the combination falls under another head if it is obvious, without any adjective, what house is meant. In those cases which come under the second category, the determination is indispensable, because without it

the predicate has no value. In the first category the following further distinctions are of importance. In the first place, the determinant may already be known as applicable to the conception to which it is appended (as is the case with the repetition of the standing epithets in the language of Epic poetry): or it may communicate something new. In the latter case the determinant has a greater independence, and approaches the value of a true predicate [as *Tullia ferax*, *Tullia mitis* (LIVY)]. We prefer, in such cases, commonly to use periphrases by means of a relative sentence; as 'Charles, who was poor;' 'Louis, who was a clever painter.' In the second place, while the determination has not necessarily any relation to the predicate, it may yet stand in a casual relation to it, as in 'The cruel man would not listen to the victim's prayers.'

208. We have conceived the determinant as a weakened predicate. There is, further, an intermediate stage at which the determination has a greater independence still, and is not so closely connected with the subject. For this reason it seems best to regard it as a special clause in the sentence. Under this head comes what we commonly call the predicative attribute; for instance, 'he arrived safe and sound.' But prepositional determinants may equally well stand in the same logical relation, e.g. 'he begged me on his knees,' for which 'kneeling' would be a perfect substitute. The relation of the predicative attribute to its substantive is not so close, because it denotes, not a peculiarity necessary and enduring, but a merely accidental and transitory situation. It may, therefore, be regarded as an independent link connected with subject and predicate alike. This independence shows itself in most languages by the greater freedom of the position of the words as contrasted with the fixed position of the pure attribute. In NHG. the nearer affinity to the predicate

has further found expression in the use of the uninflected form of the adjective, as in the case of the predicate. When once the adverbial and adnominal determinations have been developed, as special varieties, from original subjects or predicates, a further complication of the sentence becomes possible, since a combination consisting of a determined and a determining element may again be determined by a new element, or itself serve as a determinant; and since, further, several determining elements may be joined to one determinate, or several determinate elements to one determinant, just as several subjects may be joined to one predicate, or several predicates to one subject. As examples we may take (1) *alle guten geister, Müllers älteste tochter, er gerät leicht in zorn* (to be understood *gerät in zorn+leicht*); (2) *schr gute kinder, alles opfernde liebe, er spricht schr gut*; (3) *trübes, regnerisches* (*trübes und regnerisches*) *wetter, er tanzt leicht und zierlich*; (4) *Karls hut und stock, er schlägt weib und kind*.

209. The first method of combination is that commonly described as the relation of inclusion. It is not always possible to draw a sharp line between it and the third. For instance, if I say *large round hats*, it makes no essential difference whether we classify this combination under (1) or (3). In NIG., where two adjectives are used together, the use of the strong or of the weak form affords a means of distinguishing the relation of juxtaposition from that of inclusion, a means which leaves us, however, in perplexity when both forms phonetically coincide. But the difficulty of correctly maintaining the difference manifests itself in many instances where the writers have offended against the rules of grammar; compare the instances given in Andresen, *Sprachgeschichte*, p. 38 sqq.

210. Constructions (3) and (4) may be interpreted in two fundamentally distinct ways. They may either, as has been stated

above, be conceived as constructions ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, or as the combination of one element with two elements united by a copula. Hence it is that we find in (4), in those languages which have developed grammatical concord, the same vacillation in the form of the attribute as we have found above (p. 130) in the form of the predicate. Cf., on the one hand, the French *le bonheur et le courage constants, la langue et la littérature françaises*; Latin, *Gai et Appii Claudiorum*; on the other hand, *la fille et la mère offensée* (RACINE); the Latin *Tiberius et Gajus Gracchus, et tribunis et plebe incitata in patres* (LIVIUS). Not, however, that all cases of the same grammatical form are in this way open to two meanings. In the cases cited each of the two substantives denotes an independent substance. It may, however, also happen that the combination denotes merely two aspects of the same object, e.g. my uncle and foster-father. In this case, where the combination appears independently as either subject or object, we must classify only as my + uncle and stepfather. When each word denotes a particular object, the German language in modern times prefers [as also the English], at least in the case of singular nouns, to assign to each its special attribute; so that *my uncle and my foster-father* bears a different meaning from *my uncle and foster-father*. We can refer the former combination to a person only when it is expressly placed in relation to one either as predicate or as attribute, or finally as an address. On the other hand we find, though the grammarians condemn the usage, frequently enough the simple juxtaposition of the attribute with several substantives, each of which denotes a special object; cf. the numerous examples given in Andresen, *Sprachgeschichte*, p. 125 sqq. Similarly Lessing wrote *über die grenzen der malerei und poesie*.

211. The amplifications of the sentence hitherto described proceeded from the formula $(a + (b) + c)$,—cf. p. 129—in connexion with the copulative combination. We turn to the amplifications according to the formula $(a + b) + c$. We find these, for instance, represented by the combination of a verb with the accusative and infinitive, or with two accusatives, of which the one is a predicate : *memini—me audire, reddo—te beatum*. In order, however, to understand the origin of these constructions, we shall be compelled to take another point of departure. Our best course is to confine ourselves in the first place to such cases as those in which a composite member of a sentence $(a + b)$ still plainly exhibits the form of the independent sentence, and thus contains a finite verb. We here pass again beyond the borders of the so-called simple sentence, and encroach on the area of the compound sentence. Actual historical and psychological observation shows us that this division cannot be strictly maintained. It depends upon the assumption that the presence of a finite verb is the strict characteristic of the sentence ; a view which is absolutely inapplicable to many languages and epochs, and is absolutely applicable to none. In cases where the definite stamp of a finite verb is wanting, the division too between the simple and compound sentence in the ordinary sense ceases to hold good. The so-called composite and the so-called amplified sentence are accordingly in their essence absolutely identical. It thus appears further to be a mistaken view that the degradation of a sentence to the position of member of a sentence—the so-called *hypotaxis*—did not develop until a comparatively late stage of language. The existence of the amplified sentence, which is found even in the most primitive languages, presupposes this degradation as completely carried out. Further, the ordinary view that the *hypotaxis* has consistently arisen from *parataxis* is mistaken. It might be asserted with equal reason that the division of

Use of a
Sentence as
subject or
predicate.

a sentence into subject and predicate has arisen from the copulative connexion of two words. This view was enabled to arise because the oldest form of *hypotaxis* no doubt lacks any special grammatical denomination, and is merely logical and psychological. But to call a logical sub-ordination such as this a co-ordination (*parataxis*) is quite incorrect.

212. It happens very often in Modern German, and in other languages in which the structure of the sentence is already richly developed, that combinations, in form undistinguishable from the main sentence, are used as objects. Under this head we may reckon the 'Oratio directa.' Under the same head too come sentences like, *I maintain he is a liar ; I think you are mad ; I see you tremble ; consider, it is dangerous.* Demands, too, and questions are thrown into the same relation of dependence : *Pray, give it me ; cf. Latin quæso, cogita ac delibera ; sage, hast du ihn gesehen ; sprich, was bekümmert dich ; also Latin, videte quantæ res his testimoniis sunt confectæ (CIC.) ; quæro de te, qui possunt esse beati (CIC.) ; responde, quis me vendit (PLAUTUS).* It is more rare to meet with subjects of this kind, excepting where the passive is used, as *besser ist, du lässt es bleiben ; das macht, sie ist sehr mannigfaltig (LESSING).*

213. It is no doubt true that in all these cases the subject or object sentences possess a certain independence ; and, excepting in the case of the 'Oratio directa,' they cannot be employed without an independent value being assigned to them. For instance, we cannot say, *I thought you are ill ;* nor in German either, *ich glaubte, du bist krank,* or *ich glaubte, du warst krank.* It does not, however, follow from this limited independence that the relation to the main verb was in its origin paratactical ; but, with reference to the main verb a decided case of *hypotaxis* arises, and independence only in as far as the presence of this is disregarded. The inde-

Union of
Dependence
and Inde-
pendence.

pendence is more marked if the governing sentence is placed last or intercalated, as in this case the dependence is not noticed until the conclusion—e.g.: *He is a liar, I believe*; or, *he is, I think, a liar*; so in Latin, *quid illi locuti inter se? dic mihi* (PLAUTUS); *signi, dic, quid est?* (PLAUTUS). In the case of intercalation our grammarians are disposed to treat the intercalated sentence as subordinate, and they might appeal to the fact that such an expression as *I think* is nearly equivalent to *as I think*, or *in my opinion*, or *in my belief*. In the older NIIG. it is quite common to set down a sentence in the first instance as independent, and then simultaneously to make it the subject or the object of a succeeding sentence: cf. the following examples from Hans Sachs—*ein volk dreissig jar fritlich lebet, verdross den tenfel gar; der frauen wart sein hab vnd gut, geschah nach Christi geburt zware vierhundert vnd auch funfzig jare; des wirt ein böse letz der lon, deut der schwanz von dem scorpion; das betriibt weib sich selbst erstack vnd nam ein kleglich end, beschreibt Boccatus; darum jm jederman vol sprach, tut Plutarchus beweisen*. In these cases it would be quite unjustifiable to assume the ellipsis of a *das*.

214. The use of the persons in such sentences as follow must also be explained from this union of independence and dependence, e.g.: *er denkt, er hat was rechtes getan*, instead of *ich habe*; that is, from the point of view of the speaker, and not after that of the person to whom the thought is ascribed: just as *believe me, you are in error*; *he thinks, he can deceive you*.

215. It occurs also that some writers and speakers prefer the emphasised form of the parataxis in spite of the logical dependence. A common instance of this is the German *sei so gut und tue das* ('Be so good and keep quiet'). Cf. Hans Sachs' expression, *ir seidt gewonet alle zwen vnd tragt mit euch was nit wil gehn*. Other examples may be found in ANDR. *Sprachg.*, p. 140.

Indirect
Speech.

216. The 'Oratio obliqua' in German must at the present day be regarded as grammatically dependent, and the sign of its dependence is the conjunctive mood. If we, however, regard the origin of the construction, it is clear that, in this case also, a something half-way between logical dependence and logical independence lies at the root. Such a construction as *er meint, er könne dich betrügen* originally stood on the same footing as the phrase cited above, *er meint, er kann dich betrügen*; only that the assertion is made with less confidence, and that therefore the conjunctive (or optative) is employed in a potential meaning. The fact that the potential has ceased to be employed in main sentences has promoted the apprehension of the relation as one of real grammatical dependence.

Sentences in
apposition to
a Noun.

217. Now, a combination of the form $(a+b)+c$ may, just like the simpler formula $a+b$, be degraded from the position of a sentence to that of a member of a sentence. In this manner a sentence may become determinant to a noun, or be put in apposition to it. Compare such sentences as *er sprach die worte: das tue ich niemals*; *eins weiss ich: es geschieht nicht wieder*; *folgendes ist mir begegnet: ich traf einen mann*; *ein sonderbarer zufall hat sich gestern zugetragen: es begegneten sich zwei freunde*, etc.; *er hat die gewohnheit: er erwidert nie einen brief*; *ich habe die überzeugung: du wirst dich noch bekehren*. A pronoun is especially often used in this way, to which the sentence stands in the place of an apposition; cf.: *das ist sicher, er wird es nicht wagen*; *es ist besser, du gehst*; Latin, *hoc relictiomst: si infitias ibit, testis mecum est annulus* (TER.); *hoc capio commodi: neque agri, neque urbis odium me nunquam percipit* (TER.). In the same way sentences stand in apposition to a demonstrative adverb: *er ist so lieb, man kann ihm nicht böse sein*.

218. If it is only a pronoun which is defined by the sentence,

we can omit it in thought without any essential change in the sense. In this case we have again the form referred to above, in which the sentence is directly made the subject or the object. Cf.: *es ist gewiss, du bleibst* with *gewiss ist, du bleibst*. Thus the two forms of expression come into very close contact.

219. Conversely, a noun may become appositive to a sentence ; a Noun, to a Sentence. cf.: *You always squint, a bad habit*. This construction is especially common when a relative sentence is in addition connected with the noun ; as, *He means to start, a resolve which has cost him dear*. In this case we again clearly recognise the apposition as a degradation of the predicate. And it is precisely this degradation that has prevented the sentence preceding from being itself degraded to a mere subject.

220. We have thus traced the development of the sentence Parataxis. from its simplest to its most complicated form. We now turn to the paratactic conjunction of several sentences. This stands parallel to the copulative conjunction of co-ordinate members of a sentence ; for which reason even the most highly developed languages employ the same resources in order to designate both kinds of connexion. Originally in this case, too, mere juxtaposition had to suffice. And if, as we have seen in the case of hypotaxis, the one member may have a certain independence, so, on the other side, we find that a parataxis with full independence of the sentences connected together nowhere occurs ; that, in fact, it is impossible to connect sentences together without a certain kind of hypotaxis. We can only call a sentence independent a principal sentence, in the strictest sense, if it is uttered merely for itself, and not to give a determination to another sentence. In correspondence with this we should have to define

the subordinate sentence as one uttered merely in order to determine another. Now it is quite obvious that a sentence can at one and the same time be uttered for its own sake, and may still serve as determinant to another sentence, and that it is accordingly sure to exhibit a series of intermediate stages between the two extremes. It is further obvious that no reasonable ground could exist for arranging sentences paratactically to each other, were it not that there were an inner connexion between them; that is, unless one in some way determined the other. There is thus no such thing as a purely paratactical relation between two sentences in the sense that neither is determined by the other; and the only possible conception of parataxis is this, that instead of one sentence determining the other, the two reciprocally determine each other.

221. Pure parataxis in this sense exists between *parallel sentences*, whether the thoughts conjoined be of analogous or of contrary import; *he is blind, she is deaf; he laughs, she cries*. This is no longer, however, the case with *narrative*. If any one tells us: *I arrived in London at twelve o'clock; I went to the nearest hotel; I was told that they were all full; I went on;*—in such a case the preceding sentence in every case gives to the following a temporal as well as a causal determination. This is, however, a function not yet thought of at the moment when the sentence is spoken. Accordingly we have again a union of independence and dependence. We might desire a more circumstantial method of expression in which the sentence should always occur twice; once as independent, once as dependent. Instead of such a repetition, which at any rate occurs but exceptionally in practice, language avails itself of substitution by means of a pronoun or a demonstrative adverb. It was for the development of syntax a most significant step by which the

demonstrative, which originally referred solely to something immediately before the senses, acquired a reference to something just uttered. By this means it became possible also to give grammatical expression to the psychological process in which a sentence is set down as independent, and at the same time serves as determinant to a sentence following it. The demonstrative may have reference to an entire sentence, or merely to one member of the sentence. In the latter case also it frequently happens that the entire sentence which contains this member serves to determine the following. If, for instance, a German says *ich begegnete einem knaben ; der fragte mich*, the word *der* refers to *einem knaben* ; but the entire signification of *der* is not exhausted by the general notion *knabe* ; it is 'the boy whom I met.' Thus the preceding independent sentence is to some extent changed by the influence of the demonstrative into a compound member of a sentence ; the other parts of the sentence subordinating themselves to the word referred to by the demonstrative as its attributional determinant.

222. Now if it is of the essence of all combination of sentences that even the sentences set down as independent should maintain a certain element of subordination, it is quite natural that from this point the possibility is open for a graduated approximation to entire subordination, the independent value of a sentence tending more and more to give way to the function of serving as determinant to another. In the case of *narrative*, the logical subordination is indicated in the IE. languages by the employment of the *relative* tenses (the imperfect and pluperfect). Cf.: *Cincta premebantur truncibus Capitolia Gallis ; Fecerat obsidio jam diuturna famem : Jupiter ad solium superis regale vocatis 'Incipe !' ait Marti* (Ov. *Fast.* VI. 351). This usage is very common in Ovid ; it serves to introduce the situation

Graduated
Approximation
to
Hypotaxis.

from which the narrative starts. Sentences principal in form, but with decided logical subordination, are especially frequent in the most various languages, if such words as *just*, *already*, *scarcely*, *still*, etc., are added, or in such phrases as *es dauerte nicht lange*, etc.; cf.: *kaum sel' ich mich auf ebnem plan, flugs schlagen meine doggen an* (SCHILLER); Latin, *vix bene desicrat, currus rogat ille paternos* (OVID). In Latin also connected by the copulative particle: *vix ea fatus erat senior, subitoque fragore, intonuit lacuum* (VERGIL); *nec longum tempus et ingens exiit ad caelum* (VERGIL). [*Vix prima inciperat aestas Et pater Anchises dare fatis vela inebat* (VERGIL).] The form of this construction—one universal in the German of to-day—is where a demonstrative appears in the ensuing sentence, as *ich war noch nicht eingeschlafen, da hörte ich einen lärm*; *es dauerte nicht lange, so kam er wider*, etc.

223. In MHG. it occurs not unfrequently that of two sentences placed asyndetically together, the first alone serves merely as determinant to some member of the second.¹ Cf.: *ein marggräve der heiz Herman: mit deme er iz reden began* (ROTHER); *Josephus hiez ein wiser man: also schiere er den rät vernam, mit mickelen listen muose er sich cristen* (KAISERCHRONIK); *ein wasser heizet In: dd vākten die Beiere mit in* (KAISER).

224. In the case of sentences introduced by *either . . . or*, the former may be logically subordinated in such a way that it is equivalent to a sentence introduced by *in so far as . . . not*; cf. MHG., *die ir christenllchen anthäiz mit andern gehäizzen habent gemüret, . . . entweder din schrift ist gelogen oder si choment in ein vil mickel nôt* (HEINRICH v. MELK); French, *on mon amour me trompe, on Zaire aujourd'hui pour l'élever à soi descendrait jusqu'à lui* (VOLTAIRE).

¹ Cf. Behagbel in the Introduction to Velleke's *Encide*, p. xxviii.

225. Where the sequence in the sentence is inverted, logical independence and dependence cannot be united in the same way. If a sentence serves as definition to a preceding one, it is clear from the outset that it is uttered merely for the sake of that sentence; cf.: *ich kam nach hause, es schlug gerade 12 uhr*; *I had to tell him everything, he was so curious*. The fact of the dependence comes out most clearly if the determining sentence is intercalated in that which it determines. Such intercalated sentences (or parenthesis) are of course common in all, even the most highly developed languages, and they occur indifferently in the most diverse logical relations to the governing sentence.

226. When sentences of *demand* or *interrogation* come into logical dependence, they pass into designations of the condition or of the concession. Cf.: *geh hin: du wirst sehen* or *so (dann) wirst du sehen*; Latin, *cras petito: dabitur* (PLAUTUS); *sint Maecenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones* (MARTIAL); also in combination by means of a copulative particle, as *sage mir, mit wem du umgehst, und ich will dir sagen, wer du bist*; Latin, *divide et impera*; *impinge lapidem et dignum accipies praemium* (PHIAEDRUS). From such employment as this of the sentences of demand, forms of sentences have arisen in different languages which are felt as independent from the fact that what originally was an only 'occasional' conception has received a 'usual' value. Cf.: *ich bin dir nah, du seist auch noch so ferne*, or the English imperatives, such as *suppose, say* [grant] ('*Say you can swim, 'tis but a while*,' SHAKESPEARE), which have to a certain degree passed into the rank of conjunctions. Under this head we must reckon, too, the Latin conditional sentences with *modo* (cf.: *ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint*), which must not be apprehended as a governing construction, and

Transition
from demand
or interrogation
to
Hypothasis.

which can actually stand equally well side by side with *dum*. In the same way it is well known that from the interrogation has arisen a form of conditional sentences very common in German and in English, and not unknown to the Romance languages (*willst du es tun, so beeile dich*).

CHAPTER VII.

CHANGE OF MEANING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SYNTAX.

THE most general of the statements which have been made about the signification of words and their changes in Chapter IV. may be equally applied to the signification of syntactic relations. In these, too, we must distinguish between 'usual' and 'occasional' meaning. The 'usual' meaning may be more than a single one : its changes arise from the variations of the occasional signification, and they consist either in the enrichment or in the impoverishment of the contents with a corresponding narrowing or enlargement of the extent. Peculiar circumstances, however, arise from the fact that we have here to deal with the relations of several elements to each other (*cf.*: *amo patrem, amor patris*), and that these relations are compounded into narrower or wider groups (*e.g.*, verb—objective accusative, substantive—genitive of another substantive). Accordingly, besides the difference between 'usual' and 'occasional' signification, we must make another distinction, likewise a very important one, namely, that between the signification of a general relation absolutely, and that of the relation to some definite word. The signification which the accusative has in its relation to a single definite verb must be distinguished from the general signification which it has in its relation to any word whatever, and also from that which it has in its relation to any transitive verb whatever. The signification

Comparison
of Syntac-
tical with
Verbal
change of
meaning.

it bears in the first-mentioned instance may be of a more special nature, and more or less isolated with respect to the general signification. In modern times the view of the elder grammarians has been much disputed, that a case is actually *governed* by a verb or a preposition, a mood governed by a conjunction, etc. ; and it has been sought to derive the use of the case or the mood from its general signification. But still, in a certain sense, and with certain limitations, the traditional doctrine may be defended. These general statements will be supported in what follows by examples.

The Genitive.

228. No simple signification can be laid down for the genitive from which the functions which it already fulfils in the original Indo-European language can be directly gathered. For instance, we must from the very outset regard the genitive when dependent on verbs as in a different category from the same case when dependent on substantives. If we examine the latter, we are justified in maintaining that the genitive, as is, generally speaking, the case in ancient Greek, could be employed in IE. for the expression of any given relation between two substantives ; we may, therefore, ascribe to this category a simple signification of very meagre content and very wide extent, which is only in occasional use. On the other hand, in NHG. the function of the genitive in connection with substantives is considerably restricted. Many usages possible still in MHG.—*cf.*, *goldes zein* ('staff of gold'), *langes lebens wdn* ('hope of long life')—are at the present day obsolete. We must nowadays look for special meanings if we would set forth the usage of the genitive, and in this we are compelled to distinguish several categories, and to set side by side several independent significations. These might be most simply represented in this way : possessive-genitive, partitive-genitive, and the genitive denoting that the

governing substantive is what it is, in virtue of that which depends upon it (e.g.: *the man's brother, the god of wine, the writer of the work, the exploit of the hero*). The last-named category may be divided into two subdivisions in the case of nouns of action, viz., the subjective and the objective genitive (cf.: *the government of the Czar, or the government of the country*). The statement of such categories has no doubt been lately regarded as a purely logical division, to be sharply separated from grammar. This view is, however, hardly correct, assuming that the statement is made accurately and properly. The categories in question have gained an independent position with respect to their original general signification, and only owing to this fact has it been possible for these alone to survive, while the other ways of applying them, which would likewise range themselves under the original signification, have disappeared.

229. The relation of the accusative to its governing verb is The Accusative. analogous to that of the genitive to its governing substantive. If we would give a general statement of the meaning of the accusative, under which all the single methods of employing it might be arranged, we must say that it denotes generally every conceivable kind of relation which a substantive can bear to a verb, except that of a subject to its predicate. But still we are unable to employ it in each case in which such a common relation occurs; and, indeed, as early as in the epoch of the IE. fundamental language this was inadmissible, even though the application was still much freer and more extended in its range, as we may see, for example, in Greek. Hence the assumption of one single all-comprehending meaning is insufficient: we must place side by side different usages which have gradually become independent. But in this place the further fact must be taken into consideration that in its relation to single verbs also a

fixed usage, with regard to the employment or otherwise of the accusative, and a specialisation of the signification, has established itself. We must accordingly distinguish between the *free* accusative, which is independent of the nature of the verb to which it is attached, and the *attached* accusative, which is placed in connexion with a small number of verbs only, and in each individual case in a restricted signification.

230. Among the free uses of the accusative dating from the earliest times, is its employment for the designation of what extends over space and time (used not merely with verbs): also the accusative of the contents of substantives etymologically connected with the verb (as *to fight a hard fight*); in Latin the accusative of the names of towns in answer to the question *Whither?* A usage which has only arisen in later times is that with verbs commonly intransitive in connexion with a predicative adjective; *cf.*: *to cry one's eyes red—to wash one's forehead cool—to eat oneself full—to dance oneself tired—to cry oneself hoarse*, etc. In these cases, therefore, we should have a widening of the signification. Still we must take into consideration that special factors have contributed to start this construction; on the one hand, probably, the feeling—not yet thoroughly extinct—for the general signification of the accusative; on the other, the analogy of cases like *to shoot a man dead—to buy a man free—to strike a man dumb—to beat black and blue*, etc. The case is similar in constructions like those in the vulgar phrases *to talk one's head off—to worm oneself into another's confidence—to read one's own thoughts into those of one's author—to laugh a man down*, etc.

231. The accusative with compounds occupies a kind of border-ground between the absolutely 'free' and the 'attached,' when the simple verbs are either intransitive or govern quite a

different kind of accusative. We say a border-ground, considering that at least a great number of such verbs unite into a group; while in their formation and transitive application, as opposed to use, a certain freedom of movement makes itself felt. Composites with *be-* in German [and in a less degree in English] have the quite general function of making an intransitive verb transitive, or of enabling a transitive verb to adopt a different kind of object: *cf.*: *befallen*, *beschreiben*, *bestreiten*; *besetzen*, *beverfen*, *bezahlen*; *belabour*, *begrudge*, *bewitch*.

232. The accusative, when attached to a definite individual verb, has, as a rule, only a single meaning, limited by use. But multiplicity of meaning is not quite exceptional, and this is in such cases partly old—perhaps to be referred to the original general signification of the accusative—and partly it proves that originally one signification, and one only, has been ‘usual,’ while the other has grown up by ‘occasional’ transgression of the usage; *cf.* in German, *wunden schlagen—den feind schlagen—das schwert schlagen*; *einen mit steinen werfen—steine auf einen werfen*; *einen mit dem messer stechen—ihm das messer durch das hertz stechen*; *worte sprechen—einen menschen sprechen*; in Latin, *defendere aliquem ab ardore solis—defendere ardorem solis ab aliquo*; *prohibere calamitatem a provincia—prohibere provinciam calamitate* [in English, *to keep a man from harm—to keep harm from a man*; *to stick a knife into a man—to stick a man with a knife*]. Undoubtedly a later development, and due partly to ‘occasional’ usage, are the following constructions, which are especially common in poetry: in German, *ein kind schenken (=säugen)*, *wasser in einen eimer füllen*; in Latin, *vina cadis onerare* (VERG., a variation for *cados vinis*), *liberare obsidionem* (LIVY, instead of *liberare urbem obsidione*); in Greek, *δάκρυα τέρπειν*, ‘to stain tears’ (instead of ‘to stain with tears,’ PINDAR); *αἷμα δέειν*, ‘to stain

blood' (instead of to stain with blood,' SOPHOCLES). [Cf., '*The nightingale pours her throat.*'] More examples are given by Madvig, *Kleine schriften* (p. 337). Since the relation expressed by the accusative may in itself be more than a single one, the connexion of one verb with several accusatives is a circumstance which arises quite naturally.

The Preposition.

233. It would be incorrect to say of the IE. prepositions that they governed this or that particular case. The case in question was rather directly to be referred to the verb; its general meaning was still apprehended, and was merely specialised by the preposition; whence it comes that different cases could also stand after the same preposition, each with its own special meaning. The Greek stands in many respects near to this original state. But the case has more and more lost its independence with respect to the preposition; the connexion of the preposition with the case has become matter of custom, and the consciousness of the signification of the case has grown fainter. In the case of the NIIG. prepositions which govern one case only, like *en*, *um*, or which govern several without any difference in the sense, like *trotz*, the meaning of the case has decidedly disappeared; the employment of the particular case is merely a traditional habit, to which no value can be attached. Between this absolute fixity and fast connexion on the one hand, and the original life and freedom on the other, stands half-way the employment of the dative and accusative in a different sense after *in*, *auf*, *über*, *unter*.

Apposition and Partitive Genitive.

234. Appositional construction often appears when we ought, if strict accuracy of expression were aimed at, to employ a partitive genitive; not merely where the apposition consists of several members which, taken together, give the same meaning as the substantive to which they are appended; e.g.: *They went, one this way, the other that way*; *Classes populi Romani, alteram naufragio*,

alteram a Poen.'s depressam interire (CICERO); *Capti ab Jugurtha pars in crucem acti pars bestiis objecti sunt* (SALLUST); but also where the whole apposition represents a part only of the substantive belonging to it—*cf.*: *Volsci maxima pars caesi* (LIVY); *Cetera multitudo decimus quisque ad supplicium lecti* (LIVY); *Nostri ceciderunt tres* (CAESAR); and correspondingly in cases where the subject is expressed by the personal termination of the verb only—*cf.*: *Plerique meminimus*, 'most of us remember' (LIVY); *Simoni adesse me quis nuntiate*, 'one or other of you' (PLAUTUS). So in MHG.: *si weinten sumeltche*, 'many of them'; *ja sint in doch genuogen din mære wol bekant*, 'to many of you.' In the case of the designation of materials, which would regularly be expressed by the partitive genitive, the less accurate appositional relation appears; *cf.*, in Latin: *aliquid id genus*, instead of *ejus generis* (CICERO), *coronamenta omne genus* (CATO), *arma magnus numerus* (LIVY). This more simple method of construction has gained a wide hold in NHG. as against MHG.; *cf.*: *ein stück brot* (MHG., *stücke brötes*), *ein pfund mehl*, *ein scheffel weizen*, *ein glas wasser*, *eine menge obst*, *eine art tisch*, etc. [*cf.*, the Scotch use of 'a wee bit body']. In this case the collective material appellations are indeclinable throughout. We cannot, if we analyse correctly the instinct of language, longer recognise here any nominative or accusative, but merely the simple stem without any designation of case. Language has returned to its most primitive method of construction, the only one possible before the appearance of the case, and as it appears to us in the old compounds.

235. As the object, so even the subject of a verb can lend itself to denote a relation in a way varying from previous usage. *cf.* NHG. phrases, such as *die bank sitzt voller menschen*, *ihm hängt der himmel voller geigen*, *der eimer läuft voll wasser*, or *läuft leer* [in English, *The cistern is running dry*]. In MHG. the employment of

Subject of
a Verb

such combinations with *vol* is even more frequent; *cf.*: *das hils saz edeler vronwen vol, onch gienc der walt wildes vol, das gevilde was vollez parvelüne geslagen* (*cf.* HAUPT on the *Erec*, 2038); even in Hans Sachs, *den (wald) sach er springen vol der wilden tiere, all specerey voll würme loffen*; and a similar use prevails in Danish. *Cf.* further, *der narren herz ist wie ein topf, der da rinnt* (LU.,—at the present day, *rinnen* and *laufen* are used in a precisely similar way); *dass unsre augen mit tränen rinnen, und unsre augenlieder mit wasser fliessen* (LU.); *das gefäss fliesst über*; in Italian, *le vie correvano sangue* (MALESPINI); in Spanish, *corrieron sangue los rios* (CALDERON, *cf.* Diez iii. 114); in Latin, *culter sanguine manat, membra sudore fluunt*; in English, *the hall thick swarming now with complicated monsters* (MILTON); [*their eyes run with tears*]; NIIG., *der wald erklingt von gesang; das fenster schliesst schlecht*; just so in French, *la fenêtre ne clôt pas bien*. The Germans can say indifferently, *die blume riecht* and *ich rieche die blume, der wein schmeckt* and *ich schmecke den wein*. Compare the use of the NHG., *stinken*; Latin, *sapere*; French, *sentir*. The German use of *sehen* for *ausschen* is a parallel [*cf.*, *it looks bad*]. If we take the position that the relation between subject and object is to be fixed and immovable for all time, we are compelled to assign a double meaning to the verb for cases like those which we have cited.

Substantive
and Adjecti-
val Predi-
cate.

236. The corresponding departure from ordinary usage occurs when a substantive is connected with an adjectival predicate, and on a still larger scale when the connexion is attributival. Whereas the adjective ought, properly speaking, to be employed only for the quality which inheres in the substantive attaching to it, we find it also employed where the relation is merely indirect. *Cf.* such expressions as *auf schuldigen wegen* (SCHILLER)—i.e. 'ways in which one incurs guiltiness'; *einige gelassene augenblicke* (GOETHE)

—i.e. 'moments in which one is quiet ;' *der hoffnungsvollen gabe* (GOETHE) ; *bei ihrem unbekannten besuche* (LESSING)—i.e. 'one in which she remains unknown ;' *des trones, ungewiss, ob ihn mehr vorsicht schützt, als liebe stützt* (LESSING)—i.e. 'in which it is uncertain.' Many such linguistic licences have become quite 'usual.' We say quite commonly, *a happy event, a joyful surprise, happy hours, a learned treatise, in an intoxicated condition, in a foolish manner*, etc. : and further, we say, *he gives us an unhealthy impression*, and *a stingy gift*, etc. The word *sicher* in German, like *secure* and *sûr*, refers in the first instance to a person who has no need to be anxious ; in the second place to a thing or a person *about* whom or which no one need be anxious : *ekel* refers on the one hand to a person who easily feels disgust ; on the other to an object at which disgust is felt. If such freer combinations are apprehended after the analogy between the substantive and the adjective agreeing with it, we arrive at a point where we may lay it down that a change in word-meaning has occurred.

237. Such a licence is allowed with special frequency in the case of participles ; cf. : *einer reuenden träne* (LESSING) ; *lächelnde antwort* (GOETHE) ; *in der schauernden stille der nacht* (LESSING) ; *zum schauernden concert* (SCHILLER) ; *der könig betrachtet ihn mit nachdenkender stille* (SCHILLER) ; *in seiner windenden todesnot* (GOETHE) ; *nach dem kostenden preise* (NICOLAI). [We can say in English *a suspicious calmness—a smiling answer—a melancholy task*.¹]

238. Common examples of this are to be found in such usages as *sitzende, liegende stellung—fallende sucht—schwindelnde höhe—im wachenden traume*, etc., and the now condemned phrase *bei nachtschlafender zeit*. Many similar expressions are very common in English, such as, *dying day—parting glass—writing materials*

¹ Further examples are given in Andresen, *Sprachgebrauch*, p. 82 sqq.

—dining room—sleeping apartment—singing lesson—falling sickness. Cf. also such examples in French as, *thé dansant, café chantant*. Tacitus has such uses as *haec plebi volentia fuere*, instead of *volenti*, etc. (cf. DRAEGER, § 193, 3). We find examples for the perfect participle in *ein längst entwohnter schauer* (GOETHE); *in diesen letzten zerstreuten tagen* (GOETHE); *der beschuldigten heuchelung* (SCHILLER), i.e., 'the hypocrisy of which I am accused'; and in English, *the ravished hours* (PARNELL), for 'the hours of ravishing pleasure.' Common examples are *ein cingebildeter mensch, ein bedienter*.

239. Parallel to this use is probably the custom of freely attaching a predicative attribute, which is indeed condemned as careless, but which still occurs frequently enough in such cases as *seltene taten werden durch jahrhunderte nachahmend zum gesetzte geheiligt* (GOETHE); *lustig davonfahrend wurden die eindrücke des abends noch einmal ausgetauscht* (RIEHL); *zurückgekehrt wurde des ermordeten kleidung untersucht* (BRACHVOGEL). Andresen cites other instances, mostly from newspapers (*Sprachgebrauch*, p. 113). In this case we feel ourselves compelled to supply a subject to the predicative attribute; but it would be equally possible to fill up the example cited above '*mit nachdenkender stille*' to '*mit stille, während welcher er nachdenkt*' without any thing of this being contained in the expression.

240. In the case of participial constructions the time-relation alone is expressed in which the state or the event which has been denoted by the participle stands to the finite verb. It is possible, however, for numerous relations to subsist at the same time, so that in resolving the participial construction into a single sentence we have to employ sometimes one conjunction and sometimes another. Still we cannot on this account maintain that the participial construction in itself admits

Participial
Constructions:
Conjunctions.

of different meanings—*i.e.* that it denotes now the reason, now the condition, now an opposition, etc. These relations remain in each case only 'occasional' and accidental. The case is otherwise, however, with *dependent* sentences introduced by a temporal *conjunction*. In this case it is possible for the accidental relation to the governing sentence to attach itself to the conjunction, and to become an integral portion of its 'usual' signification. Thus, for instance, the employment of the word *während* in German to denote a contrast must be acknowledged as a peculiar 'usual' function, side by side with the fundamental meaning. This is manifest, apart from our feeling for language, from the consideration that this function operates equally where that which is spoken of as having passed between the dependent and governing sentence is not contemporaneous—*cf.*: *du belügst mich, während ich dir immer die wahrheit gesagt habe*. In the same way we must grant the *NIIG. stt*, besides its temporal signification, that of the *NIIG. causal da*, as an independent one, for it can be used in contradiction with the fundamental meaning in a case of contemporaneous action between dependent and governing sentence—*cf.*: *stt ich due einen crumen man mlu lant niht bevriden kan, so gewinne ich gerne einen*. The development may then proceed further, as the original temporal signification disappears entirely, as in the case of *NIIG. weil*. In precisely a corresponding way prepositions such as *through, by*, of local or temporal meaning, pass over to a causal one.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON CONTAMINATION.

Definition BY 'contamination' I understand the process by which two synonymous forms of expression force themselves simultaneously into consciousness, so that neither of the two makes its influence felt simply and purely: a new form arises in which elements of the one mingle with elements of the other. This process is also of course in the first place individual and momentary. However, by means of repetition, and the intercourse of different individuals, it is possible for the individual usage gradually to become 'usual.'

Contamination:
1. Phonetic. 242. Contamination manifests itself partly in the phonetic form of single words, partly in their syntactical combination.

243. A confusion of two words not etymologically connected is comparatively rare. Schuchardt has indicated one characteristic example. In the Aemilian dialect there is a word *emnzipà*, 'to begin,' a contamination arising from the words *cominciare* and *principiare* of the Italian written language. The confusion was rendered easier in the case of forms which may be amplified into a paradigm. The older form *wis* ('*sci*'), from OHG. *wesan*, is in MHG. gradually thrust aside by *bis* under the influence of *bist*. OHG. *him* (*hin*) is probably a contamination of *im* (Gothic), and **bium* (AS. *beōm*); a similar occurrence may be noted in the converse way in AS. *eīm*.

244. The confusion of words belonging to the same etymological group is more common. Cf. *gewohnt* from the MHG. adjective *gewen* (still found in *gewohnheit* and *gewöhnlich*), and the MHG. participle *gewent* from *wenen* (*gewohnen*); *doppelt* from the adjective *doppel* (= French *double*), and the participle *gedoppelt*, still usual in the last century; *zu guter letzt* from *zu guter lets* (MHG. *letze*, 'departure') and *zu letzt*.

245. Not merely do two single forms suffer reciprocal contamination, but single forms affect each other similarly. In this way then there arises not unfrequently a pleonasm of the formative elements, a form composed in an unusual way, being further enriched by the suffix of the regular formation. Under this head¹ come forms like MHG. *ihrer*, *ihnen*, *derer*, *denen*; OHG. *inan* (from *in* influenced by *blintan*, etc.); MHG. *Fritzens*, *Maricens*, from the older *Fritzen*, *Marien*, forms which have been affected by the most common genitival termination. Further, words like the Latin *jactitare*, *cantitare*, *ventitare*, instead of *jactare*, etc., have arisen under the influence of *volitare*, etc.; and Spanish adjectives, like *celestial*, *divinal*, *humanaal* (cf. MICHAELIS, p. 38). Especially common is the multiplication of the suffixes of the comparative and superlative; cf. NHG. *öfterer* (common in LESSING); *letztteste* (GOETHE); OHG. *m'riro*, as against the Gothic *maiza*; Gothic *aftumists*, *auhumists*, *frumists* by the side of *aftuma*, *auhuma*, *fruma*; *hindumists*, *spēdumists*; late Latin *pluriores*, *minimissimus*, *pessimissimus*, *extremissimus*, *postremissimus*; Greek *ἁπειρότερος*, *ὑπερίτερος*, *πρωτίστος*, etc. [Cf. in English the forms *former*, *nearer*, *lesser*, and *Most Highest*.] In the same way we must explain the double prefix in *gegessen*, MHG. *gezen*.

246. Contamination plays a great part in the area of syntax. We will cite, in the first instance, a few examples of merely

Syntactical
Contamina-
tion.
1. Momen-
tary.

¹ Cf. Brugman, *Morph. Unt.* iii. 67 sq., and Ziemer, *Streitz*. 146.

passing anomalies which have no influence on usage. Lessing uses the phrase, *um deines lebens wegen*; a confusion between *um . . . willen* and *wegen*; a similar confusion is quoted by Andresen (*Sprachgebranch*, 194), from the *Kölnische Zeitung*, as between *um* and *halber*. Goethe writes: *freitags als dem ruhigsten tage*, as if *am freitage* had been written. Lessing writes: *ich habe nur leugnen wollen, dass ihr alsdann der name malerei weniger zukomme*; a confusion between *leugnen . . . dass . . . zukomme* and *behaupten . . . dass . . . weniger zukomme*. Hans Sachs writes: *Ein jedes thut, als es dann wolt als jhm von jhem geschehen solt*. In this the two thoughts are confused; *wie es wollte dass ihm von jencm geschehen sollte*, and *wie ihm geschehen sollte*. Hartmann von Aue writes: *er bereite sich dar zuo als er se velde wolde komen* (from *dar zuo daz er se velde kæme*, and *als er se velde wolde komen*). Again the same author writes: *des weinens tet in michel nôt* from *daz weinen tet in* and *des weinens was in*. Goethe: *im betragen unterschied sich auch hier der gesandte von Plotho wider vor allen andern*; a confusion with *zeichnete sich aus* or something similar. Goethe writes: *die schicksale meiner wanderschaft werden dich mehr davon überzeugen, als die wärmsten versicherungen kaum tun können*; here the word *kaum* belongs properly to an entirely different manner of expression.

a. Usual.

247. We turn to cases in which the contamination has become usual, or at least makes its appearance as a frequently occurring licence. The construction *das gehört mein* is very common (cf. GRIMM, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, 4a, 2508); a confusion between *gehört mir* and *ist mein*. In English we say, '*I am friends with him*,' from *I am friendly with him* and *we are friends*; the Danish popular idiom is similar, *han er gode venner med henn* ('he is good friends with her'). The Danish popular idiom also has the expression, *jeg følger med ham* ('I follow with him'), from *jeg*

følger med ham, and te følger ad ('we follow each other,' i.e. 'we go together').¹ In Greek we find expressions like *ὁ ἡμῶν τοῦ χρόνου, τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς*, a confusion between *ὁ ἡμῶν χρόνος* and *τὸ ἡμῶν τοῦ χρόνου*, etc.; correspondingly we find in Spanish *muchas de virgines*, instead of *muchas virgines* or *mucho de virgines*; *a pocos de dias, una poca de miel, tantas de yerbas, la mas de la gente* (CERVANTES); in Italian, *in poca d'ora, la più della gente* (BOCCACCIO). Similar confusions are found also in Portuguese, Provençal, and OF. (cf. DIEZ, iii. 152.) We have a similar contamination in the case of the Latin gerund: *poenarum solvendi tempus* (LUCRETIVS), from *poenarum solvendum* and *poenas solvendi*; *exemplorum eligendi potestas* (CICERO; cf. DRAEGER, 597d). Cicero writes: *eorum partim in pompa partim in acie illustres esse voluerunt*, in which there is a confusion between *eorum pars* and *in partem*; the corresponding process is common in older NHG.; cf. *theils lente nennen ihn zum spott den unverständ* (CRONEGK).

248. Not unfrequently, in referring to what has preceded, an inaccuracy arises owing to the displacement of a word by the idea of a word etymologically related with the word actually employed, where the speaker might equally well have employed either. Thus, for instance, the idea of the inhabitants displaces that of the town or of the country; cf. *Θεμιστοκλῆς φεύγει ἐς Κέρκυραν, ὡν αὐτῶν εὐεργέτης* (THUC.); *Domitius navibus Massiliam pervenit atque ab iis receptus urbi praeficitur* (CAESAR); *Sutrium, socios populi Romani* (LIVY); NHG. *so waren wir denn an der grenze von Frankreich alles französischen wesens auf einmal bar und ledig. Ihre lebensweise fanden wir zu bestimmt und zu vornehm, ihre dichtung kalt*, etc. (GOETHE). Other examples are: *innere stärke kann man der Bodmerischen und Breitingerischen kritik nicht*

¹ See Madvig, *Kl. Schriften*, 193¹.

absprechen, und man muss den ersten als einen patriarchen anschn (HERDER); *het ich mich nicht jung thun verweiben, die er mir jetat drey jar anheugen thet* (the die referring to a wife whom he should have taken; HANS SACHS);¹ *MIIG. in dem palas, der wol gekerzet was, die* (i.e. 'welche kerzen') *harte lichte brunnen* (WOLFRAM); *entwipent wart der tote man und an den lebenden gelegt* (du wipen must be supplied as subject; id.); *servili tumultu, quos* (as if *servorum* had preceded; CAESAR). The most common case is that the relative refers to a possessive pronoun, as if the personal pronoun had preceded; cf. *laudare fortunas meas, qui gnatum haberem tali ingenio praeditum* (TERENCE); τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπεισόδου, ὃν μὴτ' ὀκνεῖτε (SOPH.); in *MIIG.* it is universal.

249. In Latin there arise from the confusion of the comparative and superlative manner of expression, combinations like *hi ceterorum Brittannorum fugacissimi* (TACITUS); *omnium ante se genitorum diligentissimus* (PLINY).² [Cf. Milton's copy of this use: *Adam the goodliest man of men since born; the fairest of her daughters, Eve;* and Shakespeare's *Midsummer Night's Dream*, v. i. 252: *This is the greatest error of all the rest.*] Conversely the superlative occurs sometimes with the meaning of the comparative; cf.: *omni vero verissimum certoque certissimum* (ARNOBIUS). Compare the Old Norse *hæstr borinn hverjun jöfri* (GRIPISPA, 'the highest,' for 'higher than any prince').

250. In Latin we often have joined to the imperative the word *jam dudum*; e.g., *jam dudum sumite poenas*—a confusion between the thoughts 'pray take' and 'you should long ago have taken,' as if he had written *jam dudum debitas*. [Cf. *Those dispositions that of late transform you from what you rightly are* (LEAR, I. iv. 242); and *He is ready to cry all the day.*]

¹ Other examples may be found in Andresen, *Sprachg.* 252 sqq.

² Cf. Ziemer; *Comp.* 55 sqq.

251. In MHG. an interrogation is common with the infinitive, e.g.: *do enweste er wie gehiren*; we expect a finite verb, and the construction is probably only to be explained by our assuming the simultaneous influence of those cases in which the infinitive was directly dependent on the verb, without any interrogative. The same thing holds good, of course, of the corresponding Romance constructions. Cf. in French, *je ne sais quel parti prendre*; in Italian, *non so che fare* (DIEZ, iii. 230); [and in English *I do not know what to do*]. We see a similar construction in the Italian phrase *non ho che dire*; in the Spanish, *non tengo con quien hablar*; in the French, *il trouva à qui parler*, and *la terre fournit de quoi nourrir ses habitants*; in Late Latin, *non habent quid respondere* (DIEZ, u.s.); in English, *how have I then with whom to hold converse* (MILTON); *then sought where to lie hid* (ib.); [*hath not where to lay his head*], etc.

252. It must further be regarded as a contamination, if an interrogative sentence be made dependent on a verb, and at the same time be made the subject of this interrogative sentence as nominal object; cf., in Latin, *nosti Marcellum quam tardus sit* (CICERO); *viden seclustum ut aucupetur* (PLAUTUS); *observatote cum quam blande palpatur mulieri* (TERENCE); *dic modo hominem qui sit* (PLAUTUS); *patriam te rogo quae sit* (PLAUTUS); in Italian, *tu 'l saprai bene chi è* (BOCCACCIO); and a similar use is common in the older Romance languages. [Cf.: *You hear the learned Bellario what he writes* (*Merchant of Venice*, IV. i. 167); cf. also *Lear*, I. i. 272]; cf. Diez, III. 391. Just in the same way a nominal object stands side by side with an object sentence with *dass*; cf. MHG. *swenne er sin sêle sêhe das si in tôtsiunden wære, die liset man si willen wæren des wunderlîchen Alexandres man, do hiez in got das er dar in gienge, die wil ich das siz merken*; NHG. *da ihn sahen alle, die ihn vorhin gekannt hatten, dass er*

mit den propheten weissagete (LUTHER); *welchen ihr sprecht, er sei euer gott* (ib.). The object of the governing sentence may also be contained in the dependent object, cf.: *vierhundert taler, die sie nicht wüsste, wie sie sie bezahlen sollte* (LESSING). In the same way it is possible, by the side of a subject sentence with *dass* as subject, for the subject or object of that sentence to appear as subject of the main sentence; cf.: *mich will Antonio von hinnen treiben und will nicht scheinen, dass er mich vertreibt* (GOETHE); and again, *nichts, was ihn gereuen könnte, dass ers gab* (ib.).

253. In German instead of *der selbe der* or *der gleiche wie* they sometimes use the phrase *der selbe wie* and *der gleiche der*; just so in Latin, *idem ut*; e.g., *in eadem sunt injustitia, ut si in suam rem aliena convertant* (CIC.). We often meet with phrases of the following kind: *dass sie nichts spricht kommt daher, weil sie nichts denkt* (LESSING); *der gedanke wurde dadurch notwendig, weil man voraussah* (WIELAND); *wortstreit, der daraus entsteht, weil ich die sachen unter andern combinationen sentiere* (GOETHE); *in dem augenblicke, wenn wir ihn auch seines bogens beraubt sehen* (LESSING); *die grösste feinheit eines dramatischen richters zeigt sich darin, wenn er in jedem falle zu unterscheiden weiss* (LESSING). In universal, and in some cases even obligatory, use are combinations like *jedesmal wenn* or *wo* (instead of *dass*) *in dem augenblicke wo* (Goethe still says *in dem augenblick, dass er amen sagte*); correspondingly we find in French, *au temps où*; at an earlier period, *au temps que*; *zu dem zwecke, in der absicht damit*; *deshalb, deswegen, aus dem grunde weil*; *desto besser weil* (MIG. *das*); and in English, *the rather because*, as well as *the rather that*.

254. When Cicero says *cum accusatus esset, quod contra rempublicam sensisse eum dicerent*, he makes a confusion between *quod*

... *sensisse enim dicebant* and *quod . . . sensisset*. For further examples cf. Dracger, § 537. Plato even uses constructions like *τὸδε, ὡς οἶμαι, ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι*, Ziem., 105 [cf.: *Marry, that I think be young Petruchio (Rom. and Jul., I. v. 133)*, which is a confusion between 'that, I think, is,' and 'I think that that be.'—ABBOTT, § 411.]

255. A common construction in MHG. seems to have been in *gesche vil schiere mîn liep* ('unless I see my love soon'), *ich bin*, or *sô bin ich tôt*. The same sense would have been yielded by the paratactical combination *ich gisihe vil schiere mîn liep oder ich bin tôt*. Instead of this the minnesinger Steinmar says in *gesche vil schiere mîn lieh alder* (=oder) *ich bin tot*. Another kind of confusion is still more striking, in which *oder* appears before the sentence with *ne*; *ich gelige tôt under mînen van oder ich nebeherete mîn êre* (KAISERCHRONIK).¹

256. A predicative attribute may have the same function as a dependent sentence introduced by a conjunction. Consequently many conjunctions may be placed before the simple adjective, whereby a more exact description of the circumstance is attained. English is peculiarly rich in such constructions; cf.: *talents angel-bright, IF wanting worth, are shining instruments* (YOUNG); *nor ever did I love thee less, THOUGH mourning o'er thy wickedness* (SHELLEY); *Mac Ian, WHILE putting on his clothes, was shot through the head* (MACAULAY).² In German, too, it is possible to say: *ich tat es, obschon gezwungen*, etc. Correspondingly, in Latin, many conjunctions are placed before the ablative absolute; cf.: *quamvis iniqua pace honeste tamen viverent* (CICERO); *etsi aliquo accepto detrimento* (CÆSAR); *etsi magno aestu* (CICERO).³ The conjunctions *quasi* and *sive*, which

¹ Further examples are given by Dittmar, *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie*, Ergänzungsband, p. 211.

² Cf. Mätzner, iii. p. 72.

³ Cf. Dräger, § 59.

originally could merely serve to introduce a sentence, are quite commonly added to mere dependent clauses.

257. Conversely, coincidence in the function of dependent sentences and prepositional determinants tends to the employment of prepositions to introduce dependent sentences. English has many examples of this; *cf.*: *FOR I cannot flatter thee in pride* (SHAKESPEARE); *AFTER he had begotten Seth* (GENESIS); *WITHOUT they were ordered* (MARRYAT). [(This use of *without* is incorrect.) '*I HATE him for he is a Christian, but more FOR THAT . . . he lends,*' etc. (*Merch. of Ven.* 1. iii. 43)]. *Till* and *until* are specially common in this use. [Indeed the prepositional use has almost died out in written English, but was common in the Elizabethan age; *cf.* Shakespeare, *from the first corse TILL he that died to-day* (*Hamlet*, 1. ii. 105), where *he* should be strictly speaking *him*. Other instances are quoted by Abbott, § 184.] It must, however, be particularly noticed that the constructions *for that*, *after that*, etc., are permissible as alternatives to *for*, *after*, etc., when used as conjunctions. A preposition also stands before indirect questions; *cf.*: *at the idea of how sorry she would be* (MARRYAT); *the daily quarrels about who shall squander most* (GAY);¹ *cf.*, in Spanish, *este capítulo habla de como el rey non deba consentir*: and similar constructions are found in Portuguese and Old Italian.²

258. The result of contamination in the area of syntax is often a pleonasm. Thus, for instance, in Latin we meet with a multiplication of particles expressing similarity, as *pariter hoc fit atque ut alia facta sunt* (PLAUTUS);³ *cf.* the common but incorrect German expression *als wie*, [and the English *like as if*]. Similarly we find in Latin *quasi si*,⁴ *nisi si*.⁵ In English we can

¹ Mätzner, iii. p. 445.

² *Cf.* Dräger, § 516, 14.

³ *Cf.* Dies, iii. p. 388.

⁴ *Id.* § 518, 16.

⁵ *Id.* § 557, *fg.*

connect a preposition either with a substantive or with a governing verb; the two even occur in combination; *cf.*: *that fair for which love groaned for* (SHAKESPEARE) [*cf.* also, *In what enormity is Marcius poor in?* (*Coriol.* II. i. 18)]. Nay, we often find such expressions as *of our general's* (SHAKESPEARE) instead of *of our general* or *our general's*. Not uncommonly a preposition denoting *whence* is added to adverbs of place, which of themselves denote the same direction; this preposition should, strictly speaking, be connected with an adverb denoting rest in a place; *cf.* Latin *deinde, exinde, dehinc, abhinc*; MHG. *von hinnen, von dannen, von wannen, von woher*, Span. *donde* from *de unde*; *cf.* the English use of *from henceforth*. In Latin we often find in the passive a pleonastic denotation of the pluperfect; *e.g.*: *causa fuerant civium capita* (LIVY); *sicuti praeceptum fuerat* (SALLUST).¹ We often meet with expressions like *erlauben Sie, dass ich mich dabei beteiligen darf*.²

259. The forms of comparison of the adjective and adverb present many examples which seem instructive in this connection. In MHG. we often find a *baz* added to the comparative, as *grazer baz*, etc.; and in the same way in Latin, especially with the comic poets, we find *magis* or *potius*; in Greek, *μᾶλλον*; ³ thus also in Gothic, *mais vulprizans*. We find a similar use with the superlative; *cf.* *μάλιστα μέγιστον* (XENOPHON); *die zunächststehendsten* (quoted from the *Frankfurter Zeitung* by Andresen). We may compare with this such combinations as *magis* or *potius malle, prius praeicipere, πλέον προτιμᾶν* (XENOPHON), *πρότερον προλαμβάνειν* (DEMOSTHENES). Lessing writes in the *Laokoon*: *niemand hatte mehr recht, wegen eines solchen geschwieres bekannter zu sein* [*cf.*: *most unkindest* (*Jul. Cæs.* III. ii. 187)]; *thy most worst*

¹ Dräger, § 134.

² For other instances see Andresen, *Sprachg.* 136, 7.

³ *Cf.* Ziemer (comp. 154, 5).

(*Winter's Tale*, III. ii. 180).] The comparative is united with a preposition denoting preference; such preposition could of course, strictly speaking, be only united with the positive: *ὁλιν ἢ τυραννὶς πρὸ ἐλευθερίας ἦν ἀσπαστότερον* (HERODOTUS); *αἰρετώτερον εἶναι τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ βίου* (XENOPHON); *prae illo plenius* (GELLIUS); *ante alios immanior omnis* (VERGIL).¹ [Cf. numerous instances drawn from Old Greek, where the comparative degree is used where several, or indeed all the objects belonging to the same class are compared with a single object: e.g. THEOCRITUS, xv. 139, "Ἐκτωρ, Ἐκίβας ὁ γεραίτερος εἵκατι παίδων. Cf. *Berliner Phil. Wochenschrift*, No. 52, p. 1622. Wolfram von Eschenbach places the two possible turns side by side: *din prûezet manegen für in baz dan des mærcs herren Parzival* (in refers to *Parzival*).]

260. Pleonasm arising from contamination occurs most extensively in the case of *negations*. It has almost disappeared from the [English and] German written language; but in the last century it was still very common in the latter. Thus, we find after negative expressions, in the dependent sentence introduced by *dass*, a negation which seems to us illogical; cf.: *es kann nicht fehlen, dass die meisten stimmen jetzt nicht gegen mich sein sollten* (LESSING); *wird das hindern können, dass man sie nicht schlachtet?* (SCHILLER); *der verfasser verbittet sich, dass man seine schrift nicht zu den elenden spötereien rechne* (CLAUDIUS); *dir abzuraten, dass du sie nicht brächtest* (SCHILLER); *nnn will ich zwar nicht läugnen, dass an diesen büchern nicht manches zu verbessern sein sollte* (LESSING); *ich zweifle nicht, dass sie sich nicht beide über diese kränkung hinwegsetzen werden* (LESSING); *der lord Shaftesbury erklärt sich*

¹ Cf. Ziemer (comp. 95 *sup.*).

² Further examples are cited in Dittmar, *Zeits. f. d. Philol.*, Ergänzungshand, 299 *sup.*

dawider, dass man nicht zu viel wahrheit sagen solle (Translation of *Tom Jones*, 1771). We find a corresponding usage in MHG. *dar umbe lîez er daz, daz er niht wolte minnen* (KUDRUN); *ich wil des haben rât, daz der kûene Hartmuot bi mir niht enstât* (KUDRUN). [In Chaucer and Shakespeare the use of the double negative is common, as, *first he denied you had in him no right* (*Comedy of Errors*, IV. ii. 7); *you may deny that you were not the cause* (*Richard III.*, I. iii. 90). See other instances in Abbott's *Shakespearean Grammar*, 406.]

261. As early as in MHG. the negation can be dispensed with. If the governing sentence is negated, in MHG. the dependent sentence is not commonly introduced by a conjunction; instead, merely the negation *en* with the subjunctive is used; *cf.*: *mit vronwe sol ich niht erlân irn saget inder mere*. The origin of the construction seems to be owing to the thought of the dependent sentence forcing itself into consciousness, on the one hand, as dependent on the governing sentence; on the other hand as independent. When, for instance, we read in the Kudrun *daz wil ich widerraten, daz ir mich mit besemen gestrafet nimmer mêr*, this is, strictly speaking, a confusion of the two thoughts, *I will counsel you not to punish me ever again* and *never punish me again*. This explanation is certainly only applicable in cases where the governing sentence is positive. Not until the application of the negative has become usual can it be transferred to the cases with a negative governing sentence. It is possible—nay, it is probable—that the employment of the negation is traditional, and dates from a time when no strict grammatical subordination of one sentence to the others existed at all. Assuming the truth of this, we still have to deal with a contamination. Kindred peculiarities occur in Latin, in the Romance languages, and in others.

262. Correspondingly, the negation appears in connexion with

the infinitive, in cases where it is not possible to derive it from an originally independent position; *cf.*: *freilich hüten wir uns sie nicht an den gnädigen herrn zu erinnern* (GOETHE); *ich habe verschworen nicht mehr an sie zu denken* (GOETHE); *ich habe es verredet, in meiner gegenwärtigen lage niemals wieder eine nacht in Braunschweig zu bleiben* (LESSING); *der habe ihm verboten, den ring weder der königin zu geben, noch dem grafen zurück zu senden* (LESSING). [*Cf.* *He waited indifferently 'twixt doing them neither good nor harm* (Coriolanus, II. ii. 19, 20); *cf.* ABBOTT, 405.]

263. A negation may also be found after an expression not essentially negative, but negatived; *cf.*: *und gantzlich kein hoffnung mehr handt zu samb zu kummen nimmer meh* (HANS SACHS).

264. A pleonastic negation occurs in various languages after *without* (*cf.* MAETZNER, *French Grammar*, § 268). *Cf.*: *sans nul égard pour nos scrupules* (BERANGER); *sin fuerza ninguna* (CALDERON); *senza dir niente*; *sin hablar palabra ninguna*; *sans que son visage n'exprimat la peine* (SAINT-PIERRE); *sin que nadie le viese* (CERVANTES); *NIIG. ohne dass wir bei seiner beurteilung weder auf irgend ein gesetz noch auf irgend einen zweck rücksicht nehmen* (SCHILLER); *ohne dass ich weder von dem vorhergehenden noch von dem nachfolgenden irgend unterrichtet gewesen wäre* (GOETHE);¹ A similar construction is found with *ausser*: *ihr findet widersprüche überall, ausser da nicht, wo sie wirklich sind* (LESSING);² and after *als* referring to a preceding *nichts*, *cf.*: *es mangelt ihm nichts, als dass es nicht gekläret ist* (SCHUCH); *es fehlt nichts als dass du nicht da bist* (GOETHE).

265. A regular negative is sometimes prefixed to words which in themselves have no absolutely negative signification, but merely acquire it by litotes. Thus in *NIIG.* we find *nix* attached to *sellen*;

¹ Another example is found in Andresen, p. 145.

² *Cf.* Andresen, *loc. cit.*

cf.: ein wlp, der ich selten nie vergaz (MINNESINGER); *das man nie dehein alsô rîchen sô senftes willen selten vant* (BITEROLF); in the same way *selten nieman* = *never any one*. In NIIG. we sometimes find a negative word after *kanm*: *nichts mag kanm sein so ungelegen* (FISCHART) = 'Scarcely can anything be so difficult; ' and after *schwerlich*: *schwerlich niemals* (LESSING).¹

¹ Cf. Sanders, 2 A, 1048 b.

CHAPTER IX.

ORIGINAL CREATION.

The conditions of new creation still present.

WE have hitherto, in considering linguistic processes, made it a rule to base our views on observations made on the historic development of language, which is easily traced; and, taking this as a starting-point, to draw conclusions bearing on the original history of language. We must endeavour to extend this principle to our judgments on original creation as well; though in this case we find ourselves confronted by greater difficulties. We do not easily meet with opportunities which facilitate accurate observations on this subject. For exceptional cases, such as the capricious invention of the word *gas*, do not throw much light on the natural development of language. A mysterious darkness veils the process, and views are always being put forward which refer to it as a special heirloom, now declared to be lost, of the original human race. All such views must be decidedly rejected. The conditions requisite for primitive language-making must one and all be inherent in the bodily and intellectual nature of mankind as man now exists. Indeed, if our intellectual tendencies have developed into higher perfection, we shall be actually driven to conclude that these conditions are now present, and in a higher state of perfection than at the period of the rise of human language. If we, generally speaking, create no new material of language, this is simply due

to the fact that the need for doing so no longer exists. It is scarcely possible for an idea or sensation to manifest itself in us without some link of the material of language which we have inherited from it. This immense mass of material, to which we are once for all habituated, forbids anything new to spring up by its side, allowing, as it does, of convenient augmentation by means of manifold combinations and by transitions of meaning. But if the experiment were to be made of allowing a number of children to grow up unacquainted with any language, excluding them carefully from outside intercourse and limiting them to their own society, we can hardly doubt as to the result; they would, as they grew up, form a language of their own out of words originated by themselves. Something approaching such an experiment is said to have been actually made. Robert Moffat's report of the state of language, as evidenced in isolated desert villages of South Africa, is well known from Max Müller's lectures. According to that report, the children invent a language for themselves during the prolonged absence of their parents. But I should not be inclined to attach too great value to such stories without ample confirmation.

267. We do not, however, require to go so far afield. We have every right, I think, to maintain that even in the languages of the European civilised peoples the creation of new material has never completely ceased. After all the progress made by IE. etymology in the last ten or twenty years, there still remains a very large residuum of words which can neither be referred to roots of the original language, nor yet proved to be borrowed from foreign languages. Even when we go through the repertory of the living German dialects we find much there that we are unable to connect with the *MITG.* repertory. We must doubtless account for this fact in part from the imperfection of

Creation
has never
wholly
ceased.

our record as we have received it, and must remember that our scientific combinations are as yet imperfect. Still, however, there remain a large number of cases in which it is difficult to see how, by the aid of sound-development and formation by analogy, a connexion with older material could ever be possible. We shall thus have to ascribe to the more and most recent periods of language not merely the capacity for original creation, but, what is more, the actual translation of this capacity into action. We must here enter our objections to the theory that two periods have to be distinguished in language—in the one of which the original material of language, the so-called roots, was created, and a second in which speakers confined themselves to the formation of combinations out of the material at hand. The fact is that in the development of popular language no point of time can be assumed from which original creation is excluded. On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that shortly after the first original creations the same kinds of further development as we have observed in the later periods have appeared. In this respect there exists between the various phases of development no difference in their nature, but solely in their degree. There is no change save in the proportion of original creation to transmission by tradition of the material created, and to the other means whereby language is enriched—the enlargement of signification by apperception, the combination of simple elements, formation by analogy, etc.

268. The essence of original creation consists, as we have already seen, in the fact that a sound-group is placed in relation to a group of ideas, which then comes to constitute its signification, and this without the aid of a connected group of ideas already attached to the sound-group. Such an original creation is in the first instance the work of the impulse, which may dis-

appear and leave no lasting traces. In order that a real language may thus arise, it is necessary for such utterances to leave behind them a psychical after-operation as well, whereby the sound can be reproduced by memory by means of the signification, and the signification by means of the sound. Further, the word must be understood by other individuals, and then be reproduced by them as well.

269. The experiences which we have made as to the rise of new words by analogical formation, and the apprehension of new conceptions by the aid of the existing vocabulary may serve to aid us equally in the judgments we form as to original creation. Hitherto we have always seen that the process of naming the new follows as a result of a perception connecting it with the already known, whether it be that we simply transfer the name already existing to the new, or that we form from it a compound or a derivative. In other words, a connexion of cause and effect exists between the newly-named object and its name, and the connecting link is an object named before. This connexion of cause and effect is necessary, in the first instance, in order that the name should be called into utterance by whoever employs it first, and in order that it should be understood by others. Such relation of cause and effect only becomes superfluous by frequent repetition, as the mere external association is gradually attached by a link strong enough for the purpose. The conclusion that original creation, in order to have come into being and been understood at all, needs such causal connexion, is certainly not to be rejected. Now as there is no connecting link, we must look for a direct connexion between object and name. But besides this, the possibility of understanding is originally rendered possible, just as in the process of adding additional ideas to a word already in existence, by

Application
to original
creation of
the results
won in other
departments
of the
history of
language.

the aid of the intuition given by the situation and by gesture-language.

270. We have seen that nothing can, generally speaking, become usual in language unless it is the spontaneous creation of different individuals. It is a further indispensable condition that it may be spontaneously created by the same individual at different times, and this without co-operation on the part of the memory. If, however, the same combination of sounds is found connected with the same meaning, at different times and in different individuals, then this connexion must necessarily be conditioned by the same cause. And this cause must be rooted in the nature of sound and of meaning, and not in any fortuitously accompanying circumstance. It may be conceded that occasionally even a connexion created by a single individual on a single occasion meets with general acceptance. But the possibility of such occurrence is confined within definite limits. If the first to name an object happen to be the discoverer or inventor of that object, so that all others receive their knowledge about it from him, then the name given by him enjoys a certain authority. But such cases naturally occur but seldom. The common acceptation of the name given can depend on nothing but its appropriateness: in other words we have again to deal with the intimate relation between sound and meaning, which, in the absence of any apparent connecting link, must depend on the impression made by the sound on the senses of the hearer, and on the satisfaction accorded to the speaker by the activity of the motor nerves indispensable to sound-production.

271. Now if we closely scrutinise words which may fairly be suspected of being comparatively new creations, we shall find them in the main to denote different noises and movements ;

cf.: *NIIG. bambeln, bummeln, bummeln, bimmeln, batzen* (NG. to ring out), *banzen* (= *batzen* — 'bark'), *belfen, belfern, blaffen, blarren, blerren, blatzen, platzen, pletzen, blitschen, platschen, platschern, planschen, panschen, plätschern, blodern, plaudern, blubbern, plappern, blauzen, böller, bollern, bullern, ballern, holdern, poltern, bompern, bumpen, buff, buffen, puff, puffen, burren, bubbeln, puppeln, puppern, dudeln, fummeln, summeln, flattern, flinder, flindern, flinderling, flandern, flink, flinken, flinkern, flirren, flarren, flarzen, flartschen, flismen, flisperm, flitter, flodern, flunkern, flüstern, gackeln, gackern, gantsche, gantschen, glucken, glucksen, grackeln, hampeln, humpen, humpeln, hätscheln, holpern, hurren, hussen, kabbeln, kichern, kirren, kischen (zischen), klabastern, klachel or klüchel (Bavarian = tongue of a bell or other dangling object), klatschen, kletszen, kleschen (= klatschen), klimpern, klirren, klunker, knabbeln, knabbern, knacken, knacks, knarpeln, knarren, knarzen, knarschen, knirren, knirschen, knurren, knascheln, knaspeln, knastern, knisten, knistern, knaster(-bart), knatschen, knetschen, knitschen, knutschen, knattern, knittern, knuffen, knüffeln, knüllen, knupfern, knuspern, kollern, kullern, krabbeln, kribbeln, krakeln, kräkeln, kreischen, kuckern, (cucurire), lodern, lullen, mucken, mucksen, munkeln, nutschen, pfuschen, pimpeln, pimpelig, pinken, pladdern, plumpen, plumpsen, prasseln, prusten, quabbeln, quabelig, quackeln, quaken, quäken, quiken, quitschen, rappeln, rapsen rascheln, rasseln, räuspern, rempeln, rummel, rumpeln, rüppeln, schlabbern, schlampen, schlampampen, schlockern, schlottern, schlürfen, schmetter, schnack, schnacken, schrill, schummeln, schwabeln, schwappen, stöhnen, stolpern, strullen, summen, surren, tatschen, tätschen, tätscheln, ticken, torkeln, turzeln (Hessian = torkeln), tuten, zwabbeln, wibbeln, watscheln, wimmeln, wimmern, wudeln, ziepen, zirpen, zischen, zischeln, zullen and zulpen ('to suck'), züsseln (schütteln), zwitschern.¹*

¹ [Cf. the numerous similar words cited as occurring in English, and other languages, in Wedgwood's *Introduction to the Dictionary of English Etymology*.]

Some words denote at once a noise and an explosion, like *klack*, *klaff*; others denote a noise and a stain, such as *klacks*, *klecks*, *klatsch*. I have purposely confined myself to words not demonstrably existent till late MHG. times. It would likewise be possible to collect a rich list of words dating from the older German dialects, which have nothing corresponding with them in the other IE. languages, and the same holds good as to Greek and Latin. We cannot resist the conclusion that, as far as our observations reach back, the proper domain of linguistic original creation is to be found in words like these.

272. Because, in the case of words like these, we recognise an intimate affinity between the sound and the signification, it does not follow that they really owe their origin to such affinity. There exist demonstrably many words which, owing to the form or the meaning which they have acquired by secondary development, convey the impression of being onomatopoeic. But an examination of these words in their entirety excludes the presumption of the universal play of chance. One circumstance of great weight has still to be considered: the frequent occurrence of similar words of similar meaning, mostly differing in their vowels alone, which still cannot, conformably to the laws of sound, be deduced from a single original form. Thus we frequently find in different languages words of this kind, resembling each other in sound, but which the laws of sound forbid us from regarding as related. [Cf. *αὐγὴ* and the German *ange*.]

273. The onomatopoeic tendency explains, besides, certain transformations of words already coined. One of the most instructive examples is the MHG. *gouch* = NHG. *knknk*, with the transition forms *guckanch*, *kuckuch*, etc. [cf. our *gowk* and *cuckoo*]. These formations also denote in some cases noises; in some cases restless movements. Such transformations must not be confused with

sound-change, and must be regarded, in some measure, as new creations. Indeed, the words previously cited cannot be regarded as absolutely new creations, as will be explained later. Strictly speaking, the only absolutely new creations are *interjections*.

274. This is the place to dwell somewhat more fully upon the ~~interjections~~ nature of this part of speech. We cannot but be interested in the question whether we are right in thinking that we see in interjections the most primitive utterances of linguistic activity ; a theory maintained by some, denied by others. We understand by interjections involuntary reflex sounds, elicited merely by sudden emotion, and without any design of communication. But we must not therefore assume that they are genuine natural sounds, arising by original necessity from sudden emotion, like laughing and crying. The fact is that the interjections usually employed are learned as truly by tradition as the other elements of language. Association alone transfers them into reflex emotions. This accounts for the fact that expressions for the same feeling may result very differently in different languages and dialects, and also in the case of different individuals speaking the same dialect. The fact holds good in the most different languages that interjections owe their origin to other words and groups of words : cf. *ach gott, alle wetter, Gott sei dank, leider*, [*dear me ! Heavens ! etc.*]. The origin may be so completely obscured by sound-changes as to be past recognition, even by the aid of reflexion : cf. *herrje !* (*herr Jesus*), *jemine* (*Jesu Domine*) [*Zounds, by Jeminy !*]. Thus in dealing with interjections which admit of no analysis, and which seem perfectly simple, we are from the outset exposed to doubt as to whether they did not come into being in the same way. But, on the other hand, we meet among interjections of indisputably recent origin, and fairly certain etymology, a considerable number which seem to own affinity to no other words—or only to the

category cited above—and very probably owe their origin immediately to reflexive emotion. Most of these, and those which bear the strongest stamp of individuality as regards the form taken by the sound and the tone expressive of the feeling, are produced in response to sudden excitements of the sense of hearing or of sight. This, at any rate, we must imagine to have been their origin. They then come to be employed when we recollect and recount the causes of such sudden excitement. I mean words like *pass*, *patsch*, *bardantz*, *perdanz*, *bausz*, *blauz*, *blaff*, *buff*, *puff*, *bums*, *futsch*, *hurra*, *husch*, *hussa*, *klacks*, *klaps*, *kladderadatsch*, *knacks*, *plump*, *plumps*, *ratsch*, *rutsch*, *schrumm*, *schwapp*, *wupp*, etc.

275. Many of these words are substantives as well, or have corresponding verbs; and in these cases it is often hard to say which is the original of the two. This is, however, of no great importance if only the words be apprehended as reactions against excitement of the feelings. The onomatopoeic character of such words comes out even more strongly in the case of the duplication and triplication often employed, and especially when the elements collected from different letters are differentiated by ablaut; *cf.*: *ficksack*, *gickgack*, *kliffklaff*, *klippklapp*, *klitschkatsch*, *klimperklamper*, *kribbeskrabbes*, *krimskrams*, *mickmack*, *pinkepanke*, *ripsraps*, *ritschratsch*, *schnickschnack*, *schnippschnapp* (*schnur*), *stripstrap* (*strull*), *schwippschwapp*, *ticktack*, *lirumlarum*, *bimbambum*, *piffpaffpuff*; English, *criddle-craddle*, *widdle-waddle*, *hankey-pankey*, *ding-dong*; French, *clic-clac*, *cric-crac*, *drelin-dreton*. These words are to some extent used as substantives as well, and indeed substantives are directly formed in this way, as *kringelkrangel*, *tingel-tangel* [*hurly-burly*]; and further derivatives are formed from such formations like *ficksacken*, *ficksacker*, *wibbelwabbelig*. Old language-material, too, which has no true interjectional character apart from this is often employed in the process; *cf.*: *klingslang*, *singsang*,

hickhack, mischmasch, wirrwarr, zickzack. We may compare also such onomatopoeitic false formations as *klinglingling* (possibly derived from *klingsklingsklings*), and *hoppsasa*. There are other words due to the same impulse, which confine themselves, however, to the limits of regular language, such as combinations of several words echoing the sound, and differing only in their vowels, such as *flimmen und flammen, flimmern und flammern, kickezen und kackezen, klippen und klappen, klippen und klappern, klistern und klastern, klitschern und klatschern, knistern und knastern, knittern und knattern, krimmen und krammen, kritzen und kratzen, gekritz und gekratz, rischeln und rascheln.* All these occur in the works of standard authors.

276. Most words belonging to nursery language are onomatopoeitic, and reduplication plays an important part in these as well; *cf.*, in German, *wauwau, putput, papa, mama*, etc.; [*bow-wow, puff-puff*, etc.]. This language is not an invention of children, but is handed down to them just like any other language. Its value consists in the fact that it serves to aid the purpose of the teacher. The more intimate relation of the sound to the meaning which still exists therein, and is in any case constantly being renewed, facilitates considerably the connexion of both. This indeed goes so far that actually words of the language of culture are to some extent learnt in the first instance composed with words of nursery language; *cf.*, *wauwanhund, bäschaft, putkuhn* [*moo-cow, baa-sheep*, etc.].

Nursery
language.

277. There is, again, a notable difference between the original creations whereby a language which has already arrived at a state of culture is enriched, and those with which language creation has universally begun. The former, where they are not pure interjections, simply accommodate themselves to the existing form system. They appear with the derivation and

flexion syllables common at the time when they were created. For instance, assuming *pollern* to be a word of this sort, *pollt* is the only part due to original creation ; *ern* is formed by analogy. And thus in such a word as this we can recognise only a partial original creation. We gather, moreover, from this example that what we commonly abstract, as the root, from a word, need certainly never have existed as an independent element, not even in an older phonetic form ; but immediately upon its appearance may be provided with one or several suffixes, and indeed must be so provided if the exigencies of the language of the day require it.

278. Not merely are suffixes created according to the analogy of the material of language at hand, but the function of words as substantive, verb, etc., is determined by the same analogy, and thus an element is imported into the new words which does not depend upon original creation.

The first
creations
belonged to
no gram-
matical
category ;
denoted
complete
intensions.

279. We cannot of course suppose that analogy co-operated in this manner in the case of the *first creations with which language began*. No trace of any grammatical category is seen in them. They answer to entire conceptions. They are primitive sentences of which we may form an idea from such sentences as *fire!—thieves!* spoken in a single word. They are thus, like these, strictly speaking, predicates, and a sense-impression forms their subject. For a human being to arrive at the utterance of any such sentence, something definite must be selected from the store of all that falls at the same time into his perception. Now this selection cannot be made by any logical operation, and must therefore be due to the outer world. Something must come to pass which directs the attention to a definite goal. It is not the world of rest and silence, but the world of movement and of noise which first comes home

to man's consciousness, and to meet which he creates the first sounds of language. A movement of his own body may also take the place of a movement of his environments, and serve to direct his eyes to an unexpected sight. The impression will naturally be the more intense when joy or sorrow, curiosity or fear, are awakened thereby. Hence the object which awakes curiosity is represented by the linguistic utterance no less than what is happening to the object. We approach this primitive method of speech in exclamations of surprise and in emotion. We may thus say of the oldest words that they connect the imperfect expression of a conception, as it is at a later period reproduced by a sentence, with an interjectional character.

280. There is another respect in which the circumstances attending new creations differ from those attending later ones. In the case of the latter *the intention of communication* may lend its aid from the very outset; not so in the case of the former. We do not arrive at a point when we intentionally call an activity into operation to carry out a particular purpose, until we know by experience that this purpose can be thus attained; and we gather this experience by seeing that the unintentional activity, or indeed the activity employed with another object, has had the success due. Before the creation of language man is ignorant of the fact that he can communicate anything to another by the aid of the sounds of language. This reason would of itself suffice to justify us in rejecting any assumption of an intentional invention. With regard to the first sounds of language, we must abide by Steinthal's¹ views that they are nothing but reflex movements. As such, they satisfy merely a need of the single individual without taking any account of his

and were uttered with no thought of communication.

¹ Cf. his *Ursprung der sprache* and his *Einleitung z. sprachwissenschaft*.

living with others. But immediately upon the perception by other individuals of a reflex-sound like this, together with the feeling which caused its utterance, each can be set in relation to the other. The fact that another individual feels this relation may depend on the true connexion of cause and effect which exists between the feeling and the sound by the aid of the excitement of the nerve. If the different individuals are in essential points similarly organised, then the same impression of feeling will produce in them almost the same reflex-sound, and when they hear this from others they must feel themselves sympathetically touched. But no doubt the number of the reflex-sounds thus produced has been, comparatively speaking, small. Conceptions, widely contrasting with each other, will have called into utterance the same reflex-sound. It is therefore inconceivable that such a sound, even assuming it to be repeatedly produced by different individuals in the same way, can call into life the memory-picture of a definite conception. The utmost that it can achieve is to excite attention. It is only the conception itself which gives more special details. The fact that the attention of the other individuals is directed to the same object which has elicited the reflex-sound in one or in several may to some extent be due to the accompanying gestures. We shall have to suppose, on the whole question, that *the language of sounds commenced by developing side by side with gesture-language*, and that its power to dispense with this aid was a comparatively late acquisition, and grew with its more perfect development. Gesture-language must of course owe its origin to involuntary reflex-movement. This origin is the more easily traceable in its case, as we can watch it in a more primitive stage of development. If an individual has repeatedly succeeded in attracting attention by a

reflex-movement, whether such attention be attracted by his eyes, his features, his hands, or by the organs of his speech, he is gradually led to excite attention voluntarily, by the aid of such movement, as soon as he is compelled by necessity to do so.

281. As soon as the possibility of intentional communication is recognised, nothing prevents sounds, in whose production the intention of communication has from the very first assisted, from attaching themselves to those produced by involuntary reflex-movement. We lay stress upon the words *intention of communication*, because there is no intention of creating a lasting instrument of communication. Any such intention remains excluded from original creation as from the regular development of language. It is the necessity of the moment which produces a new sound-group. But whether such sound-group disappears with the first production, or whether it leaves behind a lasting effect, this depends on its adaptability and on many fortuitous circumstances.

282. We have yet to take notice of a difficulty which must be surmounted before even the first rudiments of language can be formed, a difficulty which appears to have been hitherto appreciated by no one. The original human being, who has as yet not spoken at all, is as unable as a new-born babe to utter at will any sound of speech. He has to learn such sound first : in his case also it is only gradually, owing to manifold activity of the organs of language, that a motory sensation associated with a sound-formation can develop, which may then serve as a regulator for his future speech. We must not therefore suppose that a sound-group, as it has once been uttered by an individual, could immediately be imitated by others. Indeed even the same individual could not voluntarily repeat it. The problem is harder for the original human being than for the children of our

*Incapacity
of primitive
man to pro-
duce speech
at will.*

time. The latter are, commonly speaking, surrounded by a number of their fellow-beings in whom essentially identical motory sensations have already developed. They hear, therefore, out of the whole series of possible sounds a definite and limited number ever anew. Thereby a definite tendency is given from the very outset, in the direction of which their own motory sensations develop, and to which their attempts at language approach ever more nearly. There is no fixed rule or authority for human beings before the creation of language. It seems accordingly that language must have begun with a confused utterance of the most various articulations such as we never find combined in any language. But how out of such a chaos could consistency in motory sensation develop?

283. These considerations force us once more to the conclusion that certain sound-groups must very frequently be produced not merely from the same individuals, but from different ones spontaneously; *i.e.* without the co-operation of any sort of imitation, and to all intents contemporaneously. In the absence of a rule for guidance, no motory sensation can take form, except for such sound-groups as are favoured by their natural conditions. Among these stand first and foremost the pure reflex-sounds, and it is in connexion with these that the first motory sensations will have developed themselves. We can hardly fancy the process to have been other than this: the motory sensations connected with the single sounds must have developed very slowly one after the other, and the traditional language must have contented itself at its origin with a minimum of sound-signs, even though, during the process of development, different sounds were on different occasions uttered by the different individuals.

284. It is plain from what we have laid down that a long

period of linguistic activity must have preceded, before anything came into being worthy to be called a language, in the sense in which we speak, say, of the German and French languages. Reproduction necessary to the conception of language. This holds good even if the language consist but of a couple of words. What we have called original creation is of itself insufficient to form a language. Its product must be stored up in memory by individuals who belong to one linguistic community. *True language does not exist until speech and apprehension depend upon reproduction.*

285. Now if we regard this as sufficient for the recognition of the existence of a language, no doubt we must ascribe language to many beasts. It will hardly be disputed that their calls, whether of enticement or warning, are traditional and not spontaneous. They represent a stage of development which must have been passed through by human language as well ; the stage, in fact, which we have endeavoured to depict. But yet another step is necessary before such a language can come into being as we find nowadays common among the human race. It is undoubtedly of great significance that the number of the traditional words, and herewith the number of the differentiated conceptions, is far greater among mankind than among any species of beasts ; but the strict characteristic which differentiates the language of men from that of animals, existing language from a previous linguistic stage, consists in something very different. This decisive advance consists in the collocation of several words into one sentence. Only thus does man receive the power to free himself from simple intuition, and to pronounce judgment on what is not before him.

CHAPTER X.

ON ISOLATION AND THE REACTION AGAINST IT.

Possibility
of a regularly
observed
system of
grouping in
each linguistic
period.

THE concentration of linguistic elements into groups depends upon each individual member of a linguistic community. Thus these groups are in their nature thoroughly subjective. But as the elements of which they are composed are within any definite community practically identical, it follows that the formation of groups by all the individuals who compose that community must be similar, in virtue of the essential correspondence of their psychical organisation. Thus, as we are in a position to describe the general linguistic phenomena which characterise a definite period, we are equally in a position to propose a system of grouping which shall essentially hold good for each period of the development of a language. This common material in the elements composing the groups gives scientific observation the firm hold it has, while the individual peculiarities of single speakers—to discard exceptions which disappear in the great mass—escape observation.

Variation
in these
systems :
Isolation.

287. Now if we compare our abstractions made at different times as to the process of grouping, we become aware of considerable differences—differences not merely caused by the loss of some elements and the appearance of others ; but also in cases where the old elements have maintained themselves,¹ they fall

¹ I mean, of course, *maintained themselves* not in the strict sense, but as we commonly apply the expression in the history of language. I have shown with sufficient clearness how the process is to be apprehended in its essential reality.

into different groups, according as a change has passed upon either their sound-form or their meaning, or both. What at an earlier period hung closely together now coheres but loosely—or indeed not at all. We may properly give the first-named process the name of *isolation*, since even the loosening of the tie is a partial isolation. This expression, likewise, is of course due to our inevitable employment of abstractions. Strictly speaking, it would be wrong to say that what was before united has become isolated; we might only maintain that what was in the minds of a former generation united, is no longer so in the minds of a later generation.

288. The formation of groups depends upon the *similarity* or *identity* of the *sound-form* and of the *meaning*. This similarity or identity depends eventually, in by far the greatest number of cases, on *etymological connexion*. But the etymological connexion is not to be considered absolutely decisive in producing the union, but only in as far as it manifests itself at a particular time in a total or partial identity of sound and meaning; and conversely, each correspondence, as it may casually arise, has the same consequence. Numerous errors of the old school of philology are due to the non-recognition of this indisputable fact.

System conditioned solely by correspondence in form and meaning.

289. We have to consider, in this Chapter, in the first place, the loosening and dislocation of the groups. This is due to *change in sound* and *change in meaning*; sometimes to analogical formation as well. No doubt the latter operates, as we shall see further, chiefly in promoting the reconstruction of the union, now broken; but since different principles of analogy cancel each other, it may have the contrary effect.

Causes of isolation.

290. We have already seen in Chapter IV. that the different significations of a word may tend to isolate themselves more and more completely from each other. We have seen in the same

Chapter that a word regarded as the element of a firm syntactical connexion may isolate itself as against its ordinary method of application. In the same way the groups of words and word-forms described in Chapter v. may be dislocated.

Destruction
of Groups :
(7) Etymolo-
gico-phonetic
groups.

291. The *etymologico-phonetic groups* are deranged when, from whatever reason, the conditions which have caused the sound-change, and by whose guidance, aided by analogy, they have proceeded, disappear. According to Verner's Law, in the original German a regular change has set in between the hard and the soft fricative (*h-z*, *þ-g*, *f-ɣ*, *s-z*), and this change depends upon the position of the accent according to the original IE. method of accentuation. On the replacement of this method by the younger and specially German method of accentuation, there was no longer any appreciable reason for the change, which accordingly could not but appear a matter of perfect caprice. A general feeling might, no doubt, grow up, that the sounds in question had a habit of interchanging, but it was impossible for speakers to accommodate themselves to the usage of language in any other way than by mastering each several form specially. The sound-change had in fact ceased to be a living force: it was stiff and dead. In the second place, it is possible for a more recent sound-change to act destructively on this kind of groups. NIHG. has, instead of the original German change between hard and soft fricatives, the change *h-g* (sometimes *ck*), *d-t*, *f-b* (sometimes *ff*), *s-r*. Thus the single method of change has split up into several quite different ones, and any such split is always equivalent to a weakening. But the real enemy of the etymological sound-groups is the assimilating effect of the material-formal proportion-groups, as we shall have to explain at another opportunity.

(a) Syntac-
tical groups.

292. The cases of isolation which can occur in the department of *syntax* have been partly described in Chapter VII. We have here,

in the first instance, the cases of isolation of the different meanings of a syntactical relation as against each other. By this process the syntactical proportion-groups are not disarranged as long as each single function of the relation remains perfectly alive. But each case of deadening by customary connexion with a definite word is a breaking off from the common proportional connexion. Thus, for instance, we can hardly say that the combination *zu dir* can stand in any analogous relation to the connexion of any other preposition with the dative, far less that a more general function of the dative is placed in an analogical relation to it by the operation of the instinct of language. This connexion, however, still keeps its place within the limits of a narrower proportion-group, and one in which the same member passes through all the proportions: thus, *zu : dir = zu : dem Vater = zu : allen*, etc.

293. In this case it is possible to vary at will the word in which the syntactical relation is formally expressed. There is still another kind of isolation, in which this word is fixed, while the other, in which the relation finds no expression, may change at will. This isolation consists in the fact that methods of construction commonly disappear, but maintain themselves in certain survivals which have left their impress specially strong owing to their frequent use, so that they need no aid from analogous proportions, and hence are enabled to survive, even after the disappearance of these.

294. Thus in *NIHG.* there exist several functions of the genitive once fully alive, but at the present day confined to the genitives of some few words, which now stand entirely by themselves, or crystallise into comparatively small groups, capable of only a very small analogical extension, or indeed of none at all. To indicate a point of time (if we disregard the isolated formulæ *derzeit*, *jener zeit*, *dieser tage*), *nächster tage*, no case can be employed except the genitive singular of masculine and neuter substantives.

German admits of such phrases as *des morgens, eines morgens, abends, tages, jahres* : but not of saying *der stunde, einer stunde*, etc., and further, not of *des monats*. Moreover, these genitives cannot be connected with any adjective at will; they appear in standing formulæ alone, such as *eines schönen tages, morgens*, &c. The function of denoting the point of time is in this case bound up, not with the genitive as such, but with the suffix *(e)s*, whose original identity with the genitival suffix is scarcely felt any more at the present day. We see this even more distinctly in the case of forms without an article such as *abends, morgens, tags* ; particularly in the archaic form *(des) nachts*, which is now differentiated in sound likewise from the form which performs the function of the regular genitive. Certain genitives which denote a relation of space are even more isolated than such definitions of time ; *cf., des weges, gerades weges, rechter hand, linker hand, allerorten, aller wegen*. Further, there are certain causal genitives, such as *hungers sterben, todes verblieben* ; and again, such formulæ as *der hoffnung* and *des glaubens leben*, if these are not to be taken in a different way. Those which express a modal relation are more numerous and not less isolated. Different applications have to be distinguished in this case. One group of related genitives is used predicatively. German admits of *ich bin der ansicht, meinung, hoffnung, zversicht, des sinnes, des glaubens* ; *willens* is similarly used without any article, as also *anderer ansicht, guter hoffnung* ; compare also such expressions as *er ging fort, der meinung, dass* etc. The expressions *guten mutes, guter dinge* are somewhat different [*cf., be of good cheer*]. The expressions *reinen sinnes, göttlicher natur*, etc., seem already antiquated. The following are immediately joined to the substantive like an adjective, and they appear to be no more felt as genitives, *allerhand, mancherhand, einerhand, keinerhand, allerlei, aller art*, etc. The expression is

also common, *es ist einerlei*. Other formulæ, again, are adverbially joined to the verb, as *meines bedünkens, meines erachtens, alles ernstes, stehenden fusses, eilenden schrittes, kurzer hand, leichten kaufes, unverrichteter sache, vorsichtiger weise, fürchter w., vernünftiger w., etc., vorkommenden falls, besten f., keines f., etc., keineswegs, einigermaßen, gewissermaßen, etc., dergestalt, solchergestalt*. Some of these formulæ, as the ordinary way of writing them shows, are simply regarded as adverbs. The same holds good of *flugs, spornstreichs, augenblicks, teils, grössten teils*, etc., and of the following adjectival derivatives, *anders, rechts, links, stets, straks, bereits, besonders, blindlings*, etc.

295. The formula *es sei denn dass* is a survival of an old way of construction, usual in MHG.; cf. Genesis xxxii. 26, *ich lasse dich nicht, du segnest mich denn*; the same was even more common in MHG. with the negative *en* and also without *denn*. We have an unrecognisable survival of this in the adverb *nur=enwagere*.

296. The process of isolation may finally proceed even further, since none of the members connected is able to change freely, so that then each single formula is passed on by memory alone without producing any new combination.

297. It is no longer possible in MHG. to connect prepositions with a singular substantive without prefixing the article. For instance, it is not permissible to say *an hause, vor tür, zu see*, etc., but only *am hause, vor der tür, zur see*. But within certain definite limits it is still possible to create combinations without any article; e.g., *vor liebe, besorgniss, kummer*, etc. [to explain the preventing cause: thus, *Ich konnte vor kummer nicht weiter lesen*]; *auf ehre, gewinn, weisheit, geld gerichtet* (thus *auf* may be connected with every abstract or collective to denote the goal of the effort): *zu gelde, weine, wasser werden, machen*, and thus with all collectives, but *die arbeit wird ihm zur erholung, zum genuss, der knabe wird*

zum mann, das mädchen zur frau. Other combinations, however, belong no longer to any creative group; and nothing perfectly analogous to them can be created. The formulæ with *zu* are probably the most common, as *zu hause*¹ (but not *zu dorfe, zu stadt*). *zu wasser, zu lande* (this last is only used in contrast to the former, and is no longer employed like the N.H.G. *se lande*, analogously to *zu hause*), *zu schiffe, wagen, fusse, pferde, zu anfang, ende, zu tische, bette, markte, zu leide, liebe, gute, zurück, zurecht, zunichte*; other usages are now limited to the connexion with definite verbs, while in older N.H.G. in many cases a more free usage prevails: *zu grunde gehen, zu rande sein mit etwas, zu berge stehen, zu kopfe steigen, mir ist zu munde, zu sinne, einem zu gemüte führen, zu schaden kommen* (but *zum schaden gereichen*), *zu tode kommen, quälen, zu statten kommen, zu wege bringen, zu gesichte kommen, einem etwas zu danke machen, einem zu willen sein, zu rate gehen, halten, zu abend, zu nacht, zu mittag speisen, zu tage bringen, fördern*, but not *zu tage* in the sense of 'on the day' or 'on this day,' though it is so used in *heut zu tage*. Such parallel connexions as *zu nutze und frommen* are noteworthy, though *zum frommen* and *zum nutzen* are correct: not to speak of the phrase *sich etwas zu nutze machen*; *zu spiel und tanz*, but *zum spiel, zum tanz*; *in freud und leid*, but *in der freude, im leide*; *in krieg und frieden*, but *im kriege, im frieden* (*in frieden* has a different meaning); *in, or durch feld und wald*, but *im felde, im walde, durch das feld, durch den wald*; *in dorf und stadt*, but *im dorfe, in der stadt*, etc.

298. Another example under this head is the following:—In N.H.G. the adjective may still be used, when placed attributively, especially after the indefinite article, in the nominative singular of all genders, and in the accusative singular neuter, in the so-called unin-

¹ In several of these formulæ, *zu* is still used to denote rest in one place, a use only possible in quite definite combinations.

inflected form, as *ein gnot (schaue) man, fronte, kind*. On the other hand, in NHG. we can only employ the inflected form: *ein guter mann, eine gute frau, ein gutes kind*. But the old method of composition has left numerous traces in the improper compounds which have arisen through the growth of an adjective into a substantive, as *altmeister, bösewicht, kurzweil, Neumann, Schönbrunn*, etc. And further, the uninflected form still appears in certain standing combinations, as *gut wetter, schlecht w., ander w., ein gut stück, ein gut teil, ein ander mal, manch mal, ein ander bild* (*ander* occurs in this use down to the eighteenth century), *gut ding will weile haben*. Such phrases as *jung Roland, schön Suschen, lieb mütterchen*, are antiquated.

299. Isolated survivals are seen in *zweifelsohne* (in MHG. *duē* can be suffixed to any given genitive), *mutterseelenallein* (in MHG. *aleine* is commonly used with the genitive in the sense of 'deprived of'), *vergissmeinnicht* (*vergessen* was once ordinarily constructed with the genitive), *dass es gott erbarne* (MHG. *mich erbarmet ein dinc* = 'something grieves me').

300. The instances of syntactic isolation are, to some extent, at the same time isolations in the department of *formal grouping*, for this too depends in great measure on the syntactical function; cf. especially the genitives cited above. But the formal isolation again stands in close relation to the isolation of the *material element*, as far as the latter is a result of change of meaning. A separation of etymologically united forms is avoided as long as the development of meaning of the single forms moves in parallel lines. This will be found to be more and more true the more they are referred anew to each other. The relation, however, is the most strongly felt, when it does not merely hand on each by itself by an effort of memory, but when one is perpetually being created after the other, on extraneous analogies. Seeing that in the case of every new creation of any form, two groups, a material and a formal, co-

(3) Formal and material groups (a) by change of meaning

operate, both of these reciprocally suit themselves to the conditions of their creative force. A formal isolation is almost always at the same time a material one as well. As soon as *rechts* ceases to be felt as a genitive, it ceases to stand in the same intimate relation to the nominative *recht*. *Kunst* does not stand in the same intimate relationship with *können* as *führung* with *führen*; for *-ung* is still a living suffix, and by its aid we can always form new substantives from verbs: not so with *-st*. Indeed we may assert that *regierung* in the sense of 'a governing body,' *mischung* in that of 'a mixture,' *kleidung* in that of 'a way to clothe,' etc., do not stand in such intimate relation with the verbs that answer to them as *regierung* in the sense of 'the act of ruling,' etc. For the living function of the suffix *-ung* is confined to the designation of an activity; and in this a substantive can be placed by the side of every transitive verb.

301. The groups which depend upon inflexion hang naturally closer together than those which depend on word-formation. On the one hand the measure of the common element is greater; on the other the feeling for the method of the formation is most vivid. In this respect the position of the nominal forms of the verb is characteristic. As long as these are used as real nouns, the infinitive provided with the article, the participle employed to denote a lasting characteristic, the connexion with the remaining verbal forms is loosened, and thereby the possibility is created for a further departure in the meaning.

302. An enlargement of the meaning of the root-word, or of the word which commends itself as such to the instinct of language, communicates itself more readily to the derivation, than an enlargement of the derivation communicates itself to the root-word. In fact, while in the case of the derivation we remember the root-word more readily than in the opposite case, we connect the derivation more readily with all the meanings of the root-word

than we connect the root-word with all the meanings of the derivation. And hence the impulse to isolation commonly proceeds from a change in the meaning of the derivation. The relation of the simple to the compound is as that of the root-word to the derivation.

303. The reason for the discrepancy in the development of meaning of words etymologically connected is, as far as it is not conditioned by some other process of isolation, to be sought for in the originally existing difference in their function. A noun may develop itself in directions in which a verb cannot follow it. It is only the proper nouns of the agent and nouns of action which stand in true correspondence with the verb. As soon as the noun of the agent has passed into the denomination of a permanent quality or of the owner of a permanent quality, and the noun of action has come to denote a standing condition, or a product, or a tool, it is possible for an enlarged meaning to attach thereto, such as cannot attach itself to a verb. Thus the NHG. *ritter* is the noun of the agent connected with *reiten*, but at a later period comes merely to signify a man who commonly pursues riding as a profession. Up to this stage it is closely connected with the verb. But as the word is specially applied to mounted warriors, and as a privileged class or order developed from these, it passed into a meaning which has no verbal meaning to correspond to it. And thus it has proceeded to adopt a sense which has nothing to do with the original one. Thus, many developments of meaning are possible to the adverb which are impossible to the adjective. Take as an example the common adverbs, whether strengthening or limiting, such as NHG. *schr* = MHG. *sîre*, derived from an adjective *sîr* ('wounded'), OHG. *hart* and *drâto* ('valde') from the adjectives *herti* ('hard') and *drâti* ('swift'), NHG. in the language of common intercourse *schrecklich*, *furchtbar*, *entsetzlich*, *fast* as related to *fest*; and also such as *schon* as against *schön*.

(*) By change
of sound.

304. The etymological groups, and the forms which correspond in sound, and thus the proportion-groups to be compounded of both, undergo operations due to *sound-change*, which either notably limit the power of cohesion or entirely cancel it. A quantity of *purposeless differences* are produced thereby. For the most common conditions of sound-change prove that a sound very rarely undergoes consistent changes each time that it appears in language. Even such a spontaneous sound-change as the original German sound-shifting process has found certain opposing barriers which have prevented a systematic and regular carrying out of the process; for instance, in the case of the combinations *sk*, *st*, *sp*, the shifting-process has not operated. A much stronger disposition to the differentiation of sounds originally identical is given where the change is conditioned by the surrounding sounds or by the system of accentuation. There thus arise, almost in the case of each sound-change, purposeless differences between the different derivations from the same root, and between the different inflexion-forms of the same word; (cf. e.g. Greek *στίξω—στίξω—στικτός—στίγμα*; NHG. *sitze—sass*, *heiss—heitze—hitze*; *schneide—schnitt*; *friere—frost*, etc.); the same derivative and flexional suffixes separate into different forms; (cf. e.g. the different shapes taken by the IE. suffix *-ti-* in Lat. *hostis*, *messis*, *pars*, in Goth. *austs—gabaurps—qiss*; the different treatment of the nominative termination in ON. *sonr—steinn* (from **steinnr*)—*heill—tss—fugl* (from **fugl*, etc.); nay, the same word takes different forms according to its position in the sentence; (cf. the different forms of Greek prepositions such as *ἐν—ἐμ—ἐγ*, *συν—συμ—συγ*). An unnecessary burden to the memory for future generations is the result. At the same time the inevitable consequence is that the single forms, owing to the diminished amount of sound-correspondence, draw now less easily and less firmly into groups. The result of this is that a

change of meaning transfers itself too easily from one related word to another. Thus the cancelling of the agreement in the shape taken by the sounds favours the cancelling of the agreement in meaning.

305. The disappearance and death of living modes of formation dates, generally speaking, from an isolation of sound which is frequently material as well as formal; the isolation of meaning is a later matter. We may, for instance, assume in German a period in which possibly a weak causative might have been formed from every intransitive strong verb. This was from the IE. period differentiated in the root-vowel from the present of the root-word, but as it agreed with the singular indicative preterite (*brinna—brann—brannjan*, etc.), a new sound-relation was maintained. But a separation had already set in in the original German period, owing to the operation of Verner's Law, in consequence of which in many cases a consonantal deviation of the causative—not merely from the present, but from the singular preterite of the root-word, ensued. This deviation entails in OHG. further deviations in the vowels. The causative, deviating in this from the singular preterite, takes the umlaut where possible. Thus, in MHG. relations appear like *springen—spranc—sprengen*, *varen—vuor—vieren*, *sthen—sêch—seigen*, *ziehen—zôch—zougen*, *genesen—genas—neren*. Under such circumstances it was natural that the root-word and the causative should now proceed on their respective ways, so that in the case of NHG. no connexion is any longer felt between *genesen* and *nähren*. But the sound-changes mentioned have the effect of attacking the uniformity of the method of formation, and thereby the connexion of the causative verbs suffers on the side of meaning as well, and is finally wholly destroyed.

306. The disappearance of the IE. derivative suffixes in the Teutonic languages is due, in the first instance, mainly to a

sound-change. Thus, for instance, the *t* of the suffixes *-tei*, *-ten*, *-to*, etc., appears, after the *Lautverschiebung*, in five different forms : *t* (GOTH. *þaurfts*, 'need,' connected with *þaurban* ; *gaskasts*, 'creation,' with *skapjan* ; *mahts*, 'might,' with *magan* ; *fravaurhts*, 'to pass away,' with *raurkjan*) ; *þ* (*gagumps* 'meeting,' with *giman* ; *gabaurps*, 'birth,' with *bairan*) ; *d* (*-deds*, 'deed,' with O. SAXON *dōn* ; *gamunds*, 'memory,' with *munan*) ; *st* (*ansts*, 'pardon,' with *unnan*) ; *alabrunsts*, 'burnt-offering,' with *brinnan*) ; *s* (*-gis-s*, 'speech,' with *gīpan* ; *-stass*, 'step,' with *standan* ; *gariss*, 'connexion,' with *gari-dan*). Of course there can be no such thing as a consciousness of the original identity of the different shapes taken by these sounds. The great group separates into five smaller groups. Of the five suffixes none can be universally employed. Further, the connexion with the root-word is frequently loosened by changes in the auslaut of the root, as in the examples given. Hence the inevitable consequence has been that the old suffixes were deprived of their capacity of again serving for the creation of new words ; that henceforward only the old formations were transmitted by memory, though only so far as through constant use they were able to dispense with the support of the root-word. Thus, again, the suffix *no* has died out, because it had in many cases become unrecognisable in consequence of the assimilation of the *n* to the preceding consonants ; cf. *fulls* = IE. *plnos*, etc.

Reaction by
aid of Un-
ction.

307. Thus the symmetry of any system of forms meets in sound-change an incessant and aggressive foe. It is hard to realise how disconnected, confused, and unintelligible language would gradually become if it had patiently to endure all the devastations of sound-change without any possibility of *reaction*. Such reaction is, however, rendered possible by *analogical formation*. By the aid of analogy language gradually works its way into more satisfactory circumstances, to a firmer cohesion

and a more convenient method of grouping in inflexion and word-formation. And thus it is that we see in the history of language a perpetual oscillation between two opposite tendencies. Each *disorganisation* is followed by a *reorganisation*. The more violent the attack to which the groups are exposed by sound-change, the more vigorous is the activity in new creation.

308. Where an unnecessary and inconvenient difference, due to sound-change, has arisen, it may be cancelled by the aid of analogy; a form marked by such difference may be gradually thrust aside by a new creation which does not contain the difference in question. We may call this process *unification*; only we must clearly recognise that this term does not satisfactorily describe the actual course of procedure, which, strictly speaking, consists in a complicated system of single processes as described in Chapter V.

309. Unification is hindered by the material-sound proportions. A sound-change yet living and supported by such proportions resists unification for a long period, without, however, setting any insurmountable obstacle to eventual unification. If the material-sound proportions are once broken through, the sound-change loses much of its power of resistance.

310. We will now endeavour to observe the different modes of unification a little more closely. Where one and the same form has parted into several different forms, owing to the difference of their position in the sentence, the original difference in the employment of these forms is lost when the one form is used also in that position in the sentence in which phonetic development has led to the production of the others.

Unification of differences which results from difference of position in the sentence.

311. G. Curtius has shown, in his *Studien*, x. 205 sqq., that the final sound of the Greek preposition, as well as that of the accusative singular of the article, depended at a former linguistic date

on the opening sound of the following word; cf. *καὶ δὲ—καὶ κεφαλὴν—καὶ γόνυ—καὶ πῆδον—καὶ νόμον—καὶ μὲν—καὶ ῥόον—καὶ λαπαρὴν, τὸν βέλτιστον—τὸν κράτιστον—τὸν θρασύτατον—τὸν λῆϊστον*, etc., while at a later date a single form only of these manifold varieties, or the adverbial form,¹ which differs again from it, became the regular form in use.²

312. In the Teutonic languages we find the following process repeating itself at various periods. Words used as adverbs and as prepositions indifferently, as they receive the full stress or are mere enclitics, and as, in their position of enclitics, they receive a collateral stress, or have none at all, separate into two different forms or, it may be, more, whose original difference of function however is not always maintained, since one form intrudes into the place of the other; cf. *Beiträge z. Gesch. d. deutschen Sprache*, vi. 144, 191 sqq., 199 sqq., 207 sqq., 248 sqq., 137². To cite one example only. The original Teutonic *tō* ('to'), in cases where it received the full stress and remained unweakened in adverbial use, was shortened as a proclitic to **to*. From this the forms in OHG. *za*, *ze*, *zi* arise under the influence of accentual differences. These forms are employed in some of the oldest records indifferently side by side; in more recent times one takes firm root in each dialect. All three appear in MHG. as *ze*. But side by side with this appears the form *zuo* regularly developed as a preposition, and in NHG. this form alone holds the field. The same holds good of the forms of the pronouns and the article; cf. *Beiträge*, vi. 137², 144 sqq.

313. In the period of the transition from OHG. to MHG. *r* in

¹ For as such we must regard *dōd*, *carā*, *wapd* in contrast to *dō*, *car*, *wap*, with their different collateral forms; in the same way *tol*, *rep*, *weri*, *wperi*, as against *to*, *rep*, *wer* or *wei*, *wper* or *wpoi*.

² How far this applies merely to writing, and how far to actual usage in language, remains still doubtful in many cases.

auslaut after a long vowel disappears in *da* from *dar*, *hie* from *hier*, etc., though it survives, and is maintained in close connexion with a following word, because it is then drawn over to the following syllable, thus *dar an*, *hier an*, etc. In NIG. *hier* often takes the place of *hie*, and eventually completely supplants it in the written language, to say nothing of the phrase *hie und da*. Conversely in MIG. we also find the combinations *hie inne*, *hie hse*, and the contracted forms *hinne*, *hñse*, which remain South German forms to this day.

314. The process of differentiation and of unification may repeat itself several times in succession. In OIG. the form *ana* parted into *ana* the adverb, and *an* the preposition; the first form then displaced the second. In MIG. *ana* again parted into *ane* and *an*, and the second then displaced the first. *Aba* (*ab*) has gone through a similar development.

315. The influence of the component parts of the sentence upon the sound-development is explained, as we have seen, by the fact that a word-group, like a single word, is apprehended as a unity, which does not require to be previously analysed by the hearer into its several parts, nor to be made up by the speaker from the elements which compose it. Thus the circumstances are the same as in a compound; and indeed there is no sharp line, as will be afterwards more fully explained, to be drawn between a compound and a word-group. Least of all is it to be supposed that a distinction originally existed between the connexion of the preposition with a noun, and that with a verb. Thus, in the case we have chosen, a newly created method of composition takes the place of the traditional configuration of the group.

316. There are two different ways of development possible in this process. Either one form may encroach on the function of the others, or the encroachment may be reciprocal. The latter case

will naturally occur when the different forms occur with fairly equal frequency ; the former, if one form occurs more frequently than the other. As a result, in both cases in the first instance, double, or it may be triple, forms run parallel to each other for a long period ; in the one case, however, only with restricted limits, while elsewhere uniformity is maintained ; in the other case they run parallel with unlimited application. A general uniformity results in the course of a further development, owing to the disappearance of one form. In cases where plurality of form in one department is met by uniformity in the other, it cannot, of course, be long doubtful which form will eventually triumph. But where plurality of form has once become general, the forces are not so unevenly distributed, the struggle is not so easily decided ; the issue depends upon chance circumstances not always appreciable by us. The more dissimilar the relation, the shorter is the struggle, and the earlier the commencement of the attack.

317. The severance of one form into several different forms may take place in such a way that a change occurs under every circumstance ; but it may also take place in such a way that the root-form remains preserved side by side with a single or several changed forms. In the last mentioned case, in the course of further development, the root-form, as such, has no advantage over the derived forms, for it is not recognised as such. No doubt, however, this form has an advantage over the others in which the word appears, if it is independent of any influence from the syntax of the sentence, whether it be the root-form or not. A Frenchman, who has no scientific knowledge of his mother-tongue, hears with surprise that the phrase *a-t-il* represents a more original form than *il a*, and that in *un ami* the *n* represents a more original pronunciation than in *un fils*. If he thinks about the matter at all, he will be rather inclined to take the *t* for an insertion, and to

assume the pronunciation of the *u* in *un ami* to be a departure from the regular pronunciation.

318. These remarks are, *mutatis mutandis*, equally applicable to every other kind of unification due to formation by analogy.

319. Essentially similar is the unification of forms phonetically differentiated which proceed from the same stem, or of words formed from the same root. We may call this *material* in contrast to *formal* unification, the latter being concerned with the corresponding formations from different roots, or different systems of formation of inflexions or word-composition. It often happens, however, that material unification is at the same time formal.

Unification of phonetically differentiated forms which belong to the same stem.

320. Examples of this are not far to seek. The most instructive are certain systematic differentiations which make their appearance at a very early period. The following generations are often occupied with the reaction against these for many centuries after, during which one case after another falls a victim to unification, though eventually there still remain not unfrequently certain traces of differentiation. The development is more manifold and instructive as well, if, after the commencement of the differentiation of sounds, the language has parted into many different dialectic shapes. The example of this kind known to me as occurring on the largest scale is the graduation of vowels in the IE. original language, the traces of which the surviving languages are still endeavouring to efface. In the Teutonic domain the operations of Verner's Law are the most striking, according to which, in the original German, the hard fricatives *k*, *p*, *f*, *s* have maintained themselves after an originally accented syllable, but after an originally unaccented syllable have passed into the corresponding soft fricatives (Gothic *g*, *d*, *b*, *z*). The impulse created thereby is specially adapted for methodic study, especially as we find ourselves here upon safe and generally

recognised ground. The philologist who has been at the pains to follow the instances of reaction against any such sound-law into every detail, cannot conceivably harbour such perverse assertions and objections as to formation by analogy as are unfortunately so widely in vogue. And as with one phonetic law, so is it with the rest. There is in fact no phonetic law which, having once in a number of cases differentiated in sound what holds closely together in etymology, fails to produce a reaction against this differentiation, unless in the case where the sound-change left be continuously supported by analogy (*see* p. 107). This must be recognised as a fundamental maxim of the historical investigation of language. We may examine every language whose development admits of a continuous investigation to find a single sound-law which has failed to show, as a result, some centuries after it has operated, some kind of reaction. However great the prize offered for such discovery, no one would win it.

Irregularities
of unification
leading to
favouring
and hostile
varieties.

321. Whoever has followed such a development in all its connexions will not, as has been recently done, claim by an explanation of forms, resting upon the supposition of unifications, that the unification in all the forms affected by the sound-law must have come about uniformly, and in the same direction. This would be to demand a development directly contradicting the experience which we can abstract from the facts which we have actually to observe. Besides, any such demand depends on a manifest confusion of ideas. In the case of sound-change we certainly must demand that it should make its appearance in the same way in every case in which the same phonetic conditions are present. But identity or non-identity of the phonetic circumstances has nothing to do with unification. Either does such group, connected by material relationship, proceed on its own course of development, or, if several such groups operate on each

other, it happens owing to the fact that formal unification is simultaneously at work ; but the fact of being affected by the same sound-law does not in itself yield any reason for a reciprocal influence in the unification. On the other hand, there are many circumstances, serving either to foster or to check the process, which cause it to have very different results in different cases.

322. To these must be added as well a phonetic impulse. Those forms which are differentiated by the operation of several sound-laws are less favourable to unification than those in which only one of them has operated towards differentiation.

323. The well-known *NIHG.* lengthening of the vowels never, except in certain definite connexions, appears before double consonants, in which case, on the contrary, a syllable originally long is actually shortened (*cf.*, *brachte* = *NIHG. brdhte*, *acht* = *NIHG. ahte*, etc.). In accordance with this, the second and third persons singular and the second person plural of the present indicative are shortened in cases where the terminal vowel is syncopated, and this holds good of cases where the other forms of the present have allowed the lengthening to set in. But in by far the greatest number of cases unification has set in ; this is regularly the case in the weak verb (*e.g.*, *lebe*—*lebst*, *lebt*), where the quality of the vowel was always uniformly identical from the earliest times ; and further, in the strong verbs with radical *a* : *trage*—*trägst*, *trägt* (in Low German with shortened vowel, *dröchst*, *dröcht*). On the other hand, the short syllable of the second and third persons singular is maintained in those verbs in which the root-vowel has fluctuated from the earliest times between *e* and *i* : in *nehme*—*nimmst*, *nimmt*, *trete*—*trittst*, *tritt*, this change is general ; and it appears likewise in *lese*—*list*, *gebe*—*gibst*, *gibt* ; at least according to the usual pronunciation in Lower Germany. The reason for the more

successful resistance opposed by these verbs than the others to the unification affecting the quantity must certainly be sought in the fact that the quality is at the same time different. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that they have not, in the case of the second person plural, withdrawn from the influence of unification. The difference between *a* and *ä* is not felt in this way, because the umlaut seems natural to our instinct of language.

324. In OHG. the participles of the verbs *lesan*, *ginesan*, *unesan* had, according to Verner's Law, to be sounded *gileran*, *gineran*, *giuneran*; but, with the exception of a few traces in the oldest records, the forms *gilesan*, *ginesan*, *giunesan*—approaching the present form—actually appear. On the other hand, the participles of *kiesen*, *friesen*, *verliesen* appear even in NHG., maintaining the change *gekoren*, *gefroren*, *verloren*. The identity of the vowel in the one case, and the difference in the last, serves as a precedent for the condition of the consonants.

325. The strong verbs which have the same vowel in the singular and plural of the preterite, likewise cancelled at an early period the consonantal difference which rose according to Verner's Law; cf. OHG., *sluog*—*sluogun*, *hieng*—*hiengun*, *huob*—*huobun*, *hluod*—*hluodun* against *zôh*—*zugun*, *meid*—*mitun*. [Cf. OE. *slôg*, 'I struck'—*slôgon*, with *teah*, 'I drew'—*tugon*]. We can see how in this way even such forms as are not merely affected by the same phonetic law, but are connected by their function and by their method of formation in other respects, are differently treated.

326. This phenomenon demands a psychological explanation. We should be inclined at first sight to suppose that since what we call unification proceeds by analogy from a new creation, the phonetic configuration of the form expelled by the new creation did not come into consideration at all. If the picture of the traditional phonetically differentiated form comes into con-

consciousness, no new creation is possible ; if, however, it does not so come into consciousness, the new creation is given free play. But no real reason appears why one form should more easily come into consciousness because, phonetically speaking, it differs more strongly than another form from a related one. The difficulty can only be explained by the assumption of the co-operation of simple reproduction by the aid of memory and creative combination in the creation of new forms, just as we were compelled to recognise this in the daily utterance of the forms already usual in language. There is a state in which the picture of the traditional form is not powerful enough to enter into consciousness under any circumstances more easily than a new creation due to analogy ; but still not so weak as to retire without opposition before such new creation. There thus appear in opposition to each other two ideas contending as to whether of the two shall first enter into consciousness, and thus drive the other back. It is only where a relation like this exists that the degree of divergence between the traditional form and the eventual new creation comes into consideration. If the latter is on the point of pressing first to the front, the former may yet, even without being plainly apprehended in consciousness, exercise a retarding influence upon it, which, in the case of the latter, the linguistic sense prevents from acquiring the instinctive sureness requisite, and thus prompts to reflexion upon it. The idea of the traditional form, however, co-operates as a stronger retarding agent, the more widely its contents differ from the new combination. And it is with the hearer as with the speaker. A new creation operates the more bewilderingly upon him, and is the less readily accepted and imitated, the more many-sided the opposition which it presents to the traditional form, so far as the memory of it is still in some degree operative in his mind.

327. There are two other circumstances which play a much more important part in the process of furthering or impeding unification than phonetic difference, namely, the greater or less stability of the connexion of the etymological groups and the greater or less intensity with which the single forms are stamped on the memory.

(a.) Varying cohesion of the etymological groups.

328. The first depends on the degree of correspondence in the meaning, and on the degree of living capacity for formation in the several forms. Both stand, as we have already seen, in reciprocal relations to each other. The more or less intimate nature of the connexion may be at once given with the mere function of the forms; as, for instance, the forms of the present are more closely connected with each other than with those of the preterite, the forms of the same word more closely connected with each other than with the forms of words derived from the same root. The tie between them may, however, be weakened by secondary development. Every kind of isolation which affects the function increases the difficulty of reaction against the isolation by which the sounds are affected, and renders it actually impossible as soon as it has reached a certain degree.

329. A few examples may serve to illustrate these sentences. The numerous consonantal differentiations, which took their rise by the operation of Verner's Law, are completely obliterated in noun inflexions, as seen in the earliest records which have come down to us. We see, however, their traces in many double forms which remain parallel to each other without any difference of meaning. In the verb, however, the differentiation has maintained itself better, obviously aided by the differentiation of vowels (ablaut) which coincides with it; cf. *MIHG. sinhe—sôch—zugen—gesogen*. We are able now in several ways to observe how the process of unification which sets in later begins by cancelling

the difference between the singular and plural of the preterite, and cancelling it so as to differentiate the singular by this process for the first time from the present. This has happened in the case of the West Teutonic languages in almost all those cases in which no variation of the vowels interposed to retard the process; thus OHG. *slahu—slnog—slnogun*, instead of **sluoh—slnogun*, *fdhu—fiang—fiangun*, instead of **fiuh—fiangun*, etc. We see an example in which this development is not prevented even by the difference of the vowel arrangements in the OS. *ftlhan*. This ought, according to strict phonetic development, to form the preterite *fdth—fundun*. We find, however, *fand—fnudun* only; and though it be true that in the present we find the form *findan*, yet this is only by the side of *ftlhan*. The few MHG. traces of this old change all display a departure from the older circumstances still existent in MHG., where the singular of the preterite is assimilated to the plural: *ziehe—zog* (OHG. *zôh*)—*zogen*, *leide—litt* (OHG. *leid*)—*litten*, *schneide—schnitt* (OHG. *sneid*)—*schnitten*, *siede—sott* (OHG. *sôd*)—*sotten*, *erkiese—erkor* (OHG. *irkos*)—*erkoren*. In the same way the ablaut has certainly maintained itself in MHG., but a correspondence has been re-established between the singular and plural of the preterite.

330. We are often able to observe that phonetic differentiations which are disregarded, either completely, or with the exception of scanty traces, maintain their place between words etymologically connected, or are only cancelled when their relationship to each other is very close. In the Teutonic languages a change dating from the oldest times has been in operation between the sound of German *h* and our *ch*,—the sound of *h* appearing at the beginning of a syllable, that of *ch* at the end of a syllable and before consonants: cf. MHG., *râch*, 'raw,' gen. *râhes*, *ich sihe—er siht* (pronounced like the MHG. *sicht*)—*er sach—wir sahen*. In the case of

the written language of to-day, this change in the inflexion is disregarded, except in the case of *hoch*; while, besides this, the comparative and superlative have been approximated to the positive, except in the case of *höher*—*höchste* and *näher*—*nächste*. In other cases, however, it is maintained: cf. *sehen*—*gesicht*, *geschehen*—*geschichte*, *fliehen*—*flucht*, *ziehen*—*zucht*, *schmach*—*schmähen*. An interchange prevailing in many instances in the case of the vowels, appeared in the OG. dialects under the influence of the vowel of the following syllable, viz., between *e* and *i* and between *u* and *o*. This interchange has been almost disregarded in the noun-inflexion before the commencement of our tradition. In MHG. it is consistently maintained within groups etymologically connected, excepting in cases of feminine formations of nouns of the agent; cf. *got*—*gotinne* (OHG. *gutinna*), but cf. also the present use of *birin* by the side of *berinne*, and *wolf* by the side of *wülpinne* and the diminutives (cf. *vogel*—*vögelin* [OHG. *fugilt*]). In NHG. the unification only appears in the case of close relationship. Thus it appears regularly in the case of names of materials (cf. *leder*—*ledern*, MHG. *liden*; *gold*—*golden* [MHG. *guldin*]; *holz*—*holzern* [*hulzin*]; besides e.g., in *wort*—*antwort*, *antworten* [MHG. *antwürte*, *antwürten*]; *gold*, *vergolden*, still in the old-fashioned style *vergulden*). On the other hand, we find at the present day *recht*—*richten*, *richtig*, *gericht*; *berg*—*gebirge*; *feld*—*gefilde*; *herde*—*hirt*; *hold*—*huld*; *foll*—*füllen*; *koch*—*küche*, etc.

331. As a matter of course, no unification sets in where the feeling for the etymological connexion has completely disappeared owing to a divergence in the development of meaning, or even where it is so far faded that it does not come into consciousness without some reflexion. This explains, for instance, why the differences in sound just described are maintained in the following cases: *rauh*—*rauchwerk*, *rauchwaare*, *rauchhandel*;

nach (MHG. *nâch*)—*nake*; *erde*—*irden*, *irdisch*; *gold*—*gulden* (an adjective used substantively). In MHG. the contracted forms *du treist*, *er treit* from *tragen* actually exist; these are in NHG., again, replaced by *trägst*, *trägt*; but the contraction is maintained in the derivation *getreide*. MHG. *gar* shows in its inflected form a *w* (*garwe*, etc.), which ought, according to the laws of sound-change, to develop into *b*; but an inflexion, *gar*—*garber*, could not be maintained indefinitely, and the inflected followed the example of the uninflected forms: on the other hand, the *b* of the verb *gerben* remained, owing to the different development of meaning. Every language, in every possible stage of development, affords a plentiful supply of proof of this phenomenon.

332. The intensity of the impression received by the memory determines, in the first instance, the relative strength of the factors opposed to each other, in which respect the remarks made above (p. 206) equally apply. If, e.g., in ON. the first person singular of the conjunctive mood ends, in both present and preterite, in *a* (*gefa*, *gefa*), while in all other forms an *i* appears (*gefir*, *gefi*, *gefin*, *gefid*, *gefi* and *gefir*, *gefi*, etc.) the chances are, of course, highly unfavourable to the former, and thus *gefi* and *gefi* appear in the more recent sources likewise. But, of course, under certain circumstances, one isolated form may carry the day against several corresponding forms—that is, if they are more frequently used for themselves than the others taken together. If, for instance, in NHG. *siemen* the *i* runs generally through the present, from which then, instead of the old strong preterite, a further new weak preterite is formed, while in MHG. most forms still maintain *e*, this depends on the fact that the third person singular *es siemt* occurred, then, as now, more frequently than all the others.

333. But most of the irregularities in the treatment of etymological groups, which otherwise stand perfectly parallel to each

other, proceed from the fact that the individual groups differ very markedly from each other with respect to the frequency of their occurrence, and thus with respect to the facility with which the individual forms can be reproduced by an effort of memory with their traditional differences. The rarest words are those which, assuming circumstances in other respects to be similar, are earliest exposed to unification; the most commonly occurring are the latest to be so exposed, or indeed not exposed at all. This assertion can be proved inductively as well as deductively.

334. But besides this, the course of the movement is influenced by a quantity of casual processes in the mental activity of the single individuals and their reciprocal effect — processes which lie beyond the sphere of our reasoning, as of our observation. Especially do factors withdrawn from our knowledge play a great part in the contest which the double forms, which have taken their rise owing to unification, have to go through with respect to each other. Omniscience alone could explain in every case why the decision has been in certain cases thus, and in other cases otherwise. And we cannot close our eyes to the fact that very frequently analogous cases result differently in the same dialect, and one and the same case have different issues in different dialects. Thus, to cite only a quite certain example: while the Gothic has in other cases unified the so-called grammatical change, by rendering general the use of the consonant of the present and of the singular preterite, the verbs *hvaírban*, *svaírban*, *skaidan* have taken the opposite course, and have generalised the use of the consonant of the plural preterite and of the participle; and especially in the case of the last-mentioned verb in HG., which carries the consonant of the plural preterite through more commonly than the Gothic, the consonant of the present has succeeded in carrying the day.

335. Of course, however, the development in the individual material groups is not wholly independent of the formal grouping. When a phonetic differentiation affects all the etymological parallel groups belonging to a formal group, a co-operation of the material and the formal grouping is thereby caused. This co-operation sometimes serves to decide the direction of the unification. In the original German there occurred in the numerous noun-formations with the suffix *-no*, a change of the vowel preceding the *n* between *u* (afterwards further developed into *o-a*) and *e* (*i*), so that both distributed themselves among the different cases according to a regular rule.¹ Next, at a later period, we find *u* (*a*) and *e* (*i*) regularly carried through all the cases of a word. Thus in the Gothic we find forms like *kindans*, 'king,' standing beside forms like *manrgins*, 'to-morrow;' and in ON. forms like *Jermunn* beside forms like *Ösinn*, and *morgunn* and *morginn* standing together. But the participles falling under this head have, in contrast with the lawless caprice evidenced in the other forms, invariably *-an* in Gothic, and invariably *-in* in ON. The decisive part played by the formal grouping is especially seen from the fact that such participles as have been completely transformed into adjectives or substantives, have in some cases struck out a new path; cf. Gothic *folgins*, 'hidden,' as against *fulhans*, the genuine participle of *filhan*, 'to hide;' *aigin*, 'property' (*eigenthum*), the participle of *aigan*, 'to have,' used substantivally; further, the ON. *jǫtunn*, 'giant,' the old participle of *eta*, 'to eat,' with an active signification.

336. The formal grouping may, however, not merely determine the direction of the unification, but also whether it shall occur at all. The less phonetic differentiation disturbs the formal parallelism of the single groups among themselves, the more capable are they of

¹ Cf. *Beiträge*, vi. 238 sqq.

withstanding the tendencies towards unification. Thus, for instance, the maintenance of the ablaut series in Teutonic for so long a period would have been impossible if each verb had had its own special kind of ablaut, and had there not existed larger groups of verbs with the same scheme. And it can be demonstrated that the schemes preserved to us represent merely a selection from those which were in existence before the commencement of our tradition, all those which were represented either by a few or by only a single example having perished, save for a few traces. The disappearance of others may be traced historically; e.g. Gothic *truda* — *trad* — *tridum* — *trudans*. It is the same with the umlaut in the second and third persons of the singular indicative present of the strong verbs; OHG. *farn* — *ferist* — *ferit*, and thus in MHG. *fahre* — *fährst* — *fährt*.

Conversion
of a merely
formal dif-
ference into
a difference
of meaning.

337. Another circumstance which contributes to the preservation of a phonetic difference is when this happens to coincide with a difference of function. If, for instance, all the cases of the singular are arranged so as to correspond with all the cases of the plural, the relation they bear to each other is more easily and more indelibly stamped on the memory than if certain forms of the singular, coupled with certain forms of the plural are arranged so as to correspond with certain other forms of the singular and plural. And thus it is also natural that where, in the majority of cases, the phonetic differentiation corresponds with the difference of function, the unification should be confined to the groups which are more immediately connected, and this unification thus perfects the correspondence between phonetic and functional difference. In Old Danish the plural of *barn*, 'bairn,' in accordance with a general Scandinavian sound-law is *born*, *barna*, *bornum*, *born*; while in the singular, *a* prevails throughout. Modern Danish has admitted *berna* also instead of *barna*. In another word, *lagh*, 'law,' *o* is

carried even in Old Danish throughout the whole plural. The unification within the narrower groups is frequently enough the preliminary to wider unification. Thus, in the case of *lagh*, the *o* is actually making its appearance sometimes in Old Danish, and in Modern Danish *lov* is the prevailing form. The coincidence with a functional difference may, however, be the reason for the lasting retention of a phonetic difference, and especially when it is rendered capable by formal analogy of resistance in the way already described.

338. The coincidence of these two circumstances enables the idea of the phonetic variation to connect itself so closely with the functional variation that the two may appear inseparable to the instinct of language. Thus it is that the non-significant variation originated by accident became significant. It will become more significant still, the less plainly that variation in meaning is accentuated by other phonetic variations. Language thus claims compensation for the loss of the characteristic signs of the functional variation which set in as a consequence of phonetic loss.

339. The ablaut in the German verb depends upon a vowel differentiation already manifest in the IE. original language. This is a mechanical result of the shifting accent, and has nothing to do with the original difference in the function of the single forms. This differentiation was even for the original language superfluous, except as regards the distinction between the present and imperfect on the one hand, and the aorist upon the other (cf. GK. *λείπω*, *ἔλειπον*, *λείποιμι* — *ἔλιπον*, *λίποιμι*). The perfect stem, in particular, was clearly differentiated from the present stem by reduplication. Hence we see, even in Greek, distinct signs of decay in the vowel-change between present and perfect; we have, on the one hand, *λείπω* — *λέλοιπα*, but *πλίκω* — *πέπλεχα* and not **πέπλοχα*. And only a few traces remains of the original change

between the singular and the plural of the perfect (*οἶδα* — *ἴσμεν*). The ablaut disappears, in fact, simply because it is superfluous; and it was superfluous because the old characteristic sign of the perfect stem, the reduplication, survived, and was consistently maintained, while the present stem was also, in many respects, specially characterised. In Teutonic, on the other hand, the loss of the reduplicate went hand in hand with the confirmation of the ablaut. We cannot indeed assert that one was the cause of the other. Rather, the primary impulse to the loss of the reduplication was given by the phonetic development, in consequence of which certain forms were no longer recognisable as reduplicated (*cf.* the type *birum*); and the preservation of the ablaut is due, in the first instance, to the existence of parallel series. But in the further course of development, a reciprocal causal relation has become manifest. For instance, it is instructive for our purpose that, in Gothic, chiefly those verbs have maintained the reduplication in which the IE. vowel variation between present and perfect (preterite) has disappeared on phonetic grounds; and this holds good of every case; *cf.* *halda* — *haihald*, *skaida* — *skaiskaid*, *stauta* — *staitaut*. Still, even in OHG., there was as yet no absolute necessity of differentiating the root syllable of the present and preterite, because the variation was marked in the termination as well in the case of each single person of the indicative as of the conjunctive. The case is different in MHG., where in the first and second persons plural of the indicative, and throughout the whole of the conjunctive the variation between the present and the preterite depends entirely upon the form taken by the root-syllable, *cf.* *geben* = *giben*, *gebet* = *gibet*, *gebe* = *gabe*, etc. In NHG. the second person singular and the third person plural of the indicative must be added to the list. Thus the ablaut has become a characteristic, whose necessity has been increasingly felt. But it is only

the distinction between the present and the preterite that is of importance, and not that between the singular indicative preterite, or merely the first and third persons of it, and the other forms of the preterite. The last-mentioned distinction, passing as it did likewise from the original language, was maintained solely owing to the frequency of the occurrence of certain verbs, and the existence of parallel series. It was thus, in the case of certain classes, cast aside at an early date (Gothic *fōr* — *fōrum*, *faiſdh* — *faiſdhum*, OHG. *fiang* — *fiangum*) [OE. *scōc* — *scōcon*, etc.]. In the case of other classes it has maintained its ground even into NHG., but has finally been cast aside entirely save for a few traces. It is merely in respect of phonetic convenience a gain to say, as we do now, *sprang* — *sprangen*, *flog* — *flogen*, and not as in OHG., *spranc* — *sprungen*, *floug* — *flugen*. Thus the ablaut received no functional value till the NHG. period. And in this connexion there is one noteworthy circumstance. The variation between the singular and plural is (except in the past-present verbs) retained by the modern written language solely in the common verb *werden* [*ward*—*wurdon*], and in this case also by-forms preponderate, in which the variation is lost; on the other hand, there is still a number of verbs in which, though the vowel of the singular has penetrated into their plural, yet the conjunctive has maintained its peculiar vowel arrangement: *starb* — *stürbe*, *schwamm* — *schwämme* (with a by-form *schwämme*), etc. In this case a phonetic contrast is maintained within narrower limits, but again in virtue of the coincidence with a functional one. Since, however, the umlaut alone would suffice to express the latter (*schwammen* — *schwämmen*), it would be superfluous to maintain the old vowel. But precisely in the case of those verbs in which the umlaut is maintained most strictly (*verdürbe*, *stürbe*, *würbe*, *würfe*, *hülfe*) another consideration comes in, namely, the need for distinction

from the conjunctive present : *helfe* and *halfe*, which form occurs as a variant of *hülfe*, are no doubt differently written, but phonetically they correspond with each other. On the other hand, there is no verb with *i* going through all the persons of its present tense which still forms a subjunctive preterite with *ii* (e.g., *singe* — *siinge*), because in this case it is precisely the old form, which, according to the pronunciation prevalent in most German dialects, would fall into correspondence with the conjunctive present. And this explains the fact why the verbs with *mm* and *nn* show double forms still (*schwämme* — *schwämme*, *sänne* — *sönne* ; cf. *geschwommen*, *gesonnen* as contrasted with *gesungen*.)

340. A part similar to that played by the ablaut is that played by the umlaut produced by an *i* or *j* of the following syllable. In the masculine *i*-declension in OHG. it had happened to become the rule that the whole singular was free from, and the whole plural affected by, its umlaut (*gast* — *gesti*, etc.), and it is hence that the difference is maintained. The circumstance is best explained if we compare the history of the change between *e* and *i*, *u* and *o*, caused by the following vowel. The *u*-declension must in original German have run much as follows :—¹

	Sing.	Pl.	Sing.	Pl.
N.	<i>meduz</i>	<i>midiviz</i>	<i>sunuz</i>	<i>suniviz</i>
G.	<i>medauz</i>	<i>medevô</i>	<i>sonauz</i>	<i>sonevô</i>
D.	<i>midiu</i>	<i>medumiz</i>	<i>sunin</i>	<i>sunnnn</i>
A.	<i>medu</i>	<i>meduns</i>	<i>sunu</i>	<i>sunnnns</i>

So purposeless a change was not likely to be long maintained. And thus we find traces of it in Old Norse alone. OHG. has from the very earliest times made the *u* of *sunu* uniform through-

¹ The terminations are comparatively unimportant for our purpose.

out; in *metn*, *ehn*, *ern*, the *e*; and in *situ*, *quirn*, the *i*.¹ The umlaut in the *i*-declension has not yet come to be a necessity in OHG., as the cases of the plural are independently of its aid clearly differentiated from those of the singular; indeed it is not a necessity in MHG. either as long as the *e* of the flexional terminations is retained; for the nominative, accusative, and genitive plural *geste* could not easily be confused with the dative singular *gaste*, even should they dispense with the aid of the umlaut. But directly the *e* disappears—and this is the case notably in the South German dialects—the umlaut remains in the nominative and accusative as the only mark of distinction between the singular and the plural. At this stage of development the *i*-declension has a decided advantage over the *a*-declension, and the purely dynamical value of the umlaut is complete. This is very clearly manifest in the fact that it spreads beyond its original domain. This disposition to spread stands in the closest connexion with the absence or presence of a differentiating *e*. In the same way in South German the umlaut has affected almost all the substantives of the old *a*-declension capable of being affected by it (cf. SCHMELLER, *Mundarten Baierns*, § 796, and WINTELER, *Kernzer mundart*, p. 170 sqq.). Thus they say *tag*—*täg*, *arm*—*ärm*, etc. The Middle and Low German dialects have this tendency in a much less degree, and notably only in the case of words of more than one syllable, such as *sattel*, *wagen*, in which they too reject the *e* of the plural. At an early period the umlaut succeeded in affecting words expressive of relationship, which originally were inflected with consonants, and thus could dispense with a termination in the nominative and accusative plural; MHG. *vater*—*veter*, *muoter*—*müeter*, etc.

¹ Cf. *Beiträge*, t. g. d. d. spr. vi. 80. The possible alternative remains of a unification in different directions, assuming that for OHG. a phonetic transitive of *e* into *i* before *n* is to be supposed.

341. The formal unification, which we had already occasion repeatedly to call into consideration, is also often a reaction against an objectless phonetic differentiation. The process is then the following. Within a class which hitherto adopted similar formations, phonetic differences arose in one form or in several. For instance, the genitive in certain words formed itself in one way, and in others differently, while in other cases the uniformity was not disturbed. Then the tendency makes itself felt of restoring the same uniformity in the one or the few differentiated forms as well, and of changing the partial agreement of the method of formation again into a complete agreement. This method of unification is specially seen in connexion with the material method, as the instances cited may serve to show. But even independently of this it occurs frequently enough. Under this head falls, for instance, the unification of the hard and soft fricative in the terminations of the cases and persons of the Old Teutonic dialects.¹ According to Verner's Law $\text{þ} = \text{f}$. t was divided into þ and ð (d), s into s (hard) and z (soft). Accordingly in the original German we had **trdēsi* (*du trittst*, 'thou treadest'), **trdēþi* (*er tritt*), **trdēþe* (*ihre treten*) **trdōþi* (*sie treten*), as against **bērczi*, 'thou bearest,' **bērcēi*, **bērcēe*, **bērcōndi*, while in the first persons singular and plural no differentiation had yet appeared; further, in the σ -declension, the nominative singular was **stigōs* (*steg*), but **ihwōz* ('horse'); the nominative plural **stigōs*, but **ihwōz*; accusative-plural **stigōns* but **ihwōnz*, while the other case-endings remained the same; and similarly in other classes of inflexion. The unification which ensued terminated in nearly every case in favour of the soft sound; on which we have to remark that z appears as r in the ON. and in the West Teutonic dialects, but disappears from the latter in the case of original auslaut. Still, in certain cases, too, the hard

¹ Cf. *Reiniger*, vi. 348 *sqq.*

s has carried the day. Thus, in the nominative plural of the *a*-declension, we find in AS. and Old Friesic *dagas* by the side of ON. *dagar*; in OS. the *Heliand* exhibits *-as*, only in solitary cases *o* or *a* (*grurio, slutila*); while in the Freckenhorst Roll *a* appears more frequently than *as* and *as*. OHG. recognises in appellatives *a* only; on the other hand, in genealogical designations which have passed into names of towns, it displays *-as* as well, supposing that these are not to be taken in any other way.¹

342. An example, taken from modern times, is the restoration of the inflexion *e* in NHG. in cases where it had already disappeared in MHG. The derivatives terminating in *-en*, *-er*, *-el* are particularly instructive. In the case of substantives the MHG. rejection of the *e* is maintained; *cf.*, *des morgens, dem wagen, die wagen, der wagen, den wagen*, as against *tages, tage, tagen*, and in the same way *schüssel, schüsseln*, as against *schule, schulen*. On the other hand, in the case of adjectives which are connected more firmly, owing to the prevailing uniformity which characterises them, the *e* has been restored after the analogy of the monosyllabic words: *gefangenes* like *langes, gefangene, gefangenen* (MHG. *gevangen*), *andere, anderes, andere* (= MHG. *ander, anders, ander*). The NHG. forms occur even in MHG. by the side of the syncopated forms. We are able in this case to make observations again on the process of isolation. We write invariably *die* and *den eltern*, beside *die, den älteren*; *der jünger, den jüngern* (substantive), beside *der jüngere, den jüngeren* (adjective); *einzel*, dative plural of the MHG. adjective *einzel*; *anderseits, unserseits*, as against *andere seite, unsere seite*; *vorderseite, hinterseite, oberarm, unterarm, edelmann, innerhalb, ausserhalb, oberhalb, unterhalb* (all spurious composites sprung from the union of the adjective and substantive), as against *die vordere seite*, etc.; *anders*, as against *anderes*.

¹ Cf. Kögel, *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum*, xxviii. p. 110 sqq.

343. Another case in which the umlaut has become dynamical from analogous reasons is the subjunctive mood of strong preterites, and of the weak ones formed with no intervening vowel, MHG. *fuor—fiere, sang, pl. sungen—siingen, mohte—möhte, brähte—brähte*, etc. In this case the umlaut is either uniformly prevalent, or, at least for the plural, is the only method of distinction. The dynamic acceptance of umlaut by the linguistic instinct announces itself in NHG. by the fact that, in spite of all other unification of the vowel-system, the umlaut still remains, as *sang, sangen—sänge*, for *sungen, siinge*; and further, even more decidedly in MHG., in the transference of the umlaut from the preterites which had originally no vowels to the syncopated preterites (*brante—brente*, instead of *brante* after the analogy of *brähte—brähte*).¹

Conversion
of elements
of the stem
into inflexions.

344. A third case is the umlaut in the present as contrasted with the suppression of the umlaut in the preterite and the participle: OHG. *brennu—branta—gibrantir*. In the participle a change has developed phonetically: *gibrennit—gibrant-*. The first result, however, of unification under these circumstances is that the unflected form *gibrennit* is rejected in favour of *gibrant*. But then the contrast is maintained in the root syllable between the present and preterite participle for centuries unintermittently, although it is not necessary to the characterisation of the forms.

345. In this way it is possible for even elements of the stem of the word to be changed into flexional terminations. This is the case in the German weak declension. In this the *n* (as in words like *namen, frachen, herzen*) belongs to the original stem. As, however, every trace of the original flexional termination has been wiped out by phonetic decay, and as, on the other side, the *n* in the nominative (in the case of the neuter, in the accusative as well) singular has disappeared, as in the case of *name, frau, herz*, it has

¹ Cf. Bech, *Germania*, xv. p. 129 sqq.

come to be a characteristic of the oblique cases in contrast with the nominative singular. Another case-suffix, which took its rise in a similar manner, is the syllable *-er*, which serves to form plurals (*rad*—*räder*, *mann*—*männer*). The method of formation took its origin in certain neuter *s*-stems (cf. Latin *genus*—*generis*), in which *s* had, obeying the law of sound-change, turned into *r*. In the nominative singular this same *s* had naturally, according to the same laws, to disappear together with the preceding vowel. Thus, under the partial influence of the vowel-declension, there arose in the first place in OHG. the following scheme:—

Sing.	Pl.
N. <i>kalp</i>	<i>kalbir</i>
G. <i>kalbir-es</i>	<i>kalbir-o</i>
D. <i>kalbir-e</i>	<i>kalbir-um</i>
A. <i>kalp</i>	<i>kalbir</i>

In the genitive and dative singular, at least, the *-ir-* was useless and puzzling. And thus the forms in question have already disappeared at the time from which our oldest sources date, leaving but isolated traces, and are replaced by *kalbes*, *kalbe*, which are formed after the model of the normal inflexion from the nominative accusative. Then the *-ir* necessarily appeared as the characteristic of the plural, and the more so since there was in the nominative and accusative no other differentiating symbol. The functional character then of the *-ir* (= MHG., NHG. *-er*) is attested by the fact that it is gradually transferred to a quantity of words with which it had originally no connexion.

346. These examples will suffice to make it plain how a variation which sprang up without any idea of purpose, if favoured by the casual coincidence of different circumstances, may unperceived, and unintentionally, be made to subserve a purpose, causing it

All phonetic
changes in-
voluntary.

to appear as though the variation were designedly made to suit this very purpose. This appearance grows actually stronger the more perfectly the differences which arose at the same time unintentionally are abolished. We may generalise our experience drawn from historical development as far as we can trace it, in the proposition that there is no such thing as variation of sound created of set purpose with a view to denote a difference of function. The difference of function only attaches itself to the variation of sound by secondary development, and this through a development which the individual speaker neither designs nor perceives by means of a natural association of ideas.

CHAPTER XI.

FORMATION OF NEW GROUPS.

IF sound-change has, generally speaking, the effect of producing differences where none existed previously, it serves, on the other hand, not unusually to obliterate existing differences. This is under certain circumstances a salutary arrangement; but in most cases it does more harm than good. For by this process differences essential to the denotation of the function disappear; and in addition, the clear division of the single groups from each other is rendered an impossibility. Hence the effect of sound-change is commonly to produce further results, and is especially operative in producing many analogical new-creations.

348. The simplest process under this head is, when words etymologically unconnected, and equally unconnected in signification, come to coincide by the action of secondary development; e.g., *enkel* (*talus*) = MHG. — *enkel* — *enkel* (*nepos*) = MHG. *enenkel*, *garbe* (*manipulus*) = MHG. *garbe* — *garbe* (*schaufgarbe*) = MHG. *garwe*, *kiel* (*carina*) = MHG. *kiel* — *kiel* (*caulis pennae*) = MHG. *kil*, *mähre* (*narratio*) = MHG. *macre* — *mähre* (*equa*) = MHG. *merhe*, *tor* (*porta*) = MHG. *tor* — *tor* (*stultus*) = MHG. *töre*, *los* (*solutus*) = MHG. *lös* — *los* (*sors*) = MHG. *lös*, *ohm* (*amphora*) = MHG. *äme* — *ohm* (*avunculus*) = *oheim*, *schnur* (*linca*) = MHG. *sunor* — *schnur* (*nurus*) — MHG. *snur*. English is specially rich in instances of this process. [Cf., such cases as *shed* (*ascēdan*, 'to part'), *shed*, 'a hut' (doublet of

shade); *sheer* (allied to Icelandic *skjerr*, 'bright'); *sheer* (a doublet of *shear*, akin to Dutch *scheren*); *sallow* ('a willow'), *sallow*, ('yellowish'); *ronse*, *row*, *rock*, *quarry*, *purl*, *punch*, *pump*, *box*, etc.]

349. It sometimes happens that two such words, in spite of their different meaning, become, for the instinct of language, one. No one without special philological knowledge will suspect that two entirely distinct words have coalesced in the German word *unter*, namely the Latin word *inter* and another connected with the Latin *infra* (SKT. *andhari*). Few would suspect that the phrase *ein schiff lichten* is of a different origin (MHG. *lhten*, 'to lighten') from *die anker lichten* (Low German form for *lŭften*, English *lift*). *Schlingen* (*devorare*) is the MHG. form of an elder *slinden* (cf., *schlund*), and the word has perhaps taken firm root in the written language because it has coalesced with *schlingen* = MHG. *slingen*. In the phrase *in die schanze schlagen* few are aware that we are dealing with the French word *chance*, and not with the German word *schanz*. Certain cases are more instructive still in which formal influence has been at work. It may be a mere conjecture that *mahlen* (MHG. *maln*) has passed from the strong into the weak conjugation under the influence of *malen* (MHG. *mālen*). But it is less questionable that the transference of *laden* (*einladen*, OHG. *ladōn*) into the strong conjugation has been caused by contact with *laden* (*aufladen*, OHG. *hladan*, English *lade*); while conversely weak forms of the latter appear as well—e.g., *überladete* occurs in LESSING, and *ladest* and *ladet* are in actual use. It is certain that a strong form *er befährt* occurring in JEAN PAUL, in connexion with *befahren* (else conjugated as a weak verb = MHG. *ɾdren*) is due to a confusion with the strong *befahren* (MHG. *ɾarn*). In Austria, *kennen* and *können* are confused; one hears, for instance, *der schauspieler hat seine rolle nicht gekannt*. In the case of the two last instances, we have words etymologically

connected, but still essentially different, confused. In MHG. we find two etymologically different particles *wan*; one with an adversative, the other with a causal meaning used in the sense of NHG. *denn*. The latter has a fuller by-form, *wande*, which comes to be used sometimes in an adversative sense, where such sense is not justified by its origin (*cf.* MHG. *Wörterbuch*, iii. 479 b). In OHG. the prepositions *int-* and *in* in composition with a verb, have often coalesced into the form *in-*, the *t* disappearing by assimilation with the following consonants. It thus happens that the form *int-*, being taken for a doublet of *in-*, has passed into cases where *in* should, strictly speaking, be used; *cf.*, NHG. *entbrennen*, *entziünden*, etc. The German prefix *zer-* had in olden times a by-form *ze-*, which developed into *zer-* before a vowel, and *ze-* before a consonant. This form was, phonetically speaking, identical with the preposition *ze-*, which is of wholly different origin. The adverbial form *zuo* (MHG. *zu*) appeared side by side with these, which gradually thrust completely aside the form *ze*. This *zu* is also found for *ze-* = *zer-*, e.g., in LUTHER. The AS. *tô-*, used in the sense of *zer-*, is to be similarly explained.

350. Unconnected words coalesce into material-groups owing to accidental partial unification. This is the simplest variety of so-called popular etymology, consisting solely in a change of meaning effected by the impulse of language without the sound-form undergoing any change. It is a necessary condition of this that the true etymology of one of the words has been obscured, so that it has no other more natural connexion.

Union of unrelated words in material groups: (simplest form of popular etymology).

351. The component parts of a compound word are specially subject to such changes; thus the German word *erwähnen* is apprehended as compounded with *wähnen* = MHG. *wānen*, while it really and truly contains rather the MHG. *(ge)wehenen*: in the case of *freitag* we are tempted to think of the adjective *frei*.

[In *sovereign* we think that we see the word *reign*, whereas the old English form was *soverainc*, French *souverain*; in *island* we fancy that we have a word connected with the Latin *insula*, whereas it represents in fact the AS. *ealand*.] Proper names are more exposed than any others to change of significance; cf. *Reinwald*, *Bärwald*, *Braunwald*, in which the latter half was not originally equivalent to *silva*, but was the noun of the agent from *walten*; *Glaub-recht* and *Lieb-recht* are originally probably compounded with *brecht* = OHG. *beraht*; *Sauerlant* is a High German form of *Sherland* = *Süderlant*. Other instances may be seen in Andresen's *Volksetymologie* [and A. S. Palmer's *Folk-Etymology*, 1882]. In this case the change of meaning has ensued without any support derived at the very outset from a connexion in the meaning. Nothing is in fact operative but the natural expectation of finding, in a word which looks like a compound, familiar elements.

352. Proper names hold out least successfully against such secondary relationship attaching to the sound alone, simply because here no contradiction, any more than agreement, of meaning is possible. There are, however, cases as well in which it is possible to restore a relation between the significations of the word in question; cf. MHG. *endeckrist*, phonetically developed from *antikrist*; NHG. *lanzknecht* from *landes knecht*; *wahnwitz*, *wahnsinn*, *wahnschaffen*, falsely connected with *wahn* (MHG. *wān*), while the NHG. *wan* ('empty' [seen in *wan-hope*]) lies at their real root; *friedhof*, from MHG. *frīthof*; *vormund* is referred to *mund*, 'a protection'; *verweisen* does not belong to *weisen* (= MHG. *wīsen*), but comes from the MHG. *verwīzen*. *Umringen*, as its weak inflexion proves, is in its origin no compound from *ringen*, but is a derivative from the MHG. *umberinc*, now obsolete. But the fact that it is accentuated *umringen* shows that it is appre-

hended in meaning as a compound from *nun* and *ringen*. A further result of the change of meaning was the formation of a participle *nunrungen*, and even of a preterite *nunrang* (see Sanders, ii. 764). Words, too, which are really and truly no compounds, but which give the effect of being so owing to the full conformation of their sounds, are thus fashioned with true compounds; cf. *lenmmund*, which is appreciated as *lentemund*, but is really derived from the Gothic *hlinma* (*anris*); *weissagen*, NIIG. *wtssagen* = OIIG. *wtzagôn*, which is really a derivation from *wtzago*, 'the knowing one,' 'the prophet;' *trübsälig*, *armsälig*, etc., which are mere derivatives from *trübsal*, *armsal*, etc., by the derivative suffix *-sal*.

353. It is a rarer case when a word is apprehended as a derivative of another with which it is wholly unconnected.¹ The NIIG. *sucht* is apprehended by the instinct of language as connected with *suchen*. It really comes from the NIIG. *suht* (= Gothic *sauhts*), which has nothing to do with the NIIG. *suchen* (Gothic *sôkjan*). The NIIG. inclination to connect the word with *suchen* depends on such compounds as *wassersucht*, *mondsucht*, *gelbsucht*, *schwind-sucht*, *eifersucht*, *sehnsucht*, *ehrsucht*, etc., which were apprehended as 'a longing for water,' 'for the moon,' etc. Hans Sachs apprehends *-suht* still as an 'illness,' as he shows by writing *wann er hat auch die eifersucht*. On the other hand we may compare the well-known proverb *eifersucht ist eine leidenschaft, die mit eifer sucht, was leiden schafft*. The word *laute* is regarded as connected with *laut*, but is really a loan word from the Arabic. [In the same way in English, *posthumous* is popularly connected with *post humum*, *dismal* with *dies malus*; the sixteenth century connected *abominable* (written *abhominable*) with *ab-homo*, as if the

¹ [Cf. *Outlines of a History of the German Language* (last Chapter), by Strong and Meyer.]

word signified *inhuman*.] In the case of the word *hantieren*, which comes from *hanter*, we think of *hand*; in the case of *fallieren* (from the French) of *fallen*; in the case of *beschwichtigen*, the Low German form of the MHG. *swiften*, of *schweigen*; in that of *schmälen* (properly 'to make *schmal*,' 'to impair') we think of *schmähen*. The words *Herrschaft*, *herrlich*, and *herrschen* are derived from *hehr* (hence MHG. form *hîrschaft*, etc.), but are now referred to *herr*, with which word they were originally but indirectly connected.

Phonetic
trans-formation
(complex kind of
popular
etymology)

354. There is a more complex kind of popular etymology which must be distinguished from those described. This consists in a phonetic transformation whereby a word which reminds us of another by the similarity of its sound is brought into nearer correspondence with it still. Such transformation may be made of set purpose, and with the full consciousness that those who employ the word are deliberately altering its form. Such linguistic contortions are often handy tools for humorous writers: Fischart employs them on a large scale in German [and Dickens and Thackeray in English]. Many of these are handed down as traditional jokes, especially in academical circles. This intentional humorous phonetic transformation offers no problem to the philologist. It merely concerns him so far as it is not apprehended as a contortion by the simple minds of children and of the uneducated, but is accepted and propagated as the genuine form. There is, however, doubtless such a thing as an unintentional and unconscious transformation, which proves itself to be such by the absence of any humour.¹ Foreign words, proper names, and other words whose etymology has become obscured are specially exposed to this; and almost exclusively compounds, or words which in virtue

¹ We must remark that this must not be confused with the phonetic substitution to be discussed in Chapter XXII. The operations of the two processes are not always, however, clearly separated.

of their fuller sound-arrangements give the impression of being such. In this process either the first element is exposed to a change, as in the case of *jubeljahr* (Hebrew *yobel*), *dienstag*, *Huldreich* (from MHG. *Uolrich*), *mantwurf* (from *alt* HG. *moltwurf*), Latin *aurichalcum*, from the Greek *ὀρείχαλκος*: or it may be the second only; *cf.*, *hagestolz*, *Reinhold*, *Gotthold*, *W'einkhold*, etc., from *-olt* = *walt*,¹ *abspannen*, from MHG. *spanen*, 'to allure'; *abstreifen*, from MHG. *ströufen*;² *einöde*, from MHG. *einade* (*ate* being a mere suffix): or both parts may be affected; *cf.*, *armbrust*, from the Latin *arcubalista*; *liebstockel*, from the Latin *ligusticum*; *felleisen*, from French *valise*; *chrenhold*, from *herolt*; Greek *συνέριον*, from the Hebrew *sanhedrin* [*cf.* the vulgar English *sparrow-grass* for *asparagus*]. One part changes its form, while the other merely changes its meaning, in the case of *abscite*, formerly *apside*, from the Greek *ἄψις*; *Küssnacht* from *Cussiniacum*; probably also in *Mailand* from MHG. *Milân*. These examples help to show that an additional impulse is given to unification if the meaning of the transformed word permits of being connected with that of its model; but such impulse is not absolutely necessary for its production. To explain the process we have to notice in the first instance that we do not as a rule apprehend the words and sentences which we hear with absolute exactness according to their several factors. We commonly to some extent divine them by guesswork, and our guess depends on the sense which the context leads us to expect. In the process we come naturally upon sound-groups with which we are quite familiar; and it may thus happen that the very first time that the word is heard, instead of an intrinsically meaningless portion of a long word, a word in ordinary use with a similar sound may

¹ The *h* has probably never been pronounced, and in that case we have only a change of meaning, which has found expression in the orthography.

² In this case the dialectic transition from *en* into *ei* comes into consideration.

substitute itself. And further, a portion of a word, which otherwise has no hold on language, has, even when correctly caught, no firm hold on the memory, and it is therefore possible that on the attempt at reproduction a familiar element may substitute itself as an independent word. And when such substitution has once taken place either in the process of hearing or in that of speaking, the substitution has the advantage over the genuine of imprinting itself more lastingly on the memory. It is natural to expect that this process should be, as a rule, confined to words of more than ordinary length. Shorter words are more readily caught and more readily retained. But further, we are accustomed to expect to find that there are a number of simple words standing isolated, or at least grouped with derivatives generally familiar, and admitting of being found at will, while we expect besides, of a word which gives the impression of a compound, that its single elements should admit of connexion with simple words.

Union in
formal
groups: (a)
Where func-
tion is the
same.

355. Phonetic coincidence is a more active efficient on the formal than on the material side of language. The processes which range themselves under this head fall under two main groups — *i.e.* according as forms functionally identical or functionally different come to coincide.

356. The disappearance of phonetic differences in cases of identity of function may act beneficially by simplifying the formation of the formal-groups. Sometimes in the process only the phonetic differentiation described in the last chapter is again cancelled. Thus, for instance, the OHG. formative syllables *-u/, -al, -il*, which lie on the same lines, converge into the form *el*; and similarly with *-un, -an, -in*, which converge in the form *-en*, etc. But such differences as the double formation of the comparative and superlative in OHG. *-iro, -ist* — *-aro, -ast*, or the two

synonymous methods of forming the adjective in *-ag* and *-ig*—in the case of the isolated instance of *einag*, *einig*, we have a difference of signification—serve no purpose, and it is thus a clear gain that we have at present only *-er*, *-[e]st*, and *-ig*. The convergence, again, of two entire classes of inflexions like the OHG. words in *-on*, *-en*, into the MHG. *-en* is merely a useful simplification.

357. But it does not always happen that phonetic convergence affects so regularly entire systems of material-formal groups. Commonly speaking it affects only a single part of forms connected with each other. Then it contributes not to the simplification of the relations, but often to their confusion.

(a.) The phonetic divergence affects consistently the entire forms of a system of inflexion; but it affects in one class of inflexions or in several only one part of the words which originally belonged to it. While, as we have seen, of the three OHG. classes of the weak verbs in MHG. two have completely converged, only those of the third class which have the root-syllable short (Gothic ending in *-jan*) have fully united with them; those with long root-syllable remain still differentiated by the old syncope of the central vowel in the preterite and perfect participle, and it may be by the 'Rück-umlaut'; cf., *mancte*, *lebete*, *wenete*, from *manota*, *lebota*, *wenita*, connected with *manen*, *leben*, *wenen*, by the side of *neicte*, *brante*, connected with *neigen*, *brennen*. The OHG. *i*-declension has completely coalesced with the *o*-declension with respect to its terminations, but with respect to the arrangement of its stem only when the root-vowel admits of no umlaut. Thus in this case there is always a separation closely connected with the convergence, or it may be that a separation has preceded the convergence.

(b.) The convergence affects all the words of several classes of inflexion similarly, but not all the forms of a system of in-

flexions. This is a very common case. Thus the second declension in Latin has converged with the fourth in the nominative and accusative singular only; and so with the *o*- and *i*-declensions in Gothic (*fisks*, *fisk*—*gasts*, *gast*).

(c.) The convergence affects only one part of the words of several inflexional classes, and only one part of the forms of the inflexional system. Thus in OHG. the nominative and accusative of the *i*-, *u*-, and *o*- stems, in the case of words ending with either a long syllable or of words which are polysyllabic, while these cases have remained separate in the case of those terminating in a short syllable; *cf.*, *gast*, *wald*, *arm*, from **gasti*(z), **waldu* (z), **armo*(z), as against *wini*, *sunu*, and a form **goto* which may at least be assumed.

358. When the case (a) has occurred, the convergence, as well as the divergence, of inflexional classes is definite, and admits of no reaction. The lasting result is a displacement in the relative forces of the groups in question, the one receiving an accession at the expense of the others. The cases of (b) and (c), on the other hand, produce a confusion in the grouping. Where phonetic modifications once different are employed for the same function, it is most convenient for the phonetic difference to go through all the forms of a system, so that a sharp line of demarcation may be drawn between the single classes of inflexions, so that each single form betrays at a glance the class to which it belongs.

359. Now supposing that certain forms in two classes coincide, while some diverge, then we shall find that a word is easily arranged wrongly on the basis of the forms that agree, and analogical formations arise in the place of the traditional forms of the one class which rightly belong to the other. It is then possible for language to gradually work its way out of the vacillation, and the confusion which is its result, to simpler and more stable conditions.

360. Examples are easy to find in numbers. I would refer particularly to the reciprocal influences exercised by the different classes of the declensions of the IE. language on the single languages—influences which have almost always followed as a result of phonetic convergence in several cases, especially in the nominative and accusative singular. In most cases the classes which thus converge had at an earlier period an identical or approximately identical method of formation; and this original identity has only become obscured owing to secondary sound-development, against which an immediate reaction is not possible, because the differentiation was so consistent. Thus, for instance, the unity of the IE. declension had been mainly destroyed owing to the vowel separation which has set in under the influence of the accent, and the contraction of the final syllable of the stem with the regular inflexional termination. These changes were so wide-reaching that many further changes—and notably changes in the direction of weakening—were necessary in order to partially unite again on an entirely different basis what was separated.

361. In this kind of convergence the result commonly is that words of a class formed in one way pass into a class formed in a different way, and they may do this either entirely or only in some cases; either in all forms or only in certain ones. The following may serve as an example of the latter. In Gothic the masculines of the *i*-declension in the singular have passed into the *a*-declension on account of the phonetic convergence in the nominative and accusative, and the case is similar in OHG. The plural, however, remains in both dialects differently inflected. The fact of the unification being arrested at this particular point is a result of the never-failing co-operation of the etymological grouping, and so far the maxim is confirmed; the closer the bond, the more easy the power of influence.

362. It may happen that either only the one group is active while the other contents itself with a passive rôle; or that both groups are active and passive at once. In NHG. a quantity of weak masculines have taken the inflexion of the strong ones in *-en*, from which they differed even in MHG. only in their nominative and genitive singular; *cf.*, *bogen* (= MHG. *boge*), *garten*, *kragen*, *schaden*, etc. There are, however, certain cases in which conversely a strong masculine in *n* has passed over into the weak inflexion; *cf.*, *heide* (= MHG. *heidcn*), *krist(e)* (= MHG. *kristen*), *rabe* (= MHG. *raben*).

363. If such reciprocal influencing and counter-influencing of two groups appears in the same words, it may also happen that after a long period of vacillation a completely new system of flexional formation comes into existence. Thus a mixed class has arisen by contamination of the two classes just referred to: *der glaube—des glaubens*, *der gedankè—des gedankens*, etc. The rise of this mixed class is easily explained if we remark that once double forms existed in the nominative just as in the genitive: *der glaubè—der glauben*, *des glauben—des glaubens*. Then the nominative of one class and the genitive of the other class became established in the written language. Thus, again, a mixed class has arisen from the reciprocal influence exercised by the weak masculines with rejected final vowel on the one hand, and by the strong masculines on the other, which inflect the singular strong and the plural weak: *schmerz, -es, -e—schmerzen*. Similarly in the case of neuters: *bett, -es, -e—betten*. The most extensive instance of the kind in NHG. is the regular inflexion of the feminines in *-e*, which is a fusion of the old *a*-declension with the *n*- (or weak) declension. In MHG. the inflexion still runs as follows:—

SG. N. <i>vröude</i>	<i>zunge.</i>
G. <i>vröude</i>	<i>zungen.</i>
D. <i>vröude</i>	<i>zungen.</i>
A. <i>vröude</i>	<i>zungen.</i>
PL. N. <i>vröude</i>	<i>zungen.</i>
G. <i>vröuden</i>	<i>zungen.</i>
D. <i>vröuden</i>	<i>zungen.</i>
A. <i>vröude</i>	<i>zungen.</i>

364. In NIIG. the word *freude* or *zunge* holds good for the whole singular throughout, and the forms *freuden* and *zungen* run through the whole plural. This is again a characteristic example of a useful transformation attained without any consciousness of its result. The greater advantage of the NIIG. scheme consists not merely in the fact that the memory is thereby considerably relieved; but that the two terminations which are alone common to both are distributed in the most convenient fashion possible. It is more important to discriminate numbers than cases, because the latter are also characterised by the article which is in most instances attached to them. In NIIG. *die vröude* and *die zungen* may be the accusative singular and the nominative accusative plural, while *der zungen* may be the genitive singular and plural. These uncertainties are now no longer possible; on the other hand, in the case of *zunge*, only the power of marking the difference between the nominative and accusative singular is cancelled. But if we examine how these circumstances have developed, we shall find that as a preliminary process a general encroachment has taken place of each of the two classes into the department of the other. And it was natural that this should be the result as soon as once phonetic convergence had declared itself in the case of three forms (nominative singular, and genitive and dative plural). The circumstance was thus produced that

each form, with the sole exception of the nominative singular, might terminate in *-e* as well as in *-en*. In all this no single form was created with the special object of serving a purpose; but the maintenance or disappearance of every form has been determined by its utility.

365. Reciprocal influence in the case of two groups always assumes that their reciprocal forces are not too unevenly balanced. In any other case the influence will be one-sided, and thus more prevailing and more rapid in attaining its end. Those classes of course are always exposed to especial risk which are not represented by numerous examples — that is, supposing that these are not protected by the special frequency with which they occur. The limited extent of certain classes as contrasted with others may have existed from the very earliest times, through no more words having been formed in the way in question, but it is, commonly speaking, a result of secondary development. It either happens that many words originally belonging to the class die out, in which process the case may occur that one method of creating forms, originally a living method, dies out, and is merely handed on as a 'usual' formation, in a few cases in common use. Or it may be that the class splits up into several sub-divisions owing to phonetic variations, which lose all bond of connexion as no immediate reaction against them is made. Thus the greatest possible sub-division of one is sometimes the best possible way of finally uniting two different methods of formation with each other. Observations in this sense may be made, for instance, in the history of the gradual disappearance of the consonantal and the *n*-declension in German.

366. Supposing that one class has gained any decisive advantage over one or several others with which it has certain points

of contact, the latter are infallibly predestined to perish. It is only the fact of frequent occurrence which is able to impart force enough to enable certain words to escape for any long period the otherwise overwhelming influence. These then exist for the future in their isolation under the name of *anomalous forms*.

367. Every language is incessantly engaged in eliminating all useless irregularities, and securing identity between functional and phonetic expression. All languages are not equally successful. We find single languages, and single stages of development of these languages, anything but equidistant from this goal. But even the language which succeeds in approximating most nearly to its aim, fails signally in attaining it. In spite of all the transformations which operate to this end, it remains always unattainable.

368. The reasons why it is thus unattainable are easily apprehended from the remarks previously made. In the first place, forms and words which have been isolated, by whatever means, remain untouched by the normalising process. For instance, a case formed after an ancient model survives as an adverb or as a member of some compound, or a participle formed after an older model survives as a purely nominal form. This certainly does not interfere with the regularity of the actually living methods of formation. However, in the second place, it is a matter of the merest accident whether a partial abolition of the class-differences by phonetic means, which is so often the condition precedent to entire unification, appears or not. In the third place, the capacity for resistance shown by the single words of the same formation differs considerably according to the degree of force with which they are impressed on the memory; and this is why, as a rule, precisely the most indispensable elements of daily language survive as anomalies. In the fourth place, the inevitable prevalence of a single class is always the result of a

chance convergence of circumstances. As long as this prevalence does not exist, it is possible for the single words to be impelled now to one side and now to another, and thus it is possible, owing to the operation of analogy, for a chaotic confusion to be created, until the very excess of such confusion conduces to the cure of the evils in question. In the face of so many adverse circumstances, it is natural enough that the process under the most favourable circumstances should advance so slowly that before it has even approximately come to a termination, new phonetic differences should have arisen, requiring unification. The same ever-variable character of the sounds which is indispensable as a spur to the work of unification, proves also the destroyer of the work set on foot by it, before that work is accomplished.

369. We can see the truth of this in the relations of the declensions in the NIG. written language. In the feminine the three main classes of MHG., *i.e.*, the ancient *i*-, *a*-, and *u*-declension are reduced to two (*cf. supra*, p. 241). As the remains of the consonantal and of the *u*-declensions (*cf., e.g.*, MHG., *hant*, plural *hende*, *hande*, *handen*, *hende*) have also gradually intruded into the *i*-class, we should have two simple and easily-distinguishable schemes: (1) the singular without *-e*, the plural with *-e*, and it may be with the umlaut (*bank* — *bänke*, *hinderniss* — *hindernisse*); (2) the singular with *-e*, the plural with *-en* (*zunge* — *zungen*). However, the non-monosyllabic stems in *-er* and *-el* do not at once accommodate themselves to these schemes (*mutter* — *mütter*, *achsel* — *achsen*), having, according to a common rule already established in MHG., throughout lost their *e* (where it was present at all). These would not be very effective as disturbing factors. But there are, besides, many feminines which have lost their terminal *-e* in the singular; all the non-monosyllabic stems in *-inn* and *-ung*, and many monosyllabic, as *fran*, *huld*, *kost*,

etc. = M.H.G. *frouwe*, *hulde*, *koste*, etc. The process of development in the case of the latter has probably been this, that originally in the case of all bisyllabic feminines in *-e*, duplicate forms made their appearance, according to their different positions in the sentence, and that the unification which again set in after this has had a different result. Besides this, the strife between Upper German and Middle German for the supremacy in the written language comes into consideration. However this may be, a new separation appears: *zunge*—*zungen*, but *fran*—*frauen*. And at the same time the clear distinction between the two classes is an impossibility for the future; *fran* corresponds to *bank* in the singular, in the plural to *zunge*. This new confusion was certainly of advantage to the further unification. The contact between the formation *fran* and the formation *bank* entailed the attraction of a great number of words, indeed of the majority, from the former into the latter; cf., *burg* (plural *burgen* = M.H.G. *bürge*), *flut*, *welt*, *tugend*, etc., and all the words in *-heit*, *-keit*, *-schaft*. By this method we might have arrived at a uniform way of forming the plural in *-en* (*n*), and the difference between words with and without *e* would have subsisted in the singular only. But the impulse did not hold to the end, and considerable traces of the old *i*-declension remain in antagonism to it.

370. Similar observations hold good for the case of the masculine and neuter; only that, in the case of these, still more confusing circumstances are combined. In this case, too, the relations were calculated to produce a sharp inflexional division between the substantives without *-e* and those which have *-e* in the nominative singular (*arm*—*arme*, *wort*—*worte*; but *funke*—*funken*, *auge*—*augen*) were it not that the rejection of the *e* in one part of the word had interfered (*mensch*—*menschen*, *herz*—*herzen*).

371. The phonetic convergence of forms functionally different,

Union in
formal
groups : (b)
Where the
function is
different.

comes about within the etymological groups. Thus in OHG. the transition from final unstressed *m* to *n* causes the coincidence of the secondary termination of the first and third person plural : in the older sources *gābum*—*gābun*, *gāblm*—*gābln*, in the later for two persons *gābun*, *gābln*. Such coincidence is occasioned on the largest scale by the weakening of the full final vowels of the OHG. to a consistent *e*. Thus, MHG. *tage* = OHG. *tage* (dative singular)—*taga* (nominative plural)—*tago* (genitive plural) ; MHG. *hanen*, OHG. *hanin* (genitive and dative singular)—*hanun* (accusative singular, and nominative and accusative plural)—*handno* (genitive plural)—*handm* (dative plural) and in the OHG. forms we find already evidence of the convergence of forms which differed before. The convergence does not prevail always through an entire inflexional class ; it need not necessarily affect more than one part of the words which originally belonged to that class ; cf. e.g., *tag*—*tage*—*tagen* with *sessel*—*scssel*—*sesseln*, *winter*—*winter*—*wintern*, and *wagen*—*wagen*—*wagen*. This convergence in the case of derivatives from the same base is rarer than in the case of inflexional forms. Since such derivatives may of themselves merely make up an entire system of forms, it is possible for the convergence to be a merely partial one in two directions. It is possible, on the one hand, that in several classes of words originally differing phonetically, only a part of the words may coincide. Thus, for instance, it is possible in OHG. for two weak verbs to be formed out of each adjective, viz., an intransitive in *-ôn* and a transitive in *-en* (= Gothic *-jan*). In MHG. both classes come to coincide in their terminations, but in the form of the root-syllable this coincidence is only partial, as most of them remain separated by the presence or absence of the umlaut ; cf. on the one side *leiden* from *leidôn*, 'to be unpleasant,' and *leiden* from *leiden*, 'to render unpleasant ;' *reichen*, 'to become rich,' and 'to render rich ;' *nirruen*, 'to

become new' and 'to render new;' on the other hand, *armen*, 'to become poor'—*ermenen*, 'to render poor,' *swāren*, 'to become heavy'—*swāren*, 'to make heavy.' On the other hand, there is no necessity for phonetic convergence to spread over all the forms of two related words. In the case of NIIG. *schmelzen*, two words absolutely different have converged, viz., *smēlzen* (with open *e*) strong and intransitive, and *smelzen* with closed *e*, weak and transitive. The convergence, however, extends only to the forms of the present, and even from these the second and third persons of the indicative singular, and the second person singular of the imperfect are excluded; cf., *schmilzt*, *schmilz*—*schmelzt*, *schmelze*.

372. The phonetic convergence of functionally different forms has further results. One such result is this, that persons grow so accustomed to phonetic regularity, that they transfer it to cases where it is not yet warranted by the natural process of sound-development. In the case of the OIIG. verb the first person plural has taken the same form as the third person plural; this is owing to the transition of *m* final into *n* (*gābun* from *gābum*—*gābun*), with the exception of the case of the indicative present where the difference has passed, even into the MIIG. period; *geben*—*gebent*. This difference disappears in the first place in Middle German, and then in Upper German as well, as has been already remarked on p. 107, by the identification of the form of the third person plural with that of the third person plural of the preterite and subjunctive. It may be that the process of becoming gradually accustomed to the coincidence of the first and third person plural has co-operated to this end. It is, no doubt, the effect of such process when, in the Alemannic, forms in *-ent* have been used from the fourteenth century for the first person plural as well. The coincidence between the first and the third persons plural appears even in the written language of to-day in *sind*=MIIG. *sin*—*sint*;

in Upper Saxon, conversely, the third person pl. is *sein*. Another example is given us by the coincidence between the nominative and accusative in German. In original Teutonic both cases were in the masculine and feminine for the most part still different. It seems probable that identity merely existed in the plural of the feminine *a*-stems (GOT. *gibōs*, ON. *giāfar*). In OHG., as in the other West-Teutonic dialects, the nominative singular of the *o*-, *i*-, and *u*-stems, and of the consonantal stems with the exception of the so-called weak declension, has become identified with the accusative by the disappearance of the final *s* (*fisc*, *balg*, *sunu*, *man* = GOT. *fisks* — *fisk*, *balgs* — *balg*, *sunus* — *sunu* and ON. *fiskr* — *fisk*, *belgr* — *belg*, *sonr* — *son*, *maðr* — *mann*); further, phonetic coincidence has made its appearance in the nominative and accusative plural of the weak declension (*hanun*, *zungun*, OG. probably **hanoniz* — **hanonz*). This gives a tendency to further convergence. The form of the nominative plural of the *o*-, *i*-, and *u*-stems and of the consonantal stem has penetrated to the accusative, and has thus restored the same agreement as in the singular: *taga*, *balgi* (*belgi*), *sunu* = Gothic *dagōs* — *dagans*, *balgeis* — *balgins*, *sunjns* — *sununs*, and ON. *dagar* — *daga*, *belgir* — *belgi*, *synir* — *sunu* (*sonu*). The forms which regular sound-change in OHG. would have led us to expect in the accusative, would have been **tagun*, **balgin*, **sunun*. In the case of the consonantal stems, unification has also set in in Gothic and ON.; we may assume that in original Teutonic such forms as *manniz** — *mannunz** existed = OHG. *man* — *mannun*, which latter form has been driven out by the former. In the case of the adjective as well, and the pronoun which marks gender, the nominative form has affected the accusative: *blinte* (*-a*), *die* (*dia*) = GOT. *blindai* — *blindans*, *pai* — *pans*. In the case of the feminine *a*-stems on the other hand, the phonetic identity of both cases has brought about an identification in the singular. In

the first place both forms, the nominative and accusative form, were used indifferently; next the accusative form established itself as a rule, while the nominative form was confined to definite cases, and disappeared more and more. While AS. differentiates *giefu* and *giefe*, *dr* — *dre*, we have in OIIG. only the accusative forms *geba* and *era*, and side by side as nominative and accusative *halba* and *halp*, *wlsa* and *wls*, etc. In NIIG. further, in the feminine of the weak adjective, the accusative form is ousted by the nominative form: *lange* = NIIG. *lange* — *langen*; further the feminine nominative form of the article is ousted by the accusative form: *die* = NIIG. *din* — *dic*; as early as in NIIG. the nominative *sin* is ousted by *sie*. In Rheno-Franconian and Alemannic, on the contrary, we find also the nominative form of the article *der* used accusatively.

373. If, in any language, a convergence of originally different case-forms occurs on a large scale, the cause of this may be that the remains which were spared from this convergence are entirely or mostly abolished, as has happened in the case of English and the Romance languages. Thus pure stem-forms again take their rise as they existed before the case-formation which we incorrectly call nominative or accusative.

374. When the forms of cognate words partially converge, the feeling for the difference of these words is rendered less keen, and thus the forms which have not yet converged are easily confused. The partial coincidence, touched on above, of NIIG. *smälzen* and *sinelzen* has entailed the result that the strong forms *schmilzt*, *schmolz*, *geschmolzen* are employed transitively as well: the weak forms have at the present time fallen completely into disuse. In the same way, the weak forms of *verderben*, which acquired an exclusively transitive signification, are ousted by the strong forms, which were originally transitive only, and can be used at the present day only in a moral sense. In the case of *quellen*,

schwellen, löschen, the difference is maintained in what passes for correct language now-a-days ; but from *löschen* weak forms sometimes come in an intransitive form, e.g., *es löscht das licht der sterne* (Schiller) ; in the case of *quellen* and *schwellen*, we find a confusion in both directions, e.g., *dem das frischeste leben entquellt* (GOE.) — *gleichwie ein born sein wasser quillt* (LU.) ; *schwelle, brust* (GOE.) *die haare schwellten* (TIECK) — *die chrsucht schwillt die brust* (GÜNTHER), *seifenblasen, die mein hauch geschwollen* (CHAMISSO).

CHAPTER XII.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF FUNCTIONAL CHANGE ON FORMATION BY ANALOGY.

THE arrangement of the single words and forms, and of the syntactical connections between the linguistic groups depends in every case upon their function. Thus a functional change may be the ultimate cause of a transition into another group. Participation, however, in this group entails participation in its creative power. Thus there arise new analogical creations which proceed in a direction different from that which the origin of the word-form or method of construction would have led us to believe. The following examples may serve to exemplify this.

Entrance
into a new
group
changes the
direction of
analogical
formation.

376. The change of an appellative into a proper name causes a corresponding change of declension; cf. the accusatives and datives of such words as *Müllern*, *Schneidern*, *Beckern*, etc. It was a consequence of the monotheism introduced by Christianity, that from *got* an accusative *gotan* was formed in OIIG. after the analogy of proper names. We may compare with this such datives and accusatives as *valern* and *muttern* which we commonly hear in Berlin.

Results of
the change
of an appri-
lative into
a proper
name;

377. The Greek adverbs in *-ως* were originally cases of the *o*-declension. But when they had once become detached from the inflexional system, and *-ως* felt as a formative word-suffix, it was able to attach itself to other stems which had received no

of a case
into an
adverb;

influence from the *o*-stems ; cf. such cases as ἡδέως, σωφρόνως, etc. The case is similar with the adverbial suffix *-o* in OHG., which has been likewise transferred from the *o*-stems to the old *i*- and *u*-stems : *kleino* and *harto*, following *liobo*, etc.

378. There are in NIIG. many adverbs which are in their origin genitives singular of nouns ; such are *falls*, *rings*, *rechts*, *stracks*, *blindlings*. But the *s* has long since ceased to be felt as a sign of the genitive ; it must now appear as an adverbial suffix. Consequently it has since the seventeenth century been transferred to other adverbs, which are in their origin cases of nouns, or unions of a preposition with a case, but are likewise not felt as such, but have passed into the general category of adverbs ; cf. *allerdings* (from *aller dinge*, gen. pl.) *schlechterdings*, *jenseits*, *disscits* (MHG. *jenslt*, acc. sing.), *abseits* (from *ab seite*), *hinterrücks*, in the seventeenth century also *hinterrückens* (from an old form *hinterrück*, *hinterrücken*), *unterwegs*, *unterwegens* (from *unter wege*, *unter wegen*), *rollends* (earlier *rollen*, *rollend*) ; *erstens*, *zweitens*, etc. The change of the *s* from a case-suffix into a formative element of words has also made it possible for it to be adopted in derivations : *desfallsig*, *allenfallsig*.

379. Hans Sachs forms a comparative *flüchser* from *flugs*. This results from the fact that the substantival case has come to stand on the same line with the adjectival adverbs which alone originally admit of comparison.

of a syntactical group into a single word.

380. If a syntactic combination has passed into a verbal unit, then this new unit is treated after the analogy of the simple word, and the possibilities affecting this are transferred to it. It occurs in many languages that an inseparable particle attaches itself to a pronoun. The result may be that the inflexion is transferred after the model of the simple words from the middle to the end. Plautus employs still the accusatives *cumpse*, *eamse*, and the

ablatives *capse*, *capse*, from *i-pse*, which forms are later replaced by *ipsam*, etc. A similar development has been undergone by the German pronoun *diser*, as may be proved especially by the OX. Kunic forms. This word is a compound of the article and the particle *se*. Language is notably enriched by the fact that out of such compounds, which owe their origin to secondary fusion, the same derivations are formed as from simple words, and that they are able to serve like these, as the member of a compound: cf. *überwinder*, *überwindung*, *ergiebig*, *befahrbar*, *gedeihlich*, *betrübniss*, *gevangenschaft*, *befangenheit*; *edelmännisch*, *hochmütig*, *jungfräulich*, *landeskerrlich*, *landsmannschaft*, *grossherzogtum*, *barenhäuter*, *kinder-gartnerinn*; *sofortig*, *bissherig*, *jenseitig*; *rotweinflasche*, *gänseleber-pastele*; *überhandnahme*, *vorwegnahme*, *zurücknahme*.

381. Not unfrequently an inflexional form becomes *fixed*, when ^{'Crystallisation.'} it is transferred to cases with which it has strictly speaking nothing to do.¹ The German *selber*² is the nominative singular masculine, and at the same time, the genitive and dative singular feminine and genitive plural, of an older adjective *selb*, which is preserved as an adjective still only in the word *der selbe*. The word *selbst* = older *selbes*, of the same signification, is the nominative and accusative singular neuter, and at the same time the genitive singular masculine and neuter, of the same word. In MHG. the adjective is inflected sometimes strong, sometimes weak, and follows the noun with which it is connected in gender, number, and case; cf. *im selbem*, *ir selber*, *sin selbes*, etc. Now when the forms received in MHG. have forced themselves into places where others properly belong, this must result from the fact that the word is no longer felt as an adjective. Since, in the word *selber*, nothing more was felt than the function of an energetic identification, the form came to be employed in every case where such identification had

¹ Cf. Brugmann, *Ein problem der homerischen text-critik*, p. 119 sqq.

² Cf. *Voller*, *lauter*, etc.

to be affirmed. The case of the dialectic *halber* is parallel: *die nacht ist halber hin, es ist halber eins*; and it is the same with *einander*, instead of which we find in OHG. regularly inflected: *ein anderan, ein andermo*, etc. In MHG. it was still possible to say *beider des vater und des sunes* in which phrase *des vater und des sunes* stands strictly speaking in an appositional relation to *beider*. More commonly, however, we find *beide, des vater und des sunes*. We thus find the nominative form *beide* crystallized, as the origin of the construction presents itself no more to our consciousness and the function of *beide* — *und* approaches the modern German *sowohl — als auch*. In Latin the nominative *quisque* coupled with the reflexive pronoun and the possessive which corresponds to it has passed beyond its proper area, cf. e.g., *multis sibi quisque imperium petentibus*. In Plautus we find *praesente testibus* for *praesentibus*, in Afranius *absente nobis*: from this we must acknowledge that the participial forms in question have approached the characteristics of prepositions. Combinations like *agedum conferte, agedum creemus*, etc., result from the fact that *age* was no longer felt as the second person singular imperative, but merely as a general cry of exhortation. Correspondingly we find in Greek *ἄγε* used before a plural as we do *εἰπέ, φέρε, ἰδοῦ*;¹ further, in Latin we find *cave dirumpatis* (Plautus), etc.; in ordinary German conversation we hear sometimes such expressions as *warte mal*, even where the words are addressed to several persons, or to one only who is commonly addressed by *Sie*. In the older stages of NHG. we find *siehe* employed even where more than one are accosted; the French *voici* and *voilà* are completely crystallized. In late Greek *ὃφελον* and *ὃφελε* were employed, without any consideration of number or person as simple conjunctions. The German *nur* took its origin from *enwære* (*es wäre denn*). Thus this *enwære* has forced its way in the place of *enwærest, enwæren, enl, ensln*, etc.

¹ Brugmann, *N.S.*, p. 124.

382. It is a similar process when in late NIG. the word *sich* dependent on a preposition, makes its way also into sentences in which the subject is the first or the second person.¹ This results from the fact that an expression like *über sich* or *unter sich* is no longer analysed, but is apprehended as = *upwards* or *downwards*; cf. the NIG. expressions *vor sich gehen* and *an und für sich*. And hence these combinations are also employed in cases where they cannot be referred to the subject, but only to an oblique case; cf. *heb hinten über sich das glas* ('raise your glass high,' Uhland, *Volkslieder*). The same crystallization has occurred in such expressions as *seiner zeit*; cf. e.g., *die jugend ist unternehmend, wir sind es seiner zeit auch gewesen* (HACKLÄNDER). Correspondingly we find in Latin *suo loco, sua sponte, suo nomine*. In Roman jurists we find combinations like *si sui juris sumus*. In ON. a middle and passive is formed by the aid of the reflexive. In this case the *-sk*, later *-s*, which goes back to *-sik*, and could originally be applied to the third person only, is transferred in the first place to the second, and afterwards to the first person; e.g. *lukoms*, instead of an older *lukomk* (= **luko-mik*); the *s* was no longer apprehended in its original meaning, but merely as a sign of the middle or passive. In very many Upper and Middle German dialects the word *sich* is also employed as a reflexive for the third person plural; occasionally indeed for the second person as well. The ordinary practice of confining its use to the first person plural is probably to be explained by the fact that by this restriction the process of transference is rendered more easy,² owing to the formal correspondence of the verbal form with

¹ Cf. Brugmann, *n.s.*

² The view put forth by Brugmann, *n.s.*, p. 123, that this *sich* has risen from a form *unsich* seems to me untenable, because the form *unsich* had already disappeared before this application of *sich* appears at all. The wide area covered by the phenomenon forbids our assuming with Weinhold, *Beir. Gram.* § 359, and Schuchardt, *Slavendeutsches*, p. 107, any Slavonic influence.

the third person plural. In the Bavarian dialect the possessive *sein* is made to refer to the feminine, and to the plural as well ; cf. Schmeller, p. 198.

Influence of
change of
meaning
upon con-
struction.

383. Plautus [Catullus, and other poets], employ the words *perire*, *deperire*, and *demori* in the sense of *to be mortally enamoured of*, with the accusative ; in the same way Vergil, Horace, and other authors employ *ardere* in the sense of *to be inflamed by love for*. It is plain that the construction of these words is influenced by that of *amare*, because their metaphorical use approximates to the proper use of *amo*. We may fairly conclude that this signification of these words was already somewhat obsolete, at least in the language of the poets. For if their full significance had been still completely appreciated, it is probable that no such change in the construction would have set in. Still, in a case like this, we have always to set something down to the account of an intentional audacity of language on the part of the poet. It is different with the ordinary language of prose. In this case, too, it frequently occurs that a word changes the method of its construction which should characterise it according to its fundamental meaning for another which does not suit this, since it is influenced either by a particular single word or by a group of words to which it has in the course of time approximated its meaning. In this case the *change of construction* is an infallible *mark of the disappearance of the fundamental meaning*. Especially often do we find thus indicated the detachment from the concrete perception which originally lay at its root.

384. We find many compounds with adverbs of place which are especially instructive for this process of detachment. For instance, the preposition *in* belongs originally to the words *einwirken* and *einwirkung* ; and this use was common up to the last century ; cf. *sobald kunst und wissenschaft in das leben einwirkt*

(GOETHE); *durch die einwirkung in gewisse werkzeuge* (GARVE). These words are at the present day connected with *auf*, and this proves that the feeling for the sensuous perception, to which the *ein* points, has disappeared. The same change has made its appearance in the case of *einfluss*; cf. *gesundheit ist ein gut, welches in alles einfluss hat* (GARVE); and this was the general usage in the last century (*in* and *auf* were formerly connected with *einfließen* 'to have influence,' as well); *eingeschränken*, cf. *es hat längst aufgehört in die engen grenzen eingeschränkt zu sein* (LESSING), etc.; *eindruck*, cf. *die nähe des schönen kindes musste wol in die seele des jungen mannes einen so lebhaften eindruck machen* (GOETHE). More sensuous still is *um durch das grosse dieses todes einen unauflöschlichen eindruck seiner selbst in das herz seiner Spartaner zu graben* (SCHILLER); though it already appears with *auf* in Lessing. *Abneigung gegen*, or, as the older writers also express it, *vor*, cannot have been an original usage, but *von* only, which Sanders cites Heine alone to prove. The earliest instance of *nachdenken über* seems to occur in Schiller's *Don Karlos*; in other cases the simple dative (properly dependent on *nach*), is common; e.g. *um ihren briefen nachzudenken* (NICOLAI).

385. If we now say in German *sei mir willkommen in meinem hause*, it is evident that the last-named component part of the word is no longer apprehended as a participle of *kommen*. As long as it was so apprehended the denotation of a certain direction was also understood; e.g. *willekomen her in Guntheres lant* (NIBELUNGENLIED).

386. Such an expression as *quin conscendimus equos* is, properly speaking, *why do we not mount our horses?* but is understood as *let us mount our horses*; and hence it follows that we are able to employ even after *quin* an imperative or so-called adhortative subjunctive; e.g. *quin age istud, quin experiamur*. Correspondingly

the MHG. *wan fürchtent si den stab* (*warum fürchten sie nicht den stab*), approximates to the sense of *mögen sie den stab fürchten*; as a consequence of this we find after *wan* the ordinary subjunctive preterite employed in optative clauses without any introductory conjunction; cf. *wan hate ich inwer kunst*. It seems probable that the OF. usage of *car* (= *quare*) connected with the conditional and the imperative is to be thus explained; cf. DIEZ, iii. 214.

387. The Greek *οὐκοῦν* is originally = 'not therefore,' and serves to introduce a question to which an affirmative answer is expected. The sentences introduced by *οὐκοῦν* come, however, gradually to be apprehended as direct positive assertions. And thus the particle has retained merely the function of marking consequence, and it is introduced in sentences which can no longer be apprehended as interrogative sentences, e.g. coupled with the imperative; cf. *οὐκοῦν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ με αὐθις ἐς τὸν βίον* (LUCIAN).¹ The Sanskrit *na-hi* shows a precisely parallel development. It serves, in the first instance, like *nonne*, to introduce interrogative sentences; but then, as such interrogative sentences are transformed into affirming sentences, it may be translated by *surely*, and it occurs next in petition sentences; cf. *na-hi ucyatām* = *it seems to be said*.

388. The accusative with an infinitive could originally stand only in connexion with a transitive verb, as long as the accusative of the subject was felt as directly dependent from the finite verb; cf. Chapter XVI. After, however, the interpretation of it had so far changed, that the accusative and infinitive was looked upon as a dependent sentence, and the accusative as its subject, it was possible to extend the construction far beyond its original limits. Thus in Latin, too, verbs are construed with the accusative and

¹ Cf. Kühner's *Græc. Gram.*, II. i. p. 717.

infinitive which cannot have any accusative of the object connected with them, as *gaudere, dolere*; and further, we find combinations like *magna in spe sum, spem habeo*, etc. In very many cases it then happens that the accusative and infinitive is employed as the subject; thus after such words as *licet, accidit, constat*, etc., after *fas, jus est*, etc., and in the case of passives with the nominative and infinitive; cf. *non mihi videtur ad beate vivendum satis posse virtutem* (CICERO); *Volscos et Aequos extra fines exisse afferitur* (LIVY). Then the accusative and infinitive construction passes into sentences which depend on another accusative and infinitive. Thus, in the first place, it passes into relative sentences loosely connected; e.g. *mundum censent regi numine deorum, ex quo illud natura consequi* (CICERO); cf. Draeger, § 447, 1. Further, it passes into sentences of comparison: e.g. *ut feras quasdam nulla mitescere arte, sic immittem ejus viri animum esse* (LIVY); *addit etiam se prius occisum iri ab eo quam me violatum iri* (CICERO); cf. Draeger, 448, 1; 453, 2. It passes also into indirect questions: e.g. *quid sese inter pacatos facere, cur in Italiam non reveli* (LIVY); cf. Draeger, 450. It even passes into temporal and causal sentences: *crimina vitanda esse, quia vitari metus non posse* (SENECA); cf. Draeger, 448, 2, 3. A corresponding extension is met with in Greek. The custom of having the subject of the infinitive in the form of the accusative conduces in this instance, too, to the employment of this case by the side of the infinitive where the latter is turned into a substantive by the article, in whatever case this may be; cf. *αἴτιος τοῦ νικηθῆναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, διὰ τὸ τὴν πόλιν ῥῆσθαι, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ταῦτα μὴ γίνεσθαι*.

389. If two methods of construction partially cover each other in their functional use, it is possible, in the case of many traditional syntactic combinations, for an uncertainty to arise as to which of the two is the fundamental one. In this way there

Construction differently understood through influence of a synonyme.

arises a new interpretation of the combination, which turns the activity of analogy into another channel.

390. A genitive dependent on a substantive has a function similar to that of the attributive adjective. In combinations like *Hamburger rauchfleisch* or *Kieler sprotten*, the genitive of the designation of the inhabitants is at the base as the first member ; but it is more in accordance with the instinct of language to apprehend it as an adjective derived from the name of the place ; in any case we refer it directly to the place and not to the inhabitants. No doubt the absence of inflection proves that we have no true adjective before us. On the other hand, the way in which the article is employed in the connexion (*das Hamburger rauchfleisch*) shows that the genitive is not felt any longer as such ; for the position of a genitive between the article and the substantive has now become an impossibility. OHG. had no possessive pronoun of the feminine and the plural *sic*. It employed, instead of this, the genitive of this pronoun, *ira*, *iro*. In NHG., too, we have the genitive *ir* ; but here and there the usage has set in of apprehending it as an adjective, and declining it adjectivally. This use has become general in NHG., and this is the origin of the German possessive pronoun *ihr*. It seems probable that the contact of the genitive with the attributival adjective was the occasion of employing it after the model of the adjective predicatively ; cf. *er ist des todes, reines hertzens, so sind wir des herrn* (LUTHER), etc. This use belongs most probably to the IE. fundamental language.

CHAPTER XIII.

DISPLACEMENTS IN THE GROUPING OF WORDS ETYMOLOGICALLY CONNECTED.

IF we collect and arrange all the words and forms which contain the same root according to the original laws of formation, as they are found by the dissecting process proper to the older comparative grammar, we obtain a system compounded of many members, or a larger system of smaller systems which may again on their side consist of systems. Even a single IE. verb in itself represents a highly complicated system. From the verbal stem are developed different stems marking tense; from each tense-stem different moods; and then, and not till then, are the different persons in both genders developed. It is the endeavour of analytical grammar to separate what by its origin is closely related from what is related only in a further degree; always to distinguish between root-word and derivative; to avoid all sudden leaps and bounds, and not to apprehend anything as a direct derivation which is only a derivation from a derivation. But that which, judged from its point of view, is an error in the judgment formed as to word- and form-composition, is a thing to which linguistic consciousness is extraordinarily liable. It is unavoidable that the way in which the etymologically connected forms group themselves together in the mind of the members of any linguistic community should, at a later period, prove quite other

The grouping of etymologically connected words diverges, in the course of time, from that required by their formation, hence analogical creation on a new basis.

than when the forms first took shape, and the result of this is that the formation by analogy as well, which reposes upon irregular grouping of this kind, diverges from the original laws of formation. Secondary coincidence of sound and signification also often adds its influence. The importance of the part played by this process in the history of language may be shown by a list of examples.

Examples.

392. There are in NHG. a large number of masculine names of action traditionally bequeathed to us side by side with strong verbs corresponding therewith; cf. *fall* — *fallen*, *fang* — *fangen*, *schlag* — *schlagen*, *streit* — *streiten*, *lauf* — *laufen*, *befehl* (OHG. *bīfelh*) — *befehlen*. If we go back to the original principle of the formation, we shall be compelled to say that neither the noun is derived from the verb nor the verb from the noun, but both are immediately derived from the root. We have further certain cases in which, side by side with a noun of the agent, there stands a weak verb derived from it; cf. *hass* — *hassen*, *krach* — *krachen*, *schall* — *schallen*, *rauch* — *rauchen*, *zil* — *zilen*, *mord* — *morden*, *hunger* — *hungern*. In NHG. these two classes cannot be kept apart, and chiefly for this reason, that the difference of the verbal terminations in the present has entirely disappeared. The words *schlag* and *hass* seem to bear a precisely similar relationship to *schlagen* and *hassen*; and the usage is now to form other nouns similarly connected with other verbs, irrespective of the class of conjugation to which they may belong, simply by omission of the termination; cf. *betrag*, *ertrag*, *vortrag*, *betreff*, *verbleib*, *begeh*, *erfolg*, *verfolg*, *belang*, *betracht*, *branch*, *gebrauch*, *verbrauch*, *besuch*, *versuch*, *verkehr*, *vergleich*, *bercich*, *schick*, *bericht*, *ärger*, etc. In MHG. we have side by side with the substantive *glt* a verb *gltesen* derived from it. The latter in late MHG. develops regularly into *geitzsen*, *geizen*, and from this is formed the substantive *geiz*, which thrusts aside the older form *geit*.

393. Where a noun and a verb of similar signification stand

side by side, it is inevitable that the derivative formed from the one should proceed to form relations with the other as well, so that it may seem to the instinct of language to be formed from the latter as well as from the former; and this relationship deviating from the original condition may then give an impulse to new formations. The German suffix *-ig* (OHG. *-ag* and *-ig*) serves originally merely to mark derivatives from nouns. But words like *gläubig*, *streitig*, *gelaufig* stand, as far as their form and signification goes, in just as near relation to *glauben*, *streiten*, *laufen* as to *glaube*, *streit*, *lauf*; while others, like *irrig*, stand in even a nearer relation to the verb in question, because the substantive *irre* in the development of its meaning has not proceeded in a parallel path with the adjective; in the case of others like *gehörig*, *abwendig*, the substantive which lies at the base of the word (MHG. *hōre*) has been lost, or at any rate is no longer in ordinary use. In the same way we have next a quantity of adjectives formed straight from verbs; cf. *erbietig* (as against the noun-derivative *erbötig*), *ehrerbietig*, *freigebig*, *ergiebig*, *ausfindig* (this word seems, however, formed after the MHG. *fūndec*), *zulässig*, *rührig*, *wackelig*, *dammerig*, *stotterig*: the word *abhängig* too must, according to its signification, be referred not to *hang*, *abhäng*, but only to *abhängen*. The circumstances are similar in the case of the adjectives in *-isch*, of which at least the words *neckisch*, *mürrisch*, and *wetterwendisch* must be apprehended as derivatives from verbs, after the model of such words as *neidisch*, *spöttisch*, *argwöhnisch*, etc. The modern German suffix *-er* (OHG. *-ari*, *-eri*, MHG. *-ære*, *-er*), which at the present day serves as the general method of forming nouns of the agent from verbs, was originally applied only to such formations as we have still in *bürger*, *müller*, *schüler*, and many other words. In Gothic the words *bokareis*, 'a scribe,' from *boka* (in the plural 'book'); *daimonareis*, 'one possessed,' from *δαίμων*; *motareis*, 'publican,' from *mota*, 'toll;'

zullareis, 'cloth-fuller,' from *zulla*, 'wool;' *liupareis*, 'singer,' from an assumed word **liup* = OHG. *leod*, NHG. *lied*. In the same way we shall have to derive the words *laisareis*, 'teacher,' and *sokareis*, 'inquirer,' not from the verbs *laisjan* and *sokjan*, 'to seek' (*suchen*), but from assumed substantives **laisa*, = OHG. *lêra*, NHG. *lehre*, [English 'lore'], and **soka* = MHG. *snoche*. These two last-mentioned verbs, however, exhibit already the possibility of bringing the formation into connexion with a verb. By the side of *liupareis* stands also *liupjon*, 'to sing.' Thus, from association with instances like these, the derivations from verbs begin in OHG. already. We can see that the nominal derivation is the original, especially from such instances as *zuchtari* 'educator,' from *zucht*, and not from *ziuhan*; and again *notnumftäri*, 'robber.' In the cases in which the root-vowel of the nominal derivative does not agree with the present of the verb, it often happens that a new verbal formation appears beside it; and both formations have maintained themselves side by side down to the NHG. time; cf. *ritter* — *reiter*, *schnitter* — *schneider*, *nähler* — *näher*, *mähder* — *mäher*, *sänger* — *singer* (OHG. only *sangäri*), *Schilter* (as a proper name) = MHG. *schilttere* ('painter') — *schilderer*. The abstracts in OHG. ending in *-ida* Gothic *-ipa*) seem to have been originally formed from adjectives only, and from verbs as a result of secondary relation only; cf. *kisnohhida* with *kisnohhen*, *pihaltida* with *pihalten* after *chundida* — *chunden* — *chund*, etc.

394. As it is in derivation so is it in composition. The gradual process of change of the first portion of a nominal compound into a verbal, and the new formations called into existence thereby, have been treated in great detail by OSTHOFF.¹ Thus for instance, OHG. *waltipoto* 'procurator,' *sceltwort*, *betohns*, *spiloman*, *fastatag*, *wartman*,

¹ *Das verbum in der nominalcomposition im deutschen, griechischen, slavischen und romanischen.* Jena, 1878.

spurikunt, *erberecht*, which must be allowed to contain the nouns *walt* (*giwalt*), *scelta*, *beta*, *spil*, *fasta*, *warta*, *spuri*, *erbi* enter into direct relationship with the verbs *waltan*, *sceltan*, *betôn*, *spilôn*, *fastên*, *wartin*, *spuriên*, *erben*; and from these and similar components arises the class which has become so common in German of compounds with a verbal noun, forming the first portion of the compound, as *esslust*, *trinksucht*, *schreibfeder*, *schreibfaul*, etc. Under this head come especially many compounds with *-bar*, *-lich*, *-sam*, *-haft*,¹ which, however, from the standpoint of linguistic instinct are rather to be regarded as derivations, and to be ranged parallel to the formations with *-ig* and *-isch* mentioned above; cf. words like *wahlbar*, *unvertilgbar*, *unbeschreiblich*, *empfindlich*, *empfindsam*, *naschhaft*. The transition shows itself with special clearness in the case of words like *streitbar*, *wandelbar*, *vereinbar*. *Streitbar* may just as well be referred to *streit* as to *streiten*; but *unbestreitbar* can only be referred to *bestreiten*. In MHG. *wandelbare* is referred straight to *wandel*; and as this word signifies commonly 'a spot,' the word commonly signifies accordingly 'marked by a spot;' in NHG. on the contrary we find *wandelbar*, *unwandelbar* wholly attracted to the meaning of the verb *wandeln*. In MHG. we have an adjective *einbere*, (*einträchtig* 'concordant'), with no relation to the verb.

395. The case is very frequent that a derivative from another derivative is placed in direct relationship to the root-word, by which process it then happens that really direct derivatives are produced with the fusion of two suffixes into a single one. This explains, for instance, the rise of the NHG. suffixes *-niss*, *-ner*, *-ling*. In Gothic there still survived a distinct suffix *-assus*, *ufar-assus* (overness = abundance). This is, however, most commonly employed for formations from verbs in *-inon*; e.g. *gudjinassus* (*priesteramt*,

Fusion of
two suffixes.

¹ Cf. Osthoff, p. 116 sqq.

'post of priest) from *gudjinon*, 'to perform priestly functions.' As soon as this word was referred directly to *gudja*, 'a priest,' *-nassus* must have been felt as a suffix. Further, an *n* was found in such formations as *ibnassus* from *ibns* (*eben*, 'even'), and in derivations from participles such as OHG. *farloran-issa* (forlorn-ness). It has thus come to pass that the West Teutonic dialects always, with the exception of a few antiquated fragments, exhibit an *n* coalescing with the suffix. The formations in *-ner* start from noun-items which contain an *n*; cf. *gärtner* (MHG. *gartenære*), *liagner* (MHG. *liügenære* from *liigene* by the side of *liige*), *hafner* (MHG. *havenære*), *wagner*, or from verbs terminating in OHG. in *-inôn*; cf. *redner* (OHG. *redindri* from *redinôn*), *gleissner* (MHG. *gelichsenære* from *gellichsenen*). When then *liagner*, for instance, is referred to *liige*, and *redner* to *rede*, *reden*, the suffix *-ner* arises, which we find in *bildner* (as early as the fourteenth century, *bildenære*, but earlier still *bildære*) *harfner* (MHG. *harpfære*), *söldner* (late MHG. *soldenære*, earlier *soldier*). In *künstler* (MHG. *kunster*) *-ler* also appears as a suffix, for we refer it directly to *kunst*, because the verb *künsteln*, from which it strictly speaking comes, is confined to a more special meaning. The suffix *-ling* (in *pflögling*, *sögling*, etc.), proceeds from formations like the OHG. *ediling* 'the noble' from *edili* or *adal*; *chumiling* (NHG. in *abkömmling*, *ankömmling*) connected with (no-) *chumilo*. Thus between *jung* and *jungilinc* there must probably have stood once a diminutive form or **jungilo*.

396. The NHG. verbs in *-igen* originated in derivatives from adjectives in *-ig*. MHG. *einegen*, *huldegen*, *leidegen*, *nötegen*, *manecvaltegen*, *schedegen*, *schuldegen* doubtless arise from *einec*, *huldec*, *leidec*, *nötec*, *schadec*, *schuldec*, etc.; but the NHG. *vereinigen*, *beleidigen*, *beschuldigen* are rather to be directly referred to *ein*, *leid*, and *schuld*: and in the case of *huldigen* and *schädigen*, no other reference is possible than to *huld* and *schade*, because the adjectives

that forwarded the transition have disappeared, and *nötigen* in the same way, because *nötig* no longer corresponds in meaning. Thus then others appear directly derived from the substantive, such as *vereidigen*, *befehligen*, *befriedigen*, *einhändigen*, *beherrsigen*, *sündigen*, *beschäftigen*, or from simple adjectives, as *beschönigen*, *senstigen*, *genehmigen*. The verbs ending in *-ern* and *-eln* arose from a nucleus of derivations from nouns ending in OHG. in *-ar* and *-al* (*-ul*, *-il*), the OHG. *spurilôn*, (*investigare*) for instance, going back not to the verb *spuriën*, but to a presumable adjective **spuril* (= OHN. *spural*); but they are at the present day derived simply from more simple verbs, cf. *folgern*, *räuchern* (late MHG. *rouchern*, more anciently *rouchen*), *erschüttern* (MHG. even in the sixteenth century *erschütten*), *sögern* (from MHG. *sogen*), *schütteln*, *lächeln*, *schmeicheln* (from MHG. *smeichen*, etc.) In the same way derivatives from nouns like *ängeln*, *frösteln*, *näseln*, *frömmeln*, *klügeln*, *kränkeln*, etc., have been formed.

397. In MHG. many adjectives form an adverb in *-liche*, cf. *fröliche*, *grözlliche*, *lütelliche*, *eigentliche*, *vermessentliche*, *sinnelliche*, *einvaltelliche*. Forms like this are of course derived in the first instance from adjectival compounds. But as the adverb of the simple adjective becomes obsolete, a direct relation sets in between the adverb of the compound and the simple adjective. In fact, the development proceeds even further, as after the analogy of *grimmelliche*, *statelliche*, etc., which are referred directly to *grim* or *grimme* and *state*, *armedliche*, *mittelliche*, *snelleliche*, etc. are formed, although no such word as *armed*, etc. is in existence. The English abverbs in *-ly* have the same origin.

398. Similar processes clearly came into operation at a period so early that we are unable to trace their gradual development. We find in the different IE. languages, in the earliest period of their development known to us, a large number of suffixes whose

phonetic arrangement proves to us that they are complications of several simple suffixes, and which probably one and all took their rise in such a way, that in the way indicated a derivative of the first has passed into a derivative of the second degree.

Displacement of relations in compounds.

399. Further, the relation of *compounds* to each other gives occasion to many displacements of the relations. If two related words enter into composition with a similar element, it is almost inevitable that a direct relation between the two compounds must arise, and the consequence follows that one of them is apprehended no longer as a compound, but as the derivative of a compound. Conversely it is possible for a derivative from a compound to be placed in direct relation to the corresponding derivative from the simple word, and the result is that it is apprehended as a compound.

400. The history of composition in German gives rich material for the illustration of these processes. Originally a sharp distinction was made between verbal and noun composition. In verbal composition prepositions alone are employed, as the first members of a compound: in noun-composition, noun-stems, and adverbs—at first only such as were identical with prepositions; though at a later period others as well. In the case of the verbal compounds, the accent falls upon the second component portion of the word; in case of the noun-compounds it falls upon the first portion. It is thus the accent which, in the case of composition with particles, is the distinguishing sign. The case often occurs that a verb and a noun of action connected therewith are compounded with the same particle. There are numerous cases of such in which the old relationship is maintained down to the present day in spite of the parallelism of meaning between the two compounds;¹ cf. *durch-*

¹ However, generally speaking, the noun compounds have a tendency to follow the attraction of the improper verbal compounds, and this precisely because of the similarity of accent, whereas from the proper ones substantives in *-ung* are derived, cf. *durchfahren* = *durchfahrt* — *durchfahren* = *durchführung*, etc.

brechen — *durchbruch*, *durchschneiden* — *durchschnitt*, *durchstichen* — *durchstich*, *überblicken* — *überblick*, *überfallen* — *überfall*, *übergeben* — *übergabe*, — *übernehmen* — *übernahme*, *überschauen* — *übersehen*, *überschlagen* — *überschlag*, *übersehen* — *übersicht*, *überzelen* — *überzug*, *umgehen* — *umgang*, *unterhalten* — *unterhalt*, *unterscheiden* — *unterschied*, *unterschriften* — *unterschrift*, *widersprechen* — *widerspruch*, etc. In other cases the difference of accentuation has produced a different arrangement of the sounds of the particles, by which process the verbal and nominal compound stand out in even sharper contrast to each other. In this case the old condition is maintained only in some few cases, where the development of meaning has not been parallel, as in the case of *erlauben* — *urlaub*, *erteilen* — *urteil*. In MHG. we have besides *empfangen* — *empfang*, *entziehen* — *entzieh*, *entlâzen* — *entlâz*, *entsagen* — *antsage*, *begraben* — *bigraft*, *besprechen* — *bisprache*, *bedenken* — *ibvanc*, *erheben* — *irhap*, *erstân* — *irstende*, *verbleten* — *vürbot* 'citation before justice,' *versetzen* — *vürsaz* (*versetzung*, 'pledge'), *versiehen*, — *vürzoc*, etc. In all these cases when the words have maintained themselves at all, we find this discrepancy cancelled by the attraction of the noun-compound to the verb: *empfang*, *verzug*, etc. In other cases the unification set in as early as in MHG., and the particle *ga-* (NHG. *ge-*) is always unaccented, at least as early as in OHG., if not at as early a date as in original-Teutonic. It is clear that in this process the relation of the verbal compounds to the noun-derivation thence formed has aided in this operation (MHG. *erlâsen* — *erlâsere*, *erlâsunge*, etc.), which on their side are merely analogical formations from simple verbs. There is the infinitive and participle as well, which in many cases develop into simple nouns (cf. NHG. *behagen*, *belieben*, *erbarmen*, *vergnügen*; *bescheiden*, *erfahren*, *verschieden*, etc., and the substantives compounded of the latter (cf. *gewis-*

sen, bescheidenheit, bekanntschaft, verwandtschaft, erkenntniss, etc.) co-operate.

401. On the other side, the principle that a verbal compound cannot contain a name, is severely damaged, to the instinct of language, by the fact that derivatives like *handhaben*, *lustwandeln*, *mutmassen*, *nottaufen*, *radebrechen* (proved by its weak inflexion to be a derivative of *MIIG. -breche*), *ratschlagen*, *wetteifern*, *argwöhnen*, *notzüchtigen*, *rechtfertigen*, *verwahrlosen* from *handhabe*, *notsucht*, *rechtfertig*, etc., as well as the word *weissagen* misinterpreted by popular etymology (*OIIG. wlsagon* from the adjective *wlsag*, made into a substantive *wlsago* 'the prophet'), can also be apprehended as compounds. Perhaps the coalition of syntactical groups into compounds (*lobsingen*, *wahrsagen*) is thereby aided.

402. Another curious instance of the displacement of the relations in composition is found in numerous examples in Late and Middle Latin, and in the Romance languages. We have here a large number of verbs which are either actually derived from the connexion of a preposition with its case, or at least appear according to their meaning to be so derived, cf. *accorporare* (*ad corpus*), *incorporare*, *accordare*, *excommunicare* (*ex communione*), *extemporare* (*extemporalis* is found as early as the first century after Christ;) *emballer*, *déballer*, *embarquer*, *débarquer*, *enrager*, *affronter*, *achever* (*ad caput*), *s'endimancher* 'to dress one's-self in Sunday costume,' *s'enorgueillir*.¹ The words formed from adjectives are connected with these, which signify 'to place oneself in the condition implied by the word;' such are *affiner*, *enivrer*, *adoucir*, *affaiblir*, *ennoblir*, etc. The original basis for these formations was twofold. On the one hand, there were derivatives from compound nouns, cf. *assimilis* — *assimilare*, *concors* — *concordare*, *deformis* — *deformare* (with the

¹ More examples are given by Arsène Darmesteter, *Traité de la formation des mots composés dans la langue française* (Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études. Sciences philologiques et historiques 19) Paris 1875, p. 80 sqq.

meaning of 'to deform),' *degener* — *degenerare*, *depilis* — *depilare*, *exanimis* — *exanimare*, *exheres* — *exheredare*, *exossis* — *exossare*, *exsucus* — *exsucare*, *demens* — *dementire*, *insignis* — *insignire*; which stand to each other like *sanns* — *sanare*; further, *dedecus* — *dedecorare*. On the other side there are compounds from denominative verbs like *accelerare* (*celcrare* is poetical), *adaequare*, *addensare*, *aggravare*, *aggregare*, *appropinquare*, *assiccare*, *attennare*, *adumbrare*, *diarmare*, *decalcare*, *dehonorare*, *depopulari*, *despoliare*, *detruncare*, *exhonorare*, *exonerare*, *innodare*, *innumbrare*, *intestire*. Both classes had gradually to be fused with each other, and especially in the case where in the first class the noun which lay at the foundation, in the second the simple noun, became obsolete.

CHAPTER XIV.

ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF MEANING.

Causes of
superfluity
in language.

WE have seen that it is an essential characteristic of the development of language that each single language is incessantly engaged in developing a *plurality of words, forms, and constructions of similar meaning*.¹ One source of this phenomenon we have found in formation by analogy, a second in the converging development of meaning from different sides; we may add as a third the acceptance of a foreign word for a conception which is already represented by a native word (cf. *vetter* — *cousin*, *base* — *cousine*); and under this head we must of course range words borrowed from a kindred dialect.²

Tendency to
eliminate it

404. Inevitable, however, as the rise of such superfluity is, it is as unable to maintain itself permanently. *Language abhors luxury*. The objection will not hold good that, if this were so, she would not permit it to arise. It is not the habit of language to adopt precautions against the occurrence of possible disasters, but merely to take measures against such as have actually occurred. The individual speakers who add new linguistic forms to those of equivalent meaning already existing take no account, at the moment when they do so, of the latter, since these are either unknown to them, or at least do not enter their consciousness at

¹ [Excellent illustrations of this chapter from the French are found in Darmesteter's *La Vie des mots*, Chap. iv., *Synonymie*.]

² [In English the case is somewhat different, at any rate as regards Norman-French.]

the moment in question. It is, as a rule, only other persons who, hearing the new form from one and the old from another of their interlocutors, use both indiscriminately.

405. Our assertion applies in any case absolutely to the language of common life. It applies somewhat less to the language of literature, and less to the language of poetry than to that of prose. But the deviation merely confirms our fundamental view, that a need, and the means of satisfying that need, are always striving to adjust their relations ; a process which equally involves the rejection of superfluities and the filling up, as far as may be, of lacunae. But the conception of a need must not be pressed so as to comprise merely the elements absolutely necessary for social life. On the contrary, we have to take account of the whole sum of intellectual interests, and of all the impulses of poetry and rhetoric. A cultivated style, which forbids the too frequent repetition of the same expression, demands of course that where possible several phrases shall be available for the same thought. In a still higher degree, rhythm, rhyme, alliteration, and similar devices demand the possibility of choosing among several phonetic groups of similar meaning, if the constraint which they impose is not to be exceedingly burdensome. The result is that the language of poetry avails itself of the groups of synonyms which have gradually grown up, using them indiscriminately, where the language of conversation attaches the use of each to special conditions, and maintaining them where the language of conversation gradually restricts itself to a single use. This is precisely one of the most essential factors in the differentiation of poetical expression from that of prose. It is easy from the poetical language of every people and age to show that its relative luxuriance depends in the closest way upon the character of its poetic technique ; most easily, it may be, in the language of the Old

Teutonic alliterative poems, which is remarkable for its special wealth of synonyms.

406. But to assume, for the common language, the co-existence through many centuries of double forms, or double words with the same meaning, is opposed to all experience, and must decidedly be designated as a fault in method, a fault which has very frequently been committed in the construction of IE. original forms.

407. We must not of course connect the retrenchment of this superfluity with any conscious design. The purposeless overburdening of the memory brings its own remedy.

Elimination
and utilitarianism.

408. The simplest case of retrenchment is the disappearance of all among a group of similar forms and phrases, save one. It is easy to see that the superfluity belonging to the language at large belongs only in a small degree to the individual. The characteristic peculiarity of individual language consists mainly in a certain consistency in the choice made by the speaker of the different possible forms of expression at his disposal. For if one has for whatever reason become more usual than another—*i.e.* if its capacity for forcing its way into consciousness under given circumstances is greater—the tendency is also at work by which, where no special influences draw in the opposite direction, this preponderance will be reinforced on every fresh occasion. Now as soon as the great majority of a moderate-sized linguistic community coincides in its selection from any group of forms, the natural result is again that the correspondence becomes more and more confirmed, and, after the disappearance of several generations, absolute. Thus the different possibilities of choice form a main source of the distinctions of dialect. It often happens also, of course, that the choice leads to the same result over the whole linguistic area, and especially in cases where conditions peculiarly favourable for one form occur.

409. In addition, however, to this merely negative process of *retrenchment*, there is a positive process: the utilisation of superfluity by means of differentiation in the meaning. This process is no more the result of conscious purpose than the other. We have seen that the different senses of a word, an inflexion, a particle, etc., have to be learnt separately and successively. Now when a plurality of synonymous expressions is in use, each of which has several senses and applications, it is quite obvious that the different meanings cannot appear to each individual in a linguistic community evenly divided among the different expressions. On the contrary, it will often happen that he hears one expression earlier, or more frequently connected with one meaning, another expression earlier or more frequently connected with another signification. Should it, however, happen that of the different expressions each one is familiar to him in a special sense, he will abide by these, unless he be drifted by specially powerful impulses to the opposite side.

410. In cases where we cannot trace historically the single factors of the development, but only perceive their total result, it often appears as if a differentiation of sound had set in for the purpose of differentiating meaning. And even now most philologists do not shrink from assuming something of the kind. If it were only to definitely show the unreasonableness of such assumptions, it is very important to collect the cases which fall under this head taken from modern languages as fully as possible.

411. What has been hitherto done in this subject relates chiefly to the Romance languages. As early as 1683, Nicolas Catherinot published a work, bearing the title of *Les Doublets de la Langue Françoyse*, which collected material to our purpose. In fact the matter has always excited interest since the foundation of the scientific grammar of the Romance languages. Rich material

Phonetic
differentiation
for the
purpose of
differentiating
meaning
only
apparent.

Works on
Doublets.

from French has been gathered by A. Brachet, *Dictionnaire des doublets de la langue française*, Paris 1868, Supplement, 1871; from Portuguese by Coelho in the 'Romania,' ii. 281 *sqq.*; from Spanish, and, by the way, from other Romance languages by Caroline Michaelis, *Romanische wortschöpfung*, Leipzig 1876. M. Bréal has given us a collection of Latin doublets in the *Mémoires de la société de linguistique de Paris*, i. 162 *sqq.* (1868).¹ For German may be cited O. Behagel, *Die neuhochdeutschen zwilingswörter*, Germania 23, 257 *sqq.* A small collection of English doublets is to be found in Mätzner, *Englische grammatik*, i. 221 *sqq.* [Cf. also Skeat, *Etym. Dict.*; Appendix]. C. Michaelis has some penetrating observations on differentiation (cf. especially p. 41 *sqq.*). She decidedly supports our view that the differentiation in sound and in meaning stand originally in no causal connexion with each other. Behagel (p. 292) speaks yet more positively on the subject: 'In living language there is no such thing as a voluntary conscious differentiation of form for the purpose of differentiation of meaning.' His own work, however, deals almost exclusively with the phonetic side.

Cases of
apparent
differentia-
tion.

412. The material collected in the above-mentioned works is far from being wholly comprised in the category with which we have to deal. It stands to reason that all cases must be excluded in which a loan-word is from the first accepted in a different sense from a word either native or borrowed at an earlier period, or from another source, even where the two words, when traced back far enough, lead to a common source. The French *chose* and *cause* owe their origin alike to the Latin *causa*; but the difference in their meaning did not arise from any differentiation on French soil; but *cause* was borrowed as a law-term when *chose* had long since developed into the general meaning of 'thing.' It is the

¹ [Cf. Regnaud *Mélanges*, p. 299. Paris, 1886.]

came with by far the majority of doublets in the Romance [and English] languages, which, for this reason, do not affect us here.¹ It is the same again with such NIG. words as *legal—loyal*, *psals—palast*, *pulver—puder*, *spital—hôtel*, etc. [*regul—royal*, *orison—oration*, *penance—penitence*. For a fuller list see Morris's *Historical Outlines of English Grammar*, p. 32, § 28.] But we must further exclude all those cases in which the differentiation of meaning is the result of a grammatical isolation. If, for instance, the old participle *bescheiden* is still employed as an adjective with the meaning of 'modestus,' while, on the other hand, as a proper participle, we use *beschieden*, there is no doubt that the two words *bescheiden* and *beschieden* were for a time used indifferently in this latter function, but *beschieden* can never have been used for *modestus*.

413. On the other hand, no notice is taken, in the works cited, of our second class, in which the equivalence of meaning is only the result of a secondary development. We are thus after all without a clearly arranged collection of certain instances of the undoubted differentiation of equivalent expressions. It will therefore be well to illustrate the process somewhat at large. These instances are chosen for the most part from NIG. Examples of
real differentiation.

414. The forms *knabe* and *knappe* are in NIG. absolutely equivalent, each possessing the divergent NIG. significations. Similarly *raben* (= NIG. *rabe*) and *rappe* are both applied to the bird, whereas in modern times, in the written language, *rappe* is confined to the metaphorical use as a term for a black horse.² A third form, *rappen*, with an *n* transferred from the oblique cases, has established itself as a name for the coin (originally with a

¹ C. Michaelis is certainly on the whole wrong (p. 42 *sqq.*) in apprehending the more nearly Latin sense of the more nearly Latin form, as the result of a differentiation.

² I cannot, it must be owned, adduce any example of *rabe* in the transferred sense.

black head of a bird), which was at first known as *rappe*, *rapp*, and further, as *rabenheller*, *rabenpfennig*, *rabenbatzen*, *rabenvierer* (cf. Adelung). The MHG. *backe* ('hinterbacken,' 'schinken') bears the same relation to *hacke* (original Teutonic *bako*—*bakko*) as *knabe* to *knappe*; and it is hence probable enough that we have to deal with a differentiation of meaning developed, as in the previous instance, secondarily, but of much older date. The difference between *reiter* (=MHG. *riter*) and *ritter*, *scheuen* and *scheuchen*, belongs entirely to NHG., as does the different shade of meaning between *jungfrau* and *jungfer*. *Hain* is a contraction from *hagen*, and in MHG. the same meaning attaches to both (as we see still in the case of such compounds as *hagebuche*—*hainbuche*, *hagebutte*—*hainbutte*, etc.); *hagen* in the derived sense, now restricted to *hain*, appears in Burkhardt Waldis.

415. Double forms arising from the confusion of different methods of declension are often differentiated; thus *Franke*—*franken*, *tropf*—*tropfen* (cf. for their identical usage the examples given by Sanders, e.g. Haller : *Du bist der weisheit meer, wir sind davon nur tröpfe*; and conversely Wieland : *dem armen tropfen*), *fleck*—*flecken*, *fahrt*—*fahrte*, *stadt*—*statte* (MHG. nom. *vart*, *stat*—gen. *verte*, *stete*); at the same time, with difference of gender, *der lump*—*die lumpe*, *der trupp*—*die truppe*, *der karren*—*die karre*, *der possen*—*die posse*. The difference of gender, with the same nominative form, is utilised in *der band*, *das band* (cf. examples of *der band* used in the sense of 'fascia,' 'vinculum,' in the *Deutsches w.bh.*), *der*—*die flur* (the former only in the signification of 'haus-flur,' though the form *die flur* occurs also with the same signification; *der*—*die haft* (in MHG. the separation of meanings is already fairly established); *der*—*das mensch* (the latter form was still employed in the seventeenth century without any suggestion of contempt); *der*—*das schild* (the separation is hardly, even yet,

completely carried out, cf. Sanders, s.v.); *der*—*das verdienst*, *der*—*die see*, *der*—*die schulst* (examples for both genders, alike in the proper and metaphorical signification, are to be seen in Sanders); *die*—*das erkenntniss* (the latter form still used very frequently by Kant in the sense of 'cognition') [*la critique*, *le critique*: *la manœuvre d'un navire*, *le manœuvre*: *la statuaire des anciens*, *un statuaire*: *le crêpe*, *la crêpe*: similarly *livre*, *manche*, *période*, *poêle*]. To these must be added the cases in which different plural formations are differentiated, *bande*—*bänder*, *dinge*—*dinger* (as opposed to the modern usage, e.g. cf. LUTHER, Luke xxi. 26, *für worten der dinger die kommen sollen auf erden*); *gesichte*—*gesichter* (examples of cases where the distinction is not observed are given by Sanders); *lichte*—*lichter* (the difference is not consistently maintained); *orte*—*örter* (the same remark applies); *tuche*—*tücher*, *worte*—*wörter* (examples are given in Sanders iii. 1662^b), in which the former is still employed like the latter); *säue*—*saue* (cf. for an older stage passages like *von den zahmen sauen entsprossen* or *wilde saue und baren*, etc., given in Sanders); *effecte*—*effecten*, [*l'aîeul*, *les aîeux*, and *aîeuls*: *le travail*, *travaux*, and *travails* (a minister's 'reports')]. In an older stage of M.H.G. we have from *druck* the plural *drucke*, as well as *drücke*: at the present day we have the plural *drucke* employed only in the sense of printed works, for which Goethe still uses *drucke*: though, on the other hand, we have *abdrucke*, *eindrücke*, *ausdrücke*. The differentiation of *tor*—*tür* goes back further (cf. Sievers, *Beiträge* v. 111¹) and *buch*—*buche* (O.H.G. *buoh*, still frequently feminine, is the old nominative form, *buocha* the accusative form); the old nominative forms *buoz*, *wls*, *half* are restricted to the employment in certain formulae (*mir wirdit buoz*, *managa wls*, *cinhalf*, etc., even yet we use *anderthalb*, *drittehalb*), while the accusative forms *buoza*, *wlsa*, *halba* have become usual with no restrictions.

416. This utilisation of different inflexional forms meets us in nearly all inflected languages. In English we might cite many instances of duplicate plural formations: *cloths, clothes*; *brothers, brethren*, while in the older language both methods of formation were employed indifferently as in the case of most similar words: *pennies, pence* [*dies, dice*]. [In Russian the accusative plural is the same as the nominative in the case of inanimate beings; the same as the genitive in the case of animate beings.] In Dutch the plurals in *-en* and *-s* are employed in the case of some words indifferently (*vogelen, vogels*); in the case of others one alone is commonly used (*engelen, but pachters*); again, however, in the case of others both are employed, but with different meanings; cf. *hemelen* ('heaven,' in its proper sense), *hemels* (*betthimmel*), 'canopy of a bed'; *letteren*, 'letter,' or 'literature', *letters*, 'letters of the alphabet'; *middelen*, 'means', *middels*, 'waists'; *tafelen*, 'law-tables,' etc.; *tafels*, 'tables'; *vaderen*, 'ancestors', *vaders*, 'fathers'; *wateren*, 'waters', *waters*, 'streams.' In the same way the forms in *-en* and *-eren* stand side by side: *kleeden*, 'tablecloths,' *kleederen*, 'clothes'; *benen*, 'legs,' *beenderen*, 'bones'; *bladen*, 'leaves' in a book, *bladeren*, 'leaves,' in the proper sense. From the Danish we may cite *skatte* (*schätze*), 'treasures,' *skatter*, 'taxes,' *vaaben*, 'weapons,' *vaabener*, 'armorial bearings.' Where in O. Norse *a* in the root-syllable of the nouns changed with *ǣ* (the *-u* umlaut), according to the form of the inflexion; e.g. *sþk(u)*, *sakar*, etc., we find that in later Norwegian, in the first place, double forms arose, one in *a* and one in *ǣ*, of which it commonly occurs that either the first or the second has disappeared. In some cases, however, both have maintained themselves with a differentiation of meaning: *gata* (*gasse*), 'street,' 'gate,' *gola*, 'road'; *grav*, 'grave,' *grov*, 'ditch'; *mark*, 'field,' *mork*, 'wood'; *tram*, 'height,' *trom*, 'border.'

417. The difference observed at the present day in the use of the shorter and more lengthened forms in the inflexion of *der* was of gradual development. The forms *der* in the genitive singular feminine, and in the genitive plural of all genders, and *den* in the dative plural, which are now confined to the adjectival use, still occur frequently in the seventeenth century, and occasionally in the eighteenth, in the substantival sense; e.g., in Goethe: *die krone, der mein fürst mich würdig achtet*. On the other hand, we find conversely *derer* and *denen* used adjectivally—nay, even as a pure article; cf. e.g. *derer dinge, derer leute* (LOGAU); *derer gesetze* (KLOPSTOCK); *zu denen dingen, zu denen stunden* (HEINRICH VON WITTENWEILER, fifteenth century). Even as late as the eighteenth century *denen* in this application is frequent in the written language; and even at the present day *dene*, with the usual apocope of the *n*, is the generally prevailing form in Alemannic and South Franconian dialects. Further, the usage of the present day confines *deren* to the genitival function only, while *der*, on the contrary, is exclusively employed in the dative; likewise a purely secondary formation: cf. *von deren ich reden, in deren die schmeichler sind* (GAILER VON KAISERSBERG), *o fürstin, deren sich ein solcher fürst verbunden* (WECKHERLIN). Finally, the curious difference made in N.H.G. in the employment of the forms *derer* and *deren* is of purely recent development; cf. *wie viel sind deren die da haben* (PAULI); and conversely, *mit mancher kunst, derer sichs gar nit schemem thar* (MELISSUS).

418. *Schaffen*, as a strong verb, and *schöpfen*, have arisen from the same original form; cf. Gothic *skapjan*, pret. *sköp*. To the preterite *scuof* a new regular present *scaffan* was formed in O.H.G. beside the old form *scöpfen*; in M.H.G. a preterite *schepfete* and a participle *geschepfet* was then formed for *schöpfen*. In N.H.G. *schuof*, *geschaffen*, and *schepfete*, *geschepfete*, are synonymous,

uniting in themselves the signification of both the MHG. words. The same conjunction is found in the present *schepfen*. The present *schaffen* certainly appears from the earliest times confined to the signification of *to create, shape*.

419. *Ziicken* and *zucken* are originally duplicate forms with the same meaning; cf. *der schon das schwert zucket* (LESSING); *den anblick eines zuckenden* (HERDER). It is the same with *driicken* and *drucken*.

420. The conjunction *als* is derived from *alsô* through *alse*. [So the English word *as*, like *also*, took its rise from AS. *ealswô*.] In MHG. the pair are synonymous; both alike can be used demonstratively or relatively. In the same way there is no difference of signification between *danne* and *denne*, *wanne* and *wenne*. The modern distinction in usage has been developed by a very slow process; and the fortuitous nature of its origin shows itself at the present day in the want of a logical principle of differentiation. The modern difference between *warum* and *worum* is likewise secondary.

421. The participle of the intransitive *verdorben* and that of the corresponding transitive *verderbt* have separated; the latter being employed in a moral sense only. [Cf. *wrung*, *wrong*.] The difference of meaning is also secondary in the case of *bewegt* and *bewogen*; cf. e.g. *das meer . . . vom winde bewogen* (PRÄTORIUS); *der hat im tanze nicht die beine recht bewogen* (RACHEL); on the other hand, *dass er dardurch bewegt ward, solches in eigener person zu erfahren* (Buch der Liebe) [cf. the difference between *aged* and *aged*.]

422. The words in *-heit*, *-schaft*, *-tum*, were formerly essentially identical in meaning. They are all capable of denoting a property; many have in addition developed a collective meaning; and words, too, in *-niss*, and simpler formations like *höhe*, *tiefe*

often covered nearly the same ground. This state of things has, on the whole, continued ; but in single cases we find that where several of these formations stood side by side they have mostly in one way or other suffered differentiation. Cases in which the different usages now distributed over several such formations were once completely united in each are certainly not very common ; still, compare *gemein(d)e* and *gemeinschaft*, from which *gemeinheit* also did not originally differ in meaning. The two following pairs are also worth remarking : *kleinheit*, *kleinigkeit* ; *neuheit*, *neuigkeit*. Examples of the earlier undifferentiated application of the former pair are cited in the *Deutsches Wörterbuch* ; cf. *so verhält es sich auch mit gewissen kleinheiten, die es im haushalt nicht sind* (Goethe-Zelter Correspondence), *die ausnehmende kleinigkeit der masse* (KANT). As regards the latter pair Adelung teaches us that *neuheit* was used 'as a concrete, a thing hitherto not experienced or known, for which, however, *neuigkeit* is more common' ; on the other hand, '*die neuigkeit einer nachricht, einer empfindung, eines gedankens* etc., for which *neuheit* is at the present day more common in polite conversation.'

423. It is much the same with the adjectives in *-ig*, *-isch*, *-lich*, *-sam*, *-haft*, *-bar*, in which the existing differences of meaning do not depend upon any difference of meaning in the suffixes themselves. An example in point is *ernstlich*, *ernsthaft* ; cf., for the older usage, *die stets gar ernstlich und sauer sieht* (AYRER) ; *der ernsthaft fleisz* (FISCHART).

424. In MHG. *sô* and *als* (*also*, *alse*) are absolutely synonymous ; both serving equally as demonstratives and as relatives. In NHG. they are differentiated, *so* being in general used as a demonstrative, and *als* as a relative ; cf. e.g. *so wol als auch* (MHG. *sô wol sô* or *als wol als*), *so bald als*. Still a trace of the demonstrative *als* survives in *alsbald* [cf. English *as soon as*]. In MHG. *lhte* and

vil lhte have equally the meaning of NHG. *leicht* and *vielleicht*. The restriction of the form *che* to the conjunction is secondary. Even Gleim writes *che als Klopstock*; GOETHE, *er soll eh gewonnen als verloren haben*.

425. In MHG. *sichern* may bear the same meaning as NHG. *versichern*, and, conversely, *versichern* may bear the same meaning as NHG. *sichern* (e.g. *die stat mit mähren und mit graben versichern*). The differentiation of *sammeln*, *sammlung*, and *versammeln*, *versammlung*, is unknown to older NHG.; cf. *Moses und Aaron . . . samdeleten auch die ganze gemeinde, Gott ist fast mächtig in der samlunge der heiligen* (LUTHER); *Des festlichen tages, an dem die gegend mit jubel tranben lieset und tritt und den most in die fässer versammelt* (GOETHE); *Die linsen sind gleichsam eine versammlung unendlicher prismen* (GOETHE); *Dass sie* (the Jews in their dispersion) *keiner versammlung mehr hoffen dürfen* (LUTHER). The simple form *öffnen* is at an earlier period employed in the metaphorical sense of *offenbaren* ('to reveal'), like *eröffnen* at the present day. A similar relation often exists between simple and compound, or between different compounds which have a simple verb in common.

426. Certain processes must also be noticed here which, without being strictly speaking differentiations, yet arise from the same fundamental processes as these, and are hence important as aiding us to form a judgment on them. The starting-point is here a *partial*, instead of complete equivalence of meaning.

427. It may be that that partial equivalence has been preceded by a complete one, the immediate ground of the change being that the one received an enlargement of meaning in which the other did not participate. Then follows very frequently the further consequence, that the former is completely ejected from its original meaning by the latter, and confined to

the new. *Kristentum* and *Kristenheit* are certainly used even by Walther v. d. Vogelweide in their distinct modern senses; but the latter is still employed in MHG. in the fundamental meaning of *christentum*; cf. e.g. *Tristan* 1968 (of a child to be christened), *durch daz ez sine kristenheit in gotes namen empffinge*. MHG. *welstnom* denotes the same as *weltheit*, but side by side of this the derived meaning 'instruction in law' appears, and then the NHG. *welstnum* is restricted to this. MHG. *geltchnisse* can still be employed in the same sense as *gelichheit*, the NHG. *gleichniss* has renounced this original meaning. *Indessen* (*indes*) has originally a purely temporal meaning; cf. *ich bin indess krank gewesen* (LESSING); it has been ejected from this meaning by *unterdessen*.

428. A more common occurrence is that a word, which at an earlier date was quite different in meaning from another, occupies one portion of the domain of the latter, and then gradually claims it for itself alone. Thus *base* is restricted to the area of moral signification (MHG. also *basin kleit*, etc.) by the encroachment of *schlecht* (originally 'smooth,' 'straight,') [English 'slight']. Similar restrictions have been imposed upon *siech* (originally [like English *sick*] the common word for 'ill'), *senche*, *sucht*, by *krank*, *krankheit* (originally 'weak,' 'weakness'); *arg* (MHG. also in the signification of 'avaricious'), by *karg* (originally 'shrewd'); *als* by *wie* (originally an interrogative word; then a relative, in the first instance only of the generalising kind); *ob* by *wenn*.

429. Finally, it is very common to find that a newly-formed word, or one borrowed from a foreign language, ejects an older word from a portion of its domain. Thus the MHG. *ritterschaft* has also the signification of *rittertum*; but, on the formation of the latter word, it loses this meaning. In the same way *frenndlich* is menaced by *freundschaftlich*, *wesentlich* by *wesenhaft*,

empfindlich by *empfindsam*, *einig* by *einzig*, *gemein* by *gemeinsam* and *allgemein*, *lehen* by *darlehen*, *stegreif* by *streibbügel*, *künstlich* by *kunstvoll* and *kunstreich*, *bein* by *knochen* (originally Middle German).

430. These various processes may appear in manifold combinations with each other and with the process of differentiation in the stricter sense. Should the history of the development of meanings ever grow into a science, it will be of primary importance to take the most scrupulous account of these phenomena. Our principle that every detail must be judged with constant reference to the entire mass of the linguistic material is confirmed in this respect as well; in no other way is appreciation of the causal connexion possible. As the hints above given lead us to suppose, it is exactly the absence of consistently applied logical principles which is here characteristic. The accidental and involuntary are everywhere evident.

syntactical
differentia-
tion.

431. We have previously touched on several occasions on the domain of syntax. The processes above discussed manifest themselves equally in the case of purely *syntactical* phenomena.

432. In OHG. duplicate forms had arisen in the strong declension of the adjective for the nominative singular as well as for the accusative singular; cf. the neuter *guot*, *guoter*; *guotin*, *guotaz*. No difference in the usage of these forms meets us at the outset. On the one hand, the so-called uninflected attributive is employed before the substantive,—this usage is still universally prevalent in MHG.—while at the present day the inflected one has established itself universally with the exception of a few isolated traces; on the other hand, the inflected form is used as well in places where the uninflected has at a later date established itself; it is thus used attributively after the substantive; e.g. *Krist guoter*, *thaz himilrtchi hôhaz* (OTFRID); even in NHG. *der knappe guoter*

(*PARZIVAL*); *ein wolken so trübe* (HEINRICH VON MORUNGEN), by the side of the more usual *der knappe gnot*, etc.; further, as predicate: *ist inuor mieta milhilm* (TATIAN); *unird thu stummir* (OTFRID); occasionally still in MHG., e.g. *das das wille welt volles frommen were* (*PARZIVAL*, 671, 19); thus also *ih habetiz io ginnissaz* ('I always held it as certain,' OTFRID); *also nasser muose ich scheiden* (WALTHER V. D. VOGELWEIDE). In the case of *ein* and the possessive pronoun the uninflected form has established itself even before the substantive; formerly the two forms stood side by side: cf. *slur slmo*, *sluaz korn*, *cinaz figizzi* (OTFRID).

433. The duplicate forms *ward* and *wurde* have parted company: the former being confined to the signification of the aorist, while the latter alone can be employed in the sense of the imperfect. The separation is, however, not completely carried out, because *wurde* can be used in both ways. We may assume with tolerable certainty that in IE. no original difference of meaning existed between the indicative imperfect and indicative aorist, nor, again, between the different moods of the present and those of the aorist. For the double sense probably arose from a single paradigm, where a discrepancy due to the shifting accent was removed by two divergent processes of correction. In Sanskrit, even in the form in which we have received it, the forms are not distinguished in all classes of verbs. Whether we prefer to call the Gothic *viljan* ('I will') an optative present or aorist is absolutely indifferent. Generally speaking, it may be laid down that the tense and mood system of the IE. language must have proceeded to its development by means of a number of differentiations of meaning—a process accompanied at every step by the opposite one, viz., the coincidence in meaning of different formations.

CHAPTER XV.

CATEGORIES, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND GRAMMATICAL.

The original harmony between psychological and grammatical categories is, in course of time, disturbed : tendency to remove the discrepancy.

EVERY grammatical category is produced on the basis of a psychological one. The former is originally nothing but the transition of the latter into outward manifestation. As soon as the agency of the psychological category can be recognised in the use of language, it becomes a grammatical category. Its agency, however, by no means ends with the creation of the latter. It is itself independent of language. As it existed before the grammatical category, so it does not cease to operate when this comes into being. In this way the original harmony between the two may be in the course of time disturbed. The grammatical category is to some extent a petrification of the psychological. It adheres to a fixed tradition. The psychological, on the other hand, remains always a free, living agent, capable of taking manifold and changing forms according to individual apprehension. In addition to this, signification-change operates in many ways to prevent the grammatical category covering the same ground as the psychological. Then, as a tendency to convergence makes itself felt, the grammatical category suffers a displacement, whence may arise ambiguous phenomena which admit of no simple adjustment to the categories thus far existing. The consideration of these processes, which we can observe more accurately, throws light at the same time upon the origin, which our observation cannot reach,

of the grammatical categories. We proceed accordingly to consider some of the most important grammatical categories from the points of view indicated.

GENDER.¹

435. The foundation of grammatical gender is the *natural Gender-difference of sex* in men and animals. If a masculine or feminine gender is ascribed to other objects—nay, even to the names of qualities and activities—this is the operation of fancy which apprehends these after the analogy of human personality. But neither natural sex nor that ascribed by fancy has in itself anything to do with grammar. The speaker might think of anything as a male or female individual without the least trace of any such thought appearing in language. The linguistic instruments whereby we now recognise the grammatical gender of a substantive are the *concord* in which, on the one hand, attribute and predicate, on the other hand, a substitutory pronoun stands therewith. Thus the rise of the grammatical gender stands in the closest correspondence with the rise of a variable adjective and pronoun. The variability with regard to gender of the adjective presupposes that the difference in gender has become attached to a special stem-ending. This phenomenon might be explained by supposing that the stem-ending in question was originally an independent word, a pronoun which, while still independent, had acquired a reference to a male or female individual. Still this assumption is not absolutely necessary. It might conceivably happen that, by pure accident, an overwhelming majority had pronounced for the masculine in the case of one stem-ending, and

¹ For the subject of this section cf. especially Grimm, *Gr.* iii. 311—563; *Kleine schrift.* iii. 349 sqq.; Dies, iii. 92—8; Miklosich, iv. 17—37; Schroeder, p. 89; Brugmann, *Z. f. spr.* xxiv. 34 sqq.; Delbrück, iv. 4—13; W. Meyer, *Die schicksale des lateinischen neutrums im romanischen*, Halle 1883; Lange, *De substantivis Græci feminini generis secundæ declinationis capita tria*, Lipsiæ 1885 (Diss.). [See Sayce, *Principles of Comparative Philology*, p. 264 sqq.].

an equal majority for the feminine in the case of the other. In the pronoun, as in the adjective, the distinction of gender may appear in the stem-ending; it may, however, also be expressed by specific roots. It seems probable that grammatical gender developed earliest in the case of the substitutory pronoun, just as it is there that it has maintained itself longest in languages, such as English, where it has partially disappeared.

436. When it first arose, grammatical gender doubtless coincided throughout with natural sex. Departures from this rule gradually came about, especially through changes in meaning, as well as merely 'occasional' modifications of meaning. As a result of this, the natural sex again asserts its claims, in the first instance, by causing a violation of the grammatical concord; cf. such cases as *eines frauenzimmers, die sich am artigsten gegen mich erwiesen hatte* (GOE.); *die hässlichste meiner kammermädchen* (WIELAND); Lat. *duo importuna prodigia, quos egestas addixerat* (CIC.); *capita conjurationis virgis caesi ac securi percussi* (LIVY); *septem milia hominum in naves impositos* (LIVY); Greek, ὦ φίλτατ', ὦ περισσὰ τιμηθεῖς τέκνον (EUR.); φίλτατ' Λιγίσθου βία (AESCH.). From this stage we arrive next at a complete change of gender. Thus in Greek we find that masculine designations of persons and animals are made also feminine by the simple process of referring them to feminine objects. For instance, we find side by side the duplicate forms ὁ — ἡ ἄγγελος, διδύσκαλος, ἰατρός, τύραννος, ἔλαφος, ἵππος,¹ etc. Conversely, in Christian times a form ὁ παρθένος² was constructed. The diminutives, originally neuter, readily assume the masculine or feminine gender when the diminutive meaning has been obscured. Just so in German *die fräulein* is common in the dialects, even with older writers. If collectives or designations of qualities become designations of persons, the result may be a

¹ Cf. Lange, *u. s.* p. 27 *sqq.*

² *Ibid.* p. 28.

change of gender. The French *le guide*, originally 'guidance,' answers to the Italian *la guida*; the French *le garde*, 'the watchman,' is originally identical with *la garde*, 'the guard;' cf. further, the Spanish *el cura*, 'the priest,' *el justicia*, 'the magistrate;' the Old-Bulgarian *jnnota*, 'youth,' as a masculine means 'a youth;' *starosta*, 'age,' as a masculine 'the elder of a village;' the Russian *golova*, which in the feminine means 'a head,' and in the masculine 'a conductor.' Of specially common occurrence are feminine surnames given to masculine personal names; cf. Latin *Alanda*, *Capella*, *Stella*; It. *Colonna*, *Rosa*, *Barbarossa*, *Malaspina*, etc.

437. It often happens that the fact that a word belongs to a special category decides its gender. This depends partly upon the fact that the gender of the common designation of the species fixes the gender of the more special designation. Thus it is easy for a change of gender to follow in connexion with words connected in idea.

438. Here therefore we have cases of analogy. Thus the word *mittwoch*, earlier *mitte woche* (*media hebdomas*) used dialectically even at the present day as a feminine, has come, like the French *dimanche*, to be used as a masculine after the model of the other names for the week-days. The foreign names *Tiber* and *Rhône* have joined the majority of German river-names. In Greek many names of trees and plants have become feminine; the words *δρῦς* and *βοτάνη*, as class designations, causing the feminine gender to become the normal one.¹ This process manifests itself most clearly in words which in their proper meaning exhibit a different gender, and have only become feminines in their transference to plants:² cf. *ὁ κίανος*, 'steel' — *ἡ κίανος*, 'the corn flower,' so called from its resemblance in colour to that metal. In the same way the names of towns exhibit a tendency to the feminine

¹ Cf. Lange, *u.s.* p. 35 *sqq.*

² Cf. Lange, *u.s.* pp. 11, 42 *sqq.*

gender; cf. ἡ Κέραμος from ὁ κέραμος, 'clay'; ἡ Κισσός from ὁ κισσός, 'ivy'; ἡ Μάραθος from ὁ μάραθος, 'fennel'; ἡ Ἰπνος from ὁ ἱπνός, 'oven'; ἡ Ἰαλυσός, the town, from ὁ Ἰάλυσος, the name of a person,¹ [cf. *Mätzner*, FR. GR. p. 380.]

439. In other cases *formal* reasons have brought about a change in gender. Thus in Latin it was customary for words in *-a*, so far as they were not designations for male persons, to be of feminine gender. In consequence we find that the Greek neuters in *-μα* in ante- and post-classical writers appear, at least in popular Latin, as feminines: cf. *schema*, *dogma*, *diadema*, and for this reason they often appear in the Romance languages as feminines.² The Italian word *ago*, answering to the Latin *acus*, is masculine. The old Greek feminines in *-ος* are in modern Greek mostly discarded, in some cases having passed into the lists of masculines: e.g. ὁ πλάτανος, ὁ κυπάρισσος.³ Even the natural sex has in some cases not prevented the change of gender; cf. prov. *φαφα* and *profeta* used as feminines.⁴

440. The contrast between the traditional gender of the single word and that which we expect from its termination may be cancelled in another way, namely, by a change not of gender, but of *termination*—the new termination being, of course, one characteristic of the gender in question.

441. Thus we find that in Latin *peristromum* appears by the side of *peristroma*. The Latin word *socrus* produced the Spanish and Provençal word *suegra*, Portuguese *sogra*: the Latin *nurus*, the It. *nuora*, Spanish *nuera*; Port. and Prov. *nora*: Old French *nore*. Modern Greek, again, has employed this method in order to

¹ Cf. Lange, *u.s.* p. 42 *sqq.*

² Cf. W. Meyer, p. 93 *sqq.*, where many other examples are found of change of gender for formal reasons.

³ Cf. Hatzidakis, *Zschr. f. vgl. spr.* 27, 82; Lange *u.s.* p. 9.

⁴ Cf. W. Meyer, p. 9.

displace the feminines in -ος : hence we get forms like ἡ παρθένια, ἡ πλατάνη, etc. Even in Old Greek we find forms like ἡ μίνθη by ἡ μίνθος, ἡ ἐβένη by ἡ ἔβενος, etc.¹

442. In some cases the traditional was at the same time the natural gender,—an additional reason for its modifying the termination, instead of being modified by it. To this head too belongs the fact that in Greek the *d*-stems which have become masculines have adapted the *s* of the nominative (e.g. *νεανίας*).²

443. Thus far we are moving on fairly safe ground. But it is a hard matter to decide how far the natural gender, as viewed by *imagination*, has affected the change of grammatical gender. The subjective views of separate individuals may take very different forms in connexion with the same object. In modern English this subjectivity is capable of asserting itself unchecked to a certain point ; and we are thus able to form an idea of the way in which originally the transference of the masculine and feminine genders to objects which possess no natural sex proceeded. In other languages the free activity of the imagination is held in check by the traditional sex, and cannot assert itself so long as the memory of the latter continues vigorous. A certain hesitation in regard to the tradition must therefore in every case give the impulse which sets the imagination to work in this direction. If however, the traditional sex is not impressed on the speaker, or only insufficiently so, it needs no very violent effort of fancy to impel him to attribute any gender at pleasure to the word in question. For the difference in gender has so thoroughly permeated language that it is in many cases impossible to leave the gender undetermined, and therefore needful to decide for one or another. Under these circumstances the issue is often decided by chance—that is, by some trifling circumstance, not necessarily connected in

¹ Cf. Hatzidakis and Lange, *u.s.*

² Cf. J. Grimm, *Alt. u.rift.* p. 357.

any way with the original grounds of grammatical gender. We have merely to think of the errors we make in a foreign language.

444. Now whatever the positive causes for a change of gender may be, the *negative* cause ought in no case to be passed over; indeed it proves often of more decisive importance than the positive. The part that it plays may be historically demonstrated from the fact that those words have been especially exposed to change of gender, the gender of which is, in connected speech, most frequently without any special mark, and thus leaves the slightest impress on the memory. German has no longer any mark of gender in the plural, not even in the article. Hence it is natural that precisely those words which are most commonly used in the plural have changed their gender, partly in connexion with a change in their phonetic form, which is rendered likewise possible by the fact that the singular was less firmly rooted than the plural: cf. *wange* (MHG. neuter), *woge* (MHG. *der wdc*), *locke* (MHG. *der loc*), *trähne* (MHG. *der trahen*), *zähre* (MHG. *der zaher*), *wolke* (MHG. *das wolken*), *waffe* (MHG. *das wäfen*), *ähre* (MHG. *das eher*), *binse* (MHG. *der binses*). Further, if many weak masculines have become feminine (cf. Paul's MHG. *Gr.* § 130, note 4), this will correspond with the fact that the declension of the weak masculines and feminines was absolutely identical in MHG. It may be affirmed that no word will adopt a grammatical gender not habitually associated with the inflexions attached to it, excepting only those cases in which natural sex operates. This negative function of the formal element in causing change of gender must not be confused with its positive agency already discussed, though the distinction may not admit in every single case of being sharply drawn.

445. The *neuter* is in its origin nothing but the 'sexless,' as its name rightly declares. The masculine and feminine existed as

psychological categories before they passed into grammatical ones; the neuter, on the other hand, has, solely as a consequence of the formal abolition of the two natural genders, and as a consequence of the consistent observance of concord, taken its place as a third grammatical gender.

NUMBER.

446. Number also passes into a grammatical category solely by the development of concord. Even in inflexional languages the plural is not in all cases indispensable where a plurality has to be designated. Every plurality may be conceived by the speaker as a unity. And thus there are designations for a definite number which are singular, such as *score, dozen, lakh*, just as originally *thousand, hundred*, and probably also other numerals also were throughout. Number.

447. Thus, further, the so-called collectives are comprehensive singular designations of plurality. Now as the conception of an aggregate as a unity or as a plurality depends so much on the subjective caprice of the speaker, his conception may also conflict with that which is exhibited by the grammatical form of the expression chosen, and this variation of subjective conception attests itself by the fact that it, and not the grammatical number, determines the concord,—a result followed, in some cases, by variations in gender.

448. The most common case is where a plural follows a singular collective. This phenomenon is much restricted in modern literary German, which in this, as in other ways, has been very powerfully influenced by the pedantry of grammatical logic. But it was of common occurrence during the last century, as it is in Greek and Latin, and is at the present day in English. Cf. *ich habe mich offenbart deines vaters hause, da sie noch in Egypten waren*

(LUTHER); *im vollen kreise des volks entsprungen, unter ihnen lebend* (HERDER); *civitati persuadet ut exirent* (CAESAR); *ex eo numero, qui per eos annos consules fuerunt* (CICERO); *ängstlich im schlafe liegt das betäubte volk und träumt von rettung, träumt ihres ohnmächtigen wunsches erfüllung* (GOETHE); *das junge paar hatte sich nach ihrer verbindung nach engagement umgesehen* (GOETHE); *the whole nation seems to be running out of their wits* (SMOLLETT); *Israel aber zog aus in den streit und lagerten sich* (LUTHER); *alle menge deines hauses sollen sterben, wenn sie männer worden sind* (LUTHER); *dass der rest von ihnen sich durch Libyen nach Cyrene retteten und von da in ihr vaterland zurüickkamen* (LE.); *the army of the queen mean to besiege us* (SHAKESPEARE); *pars saxa jactant* (PLAUTUS); *concursum populi, mirantium quid rei esset* (LIVY); *ὁ ὄχλος ἠθροίσθη, θαυμάζοντες καὶ ἰδεῖν βουλόμενοι* (XENOPHON).

449. In the case of many words the combination with the plural is so common that we may actually apprehend them as plural—that is, supposing that no formal element points to the singular. This is, for instance, the case with the English word *people*. The development admits even of a further step, in which the discrepancy between the grammatical and psychological number is overcome by the assimilation of the former to the latter. Thus in the case of OHG. the plural *liute* (*people* = *lente*), has replaced the singular *lint* (*people* = *volk*); perfectly analogous instances are the Fr. *gens* (Old Fr. *ja furent venn la gent*), Italian *genti* (beside *gente*); late Latin *populi* (Appuleius, Augustinus), and the English *folks*. In AS. *-waren* denotes a 'state;' the plural *-ware*, 'citizens.' The German *die geschwister*, 'brothers and sisters,' has arisen from the collective *das geschwister*, which is still commonly found in the last century. In Gothic there is a collective neuter *fadrein* found in the sense of 'parents.' This is found not merely

connected with the plural of the predicate, but it turns the article which belongs thereto into the plural : *jai fadrein, pans fadrein*. At the same time it appears as well in the plural form : *ni skulun barna fadreinam huzdjan, ak fadreina barnam*.

450. It happens, too, conversely, that a plural expression receives the function of a singular by the fact that the parts which are thereby indicated are comprehended into one united whole. Thus in German one can say, *ein zehn mark*; in English, *I would do it for another five shillings*; even, *there's not another two such women* (WARREN). Further *MIIG. se einen pfingsten*; Latin *una, bina castra*, etc.; English *if a gallows were on land*; *there's some good news*; *that crystal scales* (SHAKESPEARE). Finally, such plurals also receive a singular form. In German the names of festivals, *ostern, pfingsten, weihnachten*, properly dative plurals, are used as singulars. The German word *buch* is in Gothic a plural : *bókōs*, properly 'letters'; in *OHG.* the plural is still used for a book. The Latin word *castra* is sometimes apprehended as a singular feminine, and forms a genitive *castrae*; in the same way *festa* in the Romance languages has passed into a singular feminine. The Latin *litterae*, in the sense of an 'epistle,' has passed into the Italian *lettera*; French *lettre* [the Latin *vela* into the French *voile*]; *minaciae* has become in French *menace*; in Italian *minaccia*; *nuptiae* has become in French *noce* and *noces*; *tenebrae* has become in Spanish *tiniebla* as well as *tinieblas*.

451. When a word is used as an *abstract* it is, strictly speaking, incapable of any distinction of number. Since, however, in respect of the external form, a particular number has to be chosen, it is a matter of indifference which this is. The sentences *man is mortal* and *men are mortal*, used in an abstract sense, express the same meaning. Hence a change of numbers is common in the different languages. Otfrid employs the combination *engilon*

joh manne. A pronoun which has reference to an abstract expression stands sometimes in the plural: *nicht als ob in ihm kein einziges punkt wäre, die hat er* (HERDER); *ein echter deutscher mann mag keinen Fransen leiden, doch ihre weine trinkt er gern* (GOETHE); *nobody knows what it is to lose a friend, till they have lost him* (FIELDING); MHG. *swer gesiht die minneclichen, dem muoz si wol behagen, daz si ir tugent prsint*; *jedes triftige beiwort, an denen er glücklich ist* (HERDER). The predicate can stand in the plural: MHG. *daz ieslicher recke in den satel saz und in schar schiltten*; Lat. *ubi quisque videt, eunt obviam* (PLAUT.); *uterque sumus defessi* (ib.); *uter mernistis culpam* (ib.); *neuter ad me iretis* (ib.); It. *come ogni uomo desinato ebbero*; Engl. *neither of them are remarkable* (BLAIR). Most IE. languages possess, for denoting generality, a pair of pronouns, one singular and one plural (*every, all*; *jeder, alle*). These admit of being readily interchanged. Thus, even in Latin, the singular is found by the side of *omnes*; e.g. *militai omnis amans* (OVID); in Italian the singular *ogni* has become the exclusive form. In Greek, *ἑκαστος* and *ἑκαστοι* stand side by side. Singular forms have grown out of German *beide*. The neuter *beides* is common; it is occasionally found even in MHG. We likewise meet with *ze beider sit* in MHG; cf. *beiderseits*. In older NHG. we meet with other singular applications of the word: *beider baum* (MATHESIUS); *mit beidem arm* (LOHENSTEIN); *auf beyde weise* (LESSING). Conversely the plural *jede* is common, especially in the previous century (cf. *DWb.* 4³, 2290).

452. The category of number is further inapplicable to the simple *designations of materials*. For individuals, as such, and the contrast between individual objects and pluralities, arise only when we contemplate form as well as matter. Hence the designations of materials are mostly employed only in the singular,

which has to serve the place of that *neuter number* which we do not possess. But a transition is easily made from the designation of a material to the designation for an individual object, and *vice versa*, since the individualising form is readily added, or removed, in imagination; cf. *hair, grass, bloom, fruit, weed, grain, cloth, stone, wood, field, meadow, marsh, heath, earth, land, bread, cake*, etc. Under this head, too, will fall *fowl*, for 'the meat of fowl'; and in German, *schwein* for *schweinefleisch*; cf. in Latin, *leporem et gallinam et anserem* (CAESAR), and *fagum atque abietem* (CAESAR) for *beech* and *firewood*. In the same way we must explain the singular in cases like *the enemy is approaching, the Russian* (i.e. 'the Russian army') *is drawing near us*. Similarly Livy uses the singular: *Romanus, Poenns, eques, pedes*, etc., and even ventures on the combination *Hispani milites et funditor Balcaris*. [In *Hor. Sat. i, i* we have *miles nautaeque*.] In Seneca we even find *multo hoste*. With this may be compared *mit willkürlicher beliebung des ganzen kaufmanns* (MICRÄLIUS, u.a., cf. *DIVb.* 5, 337).

453. The singular of many words, again, in the function of an absolute form on which the category of numbers has not yet been fully impressed, stands in NHG. after numerals. This method of construction no doubt arose from cases in which a true plural form, which has merely phonetically come to coincide with the singular form, lies at the base; thus in the case of *mann—pfund, buch*. If, however, the archaic forms have maintained themselves immediately after numerals, and other words such as *fuss, soll, mark*, have followed their analogy, this fact must depend upon special causes. The instinct of language is as little conscious of a plural form in the archaic combinations as in those analogically constructed after them. The fact is that, immediately following a number, there is no need for any special

expression of plurality, this being already sufficiently denoted by the number itself. We thus arrive at a form which in respect of number is neutral or absolute ; and so, once more, at a point of view similar to that occupied before the rise of grammatical number.

TENSE¹

Tense. 454. Various attempts have been made to reduce the tenses of the IE. languages to a *logical system*, and neither arbitrary judgment nor misplaced acumen has been wanting in the process. We must, here as elsewhere, guard ourselves, when dealing with logical definitions, against considering solely the grammatical phenomena, which we have before us, and, when forming a judgment of the latter, against an exclusive regard to purely logical divisions. There is no such thing as a perfect concord between the logical and the grammatical categories.

455. The category of tense depends on the temporal relation in which an event stands to a definite point of time. As such may be taken, in the first place, the actual moment of speech ; and thus arises the difference between past time, present and future, to which the grammatical categories of perfect, present and future, tense correspond. I assume the perfect as the just expression for this relation, and not the aorist, though the latter certainly does also occur in this function. The common definition, according to which the perfect denotes 'completed' and the aorist 'past' action, is a mere verbal explanation with which no clear conception can be associated. The characteristic feature of the perfect in contrast to the aorist and the imperfect lies in the fact that it expresses the relation of an event to the present time.

¹ Cf. for this section, Brugmann, *Ber. der phil.-hist. class. der sächs. gesellch. d. wissenschaften* 1883, p. 169 199.

456. Instead, however, of the present, a point may be taken which lies in the past or the future; and to this, again, correspondingly a threefold relationship is possible. An event may be contemporaneous, previous, or in prospect. Contemporaneity, with a moment in past time, has found its expression in the imperfect; that which has preceded it is denoted by the pluperfect; for what is in prospect in past time no special tense exists; we have to content ourselves with periphrases. That which has preceded a point of the future is denoted by the *futurum exactum*; that which is in prospect, from this point, can be expressed by periphrasis only; the contemporaneous is rendered by the simple future. In this scheme the aorist, and the substitutes for it which have grown up in single languages, has as yet found no place. It is the narrative tense—*i.e.* it denotes a process which falls in the past; not, however, in its relation to the present, but in relation to another, but earlier, point of past time. Herein, however, the process in question is not regarded as impending, but as already fulfilled. The point of time at which we place ourselves is continually changed and moved forwards.

457. What I have said of the relation of the tenses which actually occur to those which must be ideally constructed holds good absolutely for the indicative only. For the infinitive and participle, the point of time with reference to which we record our movements is defined by the finite verb to which they are attached. A threefold distinction of tense therefore suffices. The same tenses which serve to express the relation to a present moment of time are likewise employed to denote the relation to a point of the past or of the future.¹ This is also the reason why the participles, in connexion with a finite verb, are so well adapted to replace such tenses as happen to be defective. The

¹ Cf. Brugmann, *u.s.* p. 174.

imperative is in its nature always future, and similarly the conjunctive and the optative, so far, that is, as they denote that anything is to happen or is wished for.

458. Before the formation of grammatical tenses one and the same form had to do duty in their place, and the time-relation had to be either denoted by special words, or else guessed at by the context. No special form undistinguished by any mark of tense any longer occurs. But the function of such a form is partially fulfilled by the Present as the least characteristic tense side by side with its strictly Present function. We are accordingly in a position to realise the circumstances which preceded the formation of grammatical tenses.

459. The present fulfils the function of an absolute tense, in the first instance, in all abstract sentences (cf. p. 117). A sentence like *the ape is a mammal* applies to the past and the future as well as to the present. If another sentence is subordinated to the abstract one, the action of this may be conceived as preceding that of the main sentence, and thus the perfect may be employed ; as *we shut the door when the horse is stolen*. What is foreign, then, to the abstract sentence is not all tense-distinction as such, but the fixation of a point of departure.

460. The concrete-abstract sentence (cf. p. 117) has this in common with the pure abstract sentence, that no definite single point of time is decisive ; that it rather holds good for a number of different points of time ; whence it comes that in it the present includes in itself both past and future. Its time, however, is not an absolute one. It is bounded before and behind in narrow limits, and within these limits it is possible for interruptions to occur. It is likewise possible for all the points of time to fall into the past or the future, and hence it comes that the imperfect or perfect, and the future, can stand.

461. The present, in very many languages, performs the functions of the future. This is specially the case when another word sufficiently indicates that the action in question is in the future; cf. *ich reise morgen ab, das nächstens erscheinende buch*; and in English such phrases as *I start to-morrow; the next day that dawns*; but in other cases also, where the situation admits of no misunderstanding. Further, the future character of the main sentence is extended to the by-sentence, so that the present and perfect receive a future sense; cf. *wenn er kommt, werde ich dich rufen; wenn ich die arbeit beendigt habe, werde ich es dir sagen*. Conversely we find in Greek the present of the main sentence after the future of the by-sentence; cf. *εἰ αὖτη ἡ πόλις ληφθήσεται καὶ ἡ πᾶσα Σικελία* (EUR.).¹ In O.H.G. the present is likewise used in a future sense without any further support.

462. We are not accustomed to use the present instead of the preterite except in the case of the historical present, where, however, we have to assume an actual displacement of the point of view in the imagination. But in Sanskrit the word *भूत*, in Greek *παρος*, is found with the present in the sense of the preterite; cf. *παρος γε μὲν οὐ τι θαμίξεις* = 'formerly thou camest not often' (HOMER).²

463. There occur also cases in which the present refers alike to past and future; cf. *ich weiss das schon lange* = *I know this now and have long known it: er ist seit 20 jahren verheiratet; so lange ich ihn kenne, habe ich das noch nie an ihm bemerkt; seitdem er in Rom ist, hat er mir nicht geschrieben*.

464. The relative time-relation of two events which take place in the past or in the future remains in many cases undefined. The Germans say *als ich ihn erreichte* as well as *erreicht hatte, wenn ich ihn finde*, as well as *gefunden habe*. It is well known that in

¹ Cf. Brugmann, *u.z.* p. 170.

² *Ibid.* p. 170.

Greek the aorist stands in by-sentences instead of the Latin pluperfect, in Latin the perfect even after *postquam*; in MHG. the simple preterite is quite common, where we now employ the periphrasis which has to take the place of the pluperfect. This inaccurate employment of the tenses is the more primitive. The pluperfect is merely a secondary formation. More commonly still the relative time-relation is neglected in the case of the participle; and in this the lack of forms strictly needful co-operates. Cf. *In Zug ans land steigend, kehrten wir im Ochsen ein* (GOETHE, and more examples may be found in Andr. *Sprachg.* 112); *haec Maurus secum ipse diu volvens tandem promittit* (SALLUST; for further examples *vid.* Draeger, § 572). Conversely we find in Latin the perfect participle with a present meaning: *moritur uxore gravida relicta* (LIV., cf. Draeger, § 582). The participle in *-ndus* is not used only in a future sense but in certain cases also as a present, as in *volvenda dies, volvendis mensibus* (VERGIL.); *alienos fundos signis inferendis petebat* (CICERO; Draeger, § 599). The German participle present unites the signification of the present and the future, cf. e.g. *der noch immer betrauerte, früh verstorbene vater*.

465. It is possible too for many factors of a secondary nature to come into consideration for the signification of grammatical tenses. Since, for instance, an event which has occurred commonly leaves traces of itself, it is possible for the statement that an event has occurred, to carry with it the further suggestion of its subsequent result; and this, strictly speaking, accidental portion of the meaning may become its principal element. The result being now, however, regarded as the essence of the signification, the signification of the perfect necessarily appears as present. Thus the disappearance of the regular present conduces to the result which is called in the German grammars *präteritopräsens*.

466. The same logical relation as that of the present to the

perfect, denoting result, may subsist also between distinct verbs : — cf. *treten* — *stehen*, *fallen* — *liegen*, *erstummen* — *schweigen*, *erwachen* — *wachen*, *entbrennen* — *brennen*, *sich setzen* — *sitzen*. Since in this case the passing into a given condition, and the subsistence in such condition, are rendered by two different linguistic expressions, there are also cases in which the same verb may denote both. In MHG. it is possible for *sitzen*, *stān*, *ligen*, *salgen* to bear the sense of *sich setzen*, *treten*, *sich legen* or *fallen*, *erstummen*; cf. NHG. *aufsitzen*, *aufstehn*, *abstehn*, etc.; and the Modern Upper German use of *sitzen*. Consequently the MHG. *ich bin gesezen* and *ich sitze* may bear an identical signification. Similarly the Greek *φεύγω* may mean 'I am exiled,' and *ἄδικῶ*, 'I am sorry.' Here too may be cited cases in which events belonging to the past are denoted by the present because their effect is still operative; cf. *er lässt dich grüssen*; *der herr schickt mich*; *ich höre, dass er zurückgekehrt ist*; *er schreibt mir, dass alles gut steht* etc. In the same way the Greek *ἀκούω*, *πυνθίρομαι*, *αἰσθάνομαι*, *μανθάνω*, etc. are used; and other languages employ the same usage.

467. We have seen above (p. 303) that the modal and temporal circumstances are not independent of each other. As it is characteristic of the imperative to denote a process to be realised in the future, it is easy to understand that the future can, with the aid of the situation and of the stress laid on the word be understood as an imperative; e.g. *you will do it at once*. In the same way the future can be optative, cf. *sic me di amabunt, ut me tuarum miseritumst fortunarum* (TERENCE). In the interrogative sentences of demand ('frageaufforderungssätzen') cf. p. 125? the conjunctive and the future have the same function; cf. Latin *quid faciamus* with the Greek *τί ποιήσομεν*. Nay, the future may be employed even as a potential, cf. *das wird sich so verhalten*, 'that

will be so': and similarly in Latin popular language, e.g. *haec erit bono genere nata* (PLAUTUS), cf. Draeger, § 136. The same use is common in the Romance languages, cf. Diez, iii. 282: Mätz. *Fr. Gr.* p. 72, 3, 4; 75, 2. It is possible to seek two different explanations for this phenomenon. In the first place, since all that takes place in the future is more or less uncertain, the signification of the future might have developed in such a way that nothing but the factor of uncertainty remained over. In the second place, however, we might apprehend a sentence like *he will be at home* as 'it will turn out that he is at home.' The French conditional is a preterite to this potential mood. It denotes originally the future process from a point of time of the past, as, e.g., in such a sentence as *nous continuons que nous partirions le lendemain*. As a strict conditional it may, but need not necessarily, bear a future sense. In German as well, a future periphras is employed which has not necessarily a future sense; but for this the conjunctive is employed, as *ich würde zufrieden sein*. As the future has been transferred to a modal signification, conversely in Latin the conjunctive has passed into a future.

VOICE.

468. The tenses and moods have intrinsically nothing to do with syntax, and only come to express syntactic relations owing to their relationship to each other, and consequently not till we have to deal with compound sentences. The distinction between Active and Passive, on the other hand, is of essentially syntactical nature, since it expresses nothing else but a differing relation of the verb of the predicate to the subject. That which in the active is the object, is in the passive the subject. Hence the employment of the passive renders it possible to make a psychological subject, which otherwise would necessarily take the grammatical form of the object, into the grammatical subject as well; and this is a

principal reason for the use of the passive construction. In impersonal sentences it is a matter of indifference whether the active or the passive is employed. The custom of language has ruled that words which under normal circumstances are construed personally, are employed passively when they are by an exceptional usage employed impersonally (cf. the German *es wird gesungen, getanzt*, etc.), while in the case of verbs which normally speaking are used impersonally, the more simple active is employed (*es regnet*, 'it rains, hails,' etc.). There occur, however, points of contact between the active and passive constructions, cf. *der wald rauscht* — *es rauscht*, *das haus brennt* — *es brennt*. In the ON. Sagas, we often find in the introductions to a division the formula *hér segir* 'here it says,' = 'here is treated of.' [The same usage is common in Russian.] In Middle Latin *dicit* is equivalent to *dicitur* of classical Latin. In a superscription of the OHG. Isidor we find *hear quidit umbi dhea bauhnunga* = *hier wird gehandelt von der vorbildlichen darstellung*: and similarly in other cases. The use of *skal* in ON. in the sense of *man soll* (*wird*), etc. is similar.

469. The contrast between active and passive could not be formed until the separation between subject and object had been completed. Before this, in any case, the simple juxtaposition of subject and predicate must have denoted the passive relation as well as the active. We can still observe the change between the active and passive signification in the nominal forms of the verbs, which in their manner of formation have nothing to point to one or to the other.

470. The participle present appears in archaic NHG. frequently in a passive sense, cf. *seine dabei liegende verräterische absicht* (THUMMEL), *dem in petto habenden gedicht* (SCHILLER);¹ especially common are expressions like *vorhabende reise*. In English we say

¹ Cf. Grimm, *Gr.* iv. 66. Andr. *Sprg.* 82.

*the horses are putting to, the casinos are filling, etc.*¹ This passive application is to be apprehended precisely as the free addition of the participle discussed *supra*, p. 157.

471. In the case of the so-called perfect participle, it is seen quite plainly that the difference between active and passive cannot consist in anything already attaching to the formation, since the participles of the transitive verbs are employed passively, and those of the intransitives in part actively. Even these limits, however, are not invariably preserved. There arise turns of expression like *das den grafen befallene unglück* (GOETHE), *des den erwartungen nicht entsprochenen anferthalts* (GUTZKOW); *stattgefunden*, and *stattgehabt* are tolerably common.² Notably, however, a number of participles of transitive verbs used in a transitive meaning have passed into pure adjectives, cf. *erfahren*, *verdient*, *geschworen*, *gerecht*, *gelernt*, *studiert*, etc. [in English 'learned,' 'aged,' etc.]

472. In Latin the passive sense does not originally attach to the participles in *-endus*, *-undus*, cf. *oriundus*, [*volvenda dies*, VIRGIL, etc.], by the side of which in older writers others like *pereundus*, 'dying out,' *placendus*, 'pleasing,' etc., range themselves. Other observations of a similar nature may be made in Latin as in other languages.

473. The verbal distinction of voice was originally as foreign to the infinitive as to the verbal noun. The former, however, makes a first approximation to the voice-character, on the one hand, when an object-case is put in dependence from it; and, on the other, when it shares with the governing verb the reference to the subject of the latter (*he is able to read*); or further, to another word contained in the sentence, to which it stands in no direct grammatical relation (*befehlen steht ihm übel an, durch fliehen kann er sich retten*, etc.) Such reference is not in itself absolutely necessary.

¹ Cf. Mätzner, ii. 56.

² Cf. Andr. *Sprg.* p. 83 499.

None such, for instance, is to be found in such a sentence as *er befiehlt zu schweigen* or *er lehrt beten*. In this case the infinitive is fundamentally neither active nor passive, but voiceless. In Gothic we find not unfrequently the simple infinitive standing in the place of the Greek infinitive passive in cases where the modern Germans also employ the periphrastic passive infinitive; e.g. *warþ þan gaswilltan þamma unledin jah briggan fram aggilum* = ἐγένετο δὲ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν πτωχὸν καὶ ἀνενεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγγέλων, cf. Gramm. iv. 57 sqq. This is natural when we take notice of the originally neutral nature of the infinitive. But on the other side it is equally intelligible that the want felt in the individual IE. languages led by gradual but inevitable steps to the creation of a passive infinitive. The necessity for the employment of such naturally made itself most felt in the case of those languages in which the accusative has developed into the subject-case of the infinitive.

474. A grammatical passive exists only in cases where such passive has been formed from the same stem as the active, and has been separated therefrom by a special method of formation. The relation of an intransitive to the corresponding causative is approximately analogous to the relation of the passive to the active, cf. *fallen* — *fällen*, *hagen* — *hängen*, and the pairs from unrelated roots, *werden* — *machen*, *sterben* — *töden*, *(hin) fallen* — *(hin)werfen*. The difference, however, consists in this, that in the case of the intransitive, an operative agency is not contemplated as normally as in the case of the passive. This difference is therefore easily cancelled. In Greek the phrase is allowed, ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπὸ τινος. In Latin *fio* is employed in the present simply as the passive of *facio*. In no other way than this are the periphrases for the passive by means of *werden* and *sein* intelligible. On the other hand, the so-called deponents show us the transition from the

passive to the active. These cannot justifiably be placed in a separate category from the proper passive or middle voice by the circumstance that they have to be translated by the active in a foreign language. On the other hand, we have to take into consideration the entire loss of the active which originally belongs to them, and more decisively still, a method of construction which commonly falls only to the active; thus especially the connexion with an accusative of the object.

475. One of the most ordinary ways in which the passive takes its origin is from the middle voice, which on its side is capable of being formed from the composition of the active with the reflexive pronoun. [Cf. French *se marier*, the Scand. *-sk*, etc., the Russian way of forming the passive in *-sa*, and possibly the Latin form in *-ier*]. The exact process is that one element in the signification of the middle disappears. The middle involves at once the origin of an action in the subject and its return thither: the passive, the latter only. In the case of many reflexive combinations in NHC., the consciousness of an activity of the subject has likewise disappeared; but they approximate more to the simple intransitive by means of the relationship which exists between this and the passive; cf. *sich regen*, *ausdehnen*, *drehen*, *teilen*; *sich freuen*, *schämen*, *verwundern*, *irren*, etc. Still more completely is every active operation of the subjects excluded in *sich finden*, *befinden*, in expressions like *das lässt sich hören*, *es lässt sich da gut leben*, *das hört sich gut an*, *hier tanzt es sich sehr leicht*.

CHAPTER XVI.

DISPLACEMENT OF THE SYNTACTICAL DISTRIBUTION.

WE have already seen, in Chapter VI., that the *distribution* of a sentence,—the manner in which we combine elements in larger or smaller groups,—admits of being readily modified. It was likewise hinted there that the psychological (or logical) relation of the elements among themselves, and their purely grammatical relation, may be in absolute conflict. The syntactical forms (e.g. the cases) arise, in the first instance, in connexion with definite elements of the sentence,—such as subject, object, determination of a substantive, etc. But they express at the same time a more specific mutual relation than can be expressed by the mere juxtaposition of the several words. Now the use of this method of mere specific expression, while the old free combination of notions, which can never be wholly abolished, still prevails, produces a contradiction, which in its turn, if it becomes 'usual,' gives rise to new constructions. The departure from the external form of grammar here consists partly in a different way of grouping and detaching the single elements, partly in a different psychological arrangement of them, by which subject, predicate, object, etc., change functions.

The divergence of psychological and grammatical distribution.

477. *Duality of elements* is, as we have seen, the primitive form of the sentence. Even the fullest sentences admit of being so constructed, the whole of the supplementary matter being thrown

Duality and Multiplicity of elements.

into extensions of the two elements. But it is possible for the determinants of the predicate, the nearer and remoter object, the determinants of place and time, to likewise obtain the value of independent members, so that a multiplicity of members arises. Conversely, this multiplicity may itself give rise to a simple pair, several members being grouped in one without regard to the distribution which would be demanded by the historical development of the mode of sentence in question. If we indicate the subject by a , the predicate by b , the determinants of the latter by Greek letters, and the single groups by brackets, we should have as our fundamental scheme $(a)(ba\beta\gamma\delta)$, and beside it $(a)(b)(a)(\beta)(\gamma)(\delta)$. Hence can develop schemes such as $(aba\beta\gamma)(\delta)$ or $(aba\beta\delta)(\gamma)$, etc., or again $(a)(ba\beta\gamma)(\delta)$, $(a)(ba\beta\delta)(\gamma)$, etc., and others beside. The violation of the original distribution can go even yet further, determinants of the subject being likewise detached from it and combined with other elements; and those of the object in the same way, etc.

478. Multiplicity of elements, resulting from an approximate equality in the value of each, occurs especially in calm, connected exposition. Ordinary conversation always tends to sentences of two or three elements only.

The Psychological Predicate.

479. The element most sharply distinguished from the rest is, in the first place, the psychological predicate, as being the most important of all, containing as it does that which it is the final aim of the sentence to communicate, and on which therefore the strongest emphasis is laid. The sentence *Charles drives to-morrow to London* can be conceived as of four members in case it is spoken to a wholly unprepared hearer, to whom all its several elements are therefore alike new. We can then say equally well that three distinct predicates are attached to the subject *Charles*; or, perhaps more correctly, that to the subject *Charles* is attached the predi-

cate *drives*, to the subject *Charles travels* the predicate *to-morrow* and to the subject *Charles drives to-morrow* the predicate *to London*. Here the last determinant is no doubt somewhat, but only slightly, more emphasised than the rest. On the other hand, where the mental disposition of the hearer is previously defined in a manner known to the speaker, each of the four members may become a sharply emphasised predicate. If Charles' journey to-morrow has already been discussed, and only its goal remains uncertain, then *to London* is the predicate. We might then express it otherwise—*the goal of the journey which Charles makes to-morrow is London*. If his journey to London has been mentioned, and only the time was indefinite, then *to-morrow* is predicate, and we might express it—*Charles' journey to London takes place to-morrow*. If it is known that Charles will travel to London to-morrow, but not whether he will walk or drive there, the predicate lies in *drives*. But we could not exactly say that *drives* is psychological predicate in accordance with the grammatical form; it is rather to be split into two elements, a general verb of motion and a determinant to this verb indicating the species of motion; and only the latter is predicate. If, finally, it is known that some one is driving to London to-morrow, it is only doubtful *who*, then the grammatical subject *Charles* is the psychological predicate, and we can say equally well—*the person who is driving to-morrow to London is Charles*.

480. As opposed to the psychological predicate, all the other elements of the sentence can be conceived as subject, as is clear from the above examples. But it is also possible for a single element to stand prominently out as subject, in which case it approaches most nearly in importance, and therefore in emphasis, to the predicate. The other elements then appear as copulæ, which serve to connect the subject and predicate, and to define

Psychological subject and copula.

the precise nature of their connexion. Thus, in psychological analysis, the predicate of the sentence *Mary has toothache* is not *has* but *toothache*, while *has* is only a copula ; in the sentence *John is accustomed to walk very fast*, in the same way, the predicate is *very fast*, *is accustomed to walk* being a copula ; in *he gesticulated like one possessed*, *like one possessed* is predicate, *gesticulated* copula.

481. Every member of a sentence, in whatever grammatical form it may appear, is capable, from a psychological point of view, of being subject, predicate, or copula, or a constituent of any of them. Subject and predicate can be indicated by position as well as by emphasis. In German, wherever the place at the head of the sentence, normally assigned to the subject, is occupied by another element, this is either a logical subject or a logical predicate, the former more often than the latter. In the latter case this part of the sentence is also the most strongly emphasised, but not in the former. The view, frequently met with, that the position at the head of the sentence always serves to emphasise above all others the element which occupies that place, is therefore wholly wrong.

Elements
which are
regularly
Psychologi-
cal Subject
or Predicate.

482. When a demonstrative, referring back to a previously expressed substantive, occurs at the beginning of a sentence, it is as a rule the psychological subject, or a portion thereof. For precisely because of this backward reference, it represents the idea from which the thought of both speaker and hearer proceeds, and to which what follows is attached as new information ; cf. *ich traf einen knaben, den fragte ich ; —dem sagte ich ; —bei dem erkundigte ich mich ; —darüber war ich erfreut ;* or *ich ging nach hause, da fand ich einen brief ; ich sah ihn am sonntag zum letzten male, damals sagte er mir ;* or *Fritz war gestern bei mir ; diesen menschen möchte ich immer zum hause hinaus werfen ; aber ich muss rücksicht auf seine familie nehmen ; aus diesem grunde kann ich es*

nicht. In the same way the *relative* is regularly psychological subject. The *interrogative*, on the other hand, is regularly a predicate, or a portion of it. For the indefinite use of it in the question, the answer substitutes a definite one. Hence, if Cicero says, *quam utilitatem aut quem fructum petentes scire cupimus illa? or tu vero quibus rebus gestis, quo hoste superato contionem convocare ausus es?*—the psychological predicate lies not in the finite verb but in the participle and its appendages. Further, every element of a sentence, the connexion of which with the rest is denied by means of a negative particle, is invariably a psychological predicate; cf. *nicht ihn habe ich gerufen* = 'the person, whom I have called, is not he'; *nicht ihm habe ich das geld gegeben* = 'the person, to whom I have given money, is not he,' etc. The negation belongs, therefore, though not invariably, to the grammatical, yet invariably to the psychological predicate, or, to speak more properly, it invariably relates to the connexion of the psychological subject with the psychological predicate. It follows, of course, that the adversative clause which is placed in line with the negated element is also a predicate; e.g. *nicht am morgen, sondern am mittag will ich verreisen*. Further, every element which is emphasised by a *nur, allein, ausschliesslich, only, exclusively*, or the like, for they can be replaced by *not another*; but *besonders, vor allem, especially, above all, mostly*, etc., are also marks of the predicate.

483. The discrepancy between grammatical and psychological predicate may be avoided by a more circumstantial form of expression, which in many languages is abundantly resorted to; *Christen sind es, die das getan haben, or von denen man das verlangt*; English, 'tis thou that robbst me of my lord; French, *c'est moi qui*, etc.; *c'est à vous que je m'adresse*; English, *it is to you, young people, that I speak*; German, *was ihn am meisten ärgerte, war ihre gleich-*

The
Discrepancy
avoided by
Periphrasis.

gültigkeit ; English, *what I most prize in woman, is her affections, not her intellect.*

484. A familiar expedient in German for converting into a subject what would otherwise be the grammatical predicate, is the periphrasis with *tun* ; cf. *verbieten tut es niemand.*

The
Discrepancy
eliminated.

485. In many languages we find the conflict of grammatical and psychological subject solved in the following interesting way : the psychological subject is put first in the nominative, *i.e.* in the form proper to the grammatical subject, and is then resumed by a pronoun, the form of which is determined solely by its grammatical function ; cf. *ein eichkranz, ewig jung belaubt, den setzt die nachwelt ihm aufs haupt* (GOETHE) ; French, *cette confiance, il l'avait exprimée* ; Italian, *gli amici vostri non gli conosco* ; MHG. *riemære unde liugenære, swê die sîn, den verbinte ich mînen sanc* ; Spanish, *claro é virtuoso principe, tanto esta sciencia le plugo* ; Greek, *ἐκεῖνος δὲ οὐ δώσω αὐτῷ οὐδέν* ; MHG. *die Hiinnen durch ir haz der garte sich zwei tîsent* ; French, *tous ces crimes d'état qu'on fait pour la couronne, le ciel nous en absout* ; Italian, *quelli che hanno costituita una repubblica, tra le cose ordinate da loro è stato* (MACHIAVELLI) ; Greek, *τὸ μηδὲν ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις ξυμβάλλεται* (PLATO) ; *ach, der heiligste von unsern tricken, warum quillt aus ihm die grimme pein?* (SCHILLER). The possessive pronoun here takes the place of a genitive : MHG. *Parzival der valscheitswant sîn trinwe in lerte* ; English, *'tis certain, that every man that dies ill, the ill is upon his own head* (John, iv. 1.) ; Spanish, *la villa sin regidores, su triunfo sera breve* ; French, *les soudans, qu'à genoux cet univers contemple, leurs usages, leurs droits ne sont point mon exemple* (VOLTAIRE). A similar phenomenon occurs when an attribute to the psychological subject appears in the nominative ; cf. Greek, *διασκοπῶν καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ*

ἀνὴρ (PLATO); ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἀποκτείνειν τοὺς Μυτεληναίους ἐπικαλοῦντες τὴν ἀπόστασιν (THUC.); παθοῦσα οὕτω δεινὰ πρὸς τῶν φιλτάτων οὐδεὶς ὑπὲρ μου δαιμόνων μηνίεται (AESCH.); French, *depuis deux jours, Fatime, absent de ce palais, enfin son tendre amour le rend à mes souhaits* (VOLTAIRE).

486. A still more complete elimination of the discrepancy consists in simply giving to the psychological the form of the grammatical subject, *i.e.* in putting it in the nominative. On the Rhine they say, according to Andresen, *Sprachegebrauch* 80, *es geben dies jahr nicht viele äpfel*. The nominative is used in the same way, according to Hildebrand, *DIVb.* 4, 1a, 1404, in Strassburg, Osterlande, Thüringen, and Hesse. Andresen adduces from literary German, *es gibt nichts lächerlicheres als ein verliebter mann* (BÖRNE). Even GOETHE (*Der junge Goethe*, ii. 465) says: *müssen es hier menschen geben*; and HERDER, *gichts aber keine andere empfindbarkeit zu trönten als körperlicher schmerz?* In the last case, therefore, at least, the comparison is treated as if it belonged to a grammatical subject.

487. Adverbial determinants, which commonly, as the name shows, are simply attached to the predicative verb, play in reality very various parts in the structure of the sentence. On the one hand they are really verb-determinants; e.g. *Charles eats slowly*; *das kind zappelt mit händen und füssen*. If, then, the essential point of the communication lies in the adverbial determinant, this can be treated as the predicate, and the verb as copula between it and the subject. But the distribution may also be of this nature, that the adverb serves to define the combination of the other members of the sentence. No sharp boundary between this and the first-described distribution can be laid down. All temporal, local, and causal determinants can be referred to this class. These constitute, in antithesis to the other elements of the sen-

Psycho-
logical treat-
ment of
Adverbial
Deter-
minants.

tence, as a rule the psychological subject, sometimes the predicate ; cf. *to-morrow evening I will visit you ; on the table lie two books ; the books lie not on the table but in the box*. But here the verb is always subordinated in such a way that it can be equally well conceived as a copula. On the other hand, there are certain cases in which the adverb can only be conceived as a predicate attached to an already completed sentence. To this head belong all expressions of modality, such as *certainly, assuredly, truly, in any case, probably, doubtless, perhaps, hardly*. *He will certainly come* is equivalent to *it is certain that he will come*. Further, such expressions as *unfortunately, otherwise, under these circumstances, on this condition*, German *vorkommenden falls, leider, sonst*, etc. ; also, in German, *torichterweise*, and all other forms in *-weise*, which are distinguished just in this point from the simple adverbs *toricht*, etc. ; the latter refer to the predicate, the former to the relation between subject and predicate. The attempt to give clear grammatical expression to the logical relation has led to such German phrases as *kaum, dass er mich ansieht ; vielleicht, dass eine träne dann von seinem auge fällt* (frequent in the last century) ; *glücklicherweise, dass die gemälde so hoch stehen* (GOETHE). Expressions of assurance, occurring alone in the first place—e.g. *gewiss, er wird es tun*—are obviously predicates to the independent sentences which follow.

Rarity of
Discrepancy
in Languages
of slight
formal
develop-
ment.

488. In languages of slight formal development the discrepancy between psychological and grammatical subject or predicate is far more rare ; for this is occasioned precisely by the growth of a manifold special form of expression for the various logical relations of notions among themselves. The remarkable, and to us very singular, forms of expression in Dajak, adduced by Steinthal, *Typen*, p. 172, 3, seem to me to rest on the essentially following processes. The psychological subject or predicate is made the

grammatical subject or predicate likewise; whence either the former or the latter is put in the first place; and these two main members are thus, if originally compound, distributed on the same principle. Compare especially, in Steinthal's translation, the following: *boat this boat of his choice* = 'this is the boat he has chosen'; *witness two these which thy desire* = 'which of these two witnesses desirest thou?' *thou place of my giving* = 'it is to you that I have given it'; *too much to it moved be bench by thee* (*zu sehr ihr geschoben sein bank durch dich*) = 'thou hast moved the bench too much' (where *too much* is the psychological predicate). Cf. with this the Arabic construction *Omar dead his father* = 'Omar's father is dead' (Steinthal, *Typen*, 271), which further corresponds with the IE. constructions adduced above (p. 316).

489. The same inversion which marks the relation of the psychological, in comparison with the grammatical, subject and predicate, may occur also in the relation of the *determinant* to the *determinate*. The case where it is least easy to decide which of two members is the true determinant, and which the true determinate, is that of two substantives in opposition. I can say, e.g., *Totila, a king of the Ostrogoths*, or *a king of the Ostrogoths, Totila*. Such a change of rôles is, however, only possible when the relation of the two members is a somewhat loose one, a condition of which is, that it is communicated as a piece of new information. Then the whole combination approximates to the nature of a sentence, and the first member is related to that which follows as subject to predicate. If, on the other hand, the relation is assumed to be already known, no arbitrary exchange of rôles is possible, and the order decides nothing. If, for instance, there is question of a certain Mendelssohn, and some one asks: 'What Mendelssohn is meant?' in the reply, 'the composer Mendelssohn,' *Mendelssohn* is undoubtedly the determinate, not

Change of
functions
between the
deter-
minant and
the *Deter-*
minate.

the determinant, in spite of its not standing first. Similarly, in *Queen Anne, Mr. Smith, brother John*, the proper nouns are the determinates, the titles and other defining epithets the determinants. There also occurs, however, where no previous knowledge of the relation can be assumed, a closer combination of the two members with addition of the definite articles; e.g. *the master-tailor Thomson*. Here the article belongs, not to the first member, but to the whole, and by this very means binds it together in a unity. For we cannot say, instead of this, *Thomson the master-tailor*, but, at most, *Thomson a master-tailor*; or, in German, omitting the article, e.g. *Schulze schneidermeister*, when a further determinant follows, e.g. *in Berlin*. But this alteration would relax the closeness of the combination, and the whole expression would accordingly have a different force. In this construction, then, neither element is distinctly determinant or determinate. To the more closely-connected appositional relations belongs also the combination of Christian and surname. It is indubitable that, at the present day, in *John Smith, Peter Robinson, Henry English*, etc., the Christian name is the determinant, the family name the determinate; it is equally certain that originally the converse was the case. There has occurred here, therefore, a *displacement of the distribution*.

490. An adjectival attribute cannot thus simply change rôle, with its substantive. We must here, however, refer to a very frequent construction, in which, undoubtedly, the principal notion is deposited in the adjective. When GRIMM says *jenes heranzuziehen untersagt die mangelnde lautverschiebung*, we must, if we would make the grammatical form logical, transpose the distribution, but at the same time introduce a further change of construction: *der mangel der lautverschiebung*. Cf. the list of examples in Andresen, *Spr.* p. 122, 3.

491. A displacement of quite another kind appears in such phrases as *ein sein wollendes original* (HERDER), *so viele sein wollende kenner* (EBERT to LESSING), *sein sollende griechische simplicität* (IFFLAND); *ein gewesener soldat*, *ein sogenannter vetter*, and the like; FR. *un nommé Richard*. Here the substantives, which are properly predicates of unnamed subjects, have taken the place of these subjects, and accordingly determined the form of the participle also. In cases, again, like *sein früherer (ehemaliger) herr*, *seine spätere (zukünftige) frau*, *der angebliche baron*, the substantives are really predicates.

492. When the separation of elements which grammatically belong closely together, has become 'usual,' new constructions arise, of which we are no longer at liberty to say that they still exhibit the discrepancy between the grammatical and the logical distribution to which they certainly owe their origin. A relation in origin purely psychological has developed into a grammatical relation.

493. Thus the *genitive* frequently detaches itself from immediate connexion with the word on which it primarily depended; where it is dependent on a predicative adjective, the combination is never very close, and it is immaterial whether we treat it as dependent on the adjective alone or on the adjective together with its copula. It enjoys therefore a similar degree of independence to that of an object depending on a verb, and the same freedom of varying its position. Cf. *des erfolges bin ich sicher* ('of success I am certain'). Now in German the genitive *es*, which is frequently dependent on combinations of this kind, has become phonetically coincident with the accusative (MHG. *es*), and accordingly has been accepted as such by the linguistic sense: cf. *ich bin es zufrieden*. Furthermore, in some cases the genitive *nichts* of the MHG. *nicht* has been traditionally preserved, which was also inevitably treated as an

accusative: cf. *ich bin mir nichts böses bewusst*. These circumstances have facilitated, but hardly been the sole cause of, the the further substitution in many cases of the accusative—the objective case *κατ' ἐξοχήν*—for the genitive conceived as an objective case; a substitution precisely parallel to that which has occurred in so many verbs,—e.g. *erwähnen*, *vergessen*, etc. Cf. *was ich mir kaum noch bewusst war* (WIELAND); *sind sie das zufrieden?* (GOETHE), frequently; *wir sind die probe zufrieden* (RÜCKERT); *das bin ich vollkommen überzeugt* (LESSING); *so viel bin ich versichert* (LESSING); *ingedenk zu sein die bescheen fragen* (WEISTÜMER). The accusative is frequent with *habhaft werden*, universal with *gewahr werden*, *gewohnt*, *los*, *überdrüssig*, *schuldig sein* or *werden*. What is true of the adjective applies naturally also to the predicative adverb, hence *inne werden* is now used with accusative. The substitution of the accusative is in any case favoured by the fact that sentences in *dass* can be made dependent on such combinations (*ich bin [es] zufrieden, dass du ihn besuchst*), and treated as the object. In many of these combinations we have only evidence of the accusative of a pronoun. This shows the influence of the *cs*. But it is clear from analogous cases in Greek that the process is possible even where it is not thus facilitated, e.g. *ἐπιστήμονες ἦσαν τὰ προσήκοντα* (XEN.), *ἐξαρνός εἰμι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα* (PLATO).

Genitive and
substantive.

494. The naturally closer combination of genitive with a *substantive* is likewise in many cases relaxed, through its being made logically dependent no longer on the substantive alone, but on the combination of the substantive with a verb, and thus becoming an independent element of the sentence. This is very common in MHG.; e.g. *des wirdet mir huz* ('I have a remedy thence'); *des hân ich gnoten willen*; *des stt dne sorge*; *si wurden des ze râte*; *ich kume eines dings an ein ende* ('I learn something with perfect precision').

Cf. NHG. *des larmens ist kein ende*; *aller guten dinge sind drei*; *lass, vater, genug sein des grausamen spiels* (SCHILLER); *nun will ich des briefs ein ende machen* (SCHILLER); *des ich ein diener worden bin* (LUTHER); *dieses gerechten, welches ihr nun verräter und mörder geworden seid* (LUTHER); *ein schiff, dessen man, so es vorüber ist, keine spur finden kann* (LUTHER); *den leichten erwähnungen, die seiner einige alte grammätiker tun* (LESSING). For the most part we have now to use a preposition for the MHG. genitive. But here also the genitive *es* was misinterpreted and treated as nominative or accusative, so that the logical subject became unreservedly the grammatical also. Cf. *es ist genug* (MHG. *genuec* as substantive taking the genitive), *es ist not*, *es ist zeit*, etc.; *er will es nicht wort haben*; *er weiss es ihm dank*. But the displacement of distribution has had this further consequence, that the genitive has been replaced by the nomination or accusative, a change to which the dependent sentences in *dass*, conceived as subject or object, doubtless contributed. We now say *das nimmt mich wunder* as well as *das wundert mich*; MHG. has *des nimet mich wunder* = 'wonder about it seizes me.' Examples for the accusative are *wer wird ihm diese kleine üppigkeit nicht vielmehr dank wissen?* (LESSING); *was er mir schuld gibt* (LESSING, and similar phrases elsewhere); *in anschung der stärke wird niemand diese assertion in abrede sein* (LESSING, cf. Blümner's note in his edition of the *Laokoon*, 2d edition, p. 588). *Wahrnehmen* (MHG. *war* = 'observation') is now treated as a simple conception, and invariably constructed with an accusative. Cf. constructions in Latin such as *quid tibi nos tactiost* (PLAUT), *quid tibi hanc curatiost rem* (ib.), in which the accusative cannot be conceived as depending solely on the substantive; further *infittias ire, auctorem esse aliquid*. Also GR. *ἐν μὲν πρῶτα σοὶ μομφὴν ἔχω* (EURIP.), and the like.

495. In the languages which use a word originally substantive

to express, or to strengthen the expression of, negation, we find in connexion with it a genitive which, originally dependent on it, has gradually passed into an independent member of the sentence, and now serves as subject or object, while the word on which it originally depended has lost its substantival nature. Cf. FR. *il n'a pas (point) d'argent*; properly, 'he has no step (point) of money.' That the linguistic instinct is no longer sensible of any dependence upon *pas* or *point* is evident from this, among other facts, that *de* is transferred by analogy to other negative sentences which contain no word originally substantive (cf. *il n'y a jamais de lois observées*), and also to sentences negative only in meaning, not in form (cf. *sans laisser d'espérance*; *doit-il avoir d'autre volonté*). Similarly in MHG., cf. *des cumac niht gestu*; *min vrouwe blzet inwer niht*: and so again *alsô grôzer krefte nie mêr reeke gewan*. Cf. further NIIG. *hier ist meines bleibens nicht*.

Verb and
Adverb.

496. The German *Adverbs*, which are at the same time prepositions, enter into a closer union with the verb, in consequence of which the case, which is strictly dependent upon them alone, appears to depend on the combination of verb and adverb; cf. *einem abgewinnen*, *anliegen*, *aufdrängen*, *überwerfen*, *unterlegen*, *vorstellen*; *zusprechen*; *einen anreden*, *anklagen*. That the case was at first really dependent on the adverb is shown by the fact that in the early period we regularly find the same case employed which the adverb governed when used as a preposition; and by the special fact, more particularly, that the verbs which taken by themselves are transitive can take a double accusative when combined with an adverb; thus in NIIG. very frequently the verbs combined with *ane* (*er nam ze künde sich den weisen an*), sometimes those with *îf*, in OS., also those with *umbi*, cf. *stôd ine nuerod umbi*. In English we can clearly trace the process by which a case depending on a preposition is detached from direct connexion with it,

and attracted to the verb. In the great majority of cases, this detachment is caused by the effort to put the psychological subject at the head of the sentence. Cf. *And this rich fair town we make him lord of* (SHAKESPEARE); *washes of all kind I had an antipathy to* (GOLDSMITH); further examples in Mätz. ii. 518. The two principal cases of this phenomenon are the *relative sentences* (cf. *a place which we have long heard and read of*, cf. *ib.* 519), and *passive sentences* (*the tailor was seldom talked of*, cf. *ib.* 65 ff.), where the passive construction serves, as elsewhere, to make the psychological also the grammatical subject. This kind of passive construction is used even with transitive words with an object attached to them (*they were never taken notice of*, SHERIDAN, cf. *ib.* 67). This detachment is further usual in interrogative sentences, where the precedence of the predicate accordingly comes into question (*what humour is the prince of*, cf. *ib.* 519).

497. An element grammatically depending on an infinitive may pass into psychological dependence on the combination of this infinitive with its governing word; cf. *dies buch werde ich dich nie lesen lassen*; *das ding selbst bin ich weit entfernt zu sehen* (LESSING); *mit welchen sie sich erinnern, gegen mich glücklich gewesen zu sein* (LESSING). In consequence of this the linguistic instinct may become uncertain whether the element in question ought to be directly connected with the infinitive or with its government. Hence these cases come to bear a close resemblance to others in which the dependence on the finite verb is really the more primitive—cf. *was ich zu besorgen habe*. Thus it happens that a genuine transference of the government from the infinitive to the finite verb takes place, which is attested unmistakably by the use of the passive; cf. *hier ist sie* (Minna v. Barnhelm) *auf ansuchen des herrn von Hecht zu spielen verboten* (LESSING); *die anklage ist fallen gelassen worden* (Allgemeine Zeitung); *die*

Infinitive
an-I am
element
dependent
on it.

stellung des fürsten Hohenlohe wird zu untergraben versucht (ib.). With these compare the Greek examples: *χιλίων δραχμῶν ὁμολογηθεῖσων ἀπολαβεῖν* ('it having been agreed that I should receive 1000 drachmas,' DEM.); *τὰ ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραγγελθέντα διεξελθεῖν* (PLATO); *τῶν προειρημένων ἡμερῶν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχειν* ('of the days for which it had been ordered to have provisions,' XENOPHON). To the same displacement is also due the passive use of Latin *coepi, desino, jubeo, prohibeo* (*liber legi coeptus est, jubeor interfici*), only that here the infinitive also is thrown into the passive, involving a double reference to the element which is made the subject. A similar passive use occurs in archaic Latin with *possum* and *quco* also, e.g. *quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur* (LUCRETIUS); cf. Draeger, § 93. [So *calcitur* (PLAUT.), *captivi*.] Here belongs, further, the conversion in thought of an object depending on an infinitive into the subject of a governing, but absolutely impersonal, verb, as in *ἦν γάρ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς προσήκον ἰδεῖν* ('what it was becoming to see,' PLATO); *λόγον τινα προσήκοντα ῥηθῆναι* (ib.).¹

Origin of
Connecting-
Words.

498. We have seen that the most heterogeneous elements of a sentence are capable of being psychologically conceived as mere copulas, when two others in their neighbourhood are emphasised as its real essence. Certain words being regularly used thus, the psychological category becomes a grammatical one, and the words in question become connecting-words. By a connecting-word I mean one which serves to indicate the relation subsisting between two notions; which can, accordingly, only be used in association with two notions, and is incapable of any independent meaning when used either alone or with a single notion only. The copula *is* is a connecting-word between subject and predicate. It has latterly been denied that we are justified in setting up such a class,

¹ The above exposition is almost entirely based upon Madvig, *A7. x4r.* p. 362.

and contended that the copula, like any other finite verb, is to be treated as predicate, and the predicative substantive or adjective as the determinant of the predicate. This view seems to me an example of that misunderstanding of what is involved in the demand for a separation between grammar and logic which I have touched on at p. 16 above—an example of one-sided regard for the outer grammatical form and neglect of its functional value. We must not, however, ignore that sentences like *träume sind schäume, glücklich ist der mann*, are equivalent in value to sentences without copula, such as *träume schäume, glücklich der mann*, and that sentences of the simpler form were obviously abundant in the earliest period, and were only by degrees thrust into the background by sentences with copula. Were we to concede to the *is* an independent value beside the substantival or adjectival predicate, all sentences of this class would become assertions of *existence*, which, on the testimony of the linguistic sense, they are obviously not. What nonsense would result from the interpretation of the sentence *that is impossible*, as 'that exists as something impossible'!

499. The reluctance to recognise the copula as a connecting-word arises from its preserving, by means of its inflexion, the character of a verb. In the case of crystallised forms which are devoid of flexional change, there is less difficulty in perceiving the transition from an independent to a connecting-word. This transition is always effected by means of a displacement of the distribution, as will be shown by a series of examples below.

500. A special variety of this displacement consists in giving to two elements, which properly have only an *indirect relation* to each other due to their common dependence upon a third, a *direct relation*. It is thus that we ought, probably, to conceive the origin of the predicative accusative. We can now say equally well *ich*

*Indirect
Reference
becomes
Direct*

mache ihn zum narren and *ich mache einen narren aus ihm*. A double mode of accusative is therefore possible with *machen*, one indicating the object affected by the action, the other the result of this action. If we attach both directly to the verb, as is still possible, in certain phrases, in MIIG., e.g. *ich mache in ritter*, the idea 'he becomes a knight,' or its equivalent, must enter the consciousness at the same time, and thus both accusatives are set in mutual relation on the analogy of subject and predicate. This explanation is applicable to all the cases in various languages, in which a substantive is used as predicative accusative. The transferred use of the adjective as a predicative object might then be conceived as modelled by analogy on the similar use of the substantive. But it must further be considered that, in addition to *ich mache einen menschen glücklich*, we can say *ich mache einen glücklichen menschen*. The same explanation serves for the accusative and infinitive. The infinitive is originally a second object to the governing verb. This is still the case with our *ich lasse ihn aufstehen*, *ich lasse ihn arbeiten*, etc. The infinitive may even stand without another accusative as object (*ich lasse arbeiten*). *Er lehrt mich französisch sprechen* is not essentially different in construction from *er lehrt mich die französische sprache*. So we can say in Latin *quod te jubet* as well as *jubet te facere*. In the same way the nominative and infinitive has an analogy in the passive construction of verbs which can take a double accusative. *Bibulus nondum audiebatur esse in Syria* is identical in construction with *Cicero per legatos cunctis edoctus*; *quod jussi sunt*. The treatment of the substantival accusative as a subject of the infinitive is then a natural result of the actual situation.

501. Another not infrequent mode of displacement occurs when an element, which properly belongs to two co-ordinate or adversative elements, is conceived as belonging solely to the first,

and placed in relation to a particle which connects the two. The German *entweder—oder* is now thought of as a pair of correlative particles. But *entweder* arose from *eindeutler*, and means, properly, 'one of the two'; hence *entweder das auge oder das hertz* is literally 'one of the two, the eye or the heart.' The displacement has allowed the form to crystallise, so that *entweder* can be used in every case, and with every part of speech at will. Where *entweder—oder* serves to combine sentences, the attraction of the former into the first sentence is shown also by the inversion (*entweder ist er tot* beside *er ist tot*). It is just the same with *weder—noch*, with AN ELEMENT equally related to two other Elements is attracted to the first. *NIIG. weder—oder* = Latin *utrum—an*, *NIIG. beide—und* = English *both—and*, etc. We translate Latin *aeque ac* by 'even as,' 'just as.' But a phrase like *hic mihi aequè placet atque ille* is properly 'this man and that please me alike.' That a real displacement of distribution has nevertheless taken place, and that the *ac* of comparison is, to a certain extent, detached from the copulative *ac*, is shown by the regular use of a singular predicate where the *ac* is attached to a singular subject; also by the order; and finally, by cases in which it is no longer possible to render *ac* by 'and,'—e.g. *aeque a te peto ac si mea negotia essent*. Instructive, too, are analogous constructions which have failed to become perfectly normal—where the displacement has either not appeared at all or not yet become 'usual.' *Aequè et* sometimes stands for *aeque ac*: *aeque promptum est mihi et adversario meo* (CICERO); cf. Draeger, § 311, 18. We find further *ac* or *et* after *par*, *similis*, *idem*, *alius*, etc. (cf. *ib.*): *pariter patribus ac plebi carus*; *pariter corpore et animo* (TERENCE); *simul consul ex multis de hostium adventu cognovit et ipsi hostes aderant* (SALLUST); *solet alia sentire et loqui* (CAELIUS); *viae pariter et pugnae* (TACITUS); *omnia fuisse in Themistocle paria et Coriolano* (CICERO); *haec eodem tempore Caesari mandata referebantur et in Licori vadum*

reperiebatur (CAESAR). This displacement has also affected the ON. *ok*.

Compound
sentences.

502. The same displacements which occur within the simple sentence are naturally also found in the compound, since the two kinds of sentence are separated by no essential and pervading distinction. The subordinate sentence has the same function as an element of the sentence, and is therefore subject to the same laws as any other element in respect of the distribution of the entire period. It is therefore wrong to divide, as is usually done, every period at once into a principal and a subordinate sentence (or sentences). In the first place, it is to be considered that the subordinate sentence can represent an indispensable element such as the subject (e.g. *that he does not come, annoys me*); and, further, that what we commonly call the principal sentence is in truth no sentence at all, but only an element or a complex of elements. If the subordinate sentence contains an unessential portion of the period—e.g. a time-determinant—it is doubtless possible to distinguish the principal sentence from it as an independent whole; but this distribution is grammatically wrong, and even psychologically not always right. To divide the period *I asked him after his health when I met him* at once into principal and subordinate sentence, is no more justified than it would be to divide the sentence *I asked him yesterday after his health* into *I asked him after his health + yesterday*. We can of course just as easily put the subordinate sentence as the adverb between the other members. Finally, the subordinate sentence does not always contain an independent element, but frequently only a portion, a determinant, of one: this is the case with all relative-sentences which refer to a word in the principal sentence. Now the subordinate sentence may, just like any other element, demand, from a psychological point of view, a distribution not in accordance

with pure grammar ; and it may, just like any other element, share in the displacement of the distribution. Hence such a displacement is often the condition which renders possible the division into principal and subordinate sentence. The subordinate sentence is here always psychological subject, the principal sentence predicate—of course in the wide sense laid down in Chapter VI.

503. If we apply the distinction drawn on p. 117 between abstract, concrete, and concrete-abstract sentences to the compound sentence, we find that the *hypothetical* sentences (in the widest sense) comprise the abstract and abstract-concrete. To the abstract group belong, e.g., *if it rains, it is wet ; who touches pitch will be defiled* ; to the abstract-concrete, *if you do not yet know it, I will tell you ; as often as he meets me, he asks me ; whoever among you is not content, let him say so*. The meaning of every abstract or abstract-concrete sentence may therefore be expressed by a hypothetical period.

504. Just as the grammatically independent sentence admits of a gradual transition to dependence, so one which is grammatically denoted as dependent may approximate by successive steps to independence. In the intermediate stage described above, p. 145, between logical dependence and independence, the grammatical form may belong to either class. A preference for one or for the other serves to distinguish different languages and styles. Thus it is a familiar characteristic of Latin in the historical period to communicate facts which are in themselves new and have an independent value, but which at the same time serve as temporal or causal determinants of some other fact, in the form of a dependent sentence or a participial phrase, while in German the independent sentence is preferred. In various languages it is not uncommon to attach by a relative a sentence

Transition
from
Dependence
to Inde-
pendence.

which in no way defines or modifies what precedes, but gives new information, and therefore has the force of a co-ordinate sentence; cf. *he went to Paris, whence later on he travelled to Lyons* (=and thence); *I met your father yesterday, with whom I had a long talk* (in contrast with *I met to-day the gentleman with whom I talked yesterday*). This is of course especially frequent in Latin, and we are there accustomed to treat long sentences introduced by relatives as independent sentences. A similar loosely-attached relative appears also in conjunctive sentences, such as *quod Tiberius quum fieri animadvertit, sinu pugionem eduxit* (BELL. HISP.); *quae si dubia aut procul essent, tamen omnes bonos republicae subvenire decebat* (SALL.).¹ A test of the complete independence of the relative sentence is the use of the *imperative* in it. This I find occurring in the Greek New Testament, 2 Tim. iv. 15: ὃν καὶ σὺ φυλάσσου, and Heb. xiii. 7: ὡν ἀναθεωροῦντες τὴν ἑκβασιν τῆς ἀναστροφῆς μιμείσθε τὴν πίστιν; in both passages likewise in Luther's translation: *vor welchem hüte du dich auch und welcher ende schanet an und folget ihrem glauben nach*. The use of *quamquam* and *etsi* = 'however' corresponds. Especially obvious is the dissolution of the dependence in a case like *do poenas temeritatis meae; etsi quae fuit illa temeritas?* (CIC.). The same usage is found with the German *wiewol, obgleich*, where the dissolution of the dependence is attested by the order of subject and predicate; cf. *Wie darfst du dich doch meinen augen weisen? wiewol du kommst mir recht* (HAGEDORN); *obgleich das weissbrod schmeckt auch in dem schloss nicht übel* (HEBEL).

Inversion of
the relation
of principal
and sub-
ordinate
sentence.

505. Cases likewise occur in which the logical dependence is precisely the *converse* of the grammatical. The most familiar class

¹ In itself, no doubt, the use of the relative in a conjunctive sentence does not imply any loosening of the dependence. Cf. Luther, Apost. xv. 29, *dass ihr euch enthaltet vom gotzweiffel, etc., von welchen so ihr euch enthaltet, tut ihr recht* (ἵνα ὑμεῖς ἀναποδοῖτε τὸν φόβον τοῦ κυρίου). Here the relative is used, as elsewhere, as a portion of an element.

of instances, and one common to many languages, is formed by *time-determinants*, mostly *eben, gerade, noch, kaum*, = *just, scarcely*, etc.,—upon which the logical principal-sentence may follow not only, as we saw (p. 145) in the form of the principal-sentence, but also in that of the dependent-sentence; cf. *kaum war ich angekommen, als ich befehl erhielt*; FR. *je n'eus pas mis pied à terre, que l'hôte vint me saluer*. Other examples are: FR. *le dernier des Bourbons serait tué, que la France n'en aurait pas moins un roi* (MIGNET) = 'though the last of the Bourbons were killed, France would none the less have a king'; MHG. *jane gît er nie so balde, erne benachte in dem walde*, = 'though he walk never so fast, night will overtake him in the wood.'

506. The psychological distribution may also *break down the division between principal and subordinate sentence*. A frequent case of this is where a particle properly belonging to the principal sentence coalesces with one in relation to it which introduces the subordinate sentence, the whole group being then regarded by the linguistic instinct as introducing the subordinate sentence. Cf. *sowie* (GOTH. *sawaswe*, OHG. *sôso*), *so dass, sobald als, auch wenn*; LAT. *sicut, simulac, postquam, antequam, priusquam, etsi, etiamsi, tam(en)-etsi*. It is more important that certain words, especially pronouns or particles, which originally belong to the principal sentence, become connecting elements between the latter and a psychologically subordinate sentence which was previously introduced by no particle, or was even wholly devoid of any grammatical work of dependence. These words are then commonly treated as a part of the subordinate sentence. In this way a quantity of conjunctions have arisen which serve to introduce subordinate sentences, and this simple process of displacement of distribution has been one of the most effective means of creating a grammatical denotation for the dependence of sentences. For the

most part these words referred originally to the logically dependent sentence which followed (cf. p. 141). Here belongs the most important German particle *das*, English *that*, originally nominative and accusative of the demonstrative pronoun. *I see that he is satisfied* comes from *I see that ; he is satisfied*. When the *that* had been drawn into the subordinate sentence and so converted into a conjunction, this construction could be extended, like the accusative and infinitive (cf. p. 259), to cases in which a nominative or accusative of the pronoun could not be used ; e.g. *I am convinced (of this), that you are guilty ; he was (so) amazed, that he could not answer a word*. In many cases *das* has passed into the subordinate sentence even when accompanied by a preposition. Cf. MHG. *durch das er videlen kunde*, 'because he knew how to fiddle,' literally 'for this reason : he knew how to fiddle.' Similarly *umbe das*, *ane das*, *für das*, *af das* (rare), *bedaz* ('while'). NHG. has preserved *ohne dass* and *auf dass* ; *ausser dass*, *während dass* and *anstatt dass* are probably to be conceived as analogically modelled on them, since these prepositions do not govern the accusative. On the other hand, some prepositions with the dative of the demonstrative pronoun have only in the NHG. period passed, through displacements, into conjunctions : *nachdem*, *seitdem*, *indem*, *währendem*. Here and there we find *darum* ; *darum ich es auch nicht länger vertragen, habe ich ausgesandt* (LUTHER, 1 Thess. iii. 5). The same is the case in English with *for that*, OE. *for þam*, *ær þam*. Also, *sô* in OHG. and early MHG. = *so dass* ; and *so* in assurances and protestations : *so wahr mir gott helfe, so wahr ich hier stehe*, for which may be equally well said *so wahr wie ich hier stehe*. *So* = 'however much' ; *so gutmütig er (auch) ist, das wird er nicht tun* ; cf. MHG. *sô vil ze Salcerne von arzenen meister ist*, but also with a second relative *sô* : *sô manec wert leben sô liebe frumt* ; cf. English *Nature, as green as she looks, rests everywhere on dread foundations* (CARLYLE), a

construction frequent in the older language, while the modern mostly uses only the second relative *as*; cf. also OF. *si* — *com*, NFR. *si* — *que*. In the last cases, besides the *so*, a further element not properly belonging to it is always thrust into the subordinate sentence. It is thus with NIIG. *sobald* (*als, wie*), *so lange* (*als, wie*), (*in*) *sofern*, (*in*) *soweit, sowic*. This *so* is often conceived wrongly as an original relative. Substantives too, in part with, in part without, an article, in part depending on a preposition, have frequently entered into a subordinate sentence which served to explain them (cf. p. 141). E.g. NIIG. *die wille ich weiz drit hove*, NIIG. *diuweil, alldiuweil, deruweil, weil* = English (*the while*; NIIG. *falls, im falle, sintemal* = *sint dem mde*; *seit der zeit er anferstanden ist* (LUTHER); English *on (upon) condition, in case* (both also with following *that*), *because*.

507. A similar process is, in German at least, a partial ground of the transition from the demonstrative to the relative. This transition is a consequence of the variety of ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction described above, p. 133. The common member may consist of the demonstrative pronoun *der*, or a demonstrative adverb, cf. *liefun thic nau minnotun* (OTFRID); *thâr ther sin friunt was in êr lag fiardon dag bigrabânêr* ('where he, who had formerly been his friend, lay the fourth day buried,' ib.); *ni mag diuſal ingegin sîn thâr ir gincunet namon min* ('the devil cannot resist there, where you utter my name,' ib.); *thu giangi tharn thu unoltos* ('you go thither, whither you will,' ib.); *der mich licht und kennt ist in der weite* (GOETHE). We should here, if we followed our linguistic sense, interpret the pronoun or adverb as a relative, and as belonging to the subordinate sentence, and this interpretation has actually effected the substitution for the old demonstrative of the other relative, coincident with the interrogative, which in universal sentences is now alone used: *wer wagt, gewinnt*; *wo nichts ist*,

da hat der kaiser sein recht verloren. But that the pronoun (and hence also the adverb) originally belonged alike to principal and subordinate sentence, appears from the following reasons: Firstly, the pronoun can be combined with a substantive which must necessarily belong to the principal sentence also; *in droume sie in zelitun then nweg sie faran scoltun* ('in dream they told him the way which they were to travel,' OTFRID); *der möhte mich ergetzen niht des mæres mir inwer munt vergiht* ('he could give me no comfort for the tidings which your mouth announces to me,' WOLFRAM); *er sâr in thô gisageta thia salida in thô gaganta* (OTFRID); *din sich geltchen kunde der grôzen stl da zwischen stuont* (WOLFRAM). Secondly, the case of the pronoun is in OHG. and MHG., and even in early NHG. determined usually by the principal sentence whenever this requires a genitive or dative, and the subordinate a nominative or accusative; *uuê demo in vinstri scal stno virinê stuen* ('woe to him who in darkness shall do penance for his sins,' MUSPILLI); *owwê des dâ nâch geschiht* (WOLFRAM); *mit all dem ich kan vnd vermag* (HANS SACHS). Thirdly, the pronoun can be dependent on a preposition, and this must likewise be drawn into the principal and subordinate sentences: *waz ich bæser handelunge erliten hân von den ichs wol erlazen möhte stn* ('from those by whom I might well have been spared it,' MINNESINGER). Fourthly, a class distinct from these, but equally tending to prove that the pronoun belonged originally to the principal sentence also, is that in which it is dependent on a preposition which belongs solely to the principal sentence. Cf. *waz sol trâren für daz nieman kan erwenden* (MINNESINGER); *daz ich singe owê von der ich iemer diencen sol* (HEINR. v. MORUNGEN); or the case may even be determined solely by the principal sentence; *der suerit bi demo temple, suerit in demo dâr inne artôt* ('swears by him who dwells therein,' *Fragmenta theotisca*); *den vater êrit dâ zi himili*

der sun mid daz er hât kî in erdi giwunnen (*Summa Theologiae*). If the subordinate sentence precedes, the common element may be resumed by a pronoun or adverb, cf. *ther man thaz giagaleizit thaz sih kuning heizit, der unidarot in alawudr themo keisore sdr* ('the man who undertakes to call himself king, he assuredly opposes the emperor,' OTFRID); *daz erbe Ach hûere vorderen an brâchten mit hercille erodchten, welt ir dâ von entrinnen* (*Rolandslied*); *den schaden he uns to donde plecht, dar vor kricht he nun sin recht* (*Reincke vos*).

508. For such cases as those adduced it is clear from the above reasons that the element which introduces the sentence must really be conceived as originally common to both divisions of it, and that its repetition stands originally in the same place with such cases as *den schatz den hiez er fûeren*; *beide schonwen unde grûezen swaz ich mich daran versûmet hân* (WALTHER). We are therefore also entitled to assume the same origin for sentences like *ther brât habet, ther scal ther brâtigomo sin* (OTFRID). This is not, however, intended to exclude the supposition that relative sentences have also arisen from a primitive doubling of the demonstrative.

509. Principal and subordinate sentence may also be so intricately blended that it is no longer possible to separate the elements of the one from those of the other, as is shown also by the order of the words. In many languages the principal sentence is logically so subordinate that it can be treated as a connecting element, and inserted in the dependent sentence. The part of the latter which precedes is then the psychological subject or predicate. This is especially common in interrogative and relative sentences. Cf. Italian, *mio padre e mio fratello dimmi ove sono*; Latin *tu nos fac ames* (CICERO); *verbum cave faxis* (PLAUTUS); *matrem jubeo requiras* (OVID); *ducas volo hodie uxorem* (TERENCE); *quid vis curem?* (PLAUTUS); *quid tibi vis dicam?* (ib.); English,

Impossibility
of drawing a
hard and
fast line
between
principal and
subordinate
sentences.

something that I believe will make you smile (GOLDSMITH); *whereof I gave thee charge thou shouldst not eat* (MILTON); *whose fellowship therefore unmeet for thee good reason was thou freely shouldst dislike* (MILTON); NHG. *zuo Amelolt und Nêren nu hæret wie er sprach* (ALPHART); *die enweiz ich war ich tuo*; MHG. *eine sammlung, an deren existenz ich nicht sehe warum Nik. Antonio zweifeln wollen* (LESSING). English, *but with me I see not who partakes*; *which we would know whence learned* (MILTON). NHG. *auf diese veralteten wörter haben wir geglaubt, dass wir unser augenmerk vornehmlich richten müssten*; MHG. *tiefe mantel wilt sach man daz si truogen*; *zuo stnem brütloufte bat er daz si quæmen*; Italian, *questi mercati giudico io che fossero la cagione* (MACH.); Spanish, *los forzados del rey quiere que le dexemos* (CERVANTES); Provençal, *cosselh m'es ops qu'ieu en prenda* ('it is necessary that I take a resolve in regard to it'); Latin, *hanc domum jam multos annos est quom possideo* (PLAUTUS); MHG. *swie sie wil, so wil ich daz mîn fründe stî*; Italian, *solo Tancredi avvien che lei conosca* (TASSO); *er hat alles, was man will das ein mann haben soll*; MHG. *daz ich ie wände daz iht were*; French, *voilà des raisons qu'il a cru que j'approuverais*; Italian, *le opere che pajono che abbino in se qualche virtù* (MACH.); NHG. *was wollen sie denn dass aus mir werde* (LESSING); *wie wollt ihr, dass das geschehe? woher befehlt ihr denn dass er das geld nehmen soll? womit wollt ihr dass ich mich beschäftige? die mischung, mit welcher ich glaube, dass die moral in heftigen situationen gesprochen sein will* (LESSING). Hence in many cases it becomes uncertain whether the first part of the sentence is to be held as still dependent on the verb of the grammatical dependent sentence or rather on that of the grammatical principal sentence. The difficulty is now solved in German by a repetition of it with varying construction, by which the overlapping of principal and dependent sentence is avoided: *wovon er wusste, dass er es nie erlangen würde.*

CHAPTER XVII.

ON CONCORD.

IN inflexional languages there exists a tendency to place words related in a way for which no specific means of expression exists, as far as possible, in formal correspondence with each other. Thus is explained the concord in gender, number, case, and person, which subsists between a substantive and its predicate or attribute, or a pronoun or adjective representing the latter. We may couple with these, as kindred phenomena, the correspondence in tense and mood within the same period. Such concord is by no means to be in all cases considered as arising naturally and inevitably from the nature of the logical relation. For instance, there is no logical reason assignable why the adjective should be placed in the same gender, number, and case as the substantive. We have rather to think of the matter in this way. The starting-point for the origin of concord was afforded by cases in which the formal correspondence of a word with another was produced not by any regard for the latter, but merely by the identity of their relation. When, however, the concord once began to be felt as such, it extended its area by analogical transference to other cases. We shall most easily recognise that this is the real course of its development if we contemplate in the first place those cases in which the extension of concord can still be historically followed.

Concord started from cases in which one word came to agree with another without regard for the latter.

and was then analogically extended to other cases.

Cases in which the secondary growth of concord is historically traceable.

511. The correspondence in gender and number seems to be illogically spread beyond the area which rightly belongs to it, in cases where attention is directed by the subject to something as yet unknown, which only receives a definite content by means of the predicate. The pronoun which composes the subject ought then always to stand in the neuter singular; and it actually does so habitually in NHG.; as in cases like *das ist der mann*; *das sind die richtigen*; and similarly the French say *ce sont mes frères*. On the other hand, it appears in English brought into concord with the predicate; thus, *these are thy glorious deeds* (MILTON); [but *þæt sindon*, etc.. in OE.]; in Italian, *è questa la vostra figlia?* in Spanish, *esta es la espada*; in ancient Greek, *αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ θεῶν* (HOMER); in Latin, *ea demum firma amicitia est* (CIC.); *haec morum vitia sunt* (CIC.); *Athenae istae sunt* (PLAUT.); *quae apud alios iracundia dicitur, ea in imperio superbia atque crudelitas appellatur* (SALLUST); though we also find *id tranquillitas erit* (SENECA); and this use is common in negative and conditional sentences. We shall probably best explain this phenomenon by supposing that the subject has here conformed to the predicate, as the predicate elsewhere conforms to the subject.

512. We often find words which commonly occur in the singular only, placed by Latin writers in the plural when connected by a copula with words that have no singular, and which have in the plural a special meaning; *summis opibus atque industriis* (PLAUT.); *neque vigiliis neque quietibus* (SALLUST); *paupertates — divitiae* (VARRO); cf. Draeger, § 7, 4.

513. In a sentence like *man nennt (heisst) ihn Friedrich*, the name strictly speaking ought to have no case; the simple stem should stand; nay, we may apprehend Friedrich and other proper names which contain no case-signs as the stem, or absolute case. Further, so far as there is a reference to naming in an address we

might expect the vocative, and we actually find this in Greek ; *τί με καλεῖτε κύριε?* (St. Luke vi. 46), translated in the Vulgate *quid vocatis me domine?*¹ In default of a pure stem, the nominative has to be used, which, in most cases, is undistinguishable in form from the vocative. In Gothic the passage cited above is translated *hwa mik haitid franja?* Correspondingly, Luther further translates *was heisst ihr mich aber herr, herr?* And the nominative or vocative is thus used in other places in MHG. and NHG. ; cf. *das man in hies der bärnc* (WOLFRAM), *ich hiess ihn mein Montan* (GELLERT) ; *den ich herr Stolle nennen hörte* (INSEL FELSENBURG). The most common usage at the present day is that of the accusative ; and as early as in Gothic we find *panzei jah apanstuluns namnida*. This accusative is owing to the customary concord occurring in such cases as the Gothic *izei pindan sik silban tanjip* ('who makes himself king').

514. In like manner, in the case of phrases like *er hat den namen Max*, the pure stem, or, in default of the existence of such, the nominative, should stand ; and this is the case in German. In Latin, however, such a construction as *lactea nomen habet* (OVID) is purely poetical and post-classical. In classical Latin the nominative stands side by side with *nomen* only when this word is itself in the nominative, so that concord is observed, e.g., *cui nomen Arethusa est* (CICERO). At the same time, however, we sometimes find the name made to agree with the person to whom it is attributed, e.g., *nomen Mercurio est mihi* (PLAUTUS). A corresponding vacillation in the use of concord is seen where *nomen* is in the accusative case, cf. *filiis dnobus Philippum et Alexandrum et filias Apamam nomina imposuerat* (LIV.) — *cui Superbo cognomen facta indiderunt* (ib.). This vacillation is the best proof that the concord in this case did not spring from the nature of the case,

¹ Cf. Ziemer, p. 71.

but rather from a certain perplexity felt by the speakers, who in default of an absolute form were obliged to choose a case, and in the process sought for any basis of usage which might seem in harmony with the principle of concord already prevailing in language.

515. A similar perplexity arises in the case of the predicative or predicative-attributive noun with an infinitive. The NHG. is well off in this respect, for it possesses an absolute form of the adjective: *es glückte ihm unbekannt zu bleiben*. The substantive appears, when it is necessary to use a particular case clearly marked as such, invariably in the nominative; we find not merely *er strebt danach berüchtigt zu werden*, but also *es steht dir frei als verständiger mann zu handeln*. In Latin the nominative stands if a connexion with the subject of the governing verb is possible: e.g. *pater esse disce, omitto iratus esse*; in poetry we find such expressions as *ait fuisse navium celerrimus* (CATULL.); *rettulit Ajax esse Jovis princeps* (OVID); and similarly in Greek, even in the case of the infinitive used substantivally, in whatever case this may stand; ὀρέγονται τοῦ πρώτου ἕκαστος γίνεσθαι (THUCYDIDES); ἔδοξε πάσσοις εἶναι διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἶός τ' εἶναι (PLATO). In Greek such connexion is found even with a genitive or dative depending on the governing sentence; as in ἵπασιν ἀνάγκη τῷ τυράννῳ πολέμῳ εἶναι (PLATO); οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κύρου ἐδέοντο ὡς προθυμοτάτου πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γενέσθαι (XENOPHON). In Latin too we find the connexion with a dative, though to a more limited extent; cf. *animo otioso esse impero* (TERENCE); *da mihi fallere, da justo sanctoque videri* (HOR.); *nec fortibus illic profuit armentis nec equis velocibus esse* (OVID); and commonly in the case of *licet*. At the same time after *licet mihi* we sometimes meet with the accusative (e.g. *si civi Romano licet esse Gaditanum*, CICERO); this construction is to be explained by the fact that the accusative is

the ordinary case of the subject with the infinitive.¹ Cf. Ziemer, p. 96.

516. I proceed to cite a few cases in which no concord is carried out, and indeed is to some extent incapable of being carried out. In these cases, in default of the pure stem, which is the only form really justifiable, its place has been supplied by the nominative. In German, for instance, such expressions are common as *dem als eine schreiende ungerechtigkeit bezeichenten befehle, mein beruf als lehrer*, even such as *die stellung des königs als erster bürger des staates; in einer lage wie die seinige* side by side with *der seinigen*. In Latin we find such constructions as *Scmpronius causa ipse pro se dictus damnatur; flumen Albim transcendit, longius penetrata Germania quam quisquam priorum* (TACITUS). In these cases no doubt *ipse* and *quisquam* depend upon the subject of the finite verb, but belong strictly speaking to the ablative absolute only, which offers them no immediate connecting link.¹

517. The speaker is specially apt to feel perplexity in cases where a grammatical concord is from the sense impossible, and a third clause comes in which custom has led us to expect to agree with both. We have to decide in favour of one or the other, and in the case of such decision, usage may establish itself differently in different languages, while it may vary in one and the same.

518. In the case of subject, predicate, and copula, the original and normal rule unquestionably is that the copula, like every other verb, follows the number of the subject; and accordingly we find in English such cases as *it was my orders, what is six winters?* in French *c'est eux, c'était les petites îles*; in Latin *nequam pax est induciae* (GELLIUS). In German, however, when the predicate is plural, the copula is used in the same number, as *das sind zwei verschiedene dinge*. Other languages have similar usages; thus

Variation
of concord
between its
parts of a
sentence.

¹ See on this point Madvig, *Kl. skr.*, sqq.

in Greek we find τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, ὕπερ πρότερον Ἑννέα ὁδοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο (THUCYDIDES), and in French we find such expressions as *ce sont là des vertus de roi*. This usage seems due to the fact that the plural makes itself more characteristically felt than the singular. In several languages, however, the converse usage is possible; viz., the copula in the singular is added to a plural subject, and to a singular predicate; cf. such Greek sentences as αἱ χορηγίαι ἱκανὸν εὐδαιμονείας σημεῖον ἐστὶ (ANT.); such Latin ones as *loca quae Numidia appellatur* (SALLUST); such English ones as *two faces in the vilest earth is room enough* (SHAKESPEARE); the Spanish *los encamisados era gente medrosa* (CERVANTES); and the NHG. *falsche wege ist dem herrn ein greuel* (LU.). We find a corresponding use in the person of the verb,—cf. the English *it was you, is that you?* the French *c'est moi, c'est nous, c'est vous*, in the older form of the language we actually find *c'est eux*. On the other hand, we find in NHG. *das waren Sie, sind Sie das?* O. FR. *ce ne suis je pas, c'estez vous*.

519. In the case of the anticipatory undefined subject with logical subject and predicate, we find that in French the use is to write such sentences as *rarement il arrive des révolutions, il est des gens de bien*. On the other hand, we find in German, *es geschehen umwälzungen*.

520. A participle used as predicate or as copula may follow in gender and number the predicative substantive instead of the subject. Cf. the Greek πάντα διήγησις οὖσα τυγχάνει (PLATO); the Latin *paupertas mihi onus visum* (TERENCE); *nisi honos ignominia putanda est* (CICERO); on the other hand, we find *Semiramis puer esse credita est* (JUSTIN). A similar usage prevails in the case of the predicative accusative; cf. the Greek τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἐν (PLATO); used attributively as the Greek τὰς θυγατέρας, παιδία ὄντα (DEMOSTHENES); the Latin *Indi fuere, Megalesia appellata* (LIVY).

521. The predicate, instead of following the subject, may follow some apposition belonging to it; cf. *Θῆβαι, πόλις ἀστυγέτων, ἐκ μέσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνῆρπασται* (AESCHINES); Latin, *Corinthum totius Graeciae Inimici extinctum esse voluerunt* (CICERO); *Volsinii oppidum Tuscorum concrematum est*; NIIG. *die Aegypter aber, dies harte und gesetzmässige volk, schlug gleich die form der regel und der gewohnheit auf ihre versuche* (HERDER). This holds good even when the sentence is turned into the ablative absolute; *omni ornatu orationis tamquam veste detracta* (CICERO). In connexion with a distributival apposition we find the singular, in spite of the fact that the subject is plural; cf., *αἱ τέχναι τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται* (PLATO); *die sich nach des meisters tode sogleich entzweiten und offenbar jeder nur eine beschränkte sinnesart für das rechte erkannte* (GOETHE); *då die Kæledne und die sarjande von Semblidac iestlicher stner künste pfleg* (WOLFRAM).

522. More striking is the construction whereby the predicate is made to agree with a noun compared with the subject (1) in gender, *magis pedes quam arma tuta sunt* (SALLUST); (2) in number, *me non tantum literae quantum longinquitas temporis mitigavit* (CICERO); *ei cariora semper omnia quam decus fuit* (SALLUST); (3) in gender and number, as *quand on est jeunes, riches et jolies, comme vous, mesdames, on n'en est pas réduites à l'artifice* (DIDEROT); (4) in person, *οσοι ὥσπερ ἡμῖς ἐπιβουλευόμεθα* (THUCYDIDES); (5) in person and number, as *ἡ τύχη αἰ βέλτιον ἢ ἡμῖς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμεθα* (DEMOSTHENES). The concord of the predicate is also curious with a second subject connected by the words *and not*, as *heaven and not we have safely fought to-day* (SHAKESPEARE).

523. In Greek an apposition, if it is separated from the noun to which it belongs by a relative sentence, may follow the relative pronoun in case; as, *Κύκλωπος κεχόλωται, ὃν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλάσεν*.

ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον (*Odyssey*); οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται Πιττακοῦ τε καὶ Βίαντος (PLATO).

524. A demonstrative or relative, instead of following the substantive to which it refers, may follow a noun predicated of it, as in Latin *Leucade sunt haec decreta; id caput Arcadiae erat* (LIV.); *quod si non hominis summum bonum quaereremus, sed cuiusdam animantis, is autem esset nihil aliud nisi animus* (CIC.); *animal hoc quem vocamus hominem* (CIC.); *ii sunt, quam tu nationem appellasti* (CIC.); *in pratis Flaminiiis, quem nunc circum Flaminium appellant* (LIV.); Greek φόβος, ἣν αἰδῶ εἵπομεν (PLA.). The predicate of the main sentence may then follow the relative pronoun; cf. *Carmonenses, quae est longe firmissima totius provinciae civitas, per se cohortes eiecit*.

525. A relative pronoun which logically refers to an undefined subject usually follows the defined predicate which belongs to it, and of course the predicate of the pronoun as well. Thus the Germans have to say, *es war ein mann, der es mir gesagt hat; es sind die besten menschen, die dir das raten*. In the same way in French, *c'est eux qui ont bâti*. In French it is further to be observed that the person of the verb in the relative sentence follows the defined predicate, as *c'est moi seul qui suis coupable*. On the other hand, the NHG. use is to say, *du bist es, der mich gerettet hat*.

526. In a relative sentence the verb goes into the first or second person in connexion with the subject of the governing sentence, although the relative pronoun refers to the predicate, and the third person would consequently in strictness be demanded; cf. in Latin *non sum ego is consul, qui nefas arbitrer Gracchos laudare* (CIC.); *neque tu is es, qui nescias* (ib.); English, *if thou beest he, who in the happy realms of light didst outshine myriads* (MILTON); *I am the person, that have had* (GOLDSMITH). This kind of construction might certainly be regarded as contamination as well; in which

case, in the last example given, the thoughts, *I am the person who has had*, and *I have had*, must have become confused. The same holds good of a combination like *eine der penibelsten aufgaben, die meiner tätigkeit auferlegt werden konnte* instead of *könnten* (GOE.). With this we may compare *allaro barno betsta there the io giboran nurdi* (HELIAND) and *seega ðnegum þara þe tirledses trode seowode*, 'to one of the men who looked at the inglorious track' (BEOWULF); and so commonly in old Saxon and Anglo-Saxon.

527. The predicate or attribute, instead of agreeing with the subject or the word which it defines, may agree with a genitive depending on it, cf. ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ Θεβαίου Τειρεσίαο χρύσειον σκήπτρον ἔχων (HOM.). Stranger still is the English use, *there are eleven days' journey from Horeb unto Kadesh-barnea* (Deut. i. 2). In French, the idiom is, to say, *la plupart de ses amis l'abandonnèrent*, but *la plupart du peuple voulait*. If it often happens that after a collective with a plural partitive genitive the plural stands (in such an instance as *eine anzahl soldaten sind angekommen*), the genitive certainly does not need to be regarded as the only reason for the plural, since such an usage is possible in itself after the collective: see Chap. XV., section 447.

528. In isolated cases we find in Latin an attribute referring to a person addressed, placed in the vocative, as *quibus, Hector, ab oris expectate venis?* (VERG.)

529. We may gather, then, from the examples given, the way in which concord has spread beyond the area which strictly speaking belongs to it. We are able, accordingly, to form some idea of the way in which this process grew up at a period so early as to reach back far beyond all our tradition. No doubt we have to note the fact that concord was not so inevitable in the oldest stages of language, because absolute forms without inflexional suffixes were then the rule.

First rudiments from which concord proceeded.

530. Let us now consider the first *rudiments* from which concord proceeded. This process bears a certain analogy to the concord of the verb in number and person. Verbal forms seem mostly to owe their origin to the coalition of a personal pronoun with the tense stem. We must in any case suppose a period in which substantives coalesced in the same way with the stem, and in which pronouns could precede the stem as well. We must therefore suppose, to illustrate by an instance, that it was possible to say *gehen vater*, *vater gehen* and *ich gehen*, just as much as to say *gehen ich*, *gehen du*, *gehen er*, etc. There are various non-Indo-European languages, such as the Hungarian, in which the third person singular differs from the other persons of the same number by dispensing with a suffix. In these languages, then, the original plan maintains itself of coalition according to the formula *gehen vater* or *vater gehen*. The further development then proceeds from a reduplication of the subject, a process not without analogies at certain stages in the life of modern languages; cf. *der kirchhof er liegt wie am tage, die glocke sie donnert ein mächtiges eins*; *freilich ist er zu preisen, der mann* (cf. *supra*, p. 116); *je le sais, moi, il ne voulut pas, lui*; *toi, tu vivras vil et malheureux*. [This use is of course very common in English and German ballad poetry.] We must here mention the anticipation of the subject by means of an indefinite *es*, as *es genügt ein wort*. The pronoun originally was doubled only in cases where it had to be specially emphasised. But how such pronominal reduplication is able gradually to spread, and especially as it is favoured by the phonetic reduction of the pronominal forms, is shown by Bavarian dialects in which we find such curious amalgams as the following: *mtr hammer* (= *wir haben wir*) or *hammer mtr*; *ess lebt* = '*ich lebt ich*' or *lebt ess*. The process has thus repeated itself in the case of the verbal forms, when already made and finished, which at an earlier period was in

operation on the tense stems. The pronouns which coalesce enclitically have become fused with the verb, and have shown an increasing tendency to lose their original character of the subject of the verbs with which they are connected. In the IE. original language the development must already have gone so far that the formula *vater gehen* was entirely replaced by the formula *vater gehen er*. The suffixed pronoun however maintains, in the first place, still a double function. In certain cases it still serves as the subject (as in the Latin *lego, legit*); in other cases it is merely by the concord that it shows its relationship with the subject (as *pater legit, ego scribo*). In most IE. languages of the present day the second function alone has survived. The main reason which has conduced to render the employment of a second subject-pronoun general, is this, that the suffixes were no longer sufficient for the characterisation of the forms. For the rest, the concord of the verbal predicate with the subject has no value in itself. Thus our personal endings would merely be so much superfluous ballast, did they not, on the one hand, serve to mark the verb as such, and, on the other hand, in certain cases to express the difference between different moods; though such service is, indeed, but very imperfectly performed, and in an unnecessarily complicated way.

531. As for the concord of nouns, that of gender and number at any rate is first formed in the pronoun to which reference is made, to which grammatical gender also owes its origin. Concord in case first appears in the case of apposition. Here, likewise, no absolute necessity exists for employing the case-sign twice.¹ At the same time we are tempted to regard the apposition to one part

¹ We see this best by observing that at a more recent epoch, when the connexion is very close, the principle of concord is again given up, and the inflexion of the first component part omitted; cf. *MHO. des künig Guntheres lif, an künec Artûses hove*; *MHO. Friedrich Schillers, des herrn Müller*; even in Goethe we find *des herrn Carlyle's*, etc. Hans Sachs even says, *herr Achilli, dem ritter*.

of the sentence as a repeated employment of this part. A concord in gender and number occurs even at the present day only where it is demanded by the nature of the case. The concord of the attributive and predicative adjective can have grown only out of the substantive used as an apposition or as a predicate: in other words, their origin reaches back to an epoch in which the adjective had not yet freed itself from the category of the substantive, and assumed a position in a category of its own. The starting-point was afforded by those substantives which in the Latin grammars are called *mobilia*, such as *coquus*—*coqua*; *rex*—*regina*, etc. As such substantives passed into adjectives (cf. below, chapter XX.), they maintain the concord, and it came to be regarded as of the essence of the adjective.

532. The concord of tense, the so-called *consecutio temporum*, has, generally speaking, failed to extend beyond the area originally assigned to it. The exceptions to the rules laid down on this subject show that the tense in dependent sentences does not, strictly speaking, follow that of the clause on which such sentence depends, but that it settles itself independently on principles of its own. The concord of the mood, which sometimes further affects that of the tense, is somewhat more extended. Cf. the Latin *tantum voluit error, ut, corpora cremata cum scirent, tamen ea fieri apud inferos fingerent, quae sine corporibus nec fieri possent nec intelligi* (instead of *possunt*, CIC.); *invitus feci, ut fortissimi viri T. Flamini fratrem e senatu ejicerem septem annis postquam consul fuisset* (*fuerat*, CIC.); *cum timidius ageret, quam superioribus diebus consuesset* (CAES.).¹ The assimilation of mood is tolerably regular in MHG.

¹ Cf. Draeger, 151, 5.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ECONOMY OF EXPRESSION.

THE more economical or more abundant use of linguistic means of expressing a thought is determined by the *need*. Relative economy of expression depends on the need. It cannot indeed be denied that these means are often employed in luxurious superfluity. But, on the whole, our linguistic activity is characterised by a certain trait of parsimony. Everywhere we find modes of expression forced into existence which contain only just so much as is requisite to their being understood. The amount of linguistic material employed varies in each case with the situation, with the previous conversation, with the relative approximation of the speakers to a common state of mind. Under some conditions a word may speak as plainly as a whole sentence under others. If we take as a standard the form of expression which will convey a thought under all possible conditions to any possible hearer, the other forms in use appear to be imperfect.

534. It is natural, therefore, that what is called *ellipse* should have played a great part with our grammarians. When the terser expression is invariably referred to a more circumstantial equivalent as the standard, there is scarcely any limit to the possible assumption of ellipses. Ellipse either to be assumed in a minimum of cases, or else to be recognized as part of the essence of expression. The abuses to which this led in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are well known. They were, however, only an extreme result of conceptions still repre-

sented in our grammars. This standard must be given up, and every form of expression be apprehended in accordance with its origin without any intrusion of alien matter. The assumption of ellipse will then be reduced to a minimum. Or else, the notion of ellipse will have to be given a far wider application than it has hitherto had; it will have to be conceded that it is of the essence of linguistic expression to be elliptical, to contain less than the full contents of what is thought, so that, in regard to ellipse, the various modes of expression differ only in degree.

Words or
phrases
supplied.

535. We will consider first the cases in which a word or a phrase is *supplied* from *what precedes* or from *what follows*. Here the question immediately presents itself, whether and how far we are justified in the expressions *supplied*. We saw above (p. 129) that an element of a sentence may be posited more than once. The other elements then assume a similar relation to both positions. It will hardly be contended for all cases that these other elements would in the normal sentence be also doubly posited, that they are actually posited once, and a second (third, fourth) time have to be supplied. Least of all is the notion of supplying applicable in the construction ἀπὸ κοινοῦ. But in such a sentence as *he saw me and grew pale* it will likewise not be thought necessary to supply *he* with *grew pale*; nor, in such a combination as *in fear and hope*, will any one think of 'supplying' the preposition before *hope*, because we can also say *in fear and in hope*. It is a question, however, whether the notion of 'supplying' cannot be wholly dropped, and replaced by that of *single positing with plural reference*. Only, in this case, we must further cease to conceive what is commonly called a sentence as a closed and independent unity, and regard it rather as a link in a continuous series.

536. It is customary to assume ellipse in cases such as *die*

deutsche und die französische sprache, and still more decidedly in the form *die deutsche sprache und die französische*. But that we have here merely a pair of elements standing in the same relation to a third, is shown by the fact that in other languages, though not in German, similar modes of expression can be replaced by others in which the two elements are treated as a unity, and attached as such to the third, which now becomes, properly speaking, the second. This is shown by the use of the plural. We say, for instance, *quarta et Martia legiones* (beside *legio Martia quartaque*, both in Cicero), *Falernum et Capannum agros* (for *agrum*, LIV.); Italian, *le lingue greca e latina* (beside *la lingua greca e latina*); French, *les langues française et allemande, les onzième et douzième siècles*; English, *the German and French languages*.

537. Similar is the case where a single common element is accompanied by a plurality of mutually corresponding elements; e.g. *John writes well, James badly*. That the current assumption of an ellipse is here likewise superfluous, nay inadmissible, is shown again by the use in many languages of the plural predicate; cf. Latin, *Palatium Romulus, Remus Aventinum ad inaugurandum templa capiunt* (LIV.); and similarly with the ablative absolute: *ille Antiocho, hic Mithridate pulsus* (TAC.). Even in the case of disjoined subjects the plural predicate is in many languages as current as the singular; cf. Latin, *si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutivæ sint* (CIC.); *haec si neque ego neque tu fecimus* (CIC.); *Roma an Carthago jura gentibus darent* (LIV.); French, *ou la honte ou l'occasion le détrouperont*; *ni la douceur, ni la force n'y peuvent rien*; English, *nor wood, nor tree, nor bush are there* (SCOTT). This plural has in any case originated from instances in which the copulative connexion could be substituted without essential alteration of meaning.

and thence been extended by analogy to cases where no such substitution was possible. It proves that for the linguistic instinct the predicate has been posited once and not twice.

538. Instances of an element common to both principal and subordinate sentence (or, if it be preferred, to be supplied in one of them) occur in the variety of *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* discussed on p. 133, and also in relative sentences, which have a different origin; e.g. the Latin (*quī tacet consentit*). Further, in MHG., when a subordinate sentence without conjunction stands in the relation of object to the principal sentence: *dā wānde ich stāte fūnde* (Minnesinger); *her sprach were intrunnin* (ROTHER). Rarer are other cases: *nune weiz ich wie es beginne* (TRISTAN); *wes er im gedāhte daz elliu diu wolde bedwingen* (JUDITH); *mitthiu ther heilant gisak thio menigi steig usan berg* (Fragm. theot.); *kem einer her mit dem offer, brecht auch vil golts darvon* (H. SACHS); *da ihn die schöne fraw erblicket, winckt ihm* (ib.); *was ich da träumend jauchzt und litt, muss wachend nun erfahren* (GOE.); *dais, indem er ihn gesegnete, ihm gebot und sprach* (LU.).

539. It occurs very commonly in *dialogue* that words of one speaker are not repeated by the other. But this will not serve to justify the assumption that the words are necessarily *supplied*. For dialogue itself must, not less than the single speech, be regarded as a continuous and connected whole.

540. It strikes us now as a singular anomaly when an element belongs in common to two sentences which, instead of being continuous, are separated by a third sentence; cf. *swaz er den künic t geschalt, des wart ir sehenstunt mēr, und (er) jach, si wære gar ze hēr* (WOLFRAM); *wer mit wölfen wil genlen, der muss auch mit in heulen, sunst tun sie sich bald meulen und (er) ist bei in nuwert* (H. SACHS). Similarly, when the sentences to which the element is jointly referable are only formally continuous, without

any direct relation to one another; cf. *sô ist geschehen des ir dâ gert und wænent* ('ye ween'), *mir st wol geschehen* (HARTMANN VON AUE).

541. The common element may either stand between those which are not common, so that it is referable with equal ease to either (*ἀπὸ κοινού*), or it stands at the outset or at the close of the whole sentence; it is then nearer no doubt to the one, but still without difficulty referable also to the other; or, finally, it is inserted in one of the groups to which it is jointly referable, in which case it appears, in the first instance, to belong to this group alone. In modern German such insertions are only familiar in the first group. It is here that the hypothesis of *supplying* the second (third, etc.) group has the most in its favour. In M11G. insertion in the second group is not very rare: *mâge und mîne man* ('my relatives and subordinates'); *gelücke und Stfrides heil*; *das ich muoz und sterben sol*. Instances in M11G. are: *nicht sonne, mond und sternenschein*, *mir glänzte nur mein kind* (BÜRGER); *es bell' und wüte, wie der hund auch immer will* (HEINR. ALBERTS arien). Cf. Italian, *il mar tranquillo e l'aura era soave* (PETRARCA); *non pur per l'aria gemiti e sospiri, ma volan braccia e spalle* (ARIOSTO); Old French, *Breton l'ensaigne lor signor* ('their lord's battle-cry'), *e li Romain crient la lor*; Greek, *οὔτε βωμὸς οὔτ' Ἀπόλλωνος δόμος σώσει σε* (EURIPIDES). In this construction, again, there can be no question of 'supplying.' The case is rather that the first group remains incomplete until the common element is uttered, which, in the moment of utterance, serves to complete the first and the second group at once.

542. The function of a common element is often not perfectly identical in its several relations. Hence arises a grammatical discord, since the grammatical form of the element can only indicate a single function. The dislike of this discord, evidenced

by the repetition of the common element, varies greatly in different languages and periods.

543. Such a discord is everywhere least offensive in the person and number of the verb. Cf. *er hat mich eben so lieb wie du ; du glaubst es, ich nicht ; sie reisen morgen ab — ich auch*. It strikes us, however, as abnormal, when the common element is made to conform to the second group ; cf. αὐτὸς μὲν ὕδωρ, ἐγὼ δὲ οἶνον πίνω (DEM.) ; *dass ich im vater und der vater in mir ist* (LU.) ; *non socii in fide, non exercitus in officio mansit* (LIV.). Discord of tense is ignored in the following : ἡμεῖς ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμεν (THUC.) ; ἄλλα μὲν πρότερον, ἄλλα δὲ νῦν πειρᾷ λέγειν (XEN.). Difference of tense and mood at once is ignored in ἐπειδὴ οὐ τότε, ἀλλὰ νῦν δεῖξον (DEM.). It is further of fairly common occurrence that the infinitive has to be borrowed from a finite verb : *er hat gehandelt, wie er musste* ; still in MHG. *nach der mtn herze ie ranc und iemer muoz* ; Greek, πάντα χαλεπῶς ἔχω, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς (PLA.). It is rarer for a participle to be thus borrowed, as in MHG. : *daz diu minn dich verleitet, als si manegen lât*. The same form sometimes serves in German as both infinitive and participle : *ich habe es nicht und werde es nicht vergessen* (KLOPSTOCK) ; cf. further examples in Andresen, *Sprachg.* p. 133. H. Sachs says *zu ehren sein wir zu euch kumen, ein histori uns für genumen*, although the perfect of the second verb would have had to be written in full with *haben*, not *sein*.

544. In the case of nouns such discords are in modern German almost without exception discarded ; but they occur frequently in the older language, especially in the sixteenth century, and also in other languages. Thus the adjective agrees with the nearer only of two copulatively connected substantives : *aus meinem grossen kummer und traurigkeit* (LU.) ; *von eurer saat und weinbergen* (LU.) ; *sein sonstiger ernst und trockenheit* (GOE.) ;

seiner gewöhnlichen trockenheit und crust (ib.); many examples are given in Andresen, *Sprachg.* 127 ff.; French, *un homme ou une femme noyé*; Italian, *in publica utilità ed onore, le città ed i villagi magnifici*; Spanish, *toda sa parentela y criados, la multitud y dolor, los pensamientos y memorias, un pabellon o tienda*; Latin, *urbem ac portum validum* (LIV.). A word governed by two or more prepositions which require different cases may be posited only once without difficulty where its cases are phonetically identical, as in *mit und ohne kost*; but also where they phonetically diverge, as in *um und neben dem hochaltare* (GOE.); *durch und mittelst der sprache* (HERDER); further examples in Andresen, *Sprachg.* p. 128. Similarly, a single form, standing in relation to two or more verbs, may represent two or more cases, as in Latin, *quod tactum est et ille adjunxit* (CIC.); *quae neque ego teneo neque sunt ejus generis* (ib.); NHG. *was geschieht und ich nicht hindern kann* (LE.); *eine dose, die er mit 80 gulden bezahlt hätte und nur 40 wert wäre* (GOE.);¹ *womit uns für die zukunft der himmel schmeicheln und bedrohen kann* (GOE.); *bei dessen gebrauch wir einander mehr schmeicheln als verletzen* (GOE.);² *leidlicher wer mir end het auch lieber das dry oder vierteglich feber* (H. SACHS); with insertion, *und wissen nit jr widervart mag oft lang haben nit mehr fug* (H. SACHS). Even a word dependent on a preposition may be at the same time made the subject of the following verb: *dan leszt er uns fürtragen schon das heilig euangelion durch sein heilige junger, denten all christlich prediger* (H. SACHS); *von ritter Cainis ich lasz het lieb frau Gardeleye* (ib.). The licence is also extended to cases in which phonetically divergent forms would properly be required. Especially frequent is the use of an oblique case, as at the same time the subject of a following verb. Thus with asyndetic juxtaposition: *liess der bischoff die seinen über das*

¹ Cf. Andresen, *Sprachg.* pp. 129, 130.

² Cf. *ibid.* p. 133.

her laufen, erstachen der etlich (WILTWOLT VON SCHAUMBURG, 1507); with insertion, *ich war selb bei dieser handlung, geschach e du warst geboren* (H. SACHS). Similarly in constructions with *und*; very common in MHG., as *es möhte uns wol gelingen und brächten dir die frowen*; but also still in NHG., as in *er setzte sich auf einen jeglichen unter ihnen und wurden alle voll des heiligen geistes* (LU.); *den es krenke meinethalben und meinen ohren offenbare* (LU.); *auch dem, der sie verfolgt, und flieht und schenkt und schwöret, wird kaum ein blick gegönnt, und wird nur halb gehöret* (LES.). In constructions with *wan* (= 'for'): *thut euch bedenken, wan wisset selber ge gar wol* (H. SACHS). Incongruence may further accompany the anomaly noticed on p. 354, as in *bellbe ich dne man bt in zwei jâr oder drin, sô ist mîn herre lhte tot und kument* ('you come') in *sô grôze not* (HARTMANN VON AUE). Examples in the case of *ἀνὸρ κοινὸν* with logical subordination have been given above, pp. 133 and 134. In Latin even a nominative may replace an accusative: *qui fatetur . . . et . . . non timeo* (CIC.); a dative an accusative: *cui fidem habent et bene rebus suis consulere arbitrantur* (ib.). A possessive pronoun may also represent the corresponding personal pronoun; *ja was es ie dîn site unde hât mir da mite gemacht mange swere* (HARTMANN VON AUE); *alsobald stunden seine sckenkel und knöchel feste, sprang auf* (LU.). Or a *dâ* connected with an adverb may represent the demonstrative pronoun: *dâ mite so müezeget der muot und (das) ist dem lbe ein michel gnot* (GOTTFRID VON STRASSBURG). Finally, two different elements may, as a single whole, form the subject of a following verb; as in *da vuorte si in bt der hant und sâzen zuo einander nider* (HARTMANN VON AUE); *dû nam daz Constantînis wlb ir tochter, die was hêrlîch, unde bdtin Dietherliche* (ROTHER); *wie herzog Jason wardt verbrandt von Medea also genandt; hetten doch vor viel zeit vertrieben* (H. SACHS); *so hertzlieb*

von hertzlieb muss scheiden und gentslich kein hoffnung mehr handt (ib.).

545. We have seen in Chapter XVI. that two principal notions *Absence of links.* may be connected by several *links*, which serve to define more closely the nature of the connexion, whether this relation be at once grammatical and psychological, or purely psychological and at variance with the grammatical connexion. Now since expressions frequently occur in which these links are dispensed with, we are easily tempted to explain these as ellipses. This view is however in many cases to be entirely rejected. If, for instance, instead of *Hectoris Andromache* and *Caccilia Metelli* we can say more exactly *Andromache uxor Hectoris* and *Caccilia filia Metelli*, it by no means follows that in the shorter expressions the forms *uxor* or *filia* are to be supplied, for they may be independently explained from the general function of the genitive; and whoever assumes an ellipse here must, if he be logical, follow the grammarians of the sixteenth century in assuming ellipse for every genitive. Beside these, however, occur expressions in regard to which the term elliptical cannot be denied a certain justification, in so far as they have originated in more complete expressions, where, however, we are not on that account to assume the omission of a definite word.

546. Indications of direction were doubtless originally developed only with verbs of motion. Direction is now often stated with verbs of *preparing* and the like; as in MHG. *sich bereite von dem lande vil manic ritter starc* (NIBELUNGENLIED); *wir suln onch uns bereiten heim in mîn lant* (ib.); *dô soumte man* ('accoutred in') *den degenen von dannen wafen und gewant* (ib. C.); *di sich gegarwet hâten ze strîte hîf daz velt* (ALPHART); *dô vaste sich der herzoge in des kuniges hof* ('then the duke arranged himself to go to the king's court') (*Kaiserchronik*), and often elsewhere in this

work ; cf. Greek, *φανερὸς ἦν οἴκαδε παρασκευαζόμενος* (XEN.) ; similarly, *ἐκέλευσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα* (ib.).¹ Similarly with MHG. *rîmen* : *heiz ins rîmen von dan* (HARTMANN VON AUE) ; *ich rîme dir das rîche von hinnen vîhtidliche* (RUDOLF VON EMS). Cf. also Greek, *ἐκλείπειν τὴν πόλιν εἰς χωρίον*. It is not to be supposed that in such phrases there floated in the speaker's mind the unexpressed infinite of a definite verb such as *to go* or *ride*. The psychological process to which, e.g., the phrase *παρασκευάζεσθαι οἴκαδε* owes its origin is rather the following. In the first place, the two notions of preparing oneself, and of the local terminus which the preparation is designed to attain, present themselves to consciousness, and are directly connected as psychological subject and predicate. Since, however, it was already usual in such sentences as *πορεύονται οἴκαδε* or *παρασκευάζονται οἴκαδε πορεύεσθαι* to express the local terminus in a definite form, this was also applied in the present case. The process is thus the work of two distinct factors : first, the capacity which existed in language even before the rise of its formal elements, and which never dies out of it, of expressing the mutual relation of two notions in consciousness—whether this relation be given immediately, or only mediately through other notions—by mere juxtaposition of the terms which denote these notions ; secondly, the analogy of the already developed forms of expression.

547. The same process occurs in numerous other cases. Many of the expressions discussed in Chapter VI., such as *schere bei seite*, *wer da?* etc., belong to this head. When once the majority of words had assumed formal elements, the capacity just described,

¹ When such combinations become usual, the meaning of the verb may be modified, motion in a particular direction being treated first as an essential part of the meaning, and finally as its principal constituent. Thus in MHG. *schicken* originally meant 'to put right' ; *reine*, 'a breaking up' ; *aufbrechen*, the opposite of *aufschlagen* (i.e. the camp).

and more closely investigated in Chapter VI., could not come into play without the meaning of these formal elements asserting itself at the same time. We have now to consider a few other constructions of this kind which are commonly treated as elliptical.

548. Most nearly akin to those already discussed are terms of *direction* following the verbs: *können, mögen, sollen, wollen, dürfen, müssen, lassen*, e.g. *ich mag nicht nach hause, ich lasse dich nicht fort*. These have become so far 'usual' that from the standpoint of our present linguistic instinct they cannot possibly be described as elliptical. Further, such phrases as *er ist weg, er ist nach Rom*, which are to be understood exactly in the same way as *er ist in Rom*, i.e. *weg* and *nach Rom* are to be taken as predicates, *ist* as copula. Cf. Latin constructions such as *quando cogitas Romam?* (CIC.); *ipsest quem volui obuiam* ('of whom I wished that he should meet me,' TER.); *puto utrumque ad aquas* (CIC.).

549. If we say *ich möchte dich nicht anders, als du bist*, this will hardly be explained as an ellipse of *haben*. An ellipse of *sein* would be more natural; but its insertion would produce an un-German construction. And the same reason which forbids us to supply a *sein* here, forbids us equally to supply *esse* in the Latin *Strato physicum se voluit* (CIC.).

550. In Latin a subject-nominative is occasionally followed by an accusative without a verb: *sus Minervam, sortes fortuna, manus manum, dii meliora; quae cum dixisset, Cotta finem* (CIC.); *ego si litteras tuas* (ib.); *quid tu mihi testis?* These constructions are not explained by naming a verb to be supplied. We must rather say: Two notions are here combined in the form of nominative and accusative, because they stand in the same relation as that which, in a more complete sentence, holds between subject

and predicate. Similarly to be conceived is the immediate connexion of a subject-nominative with a prepositional determinant or an adverb, as in *itaque ad tempus ad Pisones omnes* (CIC.), *hæc hactenus* (where *hæc* could no doubt be equally conceived as accusative), *an tu id melius? ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter*; *τὰυτὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτως* (PLA.). There are analogous instances even in German; in lively narrative one can say: *ich rasch hinaus, ich hinterher*, and the like; *graf nun so eilig zum tore hinaus* (GOE.); cf. *der sultan gleich dem tone nach* (WIELAND).

551. In similar fashion a subordinate sentence may be directly combined with a principal sentence which, if the thought were more fully expressed, would have to be connected with it mediately by another subordinate sentence, or by some sentence-element. This mode of connexion may then become 'usual,' so that no omission is any longer felt. Cf. *wie Lavater sich hiebei benommen, sei nur ein beispiel gegeben* (GOE.), where for our present linguistic instinct *dafür* is wanting before *sei*; *und fragst du mich nach diesen beiden schätzen: der lorbeer ist es und die gunst der frauen* (GOE.); *dass ichs dir gestehe, da ergriff ihn mein gemüt* (ib.); *besuche deine brüder, obs ihnen wohl gehe* (LUT.). To this class belong also such phrases as *was das anbetrifft, was ich davon weiss*, and the like, which have analogies in the most various languages. Similar is the case with infinitive phrases such as *die wahrheit zu sagen, es kurz zu sagen, um nur eins anzuführen, um von allem übrigen zu schweigen*; further, *kurz*, ('I do not know,') *mit einem worte, gerade heraus, beiläufig, à propos*.

552. Words are supplied from the situation when, instead of a substantive with a determining epithet, the latter alone is expressed. We do not here refer to such usages as *der gute*, to denote any good person whatever, or *das gute* to denote any good thing whatever. There is here no ellipse at all. The notion of

person in the last resort of male person, or of thing, is denoted by the gender of the article. We have here to do only with cases in which there is a reference to a more special notion, as in *rechte, linke* (hand); *calida, frigida* (aqua); *alter, neuer, süsser, Burgunder, Champagner*, etc., *ἄκρατος* (wine); *agnina, caprina* (caro): *Appia* (via); *æstiva, hiberna* (castra); *natulis* (dies): *quarta, nona* (hora); *τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ, τῇ τρίτῃ (ἡμέρᾳ)*; *octingentesimo post Romanam conditam* (anno); *decima* (pars); *Ἰόνιος (κόλπος)*; *Μουσική*, etc. (*τέχνη*); *ΟΙΙG. frenkisen (շոնցա)*. If any one desires to assume ellipse here, no great objection can be raised. Only we must not ignore the fact that we supply from the situation, in very many cases, where we do not think of assuming an ellipse. If we understand *der alte* to mean 'old wine,' it is for the same reason that we understand the same words to mean not any old man, but some particular one whom we have before us, or who has just been the subject of conversation. In the cases referred to, the special application of the adjective has already become more or less 'usual.' The more fixed the usage becomes, the less does it need to be enforced by the situation. Thus the terms *alter, neuer*, are probably only understood of wine in taverns, in the wine-trade, or where the attention is already occupied with wine, and they are in general used only in wine-growing districts; *Champagner* on the contrary is, even in the absence of all such mental preparation, far more readily understood of the wine than of the inhabitant of Champagne. And as soon as the word becomes intelligible without the support of the situation, it is to be regarded no longer as an adjective, but as a true substantive.

553. A perfectly analogous development meets us in the case of genitive determinants. Cf. Latin *ad Martis, ad Dianæ* (templum); *ex Apollodori* (libro); *de Gracchi apud censores* (oratione); French *la saint Pierre* (fête). In German the names of festivals *Michaelis*,

Johannis, Martini, etc., and of places *St. Gallen, St. Georgen, St. Märgen*, have become completely independent, and are no longer felt to need supplementing, and therefore no longer felt as genitives.

A psychological subject or predicate may be drawn from the situation.

554. In the cases discussed, an element of a sentence has its meaning completed from the situation. But it is possible for such an element, for a psychological subject or predicate, to be entirely drawn from the situation. To this class belong the sentences of apparently one member only, discussed above, p. 118, such as '*fire*,' '*thieves*,' etc. Even the form of such sentences may be influenced, in the way described, by the analogy of more complete ones. When one says, for instance, in a threatening tone *keinen schritt weiter*, only the psychological predicate is expressed, the understood subject being the person to whom the threat is addressed. That the former, however, is in the accusative case, has the same explanation as in sentences of the form *Cotta finem*. The same holds of sentences like *guten tag, schönen dank, herzlichen glückwunsch* and the like. In such cases as *glückliche reise, keine umstände, viel glück*, and many others, the form affords no evidence whether the accusative is meant. In a sentence like *manum de tabula* we may take *manum* as psychological subject, *de tabula* as predicate; but the accusative *manum* shows that here also a subject is to be taken from the situation, and that the relation of *manum* to it is conceived on the analogy of object to subject. The same is the case with *ultro istum a me* (PLAUT.), *ex ungue leonem* = ἐξ ὀνύχων λέοντα, *malam illi pestem* (CIC.), etc. In German we have such sentences as *den kopf in die höhe*, and hence also probably such as *gewehr auf, schertz bei seite, davon ein ander mal mehr*, even though the form affords no evidence of the accusative. Other cases also, prepositional determinants and adverbs can be used in this way, as the examples adduced show; cf. further, *sed de hoc alio loco pluribus* (CIC.), *de conjectura hactenus, nimis iracunde*.

555. Sometimes the psychological predicate is also to be taken from the situation, in which case intelligibility may be promoted by the tone, facial expression, and gestures. Thus e.g., in suppressed threats: *ich will (dich)*, cf., the well-known Vergilian *quos ego*. Further, expressions of wonder or indignation, or of regret, which only state the object upon which these emotions are directed. The predicate is here chiefly indicated by the tone of feeling. Cf. subject nominatives such as *dieser kerl, diese fülle, der unglückliche, ich armer*. Also, infinitives such as *so lange zu schlafen, so ein schuft zu sein*; Latin *tantum rem tam negligentem agere* (TER.), *non puduisse verberare hominem senem* (ib.); accusative with infin. *te nunc sic vexari, sic jacere, idque fieri mea culpa* (CIC.); cf. Draeg. § 154. 3.

556. The same explanation applies also to isolated sentences, which in form are *dependent*. They are originally either psychological subjects or predicates, the correlative element being understood from the situation; they may, however, by 'usual' application, generally attain the character of independent principal sentences. Expressions introduced by *dass* are, like the above adduced expressions of wonder and regret, originally subjects: *dass du gar nicht müde wirst! dass mir dass begegnen muss! dass dir auch so wenig zu helfen ist!* Further, conditional sentences as threats: *wenn er mir in den wurf kommt —, ertappe ich ihn nur —*; Latin *verbum si adderis* (TER.). Conditional sentences to express wishes: *wäre ich erst da! wenn er doch käme!* Conditional sentences for which no completion can be found: *wenn du noch nicht überzeugt bist, wenn er aber nicht kommt*; Latin *si quidem istuc impune habueris* (TER.). Conditional sentences which serve to reject assertions or proposals which are made in ignorance of the real circumstances: *wenn du in mein herz sehen könntest; wenn du wüsstest, wie leid es mir tut*. Sentences of wishing and

Isolated sentences in form dependent.

proposing, with *dass*, are original predicate, or, according to the grammatical form, objects : *dass ich doch dabei sein könnte* ; MHG. *daz si schiere got gehæne* ; French *que j'aïlle à son secours ou que je meure* ; Italian *che tu sia maledetto*, and similarly in all the Romance languages.

CHAPTER XIX.

RISE OF WORD-FORMATION AND INFLEXION.

WE have occupied our attention much with the question of ^{Original new creation in word-formation secondary in its nature.} analogical new creation in the area of word-formation and inflexion. We must now direct our attention to original, non-analogical creation in this department. This is not, like the simplest syntactical combinations, primary in its nature, but secondary only, and of slow development. There are, as far as I can see, three ways, and three only, by means of which etymological groups of words are formed out of simple single words standing in no inner relation to each other. One of these is differentiation of sound, which is itself followed by a differentiation of meaning. An example to the point would be the division in IE. between the imperfect and the aorist ¹ (cf. *supra*, p. 287).

558. Similar divisions are no doubt conceivable enough even in the primitive elements of language. Still, in most cases, our own observation will give us proof that no groups are formed, seeing that in this process the feeling of relationship is lost; and still less are parallel groups formed, as in the case cited. A second method

¹ Of course the process is very different, even though it conduces to the same result, when a secondary sound-difference, after the loss of the other differentiating tokens, becomes the only token of the functional difference, as in the English *foot* — *feet*, *tooth* — *teeth*, *man* — *men*. Where such forms are to be found in our oldest traditions, it will often prove impossible to decide whether they owe their origin to this process or to that discussed in the text.

is the junction of converging development of signification with converging sound-development (cf. *suchen* and *sucht*) : of which we have spoken, p. 233. It is obvious enough that any such process can occur only as an isolated one. Thus the strictly normal method of the growth of everything formal in language is, and remains, the third : viz. composition.

Growth of
composition.

559. We have plenty of opportunities of watching the growth of composition. In the IE. languages there are two strata of compounds which must be distinguished from each other : an older one which has either come direct from the original language, or has, at least, been formed on original models ; and a later one, which has been independently developed on the foundation of the single-languages, and which, in modern languages, has gained a great prevalence. This last method we can see to a great extent actually growing before our eyes, and this consistently by means of the conjunction of elements originally independent. Connexions of any kind serve this purpose. Thus, for instance, we find that compounds take their rise from the junction of the genitive with the governing substantive : cf. MHG. *hungersnot*, *hasenfuss*, *freudensfest*, *kindergarten* ; French *lundi* (*lunæ dies*), *Thionville* (*Theodonis villa*), *comptable* (*comes stabuli*), *Montfaucon* (*mons falconis*), *Bourg-la-Reine* ; Latin *paterfamilias*, *legislator*, *plebiscitum*, *caprifolium* ; [English *Lady Day*, *Stagsfoot*] ; from the union of the attributive adjective with the substantive : cf. MHG. *edelmann* (MHG. still *edel man*, genitive *eddes mannes*), *altmeister*, *hochmunt*, *Schönbrunn*, *oberhand*, *Liebermeister*, *Liebeskind*, *morgenrot* ; French *demi-cercle*, *double-feuille*, *faux-marché*, *haute-justice*, *grand-mère*, *petite-fille*, *belles-lettres*, *cent-gardes*, *bonjour*, *prudhomme*, *prin-temps*, *Belfort*, *Longueville*, *amour-propre*, *garde-nationale*, *ferblanc*, *vinaigre*, *Villeneuve*, *Rocheport*, *Aigues-Mortes* ; Latin *respublica*, *jusjurandum* ; [English *half circle*, *grandmother*, *upper hand*, etc.] ; further,

in NHG. *einmal*, *jenseits* (MHG. *jenslt*), *cinigermassen*, *mittlerweile*; French *encore* (*hanc horam*), *fièrement* (*fera mente*), *autrefois*, *autrefois*, *longtemps*; Latin *hodie*, *magnopere*, *reipsa*; from the appositional connexion of two substantives, cf. NHG. *Christkind*, *gottmensch*, *fürstbischof*, *prinz-regent*, *herrgott*, *Basel-land*; French *maitre-tailleur*, *maitre-garçon*, *cardinal-ministre*, *Dampierre* (*dominus Petrus*), *Dammarié* (*domina Maria*), OFR. *damedens* (*dominus dens*); [English *master-mariner*, *prince-regent*, *head-boy*, etc.]; from the co-ordination of two substances, in NHG. only, to denote the connexion of two countries, as Schleswig-Holstein, Oestreich-Ungarn; from the appositional or copulative connexion of two adjectives, or that of an adverb with an adjective, a difference which cannot always be distinctly marked, cf. NHG. *rotgelb*, *bittersüss*, *altenglisch*, *niederdeutsch*, *hellgrün*, *hochfein*, *gutgesinnt*, *wolgesinnt*; French *bis-blanc*, *aigre-doux*, *sourd-muet*, *bienheureux*, *mal-content*; from the addition of two cardinal numbers, cf. NHG. *fünfzehn*, English 'fifteen,' Latin *quindecim*; from the connexion of the adjective with a dependent case, cf. NHG. *ansdrucksvoll*, *sorgenfrei*, *rechtskräftig*, Latin *jurisconsultus*, *peritus*, *verisimilis*; from the connexion of two pronouns, or it may be of the article with a pronoun, cf. NHG. *derselbe*, *derjene* (at present only used in the derivative *derjenige*), French *quelque* (*quale quid*), *autant* (*alterum tantum*), *lequel*; from the connexion of an adverb, or of a conjunction, with a pronoun, cf. NHG. *jeder* (from *ie-weder*), *kein* (from *nih-ein*), French *celle* (*ecce illam*), *ceci* (*ecce istum hic*), Latin *quisque*, *quicunque*, *hic*, *nullus*; from the connexion of several particles, cf. NHG. *daher*, *darum*, *hintan*, *fortan*, *vorans*, *widerum*, *entgegen*, *immer*, French *jamais*, *ainsi* (*aeque sic*), *avant* (*ab ante*), *derrière* (*de retro*), *dont* (*de unde*), *ensemble* (*in simul*), *encontre*; Latin *desuper*, *perinde*, *sicut*, *unquam*, *etiam*; from the connexion of a preposition with the dependent case, cf. NHG. *anstatt*, *sinnichte*,

zufrieden, vorhanden, inzwischen, entzwei, French *contremont, partout, endroit, alors* (*ad illam horam*), *sur-le-champ, environ, adieu, affaire, sans-culotte* [English *uphill, downstairs*], Latin *invicem, obviam, illico* (= *in loco*), *denuo* (= *de novo*), *idcirco, quamobrem*; from the connexion of an adverb with a verb, cf. NHG. *auffahren, hinbringen, herstellen, heimsuchen, mislingen, vollführen*, French *malmener, maltratter, méconnaître, bistourner* [English *foretell, gain-say, withstand*], Latin *benedicere, maledicere*; from the connexion of a dependent case with its verb, cf. NHG. *achtgeben, wahrnehmen* (OHG. *swara*, with feminine stem) *wahrsagen, lobsing, handlang, hochachten, preisgeben*; French *maintenir, colporter, bouleverser*; Latin *animadvertere, venum dare—venundare—vendere, crucifigere, nuncire, manumittere, referre*. It is also possible for more than two component parts to unite into a compound, cf. NHG. *einund-zwanzig, einundderselbe*, Latin *decEDOcto* (= *decem et octo*, cf. Corssen, *Aussprache des lat.* ii. p. 886¹); French *tour-à-tour, tête-à-tête, vis-à-vis*; French *aide-de-camp, trait-d'-union, garde-du-corps, Languedoc, belle-à-soir, pot-au-feu, Ficrabras, arc-en-ciel, Châlons-sur-Marne*; Latin *duodeviginti*; NHG. *brantinhaarn* (a flower); Latin *plusquam-perfectum*; NHG. *nichtsdestoweniger* [English *notwithstanding, nevertheless*]; Italian *nondimeno*. Compounds also rise from dependent sentences, cf. NHG. *newære*, contracted from *ninnr*, etc. = NHG. *nur*; Italian, *avvegna* (*adveniat*), *avvegnache, chicchessia*; Latin, *quilibet, quantumvis, quantumvis, quamlibet, ubiis*. Similarly they arise from sentences which are formally independent, but which are still used in logical subordination, e.g. as intercalations; cf. NHG. *weiss-gott*, NHG. *neiswas* = AS. *nat hwæt* = Latin *nescio quid*, French *je ne sais quoi*, MHG. *deiswar* (= *das ist war*), French *peut-être, pûça, naguère*, Latin *licet, illicet, videlicet, scilicet, forsitan*, Spanish *quiza* ('perhaps,' properly 'who knows'). Further, sentences may

¹ See Darmesteter, *La vie des mots*, p. 23.

be turned into compounds by the aid of metaphors, and more especially imperative sentences; cf. NHG. *Fürchtetgott, tangenichts, störenfried, geratewol, vergissmeinnicht, gottseibeinns*; French, *baisemain, passe-partout, rendez-vous*; Modern Latin, *facsimile, notabene, vademecum, nolimetangere*; NHG. *jelängeryelieber*. It is harder for a true sentence which has preserved its independence to pass into a compound. For it is the very essence of a sentence to denote the act of combining its several members, whilst it would seem to be the essence of a compound to denote the process of combination as a result already attained. In spite of this, however, compound sentences do appear in the most different languages, and particularly in the IE. and Semitic verbal forms.

560. The transition from syntactical juxtaposition to true composition is very gradual; no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between them. This is proved by the great uncertainty which prevails in the orthography of modern languages with regard to the treatment of various combinations as compounds or as separate words. This uncertainty has led to an orthographical compromise—the use of the hyphen. In English the orthographical union of words is often neglected in cases where, in other literary languages, it would appear indispensable. In MHG. we often find compounds formed after the IE. model, written separately.

Transition
from syntac-
tical juxtapo-
sition to
true com-
position.

561. The purely relative character of the difference between a compound and a mere group of words can have only one ground, viz., that the cause of such difference displays its activity in very various degrees. We must not be seduced by the written language to seek this cause in some supposed special intimacy of union distinguishing the members of a compound from the members of a group of words. Combinations such as article and substantive, preposition and substantive, substantive and attributive

adjective, or dependent genitive, have exactly the same continuity as a single word. Then, again, the cause has been sought in the accent. It is doubtless indisputable that the unity of a word consists in the graduated subordination of its other elements to the one selected by the accent. But the case is precisely the same with the unity of the sentence, and of every portion of the sentence consisting of several words, of every group of closely-connected words. The accent of an independent word may, in many cases, be as far depressed as that of a subordinate member of a compound. In a combination like *durch liebe, durch* receives no stronger stress than in *durchtrieben*; *zu* in *zu bett* no stronger than in *zufrieden*, *herr* in *herr Schulze* no stronger than in *hausherr*. Indeed we cannot always consistently maintain this distinction, that the position of the accent in a compound is fixed and invariable, while in a group of words it can change. I can say *herr Schulze* as contrasted with *frau Schulze*, but I can say equally *der hausherr* as contrasted with *die hausfrau*. Nor is any special position of the chief accent necessary to the formation of a compound; it may occur in any position at will. It is requisite indeed, in order that the more recent method of composition may be brought into line with the earlier, that the system of accentuation be identical in the two cases. In order, for instance, that a formation like *rindsbraten* or *rinderbraten* should be felt as substantially identical with a formation like *rindfleisch*, it was indispensable that the main accent should fall on the dependent genitive which precedes. Where, however, the analogy of the older method of composition does not come into consideration, in this case, even in German, the stronger stress laid upon the second element in no way prevents the formation of a nominal compound.

562. We have to seek the distinction between a compound and a group of words united under one main accent, not in any physio-

logical cause, but in the nature of the psychological grouping. The one essential point is that the whole as such be in some way *isolated* from the elements of which it is composed. The degree of isolation necessary in order to cause the fusion to pass into a compound cannot be expressed in any universally applicable definition.

563. In this question, all the different kinds of isolation which we have previously discussed have to be taken into account. It may either happen that the whole undergoes a development which the single parts in their independent usage do not share, or that, conversely, the single parts undergo a development in which the whole does not participate, and this equally in respect of the meaning and of the sound-form ; or again it may happen that the single parts in their independent usage disappear ; or finally the particular mode of combination may become obsolete and survive only in the special formula.

564. The occurrence of any one of these processes may suffice to convert a syntactical combination into a compound. But it is by no means true that we commonly regard as a compound every composite phrase in which such isolation has already made its appearance. It is precisely such combinations as these which call for our special attention, if we would observe the first beginnings of the process of fusion.

565. The first step towards isolation commonly consists in the syntactical combination as a whole acquiring a signification which does not precisely tally with that which results from the juxtaposition of the several elements. We have already become acquainted with this process (cf. p. 82). The consequence is that the single elements of the combination come no longer clearly into consciousness. But by this very process the nature of their combination is obscured, and this constitutes the first

step towards a syntactical isolation, which brings with it a formal isolation also. The process of isolation, however, once started, implies the possibility of further advance.

566. With regard to syntactical isolation we must distinguish two cases. Such isolation may conceivably affect merely the relation in which the members of the compound stand to each other, as, e.g., in *hungersnot*, *edelmann*; but it is also possible for the combination as a whole to become isolated as regards the other components of the sentence. The result is, then, invariably an uninflected word; cf. *keineswegs*, *gewissermassen*, *jederzeit*, *alldieweil*, *zurecht*, *abhanden*, *überhaupt*, *vorweg*, *allzumal*; Latin, *magno pere*, *quare*, *quomodo*, *hodie*, *admodum*, *interea*, *idcirco*, *quapropter*, *quamobrem*; French, *toujours*, *toutefois*, *encore* (= *hanc horam*), *malgré* (= *malum gratum*), *amont*, *environ*, *parmi*, *pourtant*, *cependant*, *tout-à-coup*. Such combinations as these become capable of inflection by secondary development only, as, for instance, *zufrieden*, *débonnaire* (= *de bonne air*). Where the capacity for inflection has not been destroyed by isolation, the case may occur that the fusion of the members is arrested by means of inflexion occurring in the interior of the group; e.g. in such a combination as *das rote meer*, *mare rubrum*, in which cases we are always reminded of the independence of the single members by the inflexion *des roten meeres*, *maris rubri*, etc. A further process must set in before complete fusion becomes possible, namely, the crystallisation of an inflexional form (as a rule that of the nominative singular), in consequence of the obscuration of its original function; a process which we have already described (p. 194).

567. As we have seen on p. 253, the compound acquires the same capacity of producing compounds from itself as the simple word of the same class. Now we find that from a syntactical com-

bination which is not yet commonly regarded as a compound, a derivative is composed on the model of the simple word, or that this combination, like a simple word, is made into the member of a compound after already existing models. We must draw the conclusion from this that the instinct of language has apprehended these as a unity, and that thus, in any case, their development into a compound is already, up to a certain point accomplished.

568. In the case of copulative combinations the process of fusion begins to operate as soon as it is possible to bring the whole combination under one single conception. This is the case, first, when the combined elements are synonyms representing the same thing from a different point of view ; cf. *art und weise, grund und boden, wind und wetter, weg und steg, sack und pack, handel und wandel, hangen und bängen, tun und treiben, leben und weben, wie er leibt und lebt, frank und frei, weit und breit, hoch und teuer, angst und bange, ganz und gar, drauf und dran, nic und nimmer* [bag and baggage, wind and weather, moil and toil, etc.]. In the second place, when the elements combined are antithetic terms which reciprocally supplement each other, e.g., *stadt und land, himmel und hölle, wol und wehe, alt und jung, gross und klein, arm und reich, dick und dünn, lieb und leid, tun und lassen, dieser und jener, einer und der andere, dies und das, ab und an, ab und zu, auf und ab, ein und aus, für und wider, hin und her, hin und wider, drüber und drunter, hüben und drüben, hier und da, dann und wann* [hither and thither, up and down, there and back]. There are besides many other cases, such as *haus und hof, weib und kind, kind und kegel, mann und mans* [house and home, kith and kin, etc.]. The two members may also be formed by the same word, cf. *durch und durch, für und für, nach und nach, über und über, wider und wider, fort und fort, der und der* [again and again, out and out, through and through]. In the case of *der und der*, however, the two members

in spite of their formal identity, stand in contrast to each other. In the case of some of these combinations a more thorough process of isolation has set in. In the case of substantives we have a criterion of the conception of a copulative combination as a unity, in the agreement of an adjective attached to the combination with its *second* member; cf. *durch meinen trewen hilff vnd rat* (H. SACHS); *mit allem mobilen hab' und gut* (GOE.). Another test, which occurs more frequently, is the incapacity for inflexion of the first member. In the case of the above-cited combinations of words in themselves capable of inflexion, the inflexion which would recall the independent nature of the members is in most cases discarded: thus we cannot say *mit sacke und packe* or *grundes und bodens*. Cases also occur, however, of inflexion in the second member alone; e.g. *des zu Abdera gehörigen grund und bodens* (WIE.). Compare again *von tausend durchgeweinten tag- und nächten* (GOE.); *dem wenigen glaube, liebe und hoffnung* (GOE.); in Hans Sachs we even find *dem nimmer golt noch geldts gebrach*. In German we constantly find that the inflexion is omitted in the interior of the sentence where two adjectives are conjoined; cf. *die blank- und blossen widersprüche* (LE.) *gegen inn- und aussern feind* (GOE.), *auf ein oder die andere weise* (LE.), *mit mein und deinem wesen* (LE.).¹

§69. Even in modern German the internal inflexion is necessarily dropped in a sentence like *einer schwarz- und weissen fahne*, *schwarz- und weisse fahnen*, which differs in sense from *schwarze und weisse fahnen*. The combinations, also written as such, *einund-zwanzig*, *einunddrissig* (formerly inflected as *eines und zwanzig*), are analogous to the expression *schwarz- und weiss* [cf. the English

¹ The omission, however, of the inflexion of the first member is not an absolute proof that the two members have been conceived as a notional unity. It is common in early NHD., and even in Goethe, where the combination consists of two adjectives. Hans Sachs can even say *weder mit buss noch guten dingen*. It is less common in combinations of two substantives, cf. *von thier vnd menschen* (H. SACHS), *von merck vnd steten* (ib.)

one-and-twentieth]. Fixed combinations, no longer admitting of any flexion in the middle arc, further, *all und jeder, ein und alles*. The word *einnunderselbe* is written together; the *ein* being sometimes inflected and sometimes not. The Greek *καλοκαγαθός* was probably formed from analogy under the influence of the old IE. method of composition, otherwise the stem-form *καλο* would be hard to account for. Complete fusion would probably be of more frequent occurrence if it were not checked by the copulative particle. This check is removed when this particle, owing to phonetic weakening, is no longer recognised as such; as in the case of the Low German *ritensplit*, compounded of the imperatives of *riten* and *spliten* ('tear and split,' Ger. *reißen* and *splissen*). A copulative combination without a particle fuses more easily. Thus *schwarzrotgolden* and *Oestreich-Ungarn*, which logically are related to each other as *schwarz und weiss* and *Neapel und Sicilien*, are felt as real compounds. In the period of the IE. languages when no inflexion and no copulative particle as yet existed, or when at any rate both were not absolutely indispensable, the fusion into a copulative compound (*dvandva*) must of course been very easy.

570. The combination of a substantive with an attributive, genitive, or any other kind of determinant may pass through all the phases of signification-change described in Chapter IV. without the substantive, as such, being thereby affected. It happens very commonly, in the first place, that the whole acquires a richer and more specific meaning than that yielded by mere combination of the parts. The determinant often serves, especially, to indicate merely some one characteristic, while others which coexist with this are ignored. Further modifications may then set in, in consequence of which the epithet in its strict meaning is no longer appropriate. Thus in the language of botany *viola odorata* does not mean a sweet-smelling violet, but a special kind of violet, characterised by

other qualities than its sweet smell ; and the name is applied even to a dried violet which no longer emits any trace of a sweet smell, and to the plant when not in flower. By the French *moyen âge* we understand a strictly defined period of time, though no such definition is involved in the word *moyen* itself. *Geheimer rat* and *wirklicher geheimer rat* are titles which, as wholes, possess a definite traditional value, which cannot be gathered from the words *geheim* and *wirklich* in themselves ; cf. further, *der heilige geist, die heilige schrift, die schönen künste, gebrannte mandeln, kaltes blut, der blane montag, der grüne donnerstag, der heilige abend, die hohe schule ; der stein der weisen ; die weisen aus dem morgenlande*. As regards the substantival determinants, we have still to remark that they are only able to fuse with the word defined into one single conception if their signification is not, in 'occasional use,' individualised ; i.e. they must, except in the case of proper names, and the denominations of such objects as are conceived of as existing only once, be employed in an abstract sense. Many compounds exist which are analogous to the instances cited of syntactical combinations, including both cases in which the process of fusion is historically traceable, as *schwarzweid, weissbrot, dünnbier, rotdorn, sauerkraut, edelstein ; haubenlerche, seidenraupe, blumenkohl, bundesrat ; arc-en-ciel* ; and cases in which the mode of composition belongs to a prehistorical epoch, as *eisbär, holzwurm, hirschkäfer, steineiche*. It not seldom happens that the same conception is expressed by a compound in one language, and in another by a syntactical combination ; cf. e.g. *mittelalter* with *moyen âge*.

571. A subdivision of this great class is formed by generic names of locality, which by the aid of some determinant, which may itself be likewise unspecific, have become proper names. Such are *die goldene aue, das rote meer, der schwarze see, der breite weg*

[the name of a street in Magdeburg and elsewhere], *die hohe pforte* [the name of a gate in Magdeburg]; *die inseln der seeligen, das cap der guten hoffnung*. With these may be compared such compounds as *Hockburg, Schönbrunn, Kaltbad, Lindenau, Königsfeld; Hirschberg, Strassburg, Steinbach*. Here too must be mentioned the case in which an epithet added to a proper name as a distinguishing mark passes into an integral portion of the proper name, being learnt as attaching to a definite individual; cf. *Karl der grosse—der kahle—der kühne—der dicke, Ludwig der fromme—der heilige—das kind, Wilhelm der eroberer; Davos platz—Davos dörfl; Basel land—Basel stadt; Zell am see*. With these we may compare such compounds as *Althaus, Kleinpaul; Gross-Basel—Klein-Basel, Oberfranken—Unterfranken, Eichen-Barleben; Kirch-zarten*.

572. The metaphorical application of a word is rendered recognisable and intelligible not merely by the context (cf. p. 74), but in a special degree by addition of a determinant; cf. *der löwe des tages, des haupt der verschworenen, die nacht des todes, der abend des lebens, die seele des unternehmens* [the heart of the enterprise, the life of the undertaking]. The same effect is produced by a determinant when it forms an element in a compound. Thus we venture with the aid of such a determinant to use metaphors such as, if we considered merely the undetermined word, we should refrain from using, because the determining element contains at the same time a correction of the metaphor; cf. *neusilber, katzen-rod, ziegenlamm, bienenkönigin, bienenwolf, ameisenlöwe, äpfelwein, namenswetter; hirschkuh, heupferd, seelöwe, buchweizen, erdäpfel, galläpfel, augäpfel, zaunkönig, stiefelknecht, milchbruder*.

573. We have to distinguish from these cases, those in which the compound has a proper as well as a metaphorical meaning, and only as a compound acquires its metaphorical use, as *himmels-*

schlüssel, hahnenfuss, löwenmaul, schwalbenschwanz, stiefmütterchen, brummhör [*swallow-tail, negrohead* (of tobacco)].

574. The terms discussed above (p. 81), drawn from parts of the body and mind or from clothes, are almost exclusively syntactic combinations or compounds. The reason of this is that the simple words, as in themselves lacking characterisation, would be useless for any such application.

575. It is now our task to trace further how the fusion of the determinant with the determinate is furthered by the syntactical and formal isolation.

576. In the case of the coalescence of the genitive with its governing substantive in German, we have, in the first place, to observe that it only occurs where the genitive precedes. The converse position is unsuitable for composition in the first place, because where it occurs an inflexion occurs in the interior of the combination whereby we are continually reminded of the independence of the elements; and for this reason the fusion in such a Latin word as *pater-familias* is less complete than in *plebiscitum*. Further, where the genitive precedes, the accentuation becomes analogous to that of genuine compounds (OHG. *tāges stērro* = *tāgostērro*; on the other hand, *stērro des tāges*). The decisive impulse, however, to coalescence consists in changes of the syntactical application of the article. As this has in many cases sunk to the position of a mere case-sign, it has especially become indispensable with the genitive of all appellatives not connected with an attributive adjective. Only the clearly-marked genitive singular of the strong masculines and neuters still occurs at times without an article, especially in proverbs, such as *biedermanns erbe*, and titles such as *schäfers klagelied*, *geistes gruss*, *wandrer's nachtlid*. In OHG. the article is still quite commonly absent. While this construction gradually died

out, certain combinations without article were traditionally handed down, and thus the fusion became complete. It was still further specially favoured by the usage, originally universal and then likewise dying out, of placing the genitive as in Greek between the article and its substantive. This construction long maintained itself, especially in the language of the popular epic, only, it is true, in the case of proper names and allied words; cf. in the *Nibelungenlied*, *das Guntheres lant*, *das Nibelunges swert*, *din Sturides hant*, *das Etzelen wip*, etc. Combinations such as *der gotes haz*, *segen*, *din gotes hant*, etc., are still habitual in the thirteenth century. In the older period the genitive of every substantive might be thus inserted without being itself connected with the article; cf. *ther mannes sun* ('the son of man'), common in Tatian, *then hituniskes fater* ('patremfamilias'), *ib.* 44, 16 (on the other hand, *thes k. fater* 72, 4; 147, 8; *fatere hituniskes* 77, 5), *ein ediles mann* ('a man of noble descent'), Otfrid iv. 35, 1. We find a similar insertion between the ordinal number and the substantive in *zwei diltbono gimachun* ('two pairs of pigeons'), Otfrid i. 14, 24. As the immediate juxtaposition of article and substantive gradually became necessary, the combination was necessarily apprehended by the instinct of language as a unity. In the course of time many formal cases of isolation have been added to these, the older forms of the genitive having been preserved in composition (*lindenblatt*, *frauenkirche*, *hahnenfuss*, *schwanenhals*, *gänseleber*, *Mägdesprung*, *nachtigall*, etc.). These cases have arisen further from the fact that, in the case of masculine and neuter monosyllables, the syncopated forms have become general in composition, and the non-syncopated in the simple word; cf. *hundstag*, *landsmann*, *schafskopf*, *windsbraut*, as contrasted with *hundes*, etc. (though we have also *gotteshaus* and *liebeskummer*). A final source of such instances is that the genitive form in the compound

often corresponds with that of the nominative plural, and is hence connected with the latter, there is a tendency by the linguistic instinct where the signification agrees; cf. *bienenschwarm*, *rosenfarbe*, *bildersaal*, *äpfelwein*, *bürgermeister*. In the last-mentioned case the form also coincides with that of the nominative singular: in the case of *Baierland*, *Pommerland* (OHG. *Beiero lant*) with this alone, while the plural of the simple word has changed its inflexion.

577. The most ancient stratum of genitival compounds in French proceeded from the old Latin genitives without the addition of the preposition *de*. In old French this method of construction was, at least in the case of personal notions, still in common and living use; e.g. *la volonté le rei* (= 'du roi'); it had to give way gradually, because the form had come to coincide with that of the dative and accusative, and thus the relation denoted was no longer clear. Certain traditional remains of the old usage have maintained themselves down to the present day without being orthographically denoted as compounds; *rue St. Jacques*, etc., *église Saint Pierre*, *musée Napoléon*. In other cases the fusion has become more complete, in part favoured by isolation of another kind; cf. *Hôtel-Dieu*, *Connétable* (*comes stabuli*), *Château-Renard*, *Bourg-la-Reine*, *Montfaucon*, *Fontainebleau* (*f. Blialdi*). [In English, *Lady-day*.] In French, unlike German, owing to the disappearance of all case-signs, the fusion is rendered possible, even when the genitive is placed in the second place. It must have been first completely effected in compounds where the genitive preceded, since this order early became obsolete; thus we have *Abbeville* (*abbatis v.*), *Thionville* (*Theodonis villa*), etc.¹

578. The coalescence of the adjective with the substantive

¹ Cf. such instances as *Houlogate*, v. Kluge, *die Normannen*, in Gröber's *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie*, p. 394. See also Gröber, *u.s.* p. 423.

belonging to it originates, in German, principally in the so-called uninflected form, which in its attributive use gradually becomes obsolete; cf. above, p. 157. In MHG. (*ein*) *junc geselle*, (*ein*) *edel mann*, (*ein*) *ninze jdr*, are still quite ordinary constructions; in NHG. *junggeselle*, *edelmann*, *neunjahr* can only be apprehended as compounds. A wider basis for the commencement of this process is afforded by the weak nominatives of polysyllabic adjectives in *r*, *l*, *n*, which in MHG. reject their *e*, while this is in NHG. restored after the analogy of the monosyllabic ones. In MHG. *der ober roc*, *die ober kant*, *daz ober teil* appear still as regular syntactical combinations (whence we also find the accusative *die obern kant* by the side of *die oberhaut*); in NHG. *der oberrock*, *die oberhand*, *das oberteil* can only be regarded as compounds, because they would otherwise have to appear as *der obere rock*, etc. In spite of this the simple plan of abiding by the old condition is insufficient for the creation of actual composition, and many compounds of the kind took their rise before the appearance of this syntactical isolation. As early as in OHG. we find *alifater*, *frthals*, *guottât*, *hohstuol*, and many others. The process is rather that the combination becomes so stereotyped, the notion conveyed by it so completely single, that internal inflexion is felt by the linguistic instinct as an inconsistency, and it is then only natural that the form adopted should be the really normal case, viz., the nominative singular, which, owing to the disappearance of the inflexion-ending, appears at the same time as the stem of the word. Since the uninflected form had ceased to be employed attributively, the fusion of the adjective with the substantive became correspondingly more difficult. For the inflected forms of the nominative singular (*guter*, *gute*, *gutes*) had, from the very outset, a much smaller range, and were, from the very circumstance of their inflexional termination, not so fitted to stand as representatives of the word

in itself. There was now, however, less need for such fusions, since a quantity of compounds was already at hand with their uninflected forms, which were also capable of producing analogical new formations. Still, even in this period, certain cases of fusion, complete or incipient, appear; the explanation being, in some cases, that combination has been treated on the analogy of the older combinations already fused (cf. *geheimrat* by the side of *geheim(e) rat*); in other cases, that the inflected nominative form is generalised, as in *kranseminze*, *jungemagd*, in *Gutersohn*, *Liebeskind*, and other proper names. In the case of certain words the feeling for the unity of the conception betrays itself in the fact that, instead of internal inflexion, the two elements are written as one; cf. *langeweile*, *hohepriester*, *hohelied*. Lessing even writes: *ein Jüngstesgericht en mignature*. Compare also *derselbe*, *derjenige*.

579. Even where no complete fusion of the attributive adjective with the substantive belonging to it has taken place, derivations are still made from the combination; cf. *hohepriesterlich*, *langweilig*, *kurzatmig*, *hochgradig*, *vielzünftig*, *vielsprachig*, *rotbäckig*, *einkändig*, *blauäugig*, *blondhaarig*, *kleinstädtisch*, *kleinstädter*, *schwarzkünstler*, *tausendkünstler*, *einsilbler*; which stand on precisely the same footing as *grossmütig*, *edelmännisch*, etc. We are forbidden to treat these as noun-compounds by the circumstance that many of the simple words which would in this case have to be prefixed, such as *-weilig*, *-atmig*, *-gradig*, do not exist at all, and in fact have never existed.

580. Such combinations are also employed to form compounds which, in spite of all the opposition of the grammarians, stubbornly hold their ground. The ordinary objection made to such combinations as *reitende artillerie-caserne* ('mounted artillery barracks'), that the 'barracks' are not 'mounted,' will not bear examination.

No one who uses the expression means to imply that they are, and the true distribution is not *reitende + artillerie-caserne*, but *reitende artillerie + caserne*. But a difficulty arises owing to the inflexional and congruent nature of the adjective. The latter, therefore, commonly accommodates itself to the second element, not merely in cases where it could in any case be referred to this as well as to the first, as in *französischer sprachlehrer*, *freie handzeichnung*, but also in other cases, as in *der sauern garkenzeit*. In the case of many of these combinations it has become usual to unite them continuously; cf. *alteweibersommer*, *armesiünderglöckchen*, etc. In spite of this the adjective often agrees with the latter element. Goethe writes: *auf dem armesiünderstühlchen*; Heine, on the other hand, *auf einem armesiünderbänkchen*; the *Kölnische Zeitung*, *nebst armsiündertreppe*. Klopstock even employs *hohpriestergewand*, and Luise Mühlbach *den guttenachtsgruss*.¹ In English, where no inflexion produces confusion, such combinations cause no difficulty.

581. In French coalescence is less difficult than in German, because the distinction of cases is lost. Where only the distinction of singular and plural remains, the suggestion of compositeness is necessarily far less frequent. Besides this there are many combinations which from their very nature occur in the singular only (e.g. *sainte-écriture*, *terre-sainte*), or again, in the plural only (e.g. *beaux-arts*, *belles lettres*). Hence the sense of the essential unity of such phrases commonly asserts itself by the use of the hyphen. Another more important means of obtaining the evidence of the linguistic instinct is afforded by the employment of the partitive article. It is in French usual to say, for instance, *il a des belles lettres*, just as it is to say *il a des lettres*, while it is correct to say *il a de belles maisons*. Instances of isolation alike of form

¹ Cf. Andresen, *Sprachg.* p. 152 and 64.

and syntax may here come in to strengthen the union yet further. In old French the adjectives which in Latin are inflected according to the third declension have as yet taken no *e* in the feminine, which was not added till later, according to the analogy of adjectives of three terminations; e.g. *grand* = *grandis*; later *grande*, after the analogy of *bonne*. In the case of compounds forms without *e* maintain themselves: *grand'mere*, *grand'messe*, *Grancville*, *Réalmont*, *Ville-réal*, *Rocheport*. In the case of *Vaucluse* (*vallis clausa*) the compound, apart from other phonetic peculiarities, has not undergone the change of gender of the simple word (*le val*) which has taken place in modern French. There follow assimilations just as in German. In the case of adjectives which occur more frequently in composition, the form of the masculine and of the singular is generalised; thus in *mi-*, *demi-*, *mal-* (*malfacon*, *malheure*, *mallôte*), *nu-* (*nu-tête*, *nu-pieds*). By this means the composition is plainly marked.

582. In cases where in NIIG. the genitive has coalesced with a governing adjective, it frequently appears that the construction is either obsolete or grown unusual, and replaced by another; e.g. *ehrenreich* — *reich an ehren*, *geistesarm* — *arm an geist*, *freuden-leer* — *leer von freuden*.

583. In NIIG. it is common in cases where adverbs, according to the ordinary syntactical rules, precede the verb, to unite them in writing with the verb: cf. *aufheben*, *vordringen*, *zurückweichen*, *wegwerfen*, etc. We can gather that no composition, strictly so called, has set in by the transposition (*er treibt an*, *er steht auf*, etc.) On the other hand, the circumstance that the words are conjoined in writing denotes that the whole has begun to be apprehended as a unity.

584. In the case of most of these combinations we can distinctly trace an isolation setting in against the elements. The old pre-

Of a verb
with an
adverb.

positional adverbs in general cannot any longer be employed freely and independently, but are confined to a special group of combinations. Instead of these, combinations with *her* and *hin* are chiefly employed for free syntactical combination. Cf. *hinans gehen*, *heran kommen*, which differ essentially in meaning from *ausgehen* and *ankommen*. There then sets in in most cases an independent development of meaning of the combination as such: e.g., *anstehn*, *ausstehn*, *vorstehn*, *zustehn*, *auslegen*, *aufbringen*, *umbringen*, *zubringen*, *auskommen*, *nurkommen*, *vorwerfen*, *vorgeben*, etc. However, the apprehension of these combinations as compounds is aided by the parallel noun-compounds like *ankunft*, *abnahme*, *zunahme*, *verwurf*, *ausspruch*, *zusage*, *anzeige*, etc. These of course, influence most easily the nominal forms of the verb in which the combination is already most firm, and becomes more so, the more they approach the character of a pure noun (cf. the following chapter). They possess the firmest character naturally when they only—and not the finite verb—are usual in a definite meaning or remain so; cf. *aufsehen*, *nachsehen*, *abkommen*; *ausnehmend*. In the case of the participle the fusion may appear in the formation of the comparative or superlative, which are meaningless unless the whole is apprehended as a unity, cf. *die zwei entgegengesetztesten eigenschaften* (GOE.), *der eingeborenste begriff* (GOE.), *unter nachschendern gesetzen* (LE.); other examples may be found in Andr. *Sprache*, p. 119. From the union of the verb with the adverb further arise nominal derivatives which are indisputably verbal unities, such as *anstreibung*, *vorsehung*, *auferstehung*, *abschreiber*, *anstellig*, *ausgiebig*, *zulässig*, *angeblich*, *absatzbar*.¹ For adverbial determinants the same rule holds good as for the substantival words affixed to nouns, namely, that 'occasional' individualisation stands in the way of fusion.

¹ We might be tempted to regard these words rather as nominal compounds; but by doing so we should set ourselves in opposition to the instinct of language, and in some cases we should arrive at simple words which have no existence, such as *stellig* and *geblich*.

Hence it is that the demonstrative adverbs of place, for instance, maintain their independence; *wer da ist, her kommt*, and not *daist, herkommt*. In the case of the nominal forms, it is no doubt true that orthographical cases of union occur like *sein hiersein*, but we do not in spite of these apprehend the whole so thoroughly as a unit as we do such words as *einkommen, zutragen*. The case is far different with *dasein* in the sense of 'existence,' in this case precisely *da* is not individualised. The conditions are much the same with *herkommen* and *darreichen, darbringen*, etc., because *dar* has lost its original function of demonstrative adverb equivalent to *dahin*. There appear also to be symptoms of an inclination to turn the finite verb as well into a true compound. In German newspapers—and Germanists are at one with them on this point—it has become the fashion to write *er anerkennt* [for *erkennt an*]. We thus see plainly enough the path on which the old verbal compounds in German (such as *durchbrechen, betreiben*), and in the other IE. languages have taken their rise from syntactical combination.

585. An adverb derived from an adjective sometimes fuses with the nominal forms of the verb. The first impulse to this fusion is sometimes given by the metaphorical application of one of the two component parts, cf. *tieffühlend, weitgreifend, weittragend, hochfliegend*. The combination becomes even closer when the first part retains a function which, in general, it has lost. Under this head we may class combinations with *wol*, such as *wolleben, wolschmeckend, wolriechend, woltuend*, etc., which have been handed down to us from the time when *wol* was still the common adverb of *gut*. We may further compare the word *erstgeboren*, which dates from a time when the word *erst* bore the sense of the *zuerst* of the present day. No doubt the analogy of nominal compounds is here also at work; cf. *zartfühlend* — *zartgefühl*, *scharfblickend* — *scharfblick*. Here too the comparative and superlative forms may serve to test

the completion of the fusion; cf. *bis zur schwerfälligsten, kleinkauendsten weitschweifigkeit* (SCHOP.); *der tiefführendste geist* (GOE.), *die reingewölbteste stirn* (ib.), *die freigelegenste wohnung*. Superlatives like *weitgreifendste, hochgeehrtester, hochverehrtester* are common. Still more remarkable are cases in which, from a combination in which the adverb is already superlative, another superlative is formed; cf. *die zunächststehendsten* (Frankfurter Zeitung).¹

586. There are many combinations of a verb with an object-accusative which occupy a similar intermediate position between the compound and the syntactic group; cf. *acht geben* or *achtgeben, haushalten, standhalten, stattfinden, teilnehmen*; further, combinations of a verb with a predicate-adjective, like *loskaufen, freigeben, freisprechen, feilbieten, feilhalten, hochachten, wertschätzen, gutmachen*. The causes which in this case further the impulse to composition are exactly the same as in the case of the combinations which contain an adverb. There do occur, however, in the process displacements of distribution, especially in the case of the fusion of the predicative adjective, where this is normal, see p. 328. Of course the transition to a compound is here also the easiest in the case of nominal forms. There occur a great number of participles which have coalesced with an objectival accusative; cf. *feuerspeierend, grundlegend, notleidend, leidtragend, wutschnaubend, segenbringend, nichts sagend*. Here too the comparative forms may serve as a test whether real fusion has set in; cf. *die nichtsbedeutendsten kleinigkeiten* (SCH.), *das grundlegendste der maigesetze* (Kölner Zeitung), *am gefährlichsten und feuerfangendsten* (Deutscher Reichstag).² But no sharp line can be drawn between spontaneous fusion and formation by analogy after the model of

Of a verb
with an ob-
ject-accusa-
tive.

¹ The examples are taken from Andr. *Sprachg.*, p. 120 and 42-3, where still more are adduced.

² Cf. Andresen, *u. s.*

nominal compounds which certainly meets us in words like *safstrotzend*, *kraftbegabt*, *mondbeglänzt*, but which are almost wholly confined to the high poetic style. We have transition into true composition in the case of *lobsingen*, and *wahrsagen* (*wahr* is taken substantivally and denotes truth), in which the influence of derivatives from compounds, such as *ratschlagen* and *weissagen*, cf. p. 270, may have contributed to the result. Derivatives are also formed from combinations in which the fusion is not yet perfectly accomplished, cf. *haushälter*, *teilnehmer*, *freigebig*; even *grundlegung*, *preisverteilung*, *waffenträger*, *holzhauer*, etc.; and further *bekanntmachung*, *kundgebung*, *lostrennung*.¹

With a
prepositional
determinant.

587. Like adverbs, substantives dependent on a preposition coalesce up to a certain point with the verb. It is true that it is not usual to write continuously combinations like *zu grunde legen* or *in stand setzen*, except in the case of the substantival use of the infinitive, but we form the derivations *zugrundelegung*, *instandsetzung*, *ausserachtlassung*, *zuhilfenahme*. Besides, we have such superlative formations as *an dem sichtbarsten*, *in die augen fallendsten orte* (LE.)

Verbal Com-
pounds which
have the
character of
Compound-

588. I would call attention, further, to the numerous combinations which, like the copulatives cited above, are not commonly apprehended as compounds, but which, nevertheless, represent a single notion; e.g. *so wie so*, *vor wie nach*, *mann für mann*, *schritt für schritt* (cf. French *vis-à-vis*, *dos-à-dos*, *tête-à-tête*), *von neuem*, *von hause aus*, *sobald als möglich*, *so gut wie*, *was für ein*, etc. In many of these combinations the coalescence into an unity is at the same time a displacement of the distribution in the sen-

¹ In this case also a doubt may arise whether the words in question are not to be apprehended as nominal compounds, but the instinct of language again decides for the view here taken. No doubt the analogy of nominal composition may to some extent have cooperated, but formations like *freisprechung*, *bekanntmachung* could from their signification not suit this analogy; otherwise they would necessarily be = *freie sprachung*, *bekannte machung*.

tence, which announces itself in the mode of construction. If, for instance, Lessing says *ein mehr als natürliches gift*, the attributive application of *mehr als natürlich* and the inflexion at the end has only become possible by the fact that this combination is apprehended as a unity like *übernatürlich*, and that accordingly the feeling for the method of combination has vanished. The same is the case in the following constructions: *mit einer nichts weniger als schönen bewegung* (LE.), *in so wenig als mögliche worte* (LE.), *ausser der so lang als möglichen dauer* (LE.). More striking still, and differing in the fact that an inflexion occurs in the middle of the combination, is the construction which occurs several times in Lessing: *in der letzten ohn eine zeile*. For *so gut wie* we may compare phrases like *er hat mirs so gut wie versprochen*. The substantive belonging to *was für* (= *qualis*) depended originally on *für*. Thus, for instance, the phrase *was habt ihr für pferde* means properly 'what have you in the place of horses.' If, however, we say at the present day *mit was für pferden*, this shows that the words *was für* are apprehended by the instinct of language as an indeclinable attribute to the substantive, which should properly depend on *für*.

589. The impossibility of drawing a sharp line between compound and syntactical combination manifests itself also in this, that frequently members of an otherwise undoubted compound are placed upon the same footing with independent words. We do not shrink from saying *öffentliche und privatmittel, das ordinäre und das feierkleid*. Hans Sachs even combines *gesotten, pachen und pratsfisch*. Further, the first or determining member of a compound may itself be followed by determinants, as though it were an independent word; and not merely by such as might be also applied to the whole, such as *dankesworte für die gnade*, but others also, such as *ein herausforderungslied zum zweikampf* (LE.); *ein*

Coordination
between the
elements of a
compound
and an
independent
word.

böses erinnerungszeichen für ihn an die treulosen Griechen (HER.); glaubensfreiheit an wunder und zeichen (GOE.); der vertragsentwurf mit Deutschland (Kölner Zeit.); hoffnungsvoll auf die zukunft (GOE.); erwartungsvoll des ausgangs (WIE.); hopeless to circumvent us join'd (MIL.); fearless to be overmatch'd (ib.). Lastly, pronouns are referred to a member of a compound: cf. *menschengebote, die sich von der wahrheit abwenden (LU.); er hatte einen ameisenhaufen zertreten, die seine herrschaft nicht anerkennen wollten (GOE.); es gibt im menschenleben augenblicke, wo er dem weltgeist näher ist als sonst (SCH.).*

Sound-change with isolating effect.

590. Sound-changes which effect isolation are promoted by various circumstances in the traditional groups. We may probably with reason maintain, even though we be unable to follow the development historically, that such changes, for the most part, occur at first as a general result of a closer syntactical combination, but are afterwards displaced by levelling, and are maintained only in cases where, as a consequence of the development of meaning, the elements have already coalesced too closely for change. The change most easily effected is the transference of a final consonant to the following syllable; cf. *NIIG. hincin, hieran, allein, einander*; Latin *etenim, etiam*. Attraction of this kind has no tendency to produce isolation in cases where, as in French, it regularly occurs in all close syntactic combination. In cases, for instance, like *pent-être* it cannot conduce to the formation of a closer connexion, because it equally occurs in *il pent avoir*. Where, however, through the operation of the etymological principle it is confined to the traditional forms, these are welded the closer thereby. We further have to notice the contraction of a vowel in auslaut with the vowel in anlaut of the following word, or elision of one of them, as the case may be; cf. the Latin *reapse, magnopere, aliorum, rursus* (from **re-nrsus*); French *aubépine (alba espina), Bon-*

nétable (place in the department of the Sarthe), *malaise*, Gothic *sak* ('this' from *sa-nh*), *þamunh* ('to this,' from *þamma-nh*), MHG. *hinne* (= *hie inne*), *kūzen* = NHG. *hanssen*, NHG. *binnen*. The elision in the French article (*l'état*) or in the preposition *de*, again, does not produce composition, because it follows according to a general rule, and is not confined to single formulæ. A third case of frequent occurrence is the assimilation of a consonant in auslaut to the anlaut of the following word: cf. NHG. *koffart*, *Homburg* (= *Hohenburg*), *Bamberg* (= *Babenberg*), *empor* (= *entbor*), *sintemal* (= *sint dem mal*); Latin *illico*, *affatim*, *possim*. The most thorough isolation, however, is effected by the influence of the accent; cf. NHG. *nachbar* (= MHG. *nachgebâr*), *junker* (= *junccherre*), *jungfer* (= *juncfrowe*), *grümmet* (= *gruonmât*), *immer* (*ie mër*), *mannsen*, *weibsen* (= *mannes*, *weibes name*), *neben* (from *in eban*, *ebeben*); Latin *denno* (= *de novo*), *illico*; French *celle* (*ecce illa*); cf. the corresponding phenomena in the case of compounds formed in the IE. method: NHG. *adler* (MHG. *adel-ar*), *wimper* (*wint-brâ*), *wildpret* (*wiltbrat* or *wiltbräte*), *schulze*—*schultess* (*schultheize*), *schuster* (*schuochsiltare*, 'schuonäher' ['shoe-sewer,' 'souter']), *glied* (*gelit*), *bleiben* (*bellben*); French *conter* (*computare*), *concher* (*collocare*), *condre* (*consuere*); Latin¹ *subigere* (compared with *agere*), *reddere* (with *dare*), *urgere* (from *sub-regere*), *præbere* (from *præ-hibere*), *contio* (from *contentio*), *cuncti* (from *conjuncti*).

591. It is less common to find that phonetic changes occurring in simple words occasion isolation. This happens, for instance, in this way, that a consonant in auslaut holds its ground, through having been attracted to the following word, while in other cases it falls away: cf. NHG. *da* (OHG. *dâr*), *wo* (OHG. *wâr*), as against *daran*, *woran*, etc., MHG. *hieran*, etc., as against *hie*, *sârie* as against *sâ*.

¹ In order to understand the origin of the forms cited it is necessary to go back to the prehistorical method of accentuation.

A different modification is avoided by this transition in *vinaigre* as against *vin*. Just as the diminished strength of stress in the case of the member of a compound may call changes into existence to which the simple word is not liable, so, on the other hand, it may act protectively where the simple word is changed under the influence of the chief stress; cf. NHG. *heran*, *herein* as against *her*, and the French *cordieu*, *corbleu* as against *cœur*. In NHG. the vowel of a first member of a compound is preserved from the lengthening to which the simple word is exposed by the following double consonants, cf. *herzog*, *Hermann*, *herberge*, *wollust*.

592. The same phonetic changes which divide the compound from the simple word divide also from each other the individual compounds which contain the same member; and this process also contributes to diminish the sense of the independence of the members. It is, of course, also of special import for the coalescence of the elements if one of them is lost as a simple word: cf. such instances as NHG. *bräutigam* (OHG. *-gumo* 'man'), *nachtigal* (*-gala* 'songstress'), *weichbild* (*wich-* 'holy'), *angelid* (*-lid* 'a covering'), *einerlei* (*-leie* 'kind'), *wahrnehmen*; French *aubépine* (*alb-*), *printemps* (*primum-*), *tiers-état* (*tertius-*), *minuit* (*media-*), *bonheur* (*-angurium*), *ormier* (*-merum*).

Limits within which the compound appears as such.

593. We have hitherto only considered the contrast between verbal groups and verbal unities, and endeavoured to apprehend all the factors which serve to resolve the former more and more decidedly into the latter. We have, however, to notice another contrast. The development we have described must have proceeded up to a certain point before the combination produces the effect of a compound; it must not, however, go beyond a certain point if it is to continue to produce merely this effect, and not rather that of a simple word. What from the point of view of the linguistic instinct we may call a compound lies between these points.

594. Syntactical and formal isolation do not easily lead to an advance beyond this second point ; as a rule, this is occasioned by the obsolescence of one element in independent usage or by phonetic isolation, especially the shrinking together of the complex of sounds under the influences of accent.

595. The liveliness of the feeling for composition manifests itself especially in the capacity of a compound to serve as model for analogical formations. If we have deduced composition from syntax, we in no way intend to assert that each single compound has taken its rise from a syntactical combination. Possibly, indeed, the greater part of the so-called compounds in the different languages are merely analogical formations modelled upon those to which in its strict sense the name compound belongs. Thus, for instance, every genuine noun-compound formed in the inflexional period of the IE. original language, and especially every such compound formed within the time of the development of the individual languages is to be regarded as a formation by analogy, and not as the union of an obsolete crude form with an inflected word. In the same way the NHG. genitival and adjectival compounds were to a great extent in their origin not syntactical. This may be best seen in cases where the *s* of the first member, derived from the genitive termination, is transferred to words to which in the genitive it does not properly belong (such as *regierungsrat*, etc.), and again to words where the genitive is out of place ; cf. *wahrheitsliebend* formed after *wahrheitsliebe*, etc.

596. When the limit is once overstepped, up to which the compound appears as such to the linguistic instinct, the formation, apart from the inflexional endings which may eventually belong to it, makes the impression either of perfect simplicity, or that of a derivative formed with a suffix or prefix. Thus, for instance, words like NHG. *amt* (Gothic *and-bahti*), *öhnd* (MHG. *uo-mdt*),

schulze (MHG. *schuldheize*), *echt* (from MHG. *ēhaht* = MHG. *t-haft*), *heute* (from **hiu tagu*), *heint* (MHG. *ht-naht*), *Seibt* (OHG. *Sigiboto*), *bange* (from **bi-ango*), *gönnen* (from **gi-unnan*), *fressen* (Gothic *fraitan*), *nicht* (from *ni io wiht*); Latin *demere* (from **de-emere*), *promere* (from **pro-emere*), *surgere* (from **sub-regere*), *prorsus* (from **pro-versus*), stand on precisely the same footing as (for instance) *stand*, *hase*, *bald*, *binden*, *pangere*, *versus*; and words like *adler* (OHG. *adal-ar*), *schuster* (MHG. *schuochsiutere*), *wimper* (OHG. *wint-brdwa*), *drittel* (= *dritte teil*), *Meinert* (= *Meinhard*) as *schneider*, *leiter*, *mittel*, *hundert*. Also in words like *nachbar*, *bräutigam*, *nachtigal*, the last syllable will be apprehended in the same way as the full derivative syllables in *tribsal*, *rechnung*, etc.

Origin of
derivative
and inflex-
ional suffixes.

597. We have here arrived at the origin of derivative suffixes and prefixes. These always originate in a loss of touch between a member of a compound and the originally identical simple word. But much more must happen before a word-forming element can arise. In the first place the other member must be etymologically clear, must be associated, that is, with a related word, or a related word-group; which is not the case in (e.g.) *adler* and *wimper*. In the second place, the element must appear not merely in isolated words (as in *nachbar*, *bräutigam*), but in a group of words, and in all be used in the same sense. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the group may become productive, and be augmented by means of new formations modelled on the examples which have originated by way of composition. It is, however, in the third place, necessary that the signification of the member of the compound in question should either, even in its usage as a simple word, possess a certain abstract generality of meaning (such as being, quality, action), or undergo a development within the compound from the more individual and sensuous meaning of the simple word. This last circumstance may even under certain circumstances be decisive,

even though the feeling of the connexion with the simple word be not yet completely lost.

598. We have within the historical development, as far as we can trace it, opportunity enough to observe how a suffix arises. The best known of these among German suffixes are those in *-heit*, *-schaft*, *-tum*, *-bar*, *-lich*, *-sam*, *-haft*. The type of such a word as *weiblich*, for instance, reaches back to an old *bahuvrihi*-compound, the original German **wēbollikis*; ¹ properly 'woman's form,' then by the agency of metaphor 'possessing woman's form.' Between such a compound as this, and the simple word *NIIG. lich*, *NIIG. leiche*, such a discrepancy, first of meaning, secondly of the sound-forms, has developed itself, that all connexion ceases. Above all, however, from the merely material signification of the simple word 'form,' 'outward appearance,' the more abstract 'quality' has developed. In the case of such a word as *schönheit*, the development of a compound and of a derivative from the compound took place for the first time in the west-Germanic period. The original German form was **skannis haidus*, 'fine quality'; hence was developed according to the regular laws of sound-change *OIG. scōnheit*. The composition is completed by the transference of the uninflected form to the oblique cases, exactly as in the case of *höchst*, etc., cf. p. 381. In virtue of its abstract meaning, the second member then becomes a suffix, especially when it has become lost in its independent meaning.

599. Even yet, at a later epoch, many second members of a compound approach the character of a suffix. Thus, for instance, the words *schmerzvoll* and *schmerzensreich* are in their meaning identical with the Latin *dolorosus*, French *douloureux*; and the difference between *anmutsvoll* and *anmutig*, *reisvoll* and *reisend*, is

¹ My object here and in what follows is merely to explain and illustrate the manner of composition, and I will not maintain that precisely the word chosen as the example must have belonged to the primitive formation.

very small. The *-tel* (= *teil*) in *drittel*, *viertel*, etc., is to the instinct of language a mere suffix. Again, in *allerhand*, *allerlei*, *gewissermassen*, *seltsamerweise*, a first step has been taken to the formation of a suffix. As to the termination *-weise*, we can easily imagine that had the generalisation gone further, it might have developed into a regular adverbial suffix like *-mente* in the popular language of the Romance nations.

600. The boundary line between the members of a compound and a suffix can be defined by the instinct of language only. We have objective proofs to aid our judgment ready to hand as soon as modes of composition are formed which are inconceivable as compounds. Thus, for instance, the French *fièrement* might naturally be conceived of as *fera mente*; but such a word as *révèment* could not rationally be referred to *recente mente*. The fundamental meaning of the German *-bar* (= MHG. *-bare*) is 'bearing,' 'bringing.' Words like *ehrbar*, *furchtbar*, *wunderbar* would to some extent suit this meaning; but the MHG. *magetbare* (virginal) *meienbare* (belonging to May), *scheffenbare* (admissible to the function of *schöpfen*), would no longer do so. The suffix-character is decisively present if the analogy leads to a transference into quite different domains, as in *vereinbar*, *begreiflich*, *duldsam*, etc., which can only be apprehended as derivatives from *vereinen*, *begreifen*, *dulden* (cf. on this point *ante*, p. 265); or when fusions of suffixes set in (see on this point *ante*, p. 265) as in MHG. *mittecheit*, *mittekeit* from *mitte-heit*; from which next rise formations by analogy; as *frömmigkeit*, *gerechtigkeit*, on the one hand, and, on the other *eitelkeit*, *heiterkeit*, *dankbarkeit*, *abscheulichkeit*, *folgsamkeit*.

Formation
of suffixes
constant and
unceasing.

601. From these observations, to which we might append a number of similar ones based on other languages, we must conclude that the formation of suffixes is not the work of a definite prehistorical period, limited by a definite point of time;

but rather a process continually repeating itself as long as language is living and developing. We may especially conjecture that even the general IE. suffixes were not all in existence before the rise of inflexions, as analytical grammarians are too prone to assume, but that even the prehistoric inflexional period cannot have been entirely barren in this respect. We must judge of the prehistoric origin of suffixes entirely according to the standard afforded us by historical experience; breaking with all theories not based upon this experience, which at the same time shows us the only way of making the process psychologically intelligible.

602. There is one other important point to be insisted upon. ^{Rise of new} The rise of new suffixes perpetually alternates with the disappearance of old ones. We may say that the suffix, as such, has disappeared as soon as it has ceased to be employed for new formations. The manner in which sound-change especially tends to destroy this capacity has been explained above (p. 201). Thus from time to time the need recurs of replacing a suffix which has become too much weakened, and is split up into a number of phonetic forms by one fuller and more uniform. This purpose is often served by suffix-groups which have become fused together. We may consider, for instance, how in OHG. the more ancient and simpler methods of formation have been expelled by the nomina agentis in *-dri*, the nomina actionis in *-unga* and the abstracts in *-nissa*. In other cases, however, the compounds of the kind described afford the substitute desired. These, as a rule, appear in the first instance parallel with the ancient formations, but then speedily, owing to their greater plainness and their closer connexion with the fundamental word, obtain a decided preponderance over these, and succeed in ousting all traces of it, save a certain number of traditional survivals. Thus *schönheit*

succeeds in ousting the now obsolete *schöne*, and *finsterkeit* the *diu vincer*, which was yet living in MHG.

Rise of
inflexional
suffixes.

603. Inflexional suffixes take their rise in the same way as derivative suffixes. In fact no sharp line of demarcation between the two exists at all. We have here too, in the processes historically observable, a standard for prehistorical ones. The coalescence of the pronoun into the tense-stem, for instance, admits of illustration by means of processes drawn from the Bavarian dialects of the present day which have been already described (p. 348 *seq.*). The formation of the tense-stem shows itself most conveniently in the Romance future: *j'aimerai* = *amare habeo*. But it seems superfluous, when the mass of materials is so well known and so easy of access, to collect further examples.

Criticism of
the analysis
of Indo-
European
"grand-
forms."

604. Whoever draws from our survey the conclusions as to *method* which it involves must confess that the proceeding hitherto commonly adopted in the theoretic construction of the IE. language is very perverse. I shall indicate a few principles, obvious enough after what has been said, in accordance with which the theories in vogue require either qualification or absolute rejection.

605. If we dissect the IE. original form of a word (even assuming it to be rightly constructed) in the usual way, into stem and inflexional suffix, and then dissect the stem again into root and derivative suffix or suffixes, we must not suppose that we have now gained the elements of which the word is actually composed. For instance, it should not be supposed that the second person singular optative present **bhierois* (represented earlier as **bharnais*) really and truly took its origin from *bher + o + i + s*. In the first place we must bear in mind that while no doubt the first foundations of word-formation and inflexion came into being by the coalescence of elements originally independent, these foundations, once in

existence, were necessarily used immediately as models for analogical formations. In the case of no single IE. form can we absolutely decide whether it has arisen from a syntactic word-group, or whether it is merely an analogical creation from a form already in existence. We must not however, on the other hand, assume off-hand that the type of a form must have originated in the former way. We must rather assume the play of the same factor in the earlier period which in the more modern periods has played so great a part, namely the displacement of the formative principle by analogical formation. Small grounds as exist for referring such types as *besuch*, *unbestreitbar*, *unveränderlich*, *verwaltungsrat* to a syntactical combination, there are no greater grounds for so treating many IE. formations. In the second place, we must notice that even in the case of those forms which are really of syntactical origin, the elements do not necessarily lie before us in the phonetic shape which they had before their coalescence. We have as little right to derive an IE. genitive *akmenas* from *ak+men+os*, as *schusters* from *schu+ster+s*. Many changes which may have occurred only after the formation of the complex have long been recognised: others have lately been demonstrated. And it is not only possible, but even likely, that the whole sum of such changes is far from exhausted by what we at present know.

606. Still less is it to be supposed that the elements discovered by analysis are the fundamental elements of speech in general. Our incapacity to analyse an element proves nothing whatever as to its original unity.

607. Entirely to be rejected is the distinction, so habitual in the history of IE. flexion, between a period of construction and a period of decay. That which is termed construction occurs, as we have seen, only as a consequence of decay, and that which is

termed decay is but the continuation of this process. Construction is impossible without the aid of syntax. Such a process of construction may take place at any period, and new constructed material never fails to offer its compensation whenever decay has set in beyond certain proportions.

CHAPTER XX.

THE DIVISION OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

THE customary division of the parts of speech in the IE. languages, as handed down from the grammarians of antiquity, rests upon no systematic application of logical principles; it is rather due to the consideration of very diverse sets of facts. It bears accordingly the mark of arbitrariness. Its defects are easily pointed out. Yet it would be hard to replace it by anything essentially better so long as we aim at assigning every word to a particular class. The attempt to erect a system of strictly logical division is in all cases impracticable.

609. The usual division has been effected by the consideration of three points: the *meaning* of a word, taken by itself, its *function in the sentence*, and its *behaviour in regard to inflexion and word-formation*.

610. As regards the first point, the grammatical categories—substantive, adjective, verb—correspond to the logical categories of substance, quality, and activity or, more accurately, occurrence. But though it may be the proper function of a substantive to denote substance,—a function of which the adjective and the verb are incapable, yet there are also substantive terms for quality and occurrence. There are also verbs which denote continuous states and qualities. Regard to the meaning of words has further contributed to the erection of pronouns and numerals into separate

The division of the parts of speech due to consideration not of any logical principle.

but of three points.

Criticism of the usual division.

classes. To co-ordinate these with the classes of substantives and adjectives involves a grave logical error. The contrast of substantive and adjective also pervades the pronouns and numerals. And, on the other hand, if pronouns and numerals are separated, as distinct species, from the noun-class, the same separation must be made in the case of the adverb-class, since *bene* — *huc* — *his* are related to one another just as *bonus* — *hic* — *duo*.

611. If we have regard to *function in the sentence*, we might perhaps, in the first place, divide words into those which can of themselves form a sentence, those which can serve as *members* of a sentence, and those which can only serve to *connect* such members.

612. In the first class we might place the interjections, which in isolation are to be considered imperfect sentences. But they occur also as members of a sentence, sometimes immediately sometimes with a preposition, as in *woe to the land! o über die torcn*, MHG. *ach mines libes*.

Finite verb.

613. More perfect as a sentence, with a suggestion of subject and predicate, was originally the *finite verb*. We find it, however, also occurring, even in the earliest stage of which we have a record, as a mere predicate attached to a subject separately denoted; and in our present language it occurs, apart from the imperative, only thus. It is therefore after all not possible to define the verb as that which can constitute a sentence. And the so-called auxiliary verbs are still further degraded to connecting-words.

Connecting-words, conjunctions and prepositions.

614. The connecting-words are, as we saw above, p. 326, derived by a 'displacement of the distribution' from independent words. This process is continually being repeated. Were it only on this account therefore, they cannot be sharply distinguished. And there is this further ground, that a word may be an independent member of the particular sentence to which it belongs, and yet at

the same time serve to connect this with another. If I say, for instance, *a man who believes that is a fool*, the *who* is at once an independent member of the relative sentence and a connecting word between the principal and subordinate sentence. This holds universally of the relative pronoun and adverb. It is true also of the demonstrative, in so far as it refers to the preceding or following sentence, but not where it applies to the idea actually in question.

615. If we then attempt a more complete division, we entangle ourselves in fresh difficulties. The substantive has, in contrast to the adjective and verb, above all, the function of serving as subject, and hence, in the widest sense, as object. The formation of names of qualities and of occurrences in addition to names of substances probably originated in an imaginative mode of intuition which set upon qualities and processes the mark of things and persons. But further, the capacity of the substantive to serve at will as subject or object is precisely the chief occasion for its formation. Nevertheless, it can also be used attributively, and predicatively like an adjective, and on the other hand, other words may serve as subject; I do not mean merely as psychological subject in the widest sense, but also as grammatical subject in the usual limited sense. Cf. sentences like *frisch gewagt ist halb gewonnen, aufgeschoben ist nicht aufgehoben, hin ist hin, verloren ist verloren, grün ist die farbe der hoffnung; ehrlich währt am längsten, doppelt genäht hält gut, jung gefreit hat niemand gereut, allzu scharf macht schartig, gleich wider ist die beste bezahlung, geradezu gibt gute renner*, [*slow and steady wins the race*]. An adjective may also occasionally act as object, as in *er hält gut für böse*, or, depending on a preposition, *schwarz auf weiss, aus arg ärger machen*.

616. If we now turn to the connecting-words, serious difficulty is raised by the class of conjunctions as commonly described. In the first place, their separation from the demonstrative and relative

adverbs, the position of which has already been described (p. 405), is rather arbitrary,—*where*, for instance, being called an adverb, *as*, *while*, conjunctions. In the single sentence we find prepositions and conjunctions distinguished by the presence or absence of case-government, *i.e.* in general, according as the construction is hypotactic or paratactic. It is true that these two distinctions do not absolutely coincide. On the other hand, all connecting-words which join sentences together are called conjunctions, although the same distinction between hypotactic and paratactic construction ought to be made here also. Thus, *e.g.*, *before*, *since*, *while*, when occurring in simple sentences, are called prepositions; when they connect sentences, conjunctions; although their function is analogous in both cases.¹

617. The division most capable of being systematically carried out is that which starts from the mode of flexion. Such a division is actually employed, and consists of three classes: nouns, verbs, and uninflected words (indeclinabilia, particles). Here again, however, the nominal forms of the verb and the indeclinable substances resist the division. And for further distinction the mere consideration of inflexion affords no ground. The indeclinable particles have accordingly to be treated as an indivisible class. The pronouns deviate in their inflexion to some extent from the other nouns, but only to some extent, and they differ among themselves. The distinction between substantive and adjective inflexion is not absolute. Even the formation of degrees of comparison is not a decisive mark of the adjective, since the very meaning of some adjectives renders them incapable of comparison.

Intermediate
stages be-
tween classes
of words.

618. If then the current division of the parts of speech involves such diverse and incompatible points of view, it is natural enough that it should not admit of being practically carried out. The

¹ On the use of prepositions in English to introduce subordinate sentences, cf. p. 168.

facts we have to deal with are too complex and too variously combined to be comprehended under eight or nine rubrics. There are a host of intermediate stages which render possible a gradual transition from one class into another. Such a transition results from the general laws of change of meaning and of analogical formation discussed in the preceding chapters. If we follow out these transitions we detect at the same time the grounds which originally prompted the division of the parts of speech.

619. Let us take first the division of substantive and adjective. ^{Substantive} This formal distinction rests, in the IE. languages, on the power of ^{and} the latter to admit inflexions of gender and degrees of comparison. ^{adjective} In individual languages still further distinctions have arisen. Thus, especially, the Teutonic adjective has become susceptible of a double, we may even say a triple, mode of inflexion (cf. *gut*—*guter*—*der gute*) in which forms occur absolutely without analogy in the substantives.

620. On the ground of such tests we have no difficulty, for instance, in declaring *hund* to be a substantive, *jung* an adjective. But in spite of all differentiation of form the adjective may at any time receive, at first as an 'occasionally,' then 'usually,' the function of a substantive. The content of meaning is at the same time enriched, either the general notion of a thing or a person being added, or else more special notions arising from the situation (cf. p. 363). This operation can take place 'occasionally' with any adjective whatever, the latter being recognised as a substantive in modern German orthography by the use of a capital. From this substantival adjective a pure substantive may then be derived by traditional use, especially if it becomes in any way isolated as against the other forms of the adjective. Its approximately complete conversion into a substantive is chiefly indicated, in regard to the construction, by its connexion with

an attributive adjective, which replaces an adverb, or with a genitive, which ultimately takes the place of a dative governed by the adjective; cf. Latin *bonum publicum*, *malum publicum*, *amicus fidelis*; and even where the substantival quality is less traditionally fixed: *nonnulli nostri iniqui*, *nonnullis invidis meis* (cf. Draeger, § 16); cf. also English *my like*, *equal*, *better*, *younger*, etc. (Mätzner, iii. p. 232); *his worthier* (MILTON); MHG. *mln gelliche* (whence NHG. *meines gleichen*). We also find mixture of adjectival and substantival construction, as in Latin *multorum benefactorum* (CIC.). The thought shows a different kind of confusion when, in spite of the conversion into a substantive, a superlative is formed: *mei familiarissimi*, *pessimo publico* (cf. Draeger, § 16). In Latin the complete transition is effected without difficulty, since the inflexions coincide. In German, on the contrary, even when it is very far advanced, the adjectival inflexion continues to recall the original nature of the word. *Der bekannte*, *verwandte*, *gesandte*, *vertraute*, *geliebte*, *verlobte*, *beamte*, *bediente*, *liebste*, are now felt as substantives, and constructed accordingly (*der bekannte des mannes*, *mein bekannter*), but they still betray their adjectival nature by the regular change of strong and weak inflexion (*der bekannte* — *ein (mein) bekannter*), and the corresponding feminines in addition by the weak inflexion of the singular which in the regular substantive has died out (*die bekannte* [Gen. *der bekannten*], and *die zunge* [Gen. *der zunge* for *-en*]). The following, however, are completely transformed: *der junge* (*ein junge*), *der greis* (MHG. *grlse*, from adjective *grls*), *der jünger* (both changed from the weak to the strong declension), *oberst*. Of older growth are *feind*, *freund*, *heiland*, MHG. *wigant* ('warrior'), *vllant* ('devil'), all old present participles, also *fürst* (old superlative), *herr* (old comparative from *hehr*), *mensch* (adjective *mennisch* from *man*), and the neuters *gut*,

nbel, recht, leid, wild. This transformation of adjectives into substantives is familiar to every one, and has left marks in all languages.

621. Less familiar and far more interesting is the converse process, the transformation of a substantive into an adjective. This comes about through the elimination of some part of its meaning—including at least the notion of substance—so that only the qualities attaching to the substance remain. This transformation virtually occurs as an 'occasional' use, whenever a substantive is employed as predicate or attribute. For what happens in such cases is merely the attribution of certain qualities to the substance of the subject, or of the determinate word, not the positing of a fresh substance. Apposition approaches the nature of an adjective especially where it is used to specify a class, and particularly if the combination contains some further bold irregularity. Cf. Greek *ἀνὴρ πολίτης, ῥήτωρ, ὀπλίτης*, etc., *γυνὴ δέσποινα, παρθένος χεῖρ*; Latin *exercitus victor* (LIV.); *tirones milites* (CIC.); *bellator equus* (VIRG. OV.); *bos arator* (SUE.); French *un dñen sauteur* (VOLT.); [a boy warrior;] *flattent*, and other words in *-ent* must be regarded absolutely as adjectives. The adjectival nature may disclose itself in the addition of an adverb only suitable to an adjective, as in *weg du tramm*, *so gold du bist* (GOE.); *diesen widerspruch*, *so widerspruch als er ist* (LE.); *so kriegerin als sie war* (ib. and often); *so ist er fuchs genug* (LE.); *nemo tam puer est* (SEN.).

622. Some substantives are in NIIG. felt to be completely adjectives when used predicatively, but are distinguished from the adjectives in not being attributive and in not adopting the adjectival inflexion. To this class we may probably refer the German *herr* or *meister sein* (*werden*). Goethe says: *als wenn sie* (Narciss and Landrinette) *herr und meister der ganzen truppe*

wären. Here the two words still show a substantival nature, in so far as a genitive is made dependent on them, but at the same time they are treated like predicative adjectives, since they could not otherwise be attached without inflexion to a plural subject, and, besides, would not agree with a feminine person. Still more decisive is the case of *einem feind sein*, on account of the dative. Also *schuld sein*, where the isolation in respect of the substantive *schuld* is shown by the orthography; less clear are *es ist not, zeit*, where *es* is at bottom a genitive. The isolation is carried still further in *es ist schade*, the substantive being now usually *schaden* [cf. 'tis pity beside 'tis a pity; 'tis true 'tis pity, and pity 'tis 'tis true']. In MHG. the development had gone still further. Here *schade* is also used as predicate to personal subjects, and a comparative and superlative are formed from it; e.g. in KONRAD VON WÜRZBURG'S *Trojan War*: *der was den Kriechen scheder dan icmen anders bl der zst*; ¹ further, an adverb is formed to it as if it were an adjective: *swie schade er lebe* (MHG. IVb. ii.^b 63^b). In OHG. *fruma* ('advantage') is used in the same way, e.g. Otfried, iii. 10, 33, *nist' quad er thô, fruma thaz* ('that is no advantage'). Even in MHG. this gives rise to a real adjective *frum*, NIG. *fromm*. They said *ein frumer man*, etc. How far the border-line is obliterated appears from a passage in the *Florc*, 1289, *daz wirt in nütze unde frume* (:kume), where, if we regard the combination with *nütze*, we must treat the word as an adjective; if the final *e*, as a

¹ Comparatives are also formed from other substantives in MHG., even where the syntax forbids their being regarded as adjectives. Thus from *corn*, as in *do enkunde Giselhère nimmer cornen gestin*; from *nôt*, as in *diner helfe mir nie nater wart*; from *durst*, as in *wand im nie ernes dürster wart*. From *angst* a comparative occurs in archaic NHG., as in *also viel enger sol dir werden* (LUTHER, 11^h. l. 359^a). In these cases the result is due to the analogy rather of the adverb than of the adjective. This is shown even by the frequent combination *angst und lange* (*lange* is originally only an adverb). In Gottfried's *Tristan*, 17845, we read *in was dô cuo einander vil anger und vil ander*; *ange* is adverb to *enge*, *ande* substantive ('schmerz'). We still use the adverb in this way in *mir ist wol, weh*. Latin superlatives from substantives occur in Plautus: *oculissime homo, patrie mi patriissime*, but probably with a designedly comic effect.

substantive. The adjective *erst* also, which first appears in Luther, has arisen in the same way as *fromm* from the substantive. The substantive *gock* has become an adjective in Low and Middle German dialects. *Entwicht*, from M.H.G. *ein wiht*, *entwicht* (properly 'an insignificant being' = 'nothing at all,' *nichtig*), is in the sixteenth century a pure adjective, as in *entwicht und ark* (H. SACHS); *du bist vil entwichter* (ib.); *die böß entwichten* (AVRER).

623. The same process had been already carried out in a far earlier period of language. All the so-called bahuvrīhi-compounds were originally substantives. For *ῥοδοδάκτυλος, βαρύθυμος, βαθύθυριξ, εὐελπις, μαγνηνίμης, ἱγνίπες, misericors*, are of course properly 'rosy finger,' 'melancholy,' 'deep hair,' 'good hope,' 'great spirit,' 'fire foot,' 'pitiful heart.' The substantival origin is still evidenced in part by a defective expression of the adjectival function. The masculine *ῥοδοδάκτυλος* has also to serve for the feminine.

624. Somewhat different is the course of development in *barfuss* from *bar τῆνος* ('bare foot'). It was first used as an absolute nominative or accusative in the phrase *barτῆνος γῆν*. It is now felt as an adjective. It has true adjectival inflexion, e.g. in H. Sachs: *mit barfussen füssen*.¹

625. If we disregard whether the noun is conceived as a thing or not, there is no doubt a distinction of yet another kind between substantive and adjective. The adjective denotes a simple quality or one regarded as such, the substantive embraces a group of qualities. If we treat this distinction as the fundamental one, we may certainly understand *orator* in such phrases as *Cicero orator* or *Cicero est orator* as a pure substantive. But this distinction itself cannot be carried through. It traverses the other distinctions: failing, for instance, to meet the case of, on the one hand, adjectives

¹ Yet another variety of transition is discussed on p. 260.

like *königlich*, *kriegerisch*, etc., on the other, of adjectives used as substantives, like *der gute*. Between these also there is an intermediate stage which leads imperceptibly from one to the other. The transition from the denotation of a simple quality to that of a group of qualities is effected by the use *κατ' ἐξοχήν* of a substantival adjective, this usage then became fixed. Whoever first employs the word in this way himself supplies the notions not yet explicit in its hitherto current meaning. For a subsequent speaker, however, employing the usage at second-hand, the notions supplied by the former may attach themselves from the first just as closely to the sound-group as the fundamental notion, and the latter need no longer precede the others in entering his consciousness. When this last is the case, the transition to a substantive is complete as regards the meaning, and by means of further isolations its complete severance from the adjective is then effected. Cf. the above examples.

626. The inverse process, by which all the qualities of a group retire in favour of one, may be observed in the case of adjectival derivatives from substantives, which develop into denotations of perfectly simple qualities. Especially instructive in this respect are the names of colours, cf. Gr. *πορφύρεος* from *πορφύρα* ('purple-snail'), *φοινίκεος* from *φοίνιξ*, *δέρινος* ('air colour'), *μήλινος* ('quince-yellow'), Lat. *coccinus* from *coccum* ('scarlet-berry'), *crocinus* from *crocus*, *luteus* from *lutum* ('woad'), *miniacens* from *minium* ('cinnabar'), *niveus*, *rosens*, *violaceus*. In all these words there is no essential limitation of the reference to the colour of the object denoted, and they are in part used also without such limitation, e.g., *unguentum crocinum*, *vinculum rosenum* ('rosary'), etc. Substantives may also be turned directly into names of colours; e.g. *πορφύρα*, *coccum*, *crocus*, *lutum*, and the modern *lilac*, *rose*, which are also used adjectively ('a rose ribbon').

637. This process gives us the clue to the origin of terms for simple qualities. That these arose later than terms for groups of qualities is self-evident, if we start from the assumption that complete perceptions are the primary stage of all. Here as elsewhere it can be, at the outset, only the instantaneous conception in the speaker's mind which makes it possible for one notion in a group to thrust the others into the background. It is at bottom the same process as in the figurative usage of a word. When we say, e.g. *the man is an ass, an ox, a sheep, a fox*, etc., we are always regarding a particular characteristic of the animal in question, abstracted from the rest. This is only possible when a word is used as predicate or attribute. For as soon as we connect the notion of an independent thing with it, we connect also that of an entire group of qualities. When this usage became fixed in a number of words especially adapted to it, the first step was taken to the formation of a separate word-class.

628. Again, in spite of their greater formal differentiation, the distinction between *noun* and *verb* is far from absolute. There are certain points which serve to characterise the verb and distinguish it from a noun; such are personal terminations, distinctions between active and middle and passive, and forms for the denotation of mood and tense. Hence springs the possibility of the existence of forms which possess a portion only of these characteristics; and the scope for variation is yet further increased by the fact that forms may or may not possess the positive characteristics of the noun, denotation of case and difference of gender. And lastly, the differentiation of the construction attaching to the verb and noun respectively gives occasion to manifold transitions and confusions.

629. Commonly speaking its personal endings are regarded as the strictly formal characteristic of the verb. By this criterion participles and infinitives would be excluded from the verbal

forms; and so would, in strictness, many forms of the second person singular imperative: for a form like *βάλλε* or *βάλε* is nothing else but the mere stem of the present or the aorist. The personal terminations are accordingly, if we disregard the second person singular imperative, a necessary original condition for the function of the verb as a normal sentence, and further for its function as predicate or copula in the normal sentence. They are, however, not indispensable as a condition for the formation of sentences, and other peculiarities of the verb are absolutely independent of them.

630. The contrast of meaning which we commonly assign to the verb as compared with the adjective (or substantive used predicatively or attributively), has nothing to do with the verbal terminations as such. It may exist without these, and may be lacking in spite of their presence. Such an expression as the Greek *ἔγκοτεῖς* or *βασιλεύεις* may have precisely the same signification as *ἔγκοτος εἶ* and *βασιλεὺς εἶ*. The contrast remains sharply marked only just so long as the adjective or substantive expresses a lasting quality, and the verb a process defined and limited by time. We must, however, consider that the adjective can be employed not merely for the description of a quality attaching to the essence of a thing, but likewise for the description of a transitory quality: and in this it approaches the character of a verb. Conversely the verb may also be employed to describe states, even permanent states. How nearly the two significations of *being in* and *passing into* a state touch each other, we have seen on p. 305.

631. When a signification denoting a process temporally limited is connected with the form and function of an adjective, there arises the *participle*, of which the special value is, that it gives us the power of using the expression for an event attributively. We are able in many cases to trace historically the transition from the

adjective strictly so called into the participle. This holds good, among other cases, of the so-called German perfect or preterite participle (such as *gegeben* or *gelegt*), which took its origin thus: the adjectives in *-no-* and *-to-* which have survived from IE., have in signification become approximated to the verbs formed from the same root, and more particularly to the perfect (preterite) of these. This has continued to operate and has entailed many further formal approximations. The case is the same with the participle perfect in Latin and in Slavonic. We must also assume a corresponding origin for the older participles already existing in the IE. language. We must decidedly decline to derive, as has been done by many, the category of the adjectives from that of participles: on the contrary, the former must have been completely developed before the latter could arise at all. Participial formations must have arisen from forms which could be as well apprehended as derivatives from the stem of the aorist, or present as derivatives from the root, on the model of which adjectival forms related to other verbal stems were then formed.

632. The characteristic difference between the participle and the so-called verbal adjective is the participation in the denotation of *tense*. A further consequence of the approximation to the forms of the verb is the assumption of its method of construction. The participle is constructed as a noun merely as regards the substantive to which it stands as an attribute. It may, however, take an even further departure from the character of a noun by striking out a special path in the further formation of the method of construction. In German, the fact that in such phrases as *er ist gegangen*, *er wird gefangen*, *er ist gefangen worden*, case and gender are no longer indicated, weakens also the sense of the nominal character of the participle, even although the construction in the two former combinations is that of the ordinary adjective, and in

the latter differs therefrom merely by the presence of *worden*, instead of *geworden*. In the phrases *er hat ihn gefangen*, *er hat gekncht*, etc., we must admit a complete departure from the way of constructing an adjective. No doubt it may be proved historically that the former of these two phrases signified originally *er hat ihn als einen gefangenen*; but this is a matter of indifference for our modern linguistic instinct. At an earlier period they said *habet inan gefanganen*, and this left no doubt as to the nominal character. The circumstances in the corresponding combinations in the Romance languages are peculiar and noteworthy. In these we can watch the transition from the general adjectival into the special participial construction. In French the idiom is to say *j'ai vu les dames*, but *je les ai vus*, and *les dames que j'ai vues*. In Italian it is still possible to say *ho veduta la donna*, and *ho vedute le donne* as well as *ho veduto*. In Spanish all inflexion in the case of periphrases formed with *haber* is abolished; it is correct to say *la carta que he escrito*, just as it is to say *he escrito una carta*. On the other hand, in the case of the periphrasis with *tener*—a later introduction into the language—the inflexion is always retained: *tengo escrita una carta* is as correct as *las cartas que tengo escritas*.

633. Conversely, however, it is possible for the participle to be gradually brought back to a purely nominal nature. This process of reduction may be considered strictly speaking as accomplished as soon as the present participle comes to be used for the lasting or recurring activity, and the perfect participle for the result of the activity, just as each form of the present or perfect can be employed. A method of usage κατ' ἐξοχήν, or an usage in a metaphorical sense or any other kind of isolation may have the result of completing the transformation; cf. such examples as *schlagend*, *treffend*, *reizend*, *zwingend*, *bedeutend*, *getrieben*, *gelingen*, *berufen*, *verstorben*, *verzogen*, *verschieden*, *bekannt*, *unmurmunden*,

verlegen, gewogen, verwegen, erhaben, bescheiden, trunken, vollkommen, etc. [Cf. *aged, learned, crabbed, charming* etc.] Even the combination with another word after the laws of verbal construction does not impede this process; only then the entire composition must be in a position to approximate to the analogy of nominal composition, cf. *ansprechend, auffallend, ausnehmend, anwesend, abwesend, zuvorkommend, hochfliegend, heilschend, wolwollend, fleischfressend, teilnehmend; abgezogen, angenommen, hochgespannt, neugeboren, wolgezogen, etc.* [Well educated, ill behaved, etc., cf. also the peculiar English compounds on the analogy of *good-natured*, which seem to be a survival of an IE. method of composition.]

634. The formation of a comparative and superlative may be regarded as a test for the transformation of the participle into an adjective pure and simple. Sometimes, however, this appears side by side with a verbal construction; cf. *dazu erschien mir nichts wünschenswerteres, den character der nation chrenderes* (GOE.); *die Oestreich kräftigendsten elemente* (Kölner Zeitung).¹ Another test is the method of construction, e.g. in Latin the combination of the participle with a genitive; cf. *amans tuorum ac tui* (CIC.), *religionum colentes* (ib.), *solitudinis fugiens—societatis appetens* (ib.).²

635. The participle, like all adjectives, may become a substantive, and the substantival may, like the participle adjectival, denote a momentary activity or a state. The same resemblance is seen in its power of casting off its verbal nature; cf. *der liebende, vorsitzende, geliebte, gesandte, abgeordnete, beamte* (= *beamtete*), MHG. *der varnde, gernde* (both = 'player'); of older date *heiland, freund, feind*, etc., *zahn* = Latin *dens* = Greek *ὀδούς* (part. of *essen, edere*) [*l'amant, l'aimé*].

636. The *nomen agentis*, just like the participle, is able to

¹ Cf. Andr. 119 144.

² See Draeger, § 207.

denote either a momentary or a lasting, or it may be a recurring, activity. In the first-mentioned application it always remains closely connected with the verb: and it might easily be conceived that it might as naturally as the participle adopt the verbal manner of construction; in fact, that it might be possible to say in German, *der erzieher den knaben*, just as in the compound *knabenerzieher* at least it is felt that the former part of the compound is an accusative, and is constructed after the analogy of *knaben erziehen*. Already in combinations like *der sieger in der schlacht*, *der befreier aus der not*¹ the verbal character of the substantive is evident; and, still more in such as the Greek *ὑπηρέτης τοῖς νόμοις*, or as we actually find it in Latin *dator divitiarum*, *justa orator*. Conversely the nomen agentis, as denoting lasting or repeated activity, may isolate itself more and more as regards the verb, and thus finally lose the character of a nomen agentis altogether [especially when the meaning of the verb grows faint, as in *tailor*]; cf. *schneider*, *beisitzer*, *ritter*, *herzog* (*heerführer*) *vater*, etc.

637. There is still another path from verb to noun. Beside the nomina agentis stand the nomina actionis. These, like the substantival denotations of qualities, must owe their origin to a metaphor only, the activity being apprehended under the category of the thing. These too may denote a momentary or a lasting and recurring activity. These too may approximate to the verbal construction; cf. *die befreiung aus der not*, ἡ τοῖς νόμοις ὑπερεσία, *knabenerziehung*. And it is again the denotation of the lasting and recurring activity which conduces to the loss of the character of a nomen actionis. Thence develops the denotation of a lasting condition; cf. *besinnung*, *bewegung*, *aufregung*, *verfassung*, *stellung*, *stimmung*.

638. From this point a further development to the denotation

¹ Cf. even more striking combinations with prepositions in Andr. p. 209.

of things is possible, as has already been shown (p. 86). In the course of this development the correspondence of the meaning with that of the verb may be broken ; cf. *haltung*, *regung*, *gleichung*, *rechnung*, *festung*, etc. And as the isolation proceeds, every trace of the verbal origin may then be destroyed.

639. Thus far the *nomen actionis* bears an analogous relation to the *nomen agentis*. It however approximates far more to the verbal character than the latter, more even than the adjective or participle : mainly from the fact that the infinitive and supine take their origin from it. The infinitive bears in many ways a strong analogy to the participle. While, however, the latter *generally* speaking maintains the adjectival form and maintains the adjectival method of construction by the side of the verbal, and only occasionally develops for itself a special method of construction, laying aside the formal characteristics of the adjective,—isolation from the form and method of construction of the noun is a condition of the origin of the infinitive. The infinitive is, as formal analysis proves, a case of *nomen actionis*, and must originally have been employed after the analogy of those methods of construction which hold good for the combination of the noun with the verb. But it must no longer be felt as a case, its mode of construction must no longer be after the analogy of the original models, or else it is no infinitive. The isolated form and the isolated mode of construction become then the basis for further development. The form and method of construction of the infinitive is on the one hand verbal, like those of the participle : on the other hand, however, it is not nominal, but specifically *infinitival*.

640. The infinitive, too, admits of a gradual return to the nature of a noun ; but it meets with more impediments in the process than the participle on account of its want of inflexion. The approximation to the nominal character manifests itself therefore,

as long as no special methods of distinction are resorted to, especially in cases in which the characterisation by means of a terminal inflexion is least indispensable ; *i.e.* in the employment as subject or object. In the forms of such sentences as *wagen gewinnt*, Latin *habere eripitur*, *habuisse nunquam* (SEN.), and certainly in such as *hic vereri* (= *verecundiam*) *perdidit* (PLAUT.), we may doubtless assume that the infinitive is constructed after the analogy of a noun. This is less certain in such cases as *ich lasse schreiben*, *ich lerne reiten*. At any rate, if the infinitive is really and truly employed in this case after the analogy of an accusative of the object, this analogy no longer exists for the instinct of language of the present day. The combination with prepositions finds its way into language with even more difficulty. In MHG. *durch* is especially common with the infinitive ; in the Roman popular language the combination of the infinitive with prepositions occurs instead of the gerund (*ad legere* in place of *ad legendum*, etc.): similarly sometimes in the poets and later prose writers, *praeterplorare*, 'except lamentations' (HOR.), *multum interest inter dare et accipere* (SEN.). A further approximation of the infinitive to the noun requires special favouring circumstances. Generally speaking those languages alone attain to this which possess in their article a means of creating substantives and denoting cases. Hence it is that Greek has advanced further in this direction than Latin though in the latter it is true that the demonstrative pronouns too may have a similar effect ; cf. *totum hoc philosophari* (CIC.), *inlibere illud tuum* (ib.). NHG., however, and the Romance languages have gone even further than the Greek, for in them the infinitive is employed as an equivalent to the noun pure and simple, even in respect of inflexion. This equation is rendered possible in the Romance languages by the general abolition of case-difference. Old French and Provençal go so far as to give the infinitive the -s

of the nominative; *li plorers ne t' i want rien; Meliers chansa es domars que penres*. In the case of NHG. the circumstance comes into consideration on the one hand that the case-differences in the substantives in *-en* are all cancelled excepting the genitive; on the other side the approximation of the gerund (MHG. *gebennes, ze gebenne*) to the infinitive, with which it originally had nothing to do.

641. In the course of this development different steps are again possible with respect to the maintenance of the verbal construction. It commonly occurs without any process of prefixing an article or a pronoun; cf. e.g. MHG. *durch behalten den lip, durch aventure suochen*. In Greek, too, the article is no impediment to this: we there find such expressions as τὸ σκοπεῖν τὰ πράγματα, τὸ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξετάζειν, ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίῳ καταστήσαι τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν. In NHG. the verbal construction is confined, in accordance with the assumption of the nominal inflexion, to the same limits as in the case of the *nomen actionis*. In MHG., on the other hand, a genuine verbal construction sometimes occurs: in fact a relative referring to an infinitive may have a verbal construction; cf. Hartman Greg. 2667, *des scheltens des in der man tete*; Tristan 1067, *dis sehen das ich in lûn getân*. In the Romance languages as well we find the verbal construction of the infinitive provided with an article or a pronoun side by side with the nominal construction; cf. the Italian *al passar questa valle* (but also *il trapassar del rio*); Spanish *el knir la occasion* (but also *al entrar de la ciudad*); Old French *au prendre le congîé*; even in Montaigne, *il se pmoient du tenir le chasteau*; further, in Italian, *il conoscer chiaramente*; Spanish *el bien morir*; Old French *son sagement parler*.

642. As soon as the difference between infinitive and noun resulting from inflexion is set aside, there remains nothing further to hinder the transformation of the former into a noun pure and

simple, and this is accordingly of very common occurrence in NIIG., and of not unfrequent occurrence in the Romance languages; cf. NIIG., *leben, ableben, leiden, scheiden, schreiben, tun und treiben, wesen, vermögen, betragen, belieben, einkommen, abkommen, auskommen, ansehen, aufsehen, andenken, vorhaben, wolwollen, wolvergehen, gutdünken*, etc.; French *être, plaisir, pouvoir, savoir, savoir-faire, savoir-vivre*, etc. In this process it is possible for the same differences of signification to occur as in the case of the *nomina actionis*, and the same isolation as regards the verb.

Adverbs.

643. The *adverbs*, as far as we can trace their origin, are almost exclusively the outcome of crystallised cases of nouns, and to some extent of the combination of a preposition with its case. We are thus led to suspect that the oldest stratum of the adverbs also proceeded in like manner from nouns; only with the difference that this process occurs in point of time before the development of inflexion, and that hence no case as yet, but merely the stem-form pure and simple, has come to be employed. The adverb stands in the closest relationship to the adjective. It has a relation in the first place to the verb, and then to the adjective as well, analogous to that of an attributive adjective to a substantive. This proportional relation shews itself also in this, that, generally speaking, an adverb may be formed out of any adjective at will.

644. The formal difference between the adjective and the adverb depends on the capacity of the former for inflexion, and the consequent possibility of agreement with the substantive. When this formal test is absent, the division between the two parts of speech cannot be strictly maintained by the instinct of language. In NIIG. it is actually to some extent broken through when the adjective, used predicatively, has become unchangeable, and when the difference which, generally speaking, still exists in

MIIG. between the flexionless form of the adjective and the adverb (*starc-starke, schone-schöne, guot-wol, besser-baz*) is cancelled. There is, strictly speaking, no reason to distinguish the *gut* in sentences like *er ist gut gekleidet, er spricht gut*, from that in *er ist gut, man hält ihn für gut*, and to call the former an adverbial, the latter an adjectival usage. The instinct of language knows nothing of such distinctions. We can best gather this from the fact that the adverbial form of the superlative has intruded into the place which commonly falls to the flexionless form of the adjective. The Germans say *es ist am besten*, and even *du bist am schönsten, wenn*, etc.

645. On the other hand, many adverbs in different languages take, when joined with an adverb, an adjectival inflexion. Thus, in French, it is correct to say *toute pure, toutes pures*. Correspondingly we find in Italian *tutta liscia*, in Spanish *todos desnudos*, etc.: just so, in Italian, *mezza morte*; Spanish, *medios desnudos*. In many German dialects, too, we have such phrases as *ein ganzer guter mann, eine ganze gute frau; solche schlechte ware; eine rechte gute frau* (LE.).

646. The function of the adjective corresponds especially with that of the adverb used in connexion with *nomina actionis* and *agentis*; cf. *eine gute erzählung, ein guter erzähler* ('a good story-teller'). In this case the adjective denotes the manner of a process in the same way as the adverb in other cases. The latter combination is, however, capable of two interpretations, as we might reasonably apply the word *good*, generally speaking, to the person of the story-teller. This ambiguity would be removed if the adverb were employed for one case after the analogy of the verbal construction; and so it is in fact in English, as *an early riser*. The Germans unite the conceptions into a single word; cf. *frühaufersteher, langeschläfer, schönschreiber, feinschmecker*, etc.;

derivations from *früh aufstehen*, etc. The uncertainty attaching to the meaning is, besides, not confined to the *nomina agentis*; cf. *ein guter kutscher, ein arger narr, ein grosser esel, ein junger ehmann*. The adjective can either be simply referred to the person or to the quality attributed to it by the substantive. In the latter case it bears the same relation to the substantive as an adverb to the adjective which it qualifies. The adjective holds a corresponding position with respect to substantival denominations of quality; cf. *die hohe vortrefflichkeit, grosse güte*.

647. The adjective and the adverb thus corresponding with each other, the need is at once felt to have the two together for each single case. There are, however, a great number of adverbs which are not derived from any adjective, and which thus have none parallel to them. In this case necessity impels to transfer the function of the adjective to the adverb as well. The adverb is most readily employed predicatively in this connexion; as related to the adjective, the verb has sunk into a mere link-word. In sentences like *er ist da, er ist auf, die tür ist zu, alles ist vorbei, er wird mir zuwider*, the construction is apprehended by the instinct of language as identical with that found in the phrases *die tür ist offen, er wird unangenehm*. The adverb, however, added as it is to a substantive as its definition, becomes undistinguishable from the adjectival attribute. When the Germans say *der berg dort, die fahrt hierher, der baum driiben*, the adverb marks its difference from the adjective by its position in the sentence. It is different with the Latin constructions (which are not, however, very common), as *nunc hominum mores vides?* PLAUT., *ignarus ante malorum* (VIRG.); *discessu tum meo* (CIC.)¹ The adverb, however, approximates most nearly to the functions of an adjective when it is, as in Greek, inserted between the article

¹ Cf. Dräger, § 79.

and its substantive ; as in τὴν ἐκεῖ παιδευσιν, τὴν πλησίον τύχην, τὴν οὖν γένει, ἡ λίαν τρυφή ; in English, *on the hither side, the above discourse* ;¹ in Spanish, *la siempre señora mía*. In NHG. any such employment of the adverb is an impossibility. The Germans have created inflected words to meet the exigency. These words are sometimes secondary derivations, employed only attributively, not predicatively ; cf. *alleinig, kiesig, dortig, obig, jetzig, vorig, nachherig, sofortig, alsbaldig, vormalig, diesseitig* ; of rarer occurrence are such as are employed predicatively as well, such as *niedrig, nbrig* (to which may be added *alleinig* in South German dialects). On the other hand, many adverbs have simply adopted inflexional terminations, a process which is favoured by the fact that in its predicational employment the adjective was not formally distinguished from the adverb, because its flexionless form was employed ; cf. *nahe, fern, selten, zufrieden, vorhanden, behende* (from OHG. *bi henti*), *täglich* (from OHG. *tagolich*), *ungefähr, teilweise, anderweit*. In dialects such expressions are used as *ein sues fenster, ein weher finger, ein zuwiderer mensch*. The adjective *einzel*, recently formed from the adverb (strictly speaking a dative plural), has driven the adjective *einzel*, which is at the root of the word, from the field. The German word *oft* is affected by adjectival augmentatives ; cf. such expressions as the Latin *propior, proximus*, which depend on *prope*, and the Greek forms ἐγγύτερος, ἐγγύτατος, which depend on ἐγγύς.

648. The adjective, used as a predicational attribute, closely approaches the adverb. This portion of the sentence stands in close relation to the subject, with which it is connected by concord, but has become independent of it, and is hence enabled to enter into direct relationship with the predicate. The adverb, on the other hand, is connected with the predicate, but may in a similar manner

Adjective
used as a
predicational
attribute.

¹ Cf. Mätzner, pp. 148-9.

become independent of the latter, and so approximate more closely to the subject. There are also cases, however, in which a qualification is equally suitable to the subject and to the predicate. It is thus intelligible that in many languages the adjective and the adverb may be equally admissible, and that in one language one of these parts of speech, in another the other, is customary. In NHG. it often happens that the adverb stands as the equivalent of an adjective used in other languages; cf. *allein* as against the Latin *solus*, the French *seul*, etc.; *zuerst* and *zuletzt* and Latin *primus* and *postremus*, etc.; *gern* and Greek *ἐκόν*, *ἄσμενος*, Latin *libens* and *libenter*; *ungern* and Latin *invitus*, or the less common *inivite*. We find constructions like the following striking—which indeed are not general in foreign languages—*εὐδον παννύχιοι* (HOM.); *κρήνη ἄφθονος ῥέουσα* (XEN.); *Ἄσωπὸς ποταμὸς ἐρρύη μέγας* (THUC.); Latin *beatissimi viveremus, propior hostem collocatus, proximi Rhenum incolunt, nocturnusque vocat clamore Citharon* (VERG.); *Aeneas se matutinus agebat* (VERG.); *frequens te audiri* (CIC.); *in agmine atque ad virgilia multus* (=frequent) *adesse* (SALL.); *est enim multus in laudanda magnificentia* (CIC.); *is nullus* (=non) *venit* (PLAUT.); *tametsi nullus moncas* (TER.); Italian *che più lontana se ne vada* (ARIOST.).

Origin of
prepositions
and conjunc-
tions.

649. Prepositions and conjunctions as connective elements took their origin, in every case, from independent words through a displacement of the distribution. This displacement must be definite. In 'occasional' use the most diverse kinds of component parts of sentences may, of course, be degraded to mere connecting members. Not till a word is employed with some regularity as a connecting word can it be regarded as possibly a preposition or conjunction. Another indispensable condition, however, is that the method of its construction should have become isolated from that which it possessed as an independent word. But even then it

may at the same time fulfil its own function as an independent word, so that it is thus impossible to bring it simply under the head of a definite class of words. This strict classification is not possible until the word in its independent application has disappeared, or until a phonetic differentiation has attached itself to the two methods of application, or until some other kind of isolation has crept in.

650. We are thus able to propose for the preposition the following definition:—the preposition is a connecting word, with which a case of any substantive may be connected without any connective analogy to nominal or verbal methods of construction. If we adopt this definition we shall not explain *entsprechend* in such a sentence as *er hat ihn seinen verdiensten entsprechend belohnt* as a preposition, because its construction is that of the verb *entsprechen*. When we come to *anstatt* it is different. In *anstatt des mannes* the genitive was originally the regular sign of the independence of the noun. But whether the genitive is still felt as such depends on the question whether we still feel *anstatt* to be a combination of the preposition *an* with the substantive *statt*. If it is not so felt, the construction with the genitive leaves the place it had hitherto occupied in the group, and the preposition is created. It is possible in this case for the instinct of language to be in a high degree vacillating; nay, even different in the case of different individuals. For there can be no doubt that *statt* is no longer a substantive of general application, but is confined to certain isolated combinations. If, however, we say *an meiner statt* we are more emphatically reminded of the substantival nature of the word *statt*. In other cases, the isolation has become absolute. The German *nach* is originally an adverb, and identical in meaning with *nake*. But between *seinem ende nahe* and *nach seinem ende* all relation is lost, though both go back to the same method of con-

struction. In this case the isolation of the method of construction is due to the obscuration of the etymological relationship, owing to divergency in the development of signification. In other cases it is due to the disappearance of this method of construction from living usage. In IE., as in Latin, the ablative was used after the comparative. This construction was still maintained in OG., excepting that there the ablative, as is generally the case, became confused with the instrumental and dative. As it disappeared from general use, it maintained itself, among other instances, in the case of two adverbial comparatives, which, owing to this isolation, became prepositions, MHG. *el* (NHG. still found in *ehedem*) and *sit* (NHG. *seit*) = Gothic *seis* in *panaseis*, which is, phonetically speaking, the regular comparative of *seis*. In the oldest prepositions of the IE. the case must have been, in the first instance, referred to the verb. For it denoted by itself the direction in which or whence, or the condition of being in one place.

651. The particle was added merely with the view of a nearer definition of the relation of space; it was in fact still an adverb. As the case, apart from its combination with the preposition, lost its old signification, a special method of construction was created simply from this combination.

Conjunctions.

652. The genesis of conjunctions, like that of prepositions, admits, to some extent, of being historically traced. Those which serve to connect sentences are to a large extent developed from the conjunctive adverbs, or from isolated forms of the conjunctive pronouns, which, it may be, are connected with other words (cf. *daher*, *darum*, *deshalb*, *deswegen*, *weshalb*, *indem*). These words, therefore, actually serve to connect sentences before they become conjunctions pure and simple. The question as to whether they will be accepted as such must be one, to a great extent, of subjective feeling: no sharp and definite line can be

drawn. A great deal must depend upon the degree in which the origin of the word has been obscured. The existence of such obscurity is a necessity, if we are to apprehend the word as a mere link for sentences.

653. A special method of the genesis of conjunctions has been touched on above (p. 333). In this instance, too, in most cases we shall find a conjunctival—and that a demonstrative—pronoun at the root, whether standing independently, or in connexion with another word. There are, however, cases without any demonstrative, such as those of the NHG. *weil, falls*, and the English *because, in case*. But, in this case as well, the indication of what is to follow has attached itself to and affected the substantives which lie at the root of the conjunctions.

654. A quantity of conjunctions take their rise from words expressive of a comparison; cf. *ingleichen, ebenfalls, gleichfalls, gleichwol, andernfalls, übrigens*; Greek *ὅμως, ἀλλά*; Latin *ceterum*; further the comparatives *ferner, weiter, vielmehr*; Latin *potius, nihilominus*; French *mais, plutôt, néanmoins*. A relation is, from the very outset, expressed by these words; on the other hand, an expression is lacking for the object to which the relation tends: this must be guessed from the connexion in which the word occurs.

655. The case is different, on the other hand, where words of *assuring* have passed into conjunctions connecting sentences; cf. *allerdings, freilich, nämlich, wol, zwar* (MHG. *ze wære, fürwahr*); Gothic *raiktis* ('but' or 'because'); Latin *certe, verum, vero, scilicet, videlicet*, etc. These words are in themselves expressive of no relation to another sentence. The logical relation in which the sentence in which they are contained stands to another, is originally thought as their adjunct, without finding any expression in thought. As it is, however, precisely this relation which forces upon the speaker the necessity of adding an express assurance, it comes to

pass that this relation appears to be expressed by the assurance. Just as little does the Latin *licet* originally express any reference to the governing sentence ; in this case too, a reference—originally existing in thought alone—has in a secondary way attached to this verbal form, which has thereby passed into a conjunction.

656. One method of denoting the relations of two sentences or portions of sentences is afforded by the *anaphorical* use of two adverbs, not intrinsically conjunctive : *bald* — *bald*, *jetzt* — *jetzt*, *cinmal* — *cinmal* ; *modo* — *modo*, *nunc* — *nunc*, *tum* — *tum*, etc. Of course a similar employment of words which have already become conjunctions has nothing to do with this.

657. The parallelism in the relation of members of a sentence, and that of entire sentences to each other, appears in the fact that the connecting words created for the one relation are analogically transferred to the other. Thus from the oldest times the same copulative and disjunctive particles have been employed for both relations. The transference from the member of a sentence to a sentence can be distinctly traced in words like *weder*, *entweder*, *MHG. beide*, cf. p. 329. In the same way a parallelism exists in the employment of the demonstrative and relative particles of comparison. In this case we shall have to assume the converse transference from sentence to member of sentence. For the other cases of the employment of conjunctions which introduce a sentence to introduce members of a sentence, cf. p. 166 ; for the method of employing prepositions before sentences, cf. p. 168.

Difference
between
preposition
and conjunc-
tion in the
simple
sentence.

658. The difference between the preposition and conjunction in the simple sentence is sharply defined by the fact that the former governs a case while the latter does not. Still confusions present themselves even in this obvious difference. As far as the sense goes, it matters little whether we say *ich mit(sammt) allen übrigen* or *ich und alle übrigen* : and it thus happens that the predicate or

the apposition to a connection introduced by *mit* is often placed in the plural in cases where a regard for the strict grammatical relation would demand the singular; cf. *scherz mit huld in annuntsollem bunde entquollen dem bescelten munde* (SCHIL.); Greek *Ἀποσθῆναι μετὰ τῶν συστρατιῶν σπεύδονται* (THUC.); Latin *ipse dux cum aliquot principibus capiuntur* (LIV.); *filiam cum filio accitos* (ib.); English *old sir John with half a dozen more are at the door* (SH.); French *l'automne avec Pomone ont embelli ces lieux* (ST. LAMBERT); further examples cited from the Romance languages are found in Diez, iii. 301, and from the Slavonic languages in Miklosich, iv. 77, 78. In these cases we must regard the connecting word, if we consider the case attached to it, as a preposition; if, however, we regard the form taken by the predicate, as a conjunction. Examples of an absolute transference from a prepositional to a conjunctival function are afforded by the NIIG. words *ausser* and *ohne*; cf. e.g. *niemand kommt mir entgegen ausser ein unver-schämter* (LE.), *dass ich nicht nachdenken kann ohne mit der feder in der hand* (LE.), *kein gott ist ohne ich* (LU.). On the other hand, the conjunction *wan* in NIIG. passes into a preposition constructed with the genitive, cf. *das treip er mit der reinen wan cht des alters einen* (KONR. v. WÜRZB.). We can thus understand that in a state of language previous to the formation of cases a line of demarcation between prepositions and conjunctions can hardly exist.

659. The transference from subordination into co-ordination is rendered more easy when there is no case government from the outset, and when consequently the connecting word is already a conjunction or a conjunctival adverb. This is most easily seen in such correlations as that of *sowol* with *als auch*, etc.; cf. *die zurück-weisung, welche sowol Fichte als auch Hegel . . erfahren haben* (VARNHAGEN v. ENSE); English *your sister as well as myself are*

greatly obliged to you (FIELDING); Latin *ut proprium jus tam res publica quam privata haberent* (FRONT.); French *la santé comme la fortune retirent leurs faveurs à ceux qui en abusent* (SAINT-EVRE-MONT); *Bacchus ainsi qu'Hercule étaient reconnus pour demi-dieux* (VOLT.).

CHAPTER XXI.

LANGUAGE AND WRITING.

WHATEVER information we possess as to the divergences of the linguistic conditions of the past from those of to-day is due to the use of *writing*. No philologist should ever disregard the fact that what is written is not language itself; that speech rendered into writing always needs to be rendered back into speech before it can be dealt with. Such rendering back is only partially possible—another fact which should be constantly kept in mind; but as far as it is possible at all it is an art which needs to be mastered; and in this the unprejudiced observation of the relation of writing and pronunciation prevailing at present among different peoples renders great service.

Advantages and shortcomings of writing as compared with spoken language.

661. Writing is, however, an object of philological investigation not merely on account of the mediating part which it thus plays: it is also an important factor in the development of language itself, which we have hitherto purposely avoided dwelling on. It remains to us to define the extent and the limits of its activity.

662. The advantages possessed by written over spoken matter with regard to effective operation are sufficiently obvious. By its means the narrow circle to which the influence of the individual is otherwise confined may spread till it embraces the entire linguistic community; by its means that narrow circle may extend itself beyond the generation then living, and exert an immediate

influence on all that follow. No wonder that these evident advantages are commonly much over-rated—over-rated even in the science of language, since it requires a somewhat deeper reflexion to bring out those points in which writing lags behind living language.

663. A distinction is commonly made between languages which are, and those which are not, pronounced as they are written. The former phrase must be understood in a very relative sense if we would not involve ourselves in an error of serious moment. Not merely is writing not language, but it is in no way an equivalent for it. To rightly appreciate the relations between them, we have to consider not this or that single discrepancy, but a fundamental difference. We have seen above (p. 48 *sqq.*) the importance of the continuity as well in the series of possible speech-sounds as in the series of sounds consecutively spoken, for a proper view of the phonetic side of language. But an alphabet, however perfect it may be, lacks continuity in both these respects. Language and writing bear the same relation to each other as line and number. We may employ as many signs as we like, and may define as closely as we like the corresponding articulations of the organs of language: each will still remain the sign, not for a single articulate sound, but for a series of infinitely numerous ones. And even though the transition from one articulation thus denoted to the other is in some respects a necessary one, yet a free course remains open for many variations. And then there remain quantity and accent.

Alphabets
in use not
so useful as
they might
be made.

664. The alphabets actually in use are, moreover, far behind what might be attained. To make the sounds of one language distinguishable from those of another—nay, even those of one dialect from those of another—can never be the purpose of an alphabet which seeks to serve, not scientific phonology, but only

ordinary practical needs; and this need necessarily occur only so far as the differences in question have a functional value. And thus it is that most of the alphabets in question go no further than this. It is unnecessary to denote the differences conditioned by the position in the syllable, in the word, in the sentence, by means of quantity and accent, provided only that the conditioning factors in the dialect in question have always the same result. If, for instance, the hard *s* sound in *lust*, *brust*, etc., is represented by the same sound which elsewhere denotes the soft *s* sound, while in words like *reissen* and *fließen* it is represented by *ss* (*ss*), this no doubt depends upon a historical tradition (MHG. *lust*—*risen*); but it is still a great question whether the method of writing *ss* would have maintained itself, were it not that in the beginning of the syllable a need had made itself felt to draw a distinction between the hard and the soft sound (cf. *reissen*—*reisen*, *fließen*—*fliesen*), while in the combination *st* the *st* is always hard even in forms derived from words which have otherwise soft *s* (*er reist* being in pronunciation undistinguishable from *er reiset*). That the fact of its origin from MHG. *s* has not been the only determining factor is confirmed by the form it takes when written in auslaut. Here, again, there is no difference in pronunciation between the *s* which proceeded from MHG. *s* and that which proceeded from MHG. *z*; the *s* in *hasz*, *heiss*, is pronounced like the *s* in *glas*, *cis*. *Sz* is at the present day written in auslaut (for MHG. *z*) only in cases where etymologically allied forms with hard *s* in inlaut exist along with it; thus we find *heiss*, *heisser*, etc.; but, on the other hand, *das*,¹ *es*, *alles*, *aus*; also *blos* as an adverb, and *bischen* ('a little'). Again, it is not usual to write *kreisz*, *kreises* = MHG. *kreiz*, *kreizes*.

¹ The exception in the conjunction *dass* is to be explained by the necessity felt by the grammarians for differentiating.

665. From all this it is clear that the separation in the orthography started only from cases in which more than a single pronunciation was possible in the same dialect. Thus, too, in the process of orthographically settling most languages, it was not felt necessary to employ any special sign for the guttural and palatal nasal; but the same sign is employed as for the dental, the labial receiving its own peculiar sign. The reason of this was that the guttural and palatal nasal always occurred only before other gutturals and palatals; *i.e.* in the combinations *nk*, *ng*, etc.; and in this position occurred without exception, while the labial and the dental were also common in auslaut, and before vowels in anlaut and inlaut; and thus had to be differentiated from each other. In French, again, where the guttural also appears in the auslaut of words, and in that of syllables before labials and dentals, no such pressing necessity presents itself for any special notation; and indeed such would have been with difficulty introduced, even if in other respects a closer equivalence of spelling and pronunciation had been carried out; for a guttural nasal is a universal rule for the auslaut of a syllable. It is again unnecessary in NIIG. to denote the distinction between the guttural and palatal *ch*. For the pronunciation is definitely fixed by the preceding vowel, and changes accordingly within the same stem: *fach*—*fächer*, *loch*—*löcher*, *buch*—*bücher*, *sprach*, *gesprochen*—*sprechen*, *spricht*. If, on the other hand, there were such a thing as a palatal *ch* also after *a*, *o*, *u*, a guttural *ch* after *e*, *i*, *ä*, *ö*, *u*, then the need for differentiation would certainly exist, and possibly would also be satisfied. Still less is it necessary to denote such differences as are necessarily conditioned by the position in the auslaut or inlaut of syllables; *e.g.* in the mutes to denote whether the formation or the dissolution of the termination is audible. Everywhere we find *kk*, *ll*, *pp* written, and yet

the same movement is in no case twice carried out ; but the latter is the inversion of the former. In no case, further, have the numerous economies of movement in the transition from one sound to another found phonetic expression ; cf. on this, Sievers, *Grundzüge der Lautphysiologie*, p. 84 sqq.

666. No doubt there are also certain alphabets, such as the Sanscrit, which go beyond the measure of what is demanded by immediate practical needs, and which satisfy somewhat exacting claims on the part of phonetic physiology, since they keep separate similar, though not identical, sounds, even in cases where the differentiation is self-intelligible for any one who knows the language, even without any regard to sense or context. Far more common, however, are alphabets which fail even in such modest demands as we have described. The main reason of such shortcomings is that almost every nation, instead of creating an alphabet independently to suit the demands of its own language, has adapted the alphabet of a foreign language, as best it might, to its own. Besides this we have to reckon with the fact that, as language develops, new differences may well arise which could not be foreseen or taken account of at the time of the introduction of the alphabet. The same causes may, however, further produce an unnecessary superfluity. Superfluity and defect often stand side by side. NIG. may serve as an example. We have instances of several signs serving to denote the same sound in *c—k—ck—q*, *c—s*, *f—v*, *v—sv*, *s—ss*, *ä—è*, *ai—ci*, *äu—eu*, *i—y*. Again there are symbols capable of denoting different sounds, the nature of which is not fixed by their mere position. Such a symbol is *e*, which may represent both the French *é* and the French *ê*. Thus in the relations between *ä* and *e* we see superfluity and defect united. It is the same with *r* (only in foreign words, it is true) in its relation to *f* and *w*. *Ck* also may in foreign words have different

values, as in the case of *chor*—*charmant*. To denote the length of vowels several methods are in use, such as doubling the consonant, *k* and *l* (after *i*); and yet there are many cases in which it remains unnoted. These defects are in great part as old as the drawing up of the records of the German spoken language; and at an earlier period they made their influence felt in a still more provoking way. Others which were before in existence have gradually disappeared. Thus it was likewise an instance of luxury and poverty when *n* and *ɳ*, *i* and *j*, were used each to denote not merely the vowel, but the fricative as well, and were considered, in accordance with orthographic traditions, to be interchangeable. In MIIG. MSS. *o*—*ö*, *n* (*n̄*)—*n̄* (*in*)—*no*—*ñc* are not distinguished. And there would be no difficulty in citing numerous other instances of the imperfections from which German orthography has had to suffer in the different periods of its development.

667. If we further consider that the accentuation commonly remains either wholly or mostly undenoted, it must be clear that even those among the conventional orthographical symbols in which the phonetic principle has not been intruded on by regard for etymology and the phonetic conditions of an earlier period present a very imperfect picture of living speech. Writing bears about the same relation to language as that of a rough sketch to a picture worked out with the utmost care in colour. The sketch suffices beyond doubt to satisfy a person who has a clear remembrance of the picture that it is intended to represent this, and also to enable him to identify the single figures in both. On the other hand, one who has merely a confused idea of the picture would, if he trusted to the sketch, be able to correct and fill out its details at most in regard to certain main points. And one who has never seen the picture is of course quite unable to rightly imagine the details of the drawing, colouring, and shading. Should

several painters simultaneously attempt to execute a perfect picture from the sketch, their productions would show great divergences. Suppose, for instance, that in the original picture there occurred beasts, plants, utensils, etc., which these painters have never in their life seen in nature or in exact copies of nature, but which possess a certain likeness to other objects known to them, would they not in their own picture substitute these familiar objects for those of the sketch? It must necessarily be the same with all who learn a foreign language or a foreign dialect from written specimens only, and seek to reproduce it from these alone. What can they do but introduce for each letter and combination of letters the sound and the combination of sounds which they are accustomed to connect with them in their own dialect; while quantity and accent will further be regulated according to its principles, except in so far as divergences are expressly indicated to them by symbols which they understand. It is commonly agreed that in the process of learning foreign languages, even when the alphabet they employ is identical with our own, at least a detailed description of the value of each sound is requisite, and that even this can in no way supersede the necessity of listening to the spoken utterance, especially when it is not presented to us as based upon phonetics. It is obvious, however, that the same need is present when we wish to attain a correct apprehension of the sounds of a dialect belonging to the same larger group as our own. It is important for us not to overlook the consequences which flow from this fact.

668. In every linguistic area, divided into many different dialects, there exists, as a rule, a large number of different gradations of sound; certainly far more, even when we regard only what can be clearly distinguished, and neglect all barely perceptible *nuances*, than the letters contained in the common alphabet used by all the dialects alike. In each single dialect, however, there exists only a

Dialectal
differences
concealed by
writing.

definite fraction of these gradations, the most nearly related in many cases excluding each other ; so that if we count those, which for practical purposes do not require to be distinguished, as one only, their number will fairly tally with the number of letters to be disposed of. If under such circumstances writing is applied in different places to express the dialect spoken at each, the only conceivable way in which this can be done is by employing each letter for exactly the particular species of a wider family of sounds which occurs in the dialect in question ; in other words, the same letter is used here for one sound, there for another. In this process it also occurs that if two nearly related species occur in a single dialect side by side, one symbol has to serve for both ; while, conversely, of two signs, indispensable for the other dialects, one may be dispensed with for one or the other. We need only examine some of the most important of such cases as they occur in the German linguistic area, including not merely the dialect strictly speaking, but also the language spoken by the greater part of the educated classes. The distinction between hard and soft fricatives exists in Upper as well as in Lower Germany. But while in the former it rests on the greater or less energy of expiration, in the latter¹ a further characteristic comes in—the absence or presence of the vocal tone. The Upper-Saxon and Thuringian dialects, however, have no distinction either by vocal tone or by the energy of expiration. Accordingly *b*, for instance, denotes for the Upper German a different sound (unvoiced *lenis*), from that which it denotes for the Nether-German (voiced *lenis*), and again another still for the Upper-Saxon (unvoiced *fortis*). Besides, *k*, *t*, *p* in certain places denote for the Upper-Saxon and Thuringian a different sound (unbreathed *fortis*) from that which they denote

¹ There is no necessity to define the limits more closely ; and I am unable to do so. The fact was first established by Winteler, *Grammatik der Kernener mundart*, p. 20 sq.

for the mass of other Germans (*aspirate*).¹ The Nether-German pronounces the *w* as a labio-dental; the Central-German as a labio-labial fricative; the Aleman as a consonantal vowel. The *s* in the beginning of words, before *t* and *p*, is in a great part of Nether-Germany pronounced as hard *s*, in the rest of Germany it is spoken like *sch*. *R* is in one part a lingual, in an other a uvular sound; and numerous other variations occur. *G* is in one part of Nether and Central Germany, as well as in certain Upper German districts, pronounced as a guttural or palatal fricative sound, either invariably or only in inlaut. In the Germanic dialects *g* has always denoted mute as well as the fricative. The Alemannic does not distinguish the pronunciation of the *ch* according to the nature of the preceding vowel. On the other hand, it makes a distinction between *f*=NG. *p* and *f*=NG. *f*, which is wanting elsewhere.

669. Where identity of symbol coincides with etymological identity, but the pronunciation varies, the written form conceals a dialectical difference. As this is of very common occurrence, especially when we take into account the numerous variations which, though insignificant in single cases, are, on the whole, perceptible enough, as also, in most cases, the quantity and, above all, the modulations of the pitch and of the energy of exspiration remain undenoted, we must admit that a considerable portion of the dialectic differences is taken no account of in writing. It is precisely this fact which renders writing of special convenience as a channel of communication in general intercourse. But it likewise renders it unsuited to influence pronunciation, and it is a perfectly mistaken view that we can operate as effectually with the written word at a distance as with the spoken word on what is near.

¹ Cf. Kräuter, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende sprachforschung*, 21, 30 sqq.

670. How, for instance, can any one, on seeing the written symbol *g*, know which of the easily distinguishable pronunciations current in Germany—they are at least seven in number, and in part very divergent—was intended by the employer of the symbol? How can we even know, merely from the writing, that so many pronunciations exist at all? What can he do in such a case but assume, as corresponding to it, the pronunciation current in his own home?

Incapacity of
writing to
communicate
alterations of
pronunciation.

671. Only the most extreme departures from one's own dialect can be detected in written speech; and even then without any sure discovery of the special characteristics of the divergent sounds. As far as we recognise departures we are, of course, able to imitate these. This must, however, occur with full consciousness and with full intention, the imitation of the foreign dialect being undertaken as something distinct from the use of one's own. It is a process distinguishable only in degree and not in kind from the acquisition of a foreign language; and, on the other hand, totally different from the unconscious process of being influenced by the speech of our associates, already described in p. 43. The fundamental condition of this is, as we saw, the small compass within which the differences between individuals lie, and the infinite capacity of the spoken sounds for gradation. Within the sphere in which this kind of influence finds its scope, writing shows no differences as yet, and therefore is incapable of influence.

672. And as with influence in the distance, so with influence on the future. It is pure fancy to suppose that in writing we have a control over sound-changes. Just as, in different places, sounds markedly different can be denoted by the same letters, so, and even more easily, in the same place at different times. No letter, of course, is connected really with any particular sound by a real bond capable of maintaining itself independently: the connexion

depends exclusively upon association of the ideas. We connect with each letter the association of just such sound as is in use at a particular time. The process in the case of natural sound-change is—as we have seen (p. 44),—that in the place of this idea, another slightly different is substituted, which, transmitted to the following generation, is received from the outset as bound up with the letters. The sound-image associated with the letter is thus unable to exercise any check upon the sound-change, because it is itself modified by this. And naturally, the actual phonetic value of a letter is always assumed for it in the records of the past. There is no possible way to compare the earlier phonetic value with the present one. It is of course possible, by the aid of scientific researches, to conjecture the variations; this does not affect the present question. Commonly speaking, the changed pronunciation may long go hand in hand with unchanged orthography without any insupportable inconveniences arising from the discrepancy. At all events, these do not declare themselves as such until the change has become very violent. But then, a change of language to suit orthography, if possible at all, can only be brought about by conscious intention, and any change of the kind would again be directly contrary to natural development. As long as this follows its path undisturbed, it remains but to put up with the inconveniences as well as we can, or to alter the orthography to suit the language.

673. The defects of written-speech, so far enumerated, are far from indicating the degree of divergence which may obtain between writing and speech. We have hitherto regarded, strictly speaking, only the condition incident to the period when language first begins to be fixed by writing; when every one who writes is still taking part independently in the creation of orthography; the sign for each single sound being indeed settled, but not the spell-

ing of the word as a whole ; so that the writer has always to break the word up into its elements as best he can, and compound the letters corresponding to these elements. There is no doubt, however, that mature practice in reading and writing renders the process continually shorter. Originally the connexion between the phonetic signs and the signification was always brought about by the image of the sound and by the motory sensation. As soon, however, as both of these are brought near together by this combining element they form a direct connexion, and the combining factor can be dispensed with. The possibility of fluent reading and writing depends of course on this direct association. This can be easily demonstrated by an inverse proof. If the written symbols of a particular dialect are laid before some one who is perfectly conversant with it, but who has hitherto known it only aurally, he will always at first find some difficulty in adapting the written symbols to the sounds, especially when the former do not precisely conform to the system of the literary language with all its inconveniences. And he may be more puzzled still if he be required himself to write in such a dialect, even though it be that which he has spoken from childhood. He will always evade a real solution of the task, by submitting unduly to the influence of the familiar orthography of the literary language. All modern dialectical poets give proof of this. We must cast aside this background of literary orthography which now always serves as an analogy, if we would clearly realise the difference between the position which we now-a-days occupy in committing our common language to writing and that of, say the Old High German scribes, in finding written symbols for their own dialect. We shall then be more ready to look with compassionate toleration on our forefathers' want of skill. We shall rather discover, especially if we do not confuse different writers, but examine the orthographic usage of each separately, that they

observed the sounds more correctly than is commonly done at the present day; and this for a reason which, regarded from another side, seems a defect in comparison with our present conditions, viz, that they were contorted by no fixed standard of orthography, and thus their unprejudiced observation of the sound was not confused by the perpetual contemplation of such orthography. In other words, they could not yet dispense with the phonetic image as mediating link between the orthographic image and the signification.

674. The two stand in the closest mutual relation. If the direct connexion between the orthographic image and the signification Effect of fixity of orthography. is very close in the mind of all tolerably educated persons, this is in great part due to the fixity of our orthography. We see this particularly in such words as are in pronunciation identical, but different in writing. Every divergence in spelling, even though from a phonetic point of view it may be a decided improvement, increases the difficulty of understanding. If this is a striking proof of the direct combination of writing and speech, on the other side the negative conclusion must be drawn from it, that the less fixed the spelling, the less is any direct connexion possible between it and the meaning. The want of fixity may arise from the unsuitability of the material at hand, or from the awkwardness of the writers,—as when several signs are used interchangeably in the same acceptation, or, conversely, when a single sign appears now in one acceptation, now in another; or it may be due to the want of regulative authorities who might render possible a concentration and union of the different orthographical efforts. It may, however, be also due to the very perfection and consistency of the phonetic-physiological phenomena. If, *e.g.*, the spelling of the stem in the different forms changes with the sound (MHG. *tac* — *tages*, *neigen* — *neicle*, etc.), or if, as in Sanskrit, even the spelling

of the same form changes with its position in the sentence,—the single meaning is confronted with a number of variations in spelling, and it is impossible for an absolutely distinct orthographical image to connect itself with the first. As long as fixity in spelling is wanting, it is impossible, however great may be the skill attained in writing and reading, to make the direct connexion perfect. At the same time, however, the very practice tends to produce a greater fixity. Every advance made in the former is to the advantage of the latter, and every advance in the latter facilitates the former.

Natural
tendency in
orthography
towards
greater
fixity.

675. We thus find that the natural progress of the development of the orthography of any language is towards greater fixity, and this even at the cost of phonetic-physiological accuracy. It is no doubt true that consistent progress in this direction is not the rule. Violent phonetic changes are especially apt to produce variations and retrogressive movements. There are three means by the aid of which orthography strives to gain fixity: (1) the abolition of the variation between several different manners of writing; (2) by paying attention to etymology; (3) by keeping close to tradition and disregarding changes of sound. The first-named method is viewed even from a phonetic stand-point, often an advance, or at least not a retrogression, though it not unfrequently occurs that the phonetic principle is discarded in the operation; the two others, however, are direct contraventions of this principle. Naturally, however, the tendency to bring language and writing into closer connexion with each other still remains active: and this tendency works partly in the direction of cancelling original deficiencies, and partly in the reaction against the new inconveniences perpetually arising owing to sound-change. As this tendency in most cases comes into conflict with the effort to attain fixity, the history of orthography exhibits the spectacle of a perpetual struggle

between these two tendencies, the state of which at any given moment gives a criterion of the relative strength of the combatants at that moment.

676. If we follow the movement in detail, we find striking analogies with the development of language side by side with notable differences. The latter depend chiefly on the following points. In the first place, changes in orthography are effected with much more consciousness and purpose than changes in language; though we must beware of exaggerating the degree of purpose. In the second place, in the struggle over orthography, it is not, as in the struggle over language, the whole linguistic community which is interested, but at most the writing (or printing and publishing) portion of that community, and the individual members of this in very different degrees and with very different intensity; the preponderance of special individuals makes its influence felt to a much stronger degree than in language. In the third place, since the capacity of influence is not limited to proximity in space, it is possible in the department of orthography for quite other ramifications of the reciprocal influences to develop than in the department of language. In the fourth place, orthographic changes stand in decided contrast to sound-change in this respect, that they are unable to advance by means of fine gradations, but can only do so by leaps and bounds.

677. Let us examine, in the first place, the means by which fluctuation between sound-signs of identical value is overcome. Such fluctuation may arise in several ways. The signs may have been already employed indiscriminately in the language from which the alphabet is borrowed: thus it stands in OHG. with the doublets *i—j*, *u—v*, *k—c*, *c—s*. Or it may happen that two signs had a different value in the original language, but that the language which borrows them possesses no corresponding distinction, so

Analogies between the development of writing and that of language.

A bolition of variations in sound-signs of identical value.

that now both signs fall upon the same sound. It especially happens that both easily pass into use when the single sound of the borrowing language lies between the two sounds of the other. Thus in Upper German, at the time of the introduction of the Latin alphabet there was in the guttural and labial series no difference fully answering to the Latin distinction between voiced media and tenuis; in the anlaut of syllables there was nothing even approximately answering to it; but merely a sound which differed from the Latin media in lacking the voice-tone; from the tenuis by a weaker exspiration. Hence arose a vacillation between *g* and *k*, *b* and *p*. The vacillation too between *f* and *v* (*u*) and in MG. that between *v* and *b* arose in the same manner. Further, double symbols may arise only in the course of further development where two originally different sounds fall together, their two signs being then exchanged. Thus, for instance, in later MHG. hard *s* and *ʃ* fall together, whence, *sas* written for *ʃas*, and conversely *hus* for *ʃus*, etc.; though the latter case is certainly rarer from the very outset. Finally, however, it is possible for a division to appear owing to the different development of the same written symbol; compare Latin *i—j*, *u—v*, and in German text ('*fracturschrift*') *ſ* and *ʃ*. It is possible for these differences to multiply, especially if at a later period we try to utilise an older grade of development, as we see, for example, in the use of capital letters side by side with small letters.

678. The superfluities thus arising are disposed of in a similar fashion to that which removes the superfluities in words and forms. The simplest way is by the gradual obsolescence of one of the two signs. The other way is by the differentiation of the signs originally used indifferently. This may be exclusively phonetic, the removal of the superfluity at the same time serving to supply a closely related want; e.g. when in NHG. *i*, *u*, and *j*, *v* were

gradually differentiated as vowel and consonant. It happens not unfrequently that the position of the sound within the word gives the key to the differentiation without any phonetic difference being present, or at least without any such being remarked by the writers; as when we find *j* and *v* for a long continuous period principally used in the anlaut of the word (even in the place of the vowel); *c* in MHG. (irrespective of the combinations *ch* and *sch*) in a preponderating majority of cases confined to the auslaut of a syllable (*sac*, *tac*, *neicte*, *sackes*) and in NHG. only in the gemination *tt*, it being in other cases ousted by etymological orthography; finally, *f* much more frequently before *r*, *l*, and *n* and kindred vowels than before *a*, *e*, *o*. A third method lastly consists in this, that without any phonetic or graphic motive, according to individual caprice and fancy, one orthography becomes usual in one word and another in that. This accounts for the relation in NHG. between *f*—*v* (*fall*—*vater*, etc.), *t*—*th* (*tuch*—*thun*, *gut*—*munth*, etc.), *r*—*rh*, *ai*—*ei*, and further between the cases in which length is denoted and those in which it is not denoted, and between the different methods of such denotation (*nehmen*—*geben*, *wahl*—*wahl*, *viel*—*ihr*, etc.). An essential factor in this process, and one of the main reasons which have prevented the consummation of a uniform orthography, in fact which in modern times is ever anew opposing itself to a consistent reform of orthography, is the effort to distinguish words which have the same sounds but different meanings. Compare, among others, *ferse*—*verse*, *fiel*—*viel*, *tan*—*than*, *ton*—*thon*, *rein*—*Rhein*, *redc*—*rhede*, *laib*—*leib*, *Main*—*mein*, *rain*—*rein*, *los*—*loos*, *mal*—*mahl*, *malen*—*mahlen*, *war*—*wahr*, *solc*—*sohle*, *stil*—*stiel*, *aale*—*ahle*, *kecr*—*kehr*, *meer*—*mekr*, *moor*—*mohr*. Even different meanings of words originally identical are thus distinguished; cf. *das*—*dass*, *wider*—*wieder*, etc. Here, too, should be noticed, the gradual process whereby it

became usual to employ capital letters for the initial letters of substantives which were employed at an earlier period merely to emphasise the word. Here again we see the tendency to utilise writing for the expression of distinctions unknown to speech. This manner of differentiation is one of the most characteristic signs for enabling the written to become independent over-against the spoken language. It also does not occur till such time as a true written language has freed itself from the dialects, and it is the product of grammatical reflexion. It is, however, worthy of remark that even this reflexion does not in the first place create differences in the way of writing to express its distinctions, but merely utilises for its own purposes the variations which have by accident arisen. In cases where no such variations exist, it is possible for the impulse to differentiation to fail to make itself felt ; cf. the homonyms cited above, p. 228. Moreover, it does not exhibit itself as operative in all those cases where we might have expected that it would have done so.

Effect of
etymology.

679. Like the unphonetic differentiation, the operation of etymology makes itself felt most strongly and most consistently in written language ; though it is in many cases unmistakably present in dialectic records. We may compare the expulsion of a more archaic phonetic orthography by an etymological one, with the process of analogical creation whereby unmeaning sound-differences are levelled ; indeed we may actually designate it as a kind of analogical creation peculiar to written language, for which the laws hold good which we have brought before our readers' notice. In this case, too, of course the etymology is not in itself decisive, but rather the manner of grouping prevalent in the language at the time. Isolation is a protection against assimilation, and conversely, secondary *rapprochement* between sound and meaning causes an attraction over into analogy.

680. Let us now consider from this point of view the most important cases in which the NIG. has deserted the phonetic spelling of MHG., and has allowed assimilation to set in. In MHG. the *media* in *auslaut*, and before hard consonants in writing,¹ as in pronunciation, becomes a *tennis*; in NHG. this is the case in pronunciation only, not in writing: MHG. *lac*, *leit*, *gap*, *neigte* = NHG. *lag*, *leid*, *gab*, *neigte*. We see the MHG. rule observed in *hanpt* (= *houbet*, *konpt*), *behanpten*, because there are no longer any related forms with unsyncopeated vowels remaining by its side; in the proper name *Schmitt*, *Schmidt*; and in *schulttheiss*, where the composition with *schuld* is no longer felt. In MHG. consonantal doubling is not expressed in writing in *auslaut* and before another consonant: *mann*—*mannes*, *brante*—*brennen*. NHG. represents the doubling in cases where forms etymologically closely connected give the model for such; cf. *mann*, *brannte*, *männlich*, *männchen* (though we find it already discarded in *brand*, *brunst*, etc.); still in the pronoun *man*, and further in *brantewein*, *brantwein* (which is no longer apprehended as *gebrante wein*); on the other hand, with a later attraction to *herr* we have *herrlich*, *herrschaft*, *herrschen*, which appear in MHG. as *hêrlich*, *hêrschaft*, *hîrsen* from *hêr* = NHG. *lehr*. In MHG. it is true that the umlaut of the long *a* is in most cases separated from *ê* as *æ*; while that of the short *a* is denoted by *e*. In NIG. *ä* is likewise employed for the umlaut of the sound which was originally short, but is now in many cases drawn out when we are still clearly conscious of the relation to a form from the same root which has not undergone umlaut; thus, *vater*—*väter*, *väterchen*, *väterlich*, *kraft*—*kräfte*, *kräftig*, *glas*—*gläser*, *gläsern*, *kalt*—*kälter*, *kälte*, *land*—*gelände*, *arg*—*ärger*, *ärgern*, *fahre*—*fahrt*; in the same way in the diphthongs, *baum*—*bäume*, *haut*—*häute*, *kanten*, *bärenhäuter*

¹ Less regularly, it is true, in the MSS. than in the critical editions.

(MHG. *hât*—*hinte*) ; on the other hand, *erbe*, *ente* (MHG. *ant*, gen. *ente*) *enge*, *engl*, *besser*, *regen* (verb), although spoken with an open *e* as well ; *leute*, etc., since here kindred forms unaffected by umlaut are wanting. The difference between *ligen* and *legen*, *winden* and *wenden*, *hangen* and *hängen*, and *fallen* and *fällen*, is worth noticing ; in the first-named pairs we doubtless find also *a* in the preterite (*lag*, *wand*), but it is merely the present which is brought into relation with the present. Where the bond that unites the group has been severed or loosened *e* remains ; cf. *vetter* with *vater*, *gerben* with *gar*, *scherge* with *schar*, *hegen*, *gehege*, and *hecke* with *hag*, *hen* with *hauen*, *fertig* with *fart* (on the other hand *hoffärtig*), *eltern* with *älteren*, *behende* with *hände*, *ausmerzen* with *märs* (the *ä* owing to the Latin *a*), *strecke* with *stracks*. The assimilation likewise fails in cases where the form affected by umlaut appears as the primary one ; cf. *brennen*—*brannte*, *nennen*—*nannte*, etc. The observation may be also made that the accession of a further phonetic difference operates as a restraint ; thus we find *hahn*—*henne*, *nass*—*netsen*, *henken*, *henker*, as compared with *hängen*. On the other hand, the *e* is in certain cases—even where it has not arisen through umlaut, but is the equivalent of the original German *e* (*ē*),—nevertheless apprehended as a case of umlaut, if a word with *a* stands by it, from which that in *e* can appear to be derived ; cf. *rachen* (MHG. *rēchen*) referred to *rache* (MHG. *rāche*), *schämen* (MHG. *schēmen*) to *scham*, *wägen*, *erwägen* (a form which arose from a confusion of the MHG. *wēgen* with *wegen*) to *wage* (on the other hand we have *bewegen*).¹

681. Etymology plays an important part also in the regulation of sound-vacillations spoken of above, p. 448. We

¹ The correctness of the inductions given above is by no means impugned by the fact that the *ä* is found instead of *e* and *ē* in some other cases as well where it has not been motivated by any reference to an *a*. To a certain extent the tendency to differentiation also comes into account ; cf. e.g. *währen*, *grüßren*, *grüßr*—*wärrn*, *grüßtr*.

naturally write *fahren—fahrt—gefährte—furt*, etc., with an *f* in each case. Where *k* is used as a symbol of lengthening, it is as a rule consistently carried through in all related forms with change of vocalisation; cf. *nehmen—nahm—genehm—übernahme, befehle—befiehlt—befahl—befohlen—befehl*, etc. As examples of isolation we may cite *swar* (= MHG. *scwäre*), as against *wahr*; *drittel, viertel*, etc., against *theil*; *vertheidigen* (from *tagedingen*) as against *tag*.

682. This assimilation, however, is as a rule confined within definite limits, as it only occurs in cases where it cannot render the pronunciation doubtful. It is possible in NHG. to write *leble* with a *b* without any inconvenience, because the language does not in any case distinguish between *b* and *p* in the auslaut of a syllable. But we can consistently carry a long-symbol, for instance, only so far through the related forms as the vowel maintains its length (thus *genommen* as related to *nehmen, furt* to *fahren*), and the doubling can only be consistently carried out as far as the preceding vowel is short (hence *kam* as related to *kommen, fiel* to *fallen*).

683. Analogy, too, operates protectively against changes of the older spelling; and here, again, we have a divergence from the conditions of spoken language. This is specially to be observed in the case of the orthography of the French language. If the consonants which in auslaut have become mute are maintained in writing, the reason is that related forms in most cases maintain themselves as well, in which these consonants are still pronounced, and that they are also pronounced in the same form when a word beginning with a vowel connects itself with them. If the French were to write, for instance, *fai, lai, gri, il avai, tu a*, a startling contrast would appear between these forms and *faité, laide, grise, avait-il, tu as été*:

as has actually not been avoided in *il a—a-t-il*. Thus consistency in writing would also be destroyed if we should endeavour to introduce a special sign for the guttural nasal ; in such cases *un* would be differently written in *un père* and *un ami*. Further, if it were desired to draw a distinction between the nasalised and the non-nasalised vowel, it would be necessary to employ different signs in the case of *cousin* and *cousine*, *un* and *une*, *ingrat* and *ingrat*. We may gather that the analogy of the related forms has been decisive for the result from a number of isolated forms like *plutôt*, *toujours*, *hormis*, *faulxer*, *plafond* (on the other hand *plat-bord*), *verglas* (referred to *vert*), *morbleu*, *morfil*, *Granville*, *Gérarcourt*, *Aubervilliers*, *fainéant*, *l'aurien*, *Omout* (referred to *haut*). We may also compare such cases of isolation as *Clermont—clair*.

684. If writing cannot keep up with the phonetic development of language, it is easy to see that the reason of this is to be sought in nothing else but in its want of continuity. In the phonetic conditions it is unquestionable that continuity alone renders possible the union of continuous advance with fixity of usage. A similar fixity of usage in writing implies an unchangeableness of the latter ; and this again implies a perpetual increase of the discrepancy between writing and pronunciation. On the other hand, the more vacillating that orthography is, the more capable is it of development ; or, conversely, the more it seeks to follow the development of language, the more vacillating does it become.

685. We must, however, in addition emphasize certain points of view according to which a faithful adherence to the old spelling, when the pronunciation is changed, becomes still more intelligible. In judging of the relation of writing and sound in a language it often happens that the standard of another language intrudes improperly, while the orthography of every language

claims to be judged according to its own conditions. As long as ever a definite sound corresponds to a definite symbol, there can be no question of any discrepancy between writing and pronunciation. In one language it may be one sound, in another a different one; this does not affect the question at all. Hence if a sound consistently changes in all its positions, and in the course of these changes does not coincide with another sound already existing, no change in the orthography need ensue, and the correspondence between writing and pronunciation is maintained. But even when the change is not consistent, a division occurs, if only none of the different sounds coincides with one already existing, no other alternative as a rule remains but to maintain the old orthography; for, in order to distinguish the sound, we should need at least one symbol more than we have; and this cannot be created at will. The only resource is where a superfluity existed before, which it is now possible to employ to some purpose. In order to maintain the phonetic principle intact certain violent innovations would from time to time be indispensable, and it is hard to reconcile these with the maintenance of unity in the orthography.

686. We must add to this that the operation of analogy described counts for much in the preservation of forms. And finally, we should remark that by the introduction of phonetic writing many distinctions would be completely cancelled which now are maintained in the written language. Thus in the French language the plural would in most cases cease to be distinguished from the singular; and in many cases the feminine would be undistinguished from the masculine (*clair—claire*, etc.). In those cases, however, in which differences still remained, the consistency of the method of formation which now mainly prevails in writing would be abolished.

CHAPTER XXII.

ON MIXTURE IN LANGUAGE¹

Mixture in
the wider and
the narrower
sense.

IF we start by assuming that individual languages are the only ones which have any real existence, we are justified in asserting that as soon as any two individuals converse, a mixture in language is the result. The speaker in speaking influences the idea-groups of the hearer which have reference to language. If we accept the expression 'mixture in language' in this wide sense, we must admit that Schuchardt is right in his assertion that of all the questions with which the science of language at the present day has to deal, none is of greater importance than mixture of language. In this sense we have necessarily been discussing 'mixture in language' throughout all the previous chapters, since it is inseparable from the life of language. Here, however, we take the word in a narrower sense, to denote a process not absolutely indispensable to the life of language, though it be wholly wanting in hardly any domain of speech.

Mixture of
distinct lan-
guages, dis-
lects, and
stages of
language.

688. Mixture of language in this more restricted sense is, in the first instance, the influence exercised by one language upon another, when the two languages are either wholly unconnected,

¹ Cf. for this chapter Whitney, *On Mixture in Language* (Transactions of the American Philological Association, 1881); and particularly Schuchardt, *Slavodeutsches und Slavoslavienmischer*, Graz, 1885 [also Sayce, *Principles of Comparative Philology*, Chapter v., 1885].

or, though originally connected, are so far differentiated that one has to be specially learnt by those who are acquainted with the other : it also signifies the influence to which one dialect is subjected by another belonging to the same unbroken and continuous linguistic area, even when the two dialects do not yet differ so strongly as to prevent a reciprocal understanding holding good between the constituents of the two separate areas. There is yet another kind of mixture in language which consists in the *re-adoption* into the language of material which existed at an earlier period in that language, but has since died out.

689. We will consider, in the first instance, the mixture of different languages clearly and sharply divided from each other. In order to understand the process in the case of mixture, we must, of course, closely observe what passes in the case of single individuals. The strongest predisposition to mixture is given when there are individuals who speak more than one language ; possibly several languages indifferently, but, at least, one other besides their mother-tongue. Under any circumstances a certain minimum understanding of a foreign language is indispensable. At least what is adopted from the foreign language must be understood, even if only imperfectly.

690. The most ordinary cause of bilingualism, or a more or less perfect apprehension of a foreign tongue is, of course, the situation of a community upon the confines of two linguistic areas, and it occurs in a greater or less degree according to the activity of the intercourse between them. Again, it may be due to journeys and the temporary residence of individuals in foreign countries ; it becomes more marked when individuals permanently migrate from one country to another ; and still more, when large masses of population are permanently transplanted by conquests and by colonisation.

691. Finally, the knowledge of the language of a foreign people may be imparted by writing, without any direct contact between the learners and teachers. In the last-mentioned case the knowledge thus gained commonly remains confined to certain exceptionally well-educated strata of society. It must thus be remarked that the method of communication afforded by writing facilitates not merely the process of borrowing from a foreign language, but further, of borrowing from a primitive and distant epoch of its development.

692. In cases where two nations have been brought into contact, and have been mixed on a large scale, bilingualism, and, consequently, instances of reciprocal influence exercised on and received by one language from another are common. If one nation has a decided preponderance over the other, whether this be due to its size or to pre-eminence—political or industrial or intellectual—it will be found that the employment of its language will tend to spread at the expense of the other: there will be a gradual change from bilingualism again to unilingualism. This process will be more or less speedy in its fulfilment, according to the capacity for resistance of the inferior language, and this language will leave traces more or less strongly marked in the victorious one.

693. The mixture again will not easily affect a single individual, so as to cause his diction to embrace component parts taken from one language in approximately similar proportions to those taken from the other. Assuming that he is equally master of both languages, it may be that he will find no difficulty in passing from one to the other: but it will still be found that within a single clause of a sentence one language will form the strict basis; the other, though it may exercise a more or less modifying influence, will still play but a secondary part. This, of

course, applies even more to one who has as yet gained no real command over the foreign language, but merely more or less power of understanding it. The person who speaks two languages will, of course, be liable to have each of these influenced by the other: his mother-tongue by the foreign language, and the foreign language by his mother-tongue. The influence of the latter will, as a rule, be stronger than that of the former. This is inevitable as long as the foreign language is not completely mastered. Still the influence of the foreign idiom may also be very strong upon the mother-tongue when the speaker applies himself earnestly to its study: and this is commonly the case when a foreign language and foreign culture is more highly prized than the native language of the speaker.

694. If, however, the impulse necessary to cause one language to feel the influence of another must proceed from persons who are masters of both languages, in however imperfect a degree; this sensitiveness to influence may still spread within the same linguistic community by means of the ordinary assimilating effect of intercourse; and may thus reach persons who have not the remotest direct contact with the foreign idiom. The latter are in the process influenced not merely by the members of their own community, but under certain circumstances by members of a foreign people as well, who have adopted their language. They will, of course, in every case assimilate the foreign elements, but slowly and in small quantities.

695. There are two main ways in which a foreign idiom may exert an influence. In the first place, foreign material may be adopted into the mother tongue. In the second place, though only native material may be employed, still the methods of linking this into sentences, and its application to the conceptions it represents may follow a foreign model: in this case the influencing force

Two chief
modes of
influence.
A. Adoption
of foreign
material.
B. Usage
of native
material after
a foreign
model.

extends merely to what Humboldt and Steinthal have described as the *inner language form* ('innere Sprachform').

696. Of course the first and foremost of the causes for the adoption of foreign words into the mother tongue is the need felt for them. Words are accordingly adopted for ideas which have as yet no words to express them. As a rule, both the idea and the word to express it are taken together from the same source. The names of places and persons are the most obvious and common among such adopted words; to which may be added, the names of foreign products. If these are natural products their names may pass, together with the objects themselves, from the least cultivated people to the most highly cultivated; while on the other hand, the introduction of artificial products with their names presupposes a certain predominance of foreign culture, which may no doubt extend to but a very limited area. Such predominance must be presupposed more decidedly still when technical, scientific, religious, or political terms are introduced. A strong civilising influence entails almost invariably a large importation of foreign words. One other want must be mentioned as capable of causing the adoption of words from a lower sphere of culture, namely, that of describing the circumstances of a foreign country, whether this description be designed as information, and so attempt to give accurate delineation or narration, or whether it be applied for poetical purposes. The process of borrowing transcends its actual need when the foreign language and culture is prized higher than the native, and when accordingly the mixture of words and phrases taken from the foreign language passes as specially elegant or tasteful.

697. There are practically no limits to the number of words transferred from the mother tongue into the foreign one when a speaker is compelled to employ that language without full mastery

of it. Thus words of the most varied description may be introduced into a language by persons who speak that language as a foreign idiom.

698. Borrowed words are subject to much the same laws as newly-coined words. The first employer of such words has no intention commonly speaking of making them usual. He merely employs them to satisfy the momentary need felt of making himself understood. Such employment leaves no lasting effects until it is repeated; as a rule, indeed, leaves none, except when it proceeds spontaneously from different individuals. A loan-word does not become usual at once. There are different grades of usual employment. In the first place, there is a narrow circle within a given community whose existence depends either upon the ties of neighbourhood or similarity of culture, within which a word becomes usual. It may be that there are several such circles. Many words remain in this restricted application, while others spread over the whole population. If these words have quite generally become usual, and if they present no remarkable phonetic irregularities, the instinct of language regards them much as it regards native linguistic material. In fact, to the instinct of language they are no longer foreign words at all.

699. The treatment of foreign phonetic material, in cases where foreign words are borrowed, merits particular attention. We have seen that in no two languages does the stock of sounds precisely tally. To learn to speak a foreign language with exactness, new motory sensations need to be acquired and put in practice. This process is necessary unless the speaker would continue to work on with the same motory sensations as those with which he utters his mother tongue. Consequently he will, as a rule, replace the foreign sounds by those nearest related to them in his own mother tongue, and in cases where he attempts to utter sounds not occurring in

his own language, he will, in the first instance at least, fail in his attempt. No doubt a long course of hearing and practising a foreign language may impart a more correct pronunciation, but still it is notoriously seldom that any one masters a foreign language so perfectly as not to be taken for a foreigner. Thus, where a language spreads its domain over a nation that originally spoke a different language, it must almost certainly result that the earlier language of the people must leave some traces in the production of sounds, and that other departures, more or less violent, from the normal usage, should set in, because the motory sensations connected with the two languages are not harmonious. Where the acquirement of the foreign language is the result of *writing* alone, of course there is no attempt made to imitate the foreign sounds, but the sounds of the speaker's native language are assumed as those of that thus acquired.

700. In cases where one people merely comes into contact with another in the course of travel, or by literary intercourse, it will be found that a minority only will understand the language of the foreign people; a smaller minority will be able to speak it, and a yet smaller to speak it accurately. It will thus happen that in the course of borrowing a word from a foreign language, the persons who first introduced the word will insert sounds belonging to their own language among the foreign ones. Assuming, however, that the foreign word be adopted with an absolutely correct pronunciation, such pronunciation certainly will not be able to maintain itself when it spreads to persons who are only imperfectly acquainted with the foreign language, or, it may be, absolutely unacquainted with it. The lack of a corresponding motory sensation makes in this case the intrusive element, the sound-substitution (to speak with Gröber) an absolute necessity. If a foreign word has once made its way into a language, it is generally composed of the

materials of the language into which it has entered. Even those who, owing to their exact knowledge of the foreign language, are aware of the departure it has taken, have to give in to the majority, at the risk of appearing pedantic or affected. Only in rare circumstances does a foreign sound gain complete right of citizenship in a language; those sounds, of course, succeeding most easily which occur most frequently, and which contrast most sharply with those native to the language. Thus, for instance, in spite of all the numerous loan-words in the NHG. written language, one new *sound* and one only has been introduced, viz., that of the French *j* or *g* in *jalousie*, *genie*, *genieren*, etc. And even this sound is replaced in popular dialects, and even in the ordinary language of intercourse of towns, by the sound of the German *sch*, English *sh*.

701. It happens, not unfrequently, that several different foreign sounds are replaced by the same native sound. Thus in OHG. the Latin sounds of *f* and *v* are both represented by *f* (which is sometimes written as *v* or *u*), cf. *fenstar*, *ficbar*, *fira*, etc.—*fers*, *fogat* (vocatus), *evangelio*, etc.¹ The reason why *v* as well as *f* was reproduced by *f* is the lack of a sound exactly corresponding to the Latin, a *u*, still consonantal, being spoken in the place of the modern German *w*. Besides, in OHG. the Latin strong *p*, just like the sonant lenis *b*, is reproduced by the surd lenis which lies between the two, now written as *b*, now as *p*; cf. *beh* (*pek*) = *pix*, *birn* = *pirum*, *bredigōn* = *praedicare*, etc.—*bocchi* (*pecchi*) = *baccinum*, *buliz* = *boletum*, etc. The reason is that in Southern German there was no voiced *b* after the sound-shifting, because the previously existing one had ceased to be voiced, and no strong *p*, because that which had previously existed was now shifted to *ph*. Conversely, it may be possible to reproduce the foreign sound now by one,

¹ Cf. Franz: *die lateinisch-romanischen elemente im althochdeutschen*. Strassburg, 1884, pp. 20, 22.

now by another approximately similar native sound. It will, however, commonly be found in cases where in the loan-words of a language the same foreign sound is reproduced now by one now by another sound, that the adoption of these words has taken place at different periods. Thus it is that the Latin *v* is reproduced by *w* in the oldest German loan-words (cf. *wln*, *wiccha*, *pfdrwo*, etc.), most probably because like the NHG. *v* it was still the equivalent of the consonantal *u*, or in any case was still bilabial.¹ In the later OHG. loan-words it appears as *f* (cf. above); in those of more recent times again it appears as *w*.

702. In cases where a word passing from one language into another depends merely upon the powers of hearing of those who adopt it, and where they are but imperfectly acquainted with the foreign idiom, it is quite easy for wider-spreading corruptions of the word to make their appearance, depending on the one hand on the imperfect powers of hearing of those who adopt the word, and on its imperfect retention by the memory. One result, in special, of this, is that unwonted combinations of sounds are replaced by more ordinary ones; abbreviations are adopted; and very frequently popular etymology begins to operate.

*Assimilation
of words
already
adopted.*

703. The changes affecting foreign words upon their adoption must not be confused with those that do not affect them till they have been naturalised in the language of their adoption. As, however, we have only received many words long after their adoption, it is not always so easy to prevent such confusion. The foreign words which have become naturalised of course are subject, no less than the native words, to the laws of sound-change. The fact of the participation or non-participation of a word in the sound-change may, in default of tradition, reveal to us the relative epoch of each process of borrowing. Thus, if in OHG. the Latin /

¹ Cf. *Frans*, *n. 1*.

appears in some words as *t* and in others as *s* (cf. *tempal*, *turri*, *abdt*, *altari*—*siagit*, *strdza scuzzila*), and the Latin *p* appears in some words as *p* or *b* and in others as *ph* or *f* (cf. *pina*, *priestar*—*phill*, *phlanza*, *phifa*, *pfessar*), there is no doubt that the words with *s* and *ph* or *f* represent an older stage of borrowing than those with *t* and *p*. For the changes in question could never have set in if the words had not been adopted already before the sound-shifting, so as to share the fate of the genuine German words.¹

704. Not only so, but foreign words are exposed in the course of their extension to the same assimilating tendencies as at their first adoption. A word may in the first place be exactly or approximately so adopted with its foreign sounds correctly rendered by persons who are perfect masters of the foreign language. In the next place, however, as it is transferred to persons unacquainted with the foreign language, it may be corrupted by the substitution of another motory sensation, through imperfect audition and through popular etymology. In cases where any such corruption comes into common use among the great mass of people, it may also have a reflex action upon those who are well acquainted with the correct sounds of the original word. They must, in spite of their superior knowledge, adapt themselves to the pronunciation which has become current, if they would not remain unintelligible or appear affected. In other cases, on the other hand, a combination of sounds approximating to the original model maintains itself in the mouth of the educated, while side by side with this one or more popular variants develop, e.g. *corporal*—*kaporal*, *sergeant*—*scharsant*, *gensd'armes*—*schandarre* (it is thus pronounced in Lower Germany), *kastanie*—*kristanje*, *chirurgus*—*gregorius*, *renovieren*—*renneflren*, etc.

705. A special kind of assimilation consists in the transference

[¹ Cf. Kluge: *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, i. v. 'Pfingsten.']

of the native system of accentuation to foreign words. Such transference probably does not set in as a rule when the words are in the first instance transferred,—not till the word has become quite naturalised. In English it is easy to trace how the French words adopted originally with a French accent have only gradually passed over to the German method of accentuation [Chaucer has *långage* and *langæge*, *förtune* and *fortüne*, *báttaile* and *battaille*: *ldboure* and *labolir*, see Meiklejohn's edition of Chaucer's *Prologue* (1880); so Pope, *gallant*]. In German the same remark may be made as to foreign proper names. In OHG. (and this is partly true of MHG. as well) the accent fell thus, *Adām*, *Abel*, *David*, etc. Appellatives, on the other hand, appear already in the earliest OHG. records with the accent thrown back, and with the effects of this process; cf. e.g. *fogat* (*vocatus*), *mettina* (*matutina*), *fenstar*. It is probable, however, that in these cases too, the throwing back of the accent did not follow closely upon the adoption of the word.

706. The phonetic modifications described tend to estrange a word more and more from its origin, until it may at last become unrecognisable, even by a person well acquainted with the language from which it comes. But such estrangement may also be enhanced by changes in the language from which the word is borrowed. Thus, for instance, the German pronunciation of the words borrowed by that language from French depends to a great extent upon a pronunciation no longer current in France; cf. *Paris*, *concert*, *officier*, etc. Words which have passed into the Romance languages from the German have become even more violently transformed in their passage; cf., e.g., the French words *tape*, *tapon*=*saffen*; Italian *toppo*=*sopf*; French *tonaille*=South German *zuehle*, Middle German *quehle*; Italian *drudo*=*traut*. In the same way it is possible for the signification with which the word is borrowed to change in the parent speech as well as in the

language into which it has passed, and finally it may entirely disappear in the parent language.

707. The same word may be borrowed several times at different periods. It appears then in different phonetic combinations, of which the more recent connects itself more nearly with the parent language, while the older has experienced changes more or less violent. Sometimes the meaning with which a word is adopted on the second occasion of its borrowing differs from that prevailing on the first occasion, and the result is that no connexion between the two forms is perceived; cf. such forms as the German *ordnen—ordinieren*, *dichten—dictieren*, *predigen—predicieren*, OHG. *zabal* (draft-board) by the side of *tavala*, both from *tabula*; the two words *prüfen* and *probieren* may also be mentioned as not precisely tallying in meaning. [There are many so-called doublets in French and English; cf. for French, Bréal, *u.s.*, and for English, Skeat, *Principles of English Etymology*, ch. xx.] In cases where the meaning is perfectly identical the older form easily disappears, as in the case of *altar* (in MHG. already *alter*), or it may be that the older form is confined to the ordinary and popular diction; cf. *ade—adieu*, *melodei* (regularly developed from MHG. *melodie*)—*melodie*, newly adopted from the French; *phantasci—phantasie*, *känel* (*kännel*, *kändel*, *kener*)—*kanal*, *kämi*—*kamin*, *kappel*—*kapelle*, *keste*—*kastanie*. Plurality of forms is very frequently found as a result of various borrowing processes in the names of persons: it frequently happens in this case that their origin from the same stock is no longer recognised, the older forms merely appearing still as family names; cf. *Andres—Andreas*, *Bartel—Bartholomäus*, *Michel—Michael*, *Velten—Valentin*, *Metz—Mattis—Matthias*, *Marx—Markus*, *Zacher—Zacharias*, *Merten—Martin*, etc.

708. Sometimes it happens that instead of an absolutely new loan being made, the loan-word already long-since naturalised

and phonetically modified receives a merely partial assimilation to the word in the foreign language which is at its base; cf. MHG. *trache* = NHG. *drache* (*draco*), MHG. *tihten* = NHG. *dichten* (*dictare*), MHG. *Krieche* = NHG. *Griechen* (*Graecus*). The word *Jude* also seems to depend upon a secondary attraction to the word *Judaens*, as *Jüde* would be the only form correctly developed according to the laws of sound.

Competition
among
languages
in the con-
tribution of
loan-words.

709. Where two nearly related languages co-operate to influence a third, it may easily happen that the words corresponding to each other are adopted from both; these will then agree in their signification; and in their sound-form differ but little from each other. We find this markedly the case in loan-words borrowed from Latin and from French—thus the German has the two parallel forms *ideal* and *ideell*, *real* and *reell*, at the present day differentiated in their meaning, but at an earlier epoch identical; Schiller actually uses *material* in the sense of *materiell*. Goethe writes *religios* instead of *religiös*. In the mouth of a south German *referendär* answers to a north German form *referendar*. Instead of the words *trinität*, *majestät*, etc., we find in MHG. such forms as *trinitdt*, *majestdt*; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both forms may be proved to have existed; the *ä* can only proceed from the French.¹

710. In these cases, even the form which has arisen from the French would be naturally referred by a Latin scholar to the Latin directly. In other cases words are not, generally speaking, taken directly from the parent language, but merely from another in which they occur as loan-words. Thus, for instance, Greek words came to us in the first instance from Latin; hence they had the Latin accentuation and the termination *-us* instead of *-os*. In the same way, Latin words which on their part again may

¹ Cf. J. Grimm: *AZ. Schö.* i. 337, who, however, appreciates the matter differently.

be borrowed from the Greek, have come into English and German, thanks to the French language ; cf. such words as *musik*, *protestant*, *religion*, etc., and also such proper names as *Horace*, *Ovid*, and *Liby*. In this case too a direct relationship presents itself to a person conversant with the original language, and the result is that even when he takes words directly from the original language, he gives these a phonetic combination analogous to those which have entered by another channel ; so that he, for instance, alters the Greek into the Latin accent ; that he lets the Latin terminations *-us* *-um* and others drop ; he changes the terminations of the Latin words in *-io* into *-ion*. It should here too be mentioned that words taken directly from the Latin have received the termination *-ieren* which comes from the French : cf. *negieren*, *spazieren*, *poculieren*, *praedicieren*, *annectieren*, *regulieren*, *prästieren*, *präparieren*, etc. From an older form *personifieren*, found in Lessing, a word *personificieren* has been coined, with direct reference to the Latin.

711. We have seen above (p. 161) that a derivative formed with an unusual suffix may easily receive in addition the normal suffix for its special function. A special instance of this process is when a native synonymous suffix is added to the foreign one ; as for instance, *Sicilianer*, *Mantuaner*, *Kantianer* ; *Italiener* ; *Athenienser*, *Waldenser* ; *Gennesper*, *Bologneser* ; *sicilianisch*, *italienisch*, *gennesisch*, *idealisch*, *kolossalisch* (both of these words were common in the last century), *kollegialisch*, *musikalisch*, *physikalisch*, etc. ; *princessin*, *abtissin* (MHG. *ebbetisse*). The words in *-ieren* took their rise from the fact that the German verbal terminations attached themselves to the OF. infinitive form in *-ier* already in existence.

712. Words are always borrowed in their entirety ; never derivative and inflexional suffixes. If, however, a large number of words containing the same suffix is borrowed, these range themselves into a group just as easily as native words with

Phonetic combination of a native with a foreign suffix.

Borrowing of derivative suffixes.

the same suffix: and such group may become productive in its turn. The suffix thus adopted may be attached, by means of analogical new-creation, to a native root. This case is far from rare in the case of derivative syllables. German has formed after the analogy of *abtei*, etc. such words as *bäckerei*, *gerberei*, *druckerei*, etc.; while popular spoken German has creations like *takelage*, *kledage*, *bommelage*, etc., after that of *bagage* (cf. Andr. *Volkset.* 98); again, after the analogy of *corrigieren*, we find *hofieren*, *buchstabieren*, *sich erlustieren*, *MHG. wandelieren*; and in Hans Sachs *gelidmasieret*. We find again Romance creations like the Italian *falsardo* with a Teutonic suffix: and English words like *oddity*, *murderous*, *catable* with a French suffix.¹ In German several suffixes are found of foreign origin, current, however, in the language of the educated classes alone; these proceed to enter into combination, not merely with elements drawn from the same language, but also with elements drawn from another foreign language, and at times with native linguistic material; cf. the German suffix *-ist* in *jurist*, *purist*, *romanist*, *tourist*, *manierist*, *hornist*, *hoboist*, *Carlist*, etc.; *-ismus* in *atavismus*, *purismus*, *fanatismus*, *sonambulismus*, etc.; *-ianer*, in *Hegelianer*, *Kantianer*, etc. These formations are found too to some extent in French, and are indeed partly borrowed from that language. If creations like *purist* and *purismus* be objected to as hybrids between Latin and Greek, the answer is that they are in truth neither Latin nor Greek, but German or, it may be, French creations.

713. It is rarer for inflexional terminations to be thus adopted.² Such a process implies a very intimate contact between two languages. The French plural formation in *s* is fairly common in North Germany, as in *kerls*, *mädchens*, *fräuleins*, *ladens*: it is

¹ Cf. Whitney, *u.s.*, p. 17. Examples of Slavonic suffixes in German dialects may be found in Schuchardt, p. 86.

² Cf. Schuchardt, p. 8.

pleonastic in *jungens*. It has also found its way into the written language in the case of words originally indeclinable; as for instance, *a's*, *o's*, *meins*, *abers*, *vergissmeciinnichts*, *steldicheins*; and again in the case of foreign words which end in a full vowel, and hence do not naturally range themselves under any other declension: such are *papas*, *sophas*, *mottos*, *kolibris*; *albums* as the plural of *album* is not so common nor so admittedly correct. The French plural formation has spread further in Dutch, cf. *mans*, *zons*, *vaders*, *broeders*, *waters*, *envels*, *lakens*, *vroukens*, *vogeltjes*; and so generally with neuters in *-er*, *-el*, *en*, and the diminutives; the *s* in *jongens*, *gebentes* (from *gebente*), *bladers* (a by-form of *bladen* and *bladeren*), *benders* (a by-form of *benderen* from *ben*), etc. The English genitival termination has made its way into the Indo-Portuguese; we find in that dialect, for instance, *hombre's casa*. The adoption of inflexional terminations on the largest scale has taken place in the Romany or language of the gipsies. There are thus Spanish, English [and Hungarian] gipsy dialects.

714. A language suffers influence in its *inner linguistic form* influence = the inner linguistic form of language principally in the mouths of those who speak it as a foreign tongue. By no means exclusively, however. As regards the literary language, the influence of translations in this respect is noteworthy.

715. In cases where a word taken from a foreign language only partially tallies in meaning with a word of the native language, the temptation is great to invest the former with the full significance of the latter. This is of course one of the most usual faults in exercises of translation. Mistakes like this may very easily become common in bilingual areas.¹ Thus a South Slavonic author writes *habt ihr keine schen und schande*, because the word *sramota* may mean *schande* ('disgrace') as well as *scham* ('shame'). The

¹ Cf. Schuchardt, *N.S.*, 95 144.

word *schnur* is used among the German Ruthenians in the sense of *bride*, because *nevesta* in Slovenian signifies at once *daughter-in-law* and *bride*. We often find the word *damals* used [like *olim* in Latin] in Slavo-German, of the future; in the same way *wo* is used as the equivalent for *wohin*, because in Slavonic the same word is used for both.

716. It is an essentially different process, when in order to express an idea which has hitherto lacked a name, a word is coined on the model of a foreign language, or when a transference of meaning is effected in the case of one already existing on the same model. This process is specially common in scientific and technical language where foreign material is directly adopted. We may compare, for instance, the attempts to reproduce the Latin grammatical terms by means of German ones. The Latin ones are in their turn mere imitations of the Greek.

717. Groups of words, again, which as such have developed a special meaning, are translated word for word. Thus the Austrians say *es steht nicht dafür* for 'it is not worth the cost or the trouble,' after the model of the Czechish *nestojí za to*. [Cf. Schuchardt, *Romanisches und Keltisches*, p. 280, who cites the following idioms as occurring in Alsace: *Est-ce cela vous coûte? Il a frappé dix heures. Il brûle chez M. Meyer. Ce qui est léger, vous l'apprendrez facilement. Cher ami, ne prends pas pour mauvais. Pas si beaucoup. Attendez, j'apporterai une citadine.*]¹ In South-west Germany it is common to hear, after the French model, such a phrase as *es macht gut wetter*.

718. Finally, we have to consider the influence undergone by syntax.² As the Slavs can employ one form for all genders and numbers of the relative, we find in Slavo-German the word *was* correspondingly employed; cf. *ein mann, was hat*

¹ See Schuchardt, *u.s.* p. 96.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, *u.s.* p. 99 sqq.

geheissen Jacob; der knecht, was ich mit ihm gefahren bin; also ich bin nicht in der stadt gewesen, was (= 'so long as') er weg ist. In the last century it was almost the universal custom to write, after the French model, *ich lasse ihm das nicht fühlen*, etc. In Lithuanian the German construction *was für ein mann* is literally copied.

719. Mixture in dialects, *when occurring in one continuous linguistic area*, distinctly emancipates itself from the normal assimilating effect of intercourse when it occurs as between dialects whose territories are not geographically coterminous. On the other hand, no regular border can be drawn when the territories are geographically neighbours, and are in constant communication with each other. In drawing a distinction we can only look to this: whether a sharply-marked contrast exists between the dialects in question, or whether the differences are small, and are already bridged over by transitional gradations.

720. Generally speaking, the same holds good here as in the case of the mixture of different languages. Here, too, word-borrowing is the process which most easily and frequently makes its appearance. On the other hand, phonetic material is not easily changed. Here, again, we meet with the substitution of the nearest native sounds for the foreign ones. Hence a word adopted from a kindred dialect appears commonly in the same form as it would have obtained had it maintained itself from the time of the ancient unity of language. This will, as a rule, be the condition of things, though there will be unimportant differences in the phonetic developments. The case is of course different when two dialects have, in the course of their development, parted wider asunder, so that what corresponds etymologically has lost all close resemblance on the phonetic side. Thus e.g. the *ck* in the words *sacht* and *nichte* has not, in the adoption

of these words into *hg.*, been replaced by the *ft* which, etymologically speaking, corresponds to it.

721. It very commonly happens that a mixture occurs in a literary terrain before the settlement of a general language in this way: that a record is transmuted from the dialect in which it was originally drawn up into another. This is possible in the case of written as of oral tradition. The transmutation remains, commonly speaking, an imperfect one, especially when the rhythm is opposed to it. This kind of mixture is wholly distinct from that which takes place in the organism of linguistic ideas in single individuals.

Borrowing
from an older
period.

722. The process of borrowing *from an older linguistic grade of language* can of course result only by the agency of writing. The phonetic material can accordingly never be influenced thereby. This kind of borrowing takes place as a rule consciously in the course of literary production. A distinction must be drawn here. Either in the process certain actual or imaginary advantages of the older language are intended to be stirred into new life; or the old-fashioned characteristics of the language are intended to serve as a characteristic of the time into which the description transports us. In the latter case the tendency is to go much further than in the former.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE COMMON-LANGUAGE.

IN all modern civilised countries we find side by side with manifold dialectic ramifications a widely-diffused and generally recognised common-language. The conditions of our task obliged us to defer the investigation of the nature and essence of this language till the end. We must again observe, in the first instance, the given circumstances which present themselves to our immediate observation.

724. We have up to this point always started with the view of grasping the actual processes of the life of language. From the very beginning we have insisted that in considering these processes we must not regard what descriptive grammar calls a language, the collection of the current usages, as an abstraction which has no real existence. The common-language is naturally an abstraction, and one of the first order. It is not a complex of real facts, real forces, but merely an ideal norm prescribing rules for speech. It bears the same kind of relationship to actual linguistic activity as that of a particular code of laws to the entire legal activity in the district to which the laws apply, or of a confession of faith, or a dogmatic text-book, to the entirety of religious views and feelings.

725. Regarded as such a norm, the common-language, like a code or a dogma, is in itself unchangeable. Changeability would run

directly counter to its very essence. Wherever a change is proposed it can only be imposed by a force outside of the norm, by means of which a part is purposely removed from it, and replaced by something else. The occasions of such changes are analogous in the different civilisations. A codex, however carefully executed, will still always leave a certain freedom of movement; and it will always happen that in practice a series of unforeseen cases present themselves. The codex may, however, also contain difficulties, and in places permit of several interpretations. Besides this, we must take into account possible misunderstandings and lack of knowledge on the part of those who should base their actions upon it. Finally, it may be that the codex contains much that is inapplicable, in some cases from its very inception, in some cases owing to the changes in moral or economical conditions which have set in since it was fixed. This inapplicability may cause the legal instinct of the entire community, or of its most influential circles, to set itself against the strict execution of the letter of the law. The combined action of such circumstances as these finally leads to a legislative alteration of the code. This is precisely the condition of the common-language. It is nothing but a rigid rule which would bring linguistic movement to a standstill, if it were always strictly carried out, and is only compatible with change in so far as its authority is disregarded.

726. With all this, however, there is the difference that the common-language is not actually codified. Generally speaking, it remains true that usage determines the norm. This, however, cannot be the usage of the entire community. For this very community is very far from being homogeneous. We find even in those areas in which the common-language has taken the strongest hold, that the single individuals differ considerably from one another, and this even when we regard them only so

far as they are expressly bent on speaking the written language. And even if these divergencies ceased, it would be certain that under the common conditions of the development of language new ones would always arise. Both for the creation of a unity, and for the maintenance of one already created, something is needed which shall be independent of the linguistic activity of the whole community, and stand in objective isolation from it. This something is in every case to be found in the usage of a depending on the use of a narrow circle. definite narrow circle.

727. We find, however, as far as our observation goes, that the norm is settled in two different ways, viz.—(1) by spoken language; (2) by written authorities. If a norm, which can in any degree be called settled, is to result from the first, the individuals who are regarded as authorities must stand with respect to each other in oral communication with each other, either continuous or, at least, interrupted only by short pauses, the mutual intercourse of these individuals being of the utmost frequency, and in the most various combinations. As a rule we find the language of some special district or town looked on as the model. But considering that in every case in which a real common-language has developed, in however narrow an area, appreciable differences exist between the different classes of the population, the capacity to serve as model must be restricted to the language of the educated classes of the district in question. But the model language may even declare its independence of this; as is, for instance, the case in Germany. It is pure prejudice when any particular district is picked out in which it is alleged that the 'purest German' is spoken. The language which serves as the German model is rather that employed in the theatre in serious drama, with German language of the stage. which the prevailing pronunciation of educated persons in no place exactly agrees. The representatives of this 'stage-language' form

a comparatively small, but geographically diffused, circle. This geographical dispersion, however, contravenes only seemingly our assertion that direct oral communication is an absolute necessity for the existence of a model language. In fact the unity, the consistency, which characterises the language of the stage could not be attained or maintained, were it not for the perpetual process of shifting of the individuals attached to the several stages of Germany, even the furthest removed from each other, and for the existence, present or past, of certain central points which serve again as examples to the others. There is, further, the fact that in this case a shorter period of direct contact may produce the same effect as a longer one in other cases ; since, in this case, a regular process of schooling is employed, a process which is actually based on a careful attention to the physiology of sound. The reasons why the stage-language, of all others, necessarily maintained itself as a special unity, departing from all the local dialects, are not far to seek. Nowhere else has there existed a community of persons from the most different districts so closely bound together, and compelled to co-operate in language. Nowhere else has a linguistic community had such inducements to pay diligent heed to its own pronunciation and to that of others, and to take deliberate pains with it. Attention had to be paid, on the one hand, to secure that the generality of a large audience should understand the language employed, while, on the other hand, æsthetical calculations could not be left out of sight. Both of these considerations alike forbid the admissibility of dialectic variations from the standard language, even within the narrow limits in which they still continued to distinguish the different local circles of the educated. It is obvious that a pronunciation consistently maintained, to which the public gradually grows accustomed, is a main factor in promoting intelligibility. And more, any inconsistency in this

respect does violence to the sense of beauty as well, unless indeed it intended to aid characterisation. Thus, where no characterisation is intended, dialect must be avoided, precisely because its use suggests characterisation. Now when different dialectic shades of difference were struggling for the predominance, before any agreement was settled on, it might well happen that, even though perhaps on the whole, one predominated, still in this or that point it yielded to another. The endeavour to attain the greatest possible clearness would be the decisive factor in this decision. And this endeavour must in every case have necessarily conduced to a departure from the colloquial language. Such sounds and combinations of sounds as are only employed in this, when special clearness is aimed at, were raised in the stage-language to the regular and normal. Especially was it the case that the forms which arose under the influence of the sentence, or even under that of word-composition, and were affected by assimilation or by weakness, as a result of the light stress they received, were, as far as possible again rejected, and replaced by the sound-forms usual to isolated words. There was in many ways a tendency to fall back upon the orthography in cases where the pronunciation had already deviated from the ordinary form. These peculiarities, caused by the need felt to make things plain to a large audience, prevent, and must prevent, the language of the stage from passing as an absolute model for the colloquial language. In ordinary language such laborious endeavour after clearness would appear mere affectation.

728. The language of the stage then creates a more rigid norm for the sound-conditions than that created by the colloquial language of any definite district. But its guiding influence is limited to the phonetic side. Moreover its language is doled out to it by the poets, and it cannot exert so much influence in other directions as the colloquial language.

Unyielding
character of
its norm.

729. The degree of agreement existing in the language of the circle which passes for an authority can, of course, never be absolute. It is difficult for it, in the case of any colloquial language, to exceed the degree which exists in the idiom of a narrow district which has grown up by natural processes. In an artificial stage-language it is, no doubt, possible to effect a little more than this. And just as the normal language is liable to variations, so is the artificial language liable to gradual change like any other idiom. In fact the conditions of its life are identical with those of the other. Even though the norm may occupy an independent position as regards a wider circle, it cannot do so to the same extent in relation to the narrower circle which sets the fashion; but must rather, from natural causes, be gradually modified by the speech of this circle. This would be the case, even if this narrower circle were able to maintain itself quite independent of the influences of the wider one. But it is impossible to suppose that in the course of an uninterrupted linguistic communication it should always have merely been the contributor, and never the receiver. And in this way the common-language also is determined by the generality of those who speak it; only the part which individual speakers take in the determination is very different.

*Effect of
reduction of
the common-
language
to writing.*

730. The second norm of the common-language, which is created by its reduction to writing, presents many considerable advantages. Not till it has been fixed by writing does the norm become independent of the individuals who speak it, and capable of being transmitted unchanged to the following generations. It may further be diffused without any direct intercourse. Finally, in so far as it has merely to exert its influence again upon written language, it has a much easier task, since, in order to accommodate ourselves to it, we do not need to habituate our motory sensations anew as is the case when we have to master a foreign

pronunciation. On the other hand, it has the disadvantage of leaving a very wide scope for variations in the pronunciation, as is clear from our instances given in the previous chapter ; and therefore it is not a good example to take as a model for this purpose.

731. With a view to the settlement of written language in the strict sense of the word, it is at all events possible to propose the usage of definite writers, definite grammars, and dictionaries as sole authorities, and to adhere consistently to their usage. This happens, for instance, when modern Latinists aim at reproducing the style of Cicero. But even from this example we can judge how all but impossible it is, even when we have a perfectly definite model before our eyes, to produce its absolute equivalent. It is of the essence of the process that we keep ourselves in uninterrupted familiarity with our model, and scrupulously strive to protect ourselves against any extraneous influences. The most successful in this pursuit attains his success only by a self-imposed limitation in the communication of his thoughts, by a renunciation of all individuality, and at the same time of exactness and clearness of expression. Rich as the writer's store of thought may be, still even a cotemporary belonging to the same stage of civilisation will fail to find in him the corresponding power of representing all that he himself wishes to say, and this will be much truer as applied to one of a later epoch still, when the character of the civilisation has changed.

732. A written language to serve any practical purpose must change with the times, just like a living dialect. Even where it is based, in the first instance, on the usage of a single author, or of a particular school of authors, still it must not attach itself unconditionally for all time to its model, and, above all, must not tend to exclude improvements in cases where the model is inadequate. The individual must cease to keep the model before

his eyes in whatever he writes ; he must, as in dialect, employ his linguistic materials unconsciously with a firm confidence in his own instinct ; nay, this instinct should itself endue him with a certain creative energy employed in the formation of language, and enable him to influence others by his very creations. The linguistic usage of the present must be his aim and model, if not exclusively, at least in conjunction with ancient models. This is the case with the Latin of the Middle Ages. The Humanists, by cutting short the living development of the Latin language, and re-establishing the ancient models as solely authoritative, gave in fact the death-blow—quite against their intention—to Latin as a world-literature, and rendered it henceforth completely unfit to satisfy the general requirements of scientific or mercantile intercourse.

732. As a literary language emancipates itself from its original models, it is doubtless inevitable that it should lose in regularity, and that numerous variations should occur in the usage of individuals. But it does not follow that it need split up into different dialects geographically separated, as must inevitably be the case under similar circumstances with spoken language. One, and indeed the most important, source of dialectic differentiation is completely wanting to the written language, viz., sound-change. Inflexion, word-formation, word-signification, and syntax undoubtedly remain exposed to change, and hence to differentiation ; though even this is less the case than in the spoken dialect. A principal disposing cause to change in this domain is, as we have seen, the divergent character of the grouping which depends upon the phonetic form of words from that which depends upon their signification. It need hardly be said that even the written language, as originally fixed, is not free from this divergence ; but it differs from the colloquial idiom, in which fresh

discrepancies are constantly called into play by sound-change: the different linguistic areas rendered, through dissimilar development of their sounds, unequally adapted to analogical changes. Thus it is that much less opportunity is given for in the laws for the formation of inflexions and word-composition. Nor is it simply and solely that fewer changes set in; but those which do set in may easily spread over the whole area, as long as the literary connexion is not broken. In cases where they have not sufficient strength, they will, as a rule, have to yield to overwhelming influences even in the narrow area in which they may have established themselves. Least of all will the unity of language be imperilled if the ancient models continue to maintain a certain authority side by side with those of more recent date, if they are much perused, and if rules are abstracted from them which are generally recognised as authoritative. The maintenance of agreement is most easily reconciled with adaptation to changed conditions of civilisation, by keeping as nearly as possible to the ancient models in syntax, and more still in accidence, while preserving, on the other hand, a certain freedom in the creation of new words, and in the application of new significations to old ones. This is, generally speaking, the case with the more cultivated Middle-Latin authors.

733. It is in middle and in modern Latin that we are best able to study the essence of a common-language which is a written language only.¹ The national general languages, on the other hand, are at once literary and colloquial languages. Hence in these we find a norm proper to the written language, and

¹ It is true that Middle-Latin was not a language living and developing exclusively in writing. It was also employed in oral intercourse. This can, however, have had but little influence upon its development, as it was always learned on the basis of written examples. On the other hand, another factor totally unconnected with the influence of writing was certainly of great importance, especially for the arrangement of the syntax, viz., the mother-tongue of the writers.

another proper to oral intercourse existing side by side. It seems obvious that both must be brought into agreement, and continuously maintained in it. But, as we have seen in the previous chapter, no such agreement is, strictly speaking, possible on the phonetic side; and the emancipation of the written from the colloquial language may go so far that their reciprocal influence nearly ceases. And precisely the introduction of a fixed norm favours this emancipation. It appears from this how necessary it is that there should be a special norm for the spoken language, seeing that on the basis of the mere written norm it would hardly be possible to attain even an approximate agreement in the sounds, though it would doubtless be easier to attain this with an orthography like that of German than with one like that of English.

734. We must further take the fact into account that between written and colloquial language there exists a permanent distinction of *style*, which no one seeks to set aside. In consequence of this, methods of construction, words, and combinations of words, maintain themselves in the former, which in the latter have become wholly obsolete; and on the other hand, much that is new forces its way into the latter, which is rejected by the former.

735. There is thus no absolute agreement of both departments in what is regarded in them as normal. They are, however, even apart from the two points mentioned, always liable to the risk of separating in different directions. The authoritative persons are in the two cases only partially identical, and the degree of influence exerted by the individual is in the case of the one not the same as in the other. To this must be added in the written language the ever-renewed influence of the older writers, while in the language of intercourse none but the living

generation operates directly. Thus, to avoid a wide gulf between the two, a kind of compromise must always be arranged between them, each yielding something to the other.

736. We have seen above (p. 33) that we have to seek that which strictly characterises a dialect and differentiates it from others in its sound-system. The same holds true of the common-language in contrast to the individual dialects. We must not, therefore, co-ordinate a technical language, or a poetical or artificial style, with a common-language any more than with a dialect.

737. In every domain in which a normal common-language exists, the languages of individuals are found to present very manifold gradations. Between those which approach the norm most closely and those which represent the different dialects as least affected by the norm, there are numerous connecting stages. In these, most individuals employ two, sometimes even more, languages, one of which approaches more nearly the norm, the other the dialect. The latter is the cradle language which comes naturally to the individual; the former is only acquired in later years by artificial efforts. No doubt it happens now and then that an individual learns at the very outset two side by side, and special circumstances may even cause many, even in later life, to learn and employ a language more widely differing from the norm. The contrast between the two languages may be of very different magnitudes. It may be so small that they are distinguished in ordinary life merely as a somewhat more careful and a somewhat more careless pronunciation; in this case, again, it is easy for gradations again to set in between the two. A wide gulf may, however, exist between the two. The magnitude of the contrast depends of course not less upon the degree in which the natural language differs from the norm than upon that in which the artificial language approaches it. In

Gradations in the languages of individuals speaking a normal

both respects there are great variations. If in ordinary life we are contented to denote the artificial language simply as a literary language, we leave out of calculation a quantity of not unimportant local and individual differences: if we denote the natural language simply by the name 'dialect,' we overlook important variations occurring within the same narrow area. There are of course cases of individuals who employ only one language; on the one hand, such as in their natural language approach or think that they approach the norm so nearly that it seems to them no longer necessary to approach it any nearer by any artificial exertions; on the other hand, such as are still unaffected by the necessities which have conduced to the creation and employment of the common-language.

738. The further the natural language of an individual departs from the norm, the more will he tend to feel the artificial language by its side as something foreign; on the other hand, commonly speaking, the greater will be the diligence which he expends on mastering the artificial language, and the more complete his final approach to the norm, especially in all those points which can be fixed by writing. In Lower Germany a more correct literary German is spoken than in Middle or Upper Germany. In the same way the so-called *gut deutsch* of Switzerland is much more correct than that, for instance, of the neighbouring territory of Baden or of Würtemberg, because in these districts the town dialects have approached the norm much more closely than in Switzerland.

739. If on the same area many gradations exist side by side, these must of course exercise a perpetual influence upon each other. This must hold especially true of both the gradations which are found together side by side in the same individual. All gradations on the same territory must have certain peculi-

arities in common with each other. The gradations in the different territories which stand nearest to the norm must still always stand in a relation to one another somewhat analogous to that between those most remote from the norm.

740. The norm of the literary language is in all cases more definite and freer from variations than that of colloquial language; and the written language actually excels in this respect in actual practice even those forms of colloquial language which approach nearest to the norm. This is a statement whose general truth may be found confirmed by experience wherever we may look, and which, moreover, results necessarily from the nature of the case. For in the first place, as we have seen, all the finer differences of pronunciation must of themselves disappear in writing; and in the second place, it is easier for an individual to adopt a particular method of writing than a pronunciation differing from his usual one. Thus a very little unprejudiced consideration will enable us to detect the fallacy of certain hypotheses which assume for an older period a greater degree of unity in the spoken than in the written language.

741. In the relation of the single individual languages to the norm there occurs a continuous succession of displacements. While these, on the one hand, are unable to emancipate themselves from the general conditions of the natural development of language and are hence impelled towards an ever-increasing differentiation, and therefore to an ever-increasing distance from the norm; on the other hand, artificial efforts succeed in producing an ever-increasing approximation to the norm. It is of importance to master the fact that both tendencies are in operation side by side, and that it is not the case that where the latter begins to operate the effectiveness of the former is checked. We are in some degree able to directly observe the graduated approximation

Artificial
efforts pro-
ducing an
approxima-
tion to the
norm.

to the norm. But besides this, we find all the stages of development through which the single individuals gradually pass contemporaneously side by side. Let us now attempt to get a clear appreciation of the single processes, by means of which such approximation is effected.

742. In the first place, an individual learns, in addition to the natural language alone hitherto employed, an artificial one standing nearer to the norm. This is effected, in modern educated countries, in the first instance, mainly by school-instruction; and the written language in its strict sense is thus learnt contemporaneously with a colloquial language approximating to the written language. It is possible, however, to learn an artificial language by joining a fresh community which employs a language more nearly resembling the norm than that of the community in which one has hitherto lived, or at least by coming into nearer contact with such a community than was the case when one first learnt to speak. In the latter case it is not even necessary to learn reading and writing at all. The relation of the individual to the new language is of course for a long time a passive one before it becomes an active one—that is, he learns, in the first place, to understand the language and accustom himself to it before speaking it. The individual has often a similar more or less intimate passive relation to a great many dialects and graduations of the colloquial language without ever passing from this point into any active relation with them. To effect this a special impulse, an unusually energetic influence, is necessary. The acquisition of the artificial language is at first always incomplete; a gradual advance may be made to an ever-increasing completeness; but many never succeed in employing it confidently and correctly. Under all circumstances a man's natural language, earlier acquired, determines the specific character of his artificial

language. Even in cases where the latter takes the widest possible departure from the former, it is still not learnt as an absolutely foreign language, but always as having some relation with the natural language, and this relation co-operates and aids in its application. We guide ourselves, in the first instance, as indeed generally in the employment of any foreign language or dialect, as much as possible by the motory sensations in which we are versed. The finer phonetic divergences of the model-language, which we are striving to imitate, remain disregarded. Thus it may happen that even when the model language in question stands as near as possible to the norm of the common-language, still in the course of the endeavour to form language on its model, small touches, reminding us of the original dialect, make themselves apparent. We have, moreover, to consider that the individual, as a rule, learns his artificial language from the companions of his home, whose language is already built up on the foundation of the same dialect. Further, as far as the artificial language is learnt by reading, it is matter of course that a process of inserting kindred sounds from one's own dialect must take place.

743. But the stock of words and their meaning, the inflexions and the syntax of the artificial language are not composed merely after the models, but after the contents of the native natural language. The stock of words especially drawn from the model language is increased, if it is inadequate or does not come with sufficient readiness, from the natural language : words are employed which have never been heard in the model language or which the person employing them, even assuming him to have heard them, would be unable to reproduce if they did not likewise occur in this model language. We proceed in this case, commonly speaking, with a certain straightforward confidence, because indeed a great

portion, or indeed the greater portion of the words occurring in the natural language, occurs in the model language as well, and because we in many cases supply, and rightly supply, in this way, the points wherein our knowledge of the latter falls short. It must, however, in this process naturally occur that words are taken over into the artificial language which are unknown to the model language, or are known to it only with some discrepancy of meaning. Where the same word occurs in the model language and in the natural language, phonetic differences of form often appear. If these differences appear regularly in any large series of words, it follows that parallel series will form themselves in the mind of the person who is master of both languages at once (e.g. *NG. water*—*HG. wasser*; *eten*—*essen*; *laten*—*lassen*, etc.). There grows up in his case a feeling, however dim and undefined, of the regular relationship borne by the sounds of one language to those of the other. This feeling may actually so operate as to transfer correctly words with which it is familiar in its natural language alone into the corresponding sounds of the artificial language. Psychologically speaking, the process is similar to what we have described as creation by analogy. In its carrying out, it is possible for mistakes to arise owing to an incorrect generalisation of the value attaching to a proportion: as a German boy brought up to speak a Low German dialect has been heard in speaking High German to say *zeller* for *teller*. Such faults as these, however, are generally speaking merely individual and of transitory effect, as a counteracting control soon sets in. On the other hand, however, the parallel series do not always show themselves operative, and words are transferred into the artificial language in their dialectic form, differing from the phonetic arrangements of the model language. For the rest, it is in other respects as with the phonetics: as a rule the colloquial language which in the first place serves

as each individual's model takes its shape through a co-operation of the strict normal language with the home dialect.

744. In the second place, the artificial language affects the natural language by borrowing from it words, and occasionally inflexional forms and methods of construction. The words are, of course, such as have reference to groups of ideas to express which the artificial language would naturally be preferred. In the case of any converse process of borrowing, these words are either transformed into the phonetic shape proper to the natural language, or are maintained in the phonetic form of the artificial language. There is no single German dialect which has kept itself completely free from such a contagion as that described, although the degree in which it has maintained its purity differs widely.

745. In the third place, in the case of persons who speak an artificial and a natural language side by side, the use of the former spreads at the expense of the latter. Originally the artificial language is employed in cases only where a real need occurs for its employment, *i.e.* in the case of intercourse with foreigners who belong to an essentially different dialectic area. This comes about more by means of written than by oral agencies: an artificial written language is more a necessity for the purpose than an artificial language of intercourse. In the case of communication between persons from the same home, the artificial language does not come to be employed until a foreign language at the same time claims attention. As soon as it has taken firm root in its application to literature and to official documents, it has a tendency to spread generally to all written records, even those of a private character, which are not intended for a foreign dialectic area. This is the natural consequence of learning to read and write from literary records,—a result of which is that it is easier to accommodate ourselves to the orthography prevalent therein, than to

master a system of writing applicable to one's own dialect as well, or to invent one ourselves.

746. Further, the artificial language is customary for public declamations delivered from written documents, for preaching, instruction, etc. Not till it has found a wider application in all the forms of intercourse mentioned, does it come so naturally to any portion of the people that they begin to use it for private intercourse in their homes as well, in fact that it becomes the common-language of the cultured classes. The class who first habitually employ it is naturally composed of those who first come under the influence of literature, schools, etc. It is of course not till this stage of development is attained that the employment of a dialect in ordinary intercourse is able to pass as a sign of inferior education: not till then does the dialect yield in prestige to the artificial language. In Switzerland things have not universally reached this stage. In the most highly educated circles of Bâle, Bern, and Zürich, persons converse, unless indeed any regard has to be paid to the needs of foreigners, in the natural dialect of the speaker's youth, and the use of Swiss German, even in political assemblies, gives offence to no one. The same or nearly the same state of things was seen in Holstein, Hamburg, Mecklenburg, and other Low German districts some twenty or thirty years ago. In the entire district of South and Middle Germany a noteworthy variation from the strict normal language is still tolerated, at least in the language of intercourse. The mere consideration of the circumstances at present existing may serve to teach how preposterous is the view that when two languages, the artificial and the natural, co-exist, the latter need necessarily sink in estimation as compared with the former, and how mistaken it is to set down as the first motive for the acquisition and creation of an artificial language not the need felt for it, but the

desire to contrast with the great mass of the people by more refinement of culture. To assume anything of the sort is to listen to the prejudices of an unscientific pedantry, heedless of the facts of historical development. The employment of the language in daily intercourse may spread in very various and very finely-marked gradations. In the first place they are employed with the natural language interchangeably. In this stage a difference is made according to the degree of acquaintance with the natural language possessed by the person who is addressed, and the degree in which he employs it. Finally, it may be that persons arrive at a stage when they no longer employ the natural language at all. There occur at the present day cases enough in which it is possible to follow this entire course of development stage by stage in a single individual. Persons never arrive at the exclusive use of the artificial language without the previous existence of a period of longer or briefer duration, in which bilingualism was the rule.

747. If a number of persons has succeeded in employing the artificial language, either exclusively or to a prevailing extent, then the portion of the younger generation which chiefly falls under their influence learns from the very beginning as its natural language what was to them still an artificial language. The fact that the elder generation arrived at this language by artificial means is afterwards a matter of indifference as far as concerns its existence, and its survival in the younger generation. This latter stands towards that language much as the elder generation or other strata of the people stand to their dialect uninfluenced by the norm of the general language. We must beware of simply confusing the contrast between artificial and natural language with that between common-language and dialect. We must always have a clear idea of whether we wish to judge the different indi-

vidual languages, after the objective shape they have taken, with respect to their greater or less distance from the norm, or according to the subjective relation of the speaker to them. Of two languages which we hear from two different persons, *A* may stand nearer to the norm than *B*, and yet *A* may be a natural, *B* an artificial, language.

748. If in a single linguistic area one portion keeps to the original dialect, while another employs a language artificially introduced, even for the purposes of its daily life, there are, of course, a number of persons who, from their earliest youth, are to some extent equally influenced by both groups, and thus different mixtures cannot fail to rise. Every mixture, however, favours the rise of new mixtures. And thus a large quantity of manifold gradations necessarily arises in the natural language as well. In High and Middle Germany we can pass almost everywhere from the dialectic conformations nearest approximating to the norm to those which depart from it most widely; and this quite gradually, and without a broad division occurring in any place. On the other hand, in Switzerland, where the artificial language has not yet penetrated into daily intercourse, a graduation is seen, no doubt, between the dialects according as they are more or less strongly affected by the written language; but between the written language and the dialect, which is most strongly influenced thereby, a contrast bridged over by no gradations exists.

749. If any one from his earliest years have learnt a language standing nearer to the norm, he naturally has no such pressing necessity to learn an artificial language in addition, as if he had learnt the pure dialect of his home. It thus frequently happens that a single language suffices for his oral intercourse. Circumstances may, however, compel him to aim at attaining a greater proximity still to the norm, and then he becomes again bilingual,

and once again his artificial language may pass into the natural one of a following generation, and this process may frequently repeat itself.

750. We have hitherto attempted to realise how circumstances settle themselves, on the assumption that a generally recognised norm for the common-language is in existence. We have yet to consider the way in which such a norm is able to come into existence at all. It must be pretty commonly admitted that no such norm can have originally been found in the areas where it exists at present ; that there must have been a preceding period in which merely pure dialects, with equal privileges, stood side by side. But it seems difficult to many people to picture to themselves a language employed for literary purposes without a norm, and the inclination seems very prevalent to date its origin as far back as possible. I can merely see in this the after effects of ancient prejudices, which regard the written language as the only one with a right to exist, and the dialect as a perverted form of the same. The reason why any doubt at all is possible on the subject is that olden times have bequeathed us only written records, and not spoken language. In consequence, there is much room for conjecture as to the character of the latter. The experiences hitherto gathered as to the conditions of the life of language are the sole possible test of the justness, or otherwise, of these conjectures. All that fails under this test must be content to submit and be convinced.

751. Of the impulses which operate towards the creation of a common-language, the necessity felt for such a language must first come into consideration ; as may be seen from our previous investigations. Such necessity does not arise until the dialectic differentiation has gone so far that all the members of a linguistic community cannot conveniently understand each other : and even

Rise of a
norm for
the common
language.

Impulses
towards the
creation of
a common
language.

in this case the necessity will only be felt for the reciprocal communication of those whose native places lie far from each other, as no overwhelmingly strong contrasts develop among near neighbours. Nothing of more questionable veracity can be advanced than the assumption that a common-language has formed, in the first instance, within a narrow area which has as yet only trifling dialectic differences to show, and that this has spread thence over the further lying areas. It is far more natural to suppose, and experience confirms our supposition, that a language becomes a common-language and is taken as a model in areas whose dialect is pretty far removed from itself, while smaller variations pass entirely unnoticed. Indeed the whole character of a common-language may be strengthened by the fact of its transference to an unquestionably foreign linguistic area, as we may observe in the case of the Greek *κοινή*, and in that of the Latin language.

Intercourse
between
areas lying
apart
from each
other.

752. Assuming accordingly the existence of a pressing need, the intercourse between the areas far separated from each other must be already developed to a certain degree of intensity; active relations, commercial, political, or literary, must already exist between them. To some extent too, the circumstances attending the intensity of the wider communication must regulate the size of the area over which the common-language spreads its domination. The boundaries of the area do not by any means necessarily correspond with those which we should draw as most useful if we merely wished to regard the relation of the dialects to each other. If the dialectic differences are approximately equal even in two different linguistic areas, it may still happen that on one merely a single common-language develops, on another two, three, or, it may be, more. For instance, there is no doubt that greater differences exist between Upper and Lower German dialects than between Polish and Czechisch, or Servian and Bulgarian, even than

between Polish and Servian. It is possible for two areas with very nearly related dialects to take widely different departures as regards the common-languages which establish themselves in them, while two others with dialects widely contrasting may assume the same common-language.

753. How much depends on the *necessity*, the following consideration may serve to show. It is difficult, if not impossible, after a common-language has to a certain extent established itself in an area of any large size, to create a special common-language for a portion of such area. It is too late to hope to create a Low German or a Provençal common-language. Even the efforts which have been made to create a special Norwegian common-language have proved useless before the existing predominance of the Danish. Conversely, it is not easy to enforce the predominance of a common-language over any large area, if the single parts of this area have already their special common-language, which itself sufficiently responds to the calls of the greatest necessity. We can see this in the failure of the efforts of the Panславists. An entirely foreign language too, if it has once become the accredited language of literary and official communication, tends to hinder the formation of a national common-language. Thus the efforts to found a Flemish literary language have been crowned with but little success; French has taken too deep root in Flemish-speaking Belgium. Latin, from its claim to be considered a universal language, exerted this impeding influence in a very marked way.

For a common-language to be created the necessity for it must be felt.

754. Direct communication alone feels the necessity in its greatest extent. No necessity in many cases exists for indirect communication at all, even if the persons between whom the communication takes place are dialectically far removed from each other. If the communication be made by the agency of other persons whose dialects lie between the two extremes, it may, owing

to numerous cases of transference, receive such a shape as to be easily intelligible even to those to whom it would have appeared unintelligible in the original dialect. Such a transference obviously occurs if the productions of poetry pass orally from one place to another. But even records committed to writing and spread further by copyists yield to it also. In any case, the transference remains always imperfect, so that mixed dialects arise. Very numerous examples of this proceeding are afforded by the different national literatures of the middle ages. In this way a literary link becomes possible without the agency of a common-language between territories, which, dialectically speaking, stand far removed from each other. Indeed this obvious process absolutely prevents a dialect in which any literary records of special prominence are drawn up from gaining a prevailing influence in its own territory, because it is not spread with the records in question ; at least not in its simple form. Matters are very different when once printing has begun to do the work of extension. By its aid it is possible to spread a written record in every place without restriction, in its genuine form, in the shape given it by the author or the printer. And, for the advantages of printing to have full play, one type of letters must, if possible, suffice for the whole linguistic area, and it is of course also indispensable that the language expressed by this type shall be everywhere understood. Thus the introduction of printing introduces on the one hand the necessity of a common-language, while on the other hand greater conveniences for the satisfaction of this need are provided. For the rest, not until printing was discovered was any diffusion of a knowledge of reading and writing possible in large circles. Before the application of printing there must always have existed but a narrow circle capable of being touched by the operation of the norm of a written language.

755. The want is not of course in itself sufficiently strong to create the norm of a common-language. It is also incapable of giving the impulse to create such a language voluntarily. Neither does *purpose* prevail to this extent in this department, however much greater may be its power than in the case of the natural development of language. In every case the norm is represented not, in the first instance, by any new creation, but by one of the existing dialects. Nor is one of these chosen as the result of deliberate consultation. It is rather true to say that the dialect destined to become the norm must already possess some natural preponderance, it may be in commerce, politics, religion, literature, or in respect of several of these simultaneously. The intentional creation of a common-language is a later matter, and only arises after the first steps have been taken towards it. At all events it seems to be of quite modern occurrence that the plan has been deliberately adopted of creating a common-language without some previously existing basis for its existence; and even in cases where such attempts have been made [as in the case of Volapük], they have rarely proved successful. The creators of any such language have taken as their guide the circumstances of other linguistic areas already possessing a common-language. When the common-languages of the great civilised countries of Europe were founded, there were as yet no guides to follow. The discovery had to be reached that the existence of such a language was possible before the attempt could be made to create one.

A common-language must be based upon an existing dialect.

756. Any impulse to the formation of a common-language implies the existence of a number of persons compelled by circumstances to make themselves acquainted with one or with several foreign dialects, so that they can easily understand them, and to some extent apply them as well. This may be the result of their having passed into another territory and settled there; or of their

Circumstances which must necessarily precede the formation of a common-language.

having made a long stay there in passing through ; or of constant association with persons who have arrived from a foreign land ; or of close familiarity with written records which took their origin there. The relationships established in this way may be very manifold. One who belongs to dialect *A* may learn dialect *B*, another may learn *C*, another *D* ; and again, conversely, one who belongs to dialect *B*, *C*, or *D* may learn dialect *A*. As long as the reciprocal influences of the different dialects are fairly balanced, no progress is possible. If, however, one dialect presents in a marked degree more occasion to master it than all the rest, and if this occasion appeal to those who belong to all the dialects, this is then predestined to be the common-language. Its predominance manifests itself in the first place in the communication between the persons who belong to it and those who belong to the other dialects, as it is in this process mastered more generally and with more facility by the latter than their dialect is mastered by the former ; while the other dialects remain more in a position of equality with each other. The first really decisive step, however, is not made until the prevailing dialect is actually employed for communication between those who belong to other different dialects. A natural result of this is that a larger quantity of persons become acquainted with it. For it is then more convenient to employ it, when once the native dialect has ceased to suffice, than to learn a third or fourth dialect in addition. It presents itself most naturally when the speaker desires to appeal not less to those who by birth belong to it than to the rest of the nation, as is the case in literary intercourse, and political intercourse as well, presuming always the existence of political unity. Immediately that the consciousness that such dialect is suitable for further intercourse has arisen, the propagation of the development by voluntary means begins as well.

757. The suitability, however, of a special dialect to serve as model, is, as a rule, only a transitional step in the development of the norm of the common-language. The imitations of the model remain, as we have seen, in every case, more or less imperfect. Mixtures arise between the model and the different native dialects of the single individuals. It can scarcely fail to occur that these mixed dialects as well obtain a certain authority, especially when eminent writers employ them. On the other hand, the original model dialect is exposed to incessant change as such,—while the normal language must be more conservative in its tendencies, and indeed, cannot maintain itself but by remaining true to the models of past times. Thus it is that the dialect must gradually lose its character of absolute model, and must strive for the mastery with others of varying shades of difference.

758. Accordingly, the artificial language of a large area has a tendency to become dialectically differentiated in a certain stage of development, in much the same degree as the natural language within a particular territory. Centralisation of a more perfect kind is commonly attained only by laying down actual rules, by directions given orally, by grammars, lexicons, academies, etc. But, however consciously, and with however set purpose, the norm of a common-language may be created, the involuntary development described in the former chapters can never be stayed; such development is inseparable from all linguistic activity.

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INDEX.

A

abnormal, 88.
abnōi, 194.
abnorminus (cinem), 324.
abnōr, 169.
abominable, 233.
abnōr, 235.
abnōr (infin. used in demands), 124.
abnōr, 235.
Abstract meaning, 66.
abnōr, 235.
Accusative, 151.
acum, 55.
acht (different meanings of), 68.
 — (*acht*), 209.
acht, 244.
ἀγγελος (ἀ—ἄ), 290.
ἀγρ, 254.
ἀδρ, 305.
Adjective used as a predicative attribute, 425.
Adoption, stages in process of, 461.
 — of words, causes of, 460.
Adverbs, 422.
Adverbial determinance, - psychological treatment of, 317.
adverb, 85.
adys . . . *ac*, 329.
after, 168.
alms . . . *ac*, 329.
alms (emphatic word), 315.
ab, 172, 282, 283.
 — *ab*, 168.
ams, 94.
ἀμπερ, 56.
ἀμπερ, 298.
ams, 295.
Analogy in inflexion and word-formation, 100.

Analogy in sound-substitution, 107.
ander, 225.
anders, 195.
anima, 85.
anklagen (cinem), 324.
anliegen (cinem), 324.
anreden (cinem), 324.
anstalt, 427.
ants, 200.
antiquam, 333.
antivert, 214.
ἀντιπρ, 57.
ardere, 256.
ἀντιπρ, 161.
arm, 94.
armhaus, 235.
armen, 247.
Assimilation of words already adopted, 464.
a-t-il, 206.
-almis, 384.
alms, 168.
an, 154, 195.
aufdrängen (cinem), 324.
aufsitzen (infin. used in demands), 121.
an, 245.
auricularum, 235.
ausdrucksvoll, 369.
ausschliesslich (emphatic word), 315.
ausserhalb, 225.

B

bal, 248.
band (double gender of), 278.
bank, 244.
-bar, 265, 283.
barfuss, 411.
barn (Danish), 218.
baz, 169.

be- (function of making intrans. verb. trans.), 153.
beckern, 84.
befallen, 153.
befahren, 230.
befehl—befehlen, 262.
beide, 254, 298.
beizen (different meanings of), 68.
belabour, 153.
belt, 240.
berg, 214.
beschiden, 277.
beschreiben, 153.
beschwichtigen, 234.
besonders (emphatic word), 315.
bezeugt, 282.
bezeugungsgefühl, 36.
bezeugen, 282.
 Bilingualism, 457.
bind (double meaning of), 74.
bittschriften, 118.
blindlings, 252.
lock (different meanings of), 68.
bogen, 240.
brachte (*brichte*), 209.
brennen, 237.
brinne, 201.
brother (double plural of), 280.
buch, 279.
burg, 245.
burgker, 84.
buttern, 84.

C

cantilare, 161.
carina (fig. of speech, *pars pro toto*), 77.
castra, 297.
 Categories psychological and grammatical, 288.
captive (sound of), 46.
celestial (Spanish adjective), 161.
ck—palatal and guttural, 436.
 Change of usage results from the ordinary exercise of speech, 12.
 — of meaning, 65.
 — linguistic, 24.
larus, 85.
clock (double plural of), 280.

cominciare, 160.
 Composition, growth of, 368.
 Compound sentences, 330.
 Compounds, displacement of relations in, 268.
 Concord, 339.
 Concrete meaning, 66.
 Conjunctions, 428.
 Connecting words, origin of, 326.
 Contamination, 160.
 Convenience, 47.
 Conversion of formal difference into difference of meaning, 218.
 Creation, analogical in syntax, 98.
crife (double gender of), 279.
crocodilus, 55.
Crompare, comprare, 55.
 Crystallisation, 253.
 Culture of speaker, conditions, meaning, 91.

D

da, 358.
dach, 82.
daças (Old Friesic), 225.
dass, 165, 166.
 — (illogical), 170.
de (French), 324.
debonnaire, 374.
deinde, 169.
-dem (Conjunction suffix), 334.
 Dependence united with independence, 140.
 Dependence to independence, transition from, 331.
derer, deren, 281.
derselbe, 369.
 Derivative and inflexional suffixes, origin of, 396.
 Determinant and determinate, changes of functions between, 319.
 Development necessary even in an artificial language, 501.
 Deviations from prescriptions of motory sensation inevitable, 43.
 Dialectical differences concealed by writing, 439.
 Dialects, mixture of, 473.
Edenwälen (1—4), 290.

timidus, 235.
 Distinctions mutually independent, 27.
 Distinction, real and apparent, 276.
 Distinction (double plural of), 279.
dis (in Adverbs), 252.
dis, 233.
 Displacement of motory sensation, 44.
dis, 229.
 Divergence of analogical formation from
usage, 102.
divinus (Spanish adjective), 161.
 Division of parts of speech, 403.
doppel, 161.
 Doubles, 275.
drück, 209.
drückt, 209.
drücke, 279.
drückes, 55.

E

ehrenhold, 235.
eindruck, 257.
einfluss, 257.
einmale, 235.
einwirken, 256.
einzel, 225.
εἰσάγειν, 56.
elira—*eller*, 55.
-eln (verbal suffix), 267.
 Emphasis as a means of distinguishing
 subject from predicate, 115.
empfangen, empfangen, 46.
en (negation), 171, 195.
endetrist, 232.
-endus (participial ending), 308.
entzwei (double meaning of), 229.
-en (Adverbs in), 252.
entweder . . . *oder*, 329.
entweder, 165.
-er, 263.
erziehen (different meanings of), 68.
erde, 215.
εἰσθῆναι, 57.
erfahren, 308.
erika, erik, 55.
erkenntnis (double gender of), 279.
ermen, 247.
-ern (verbal suffix), 267.
ermitteln, 231.

erziehen, 94.
es (a genitive), 321.
etsi, 167, 332.
 Etymology, effect of, 450.
examen (different meanings of), 68.
ezik, 55.

F

Factors in production of sound, 36.
fakener, 84.
fallen, 309.
fallen, 309.
fallieren, 234.
falls, 195, 252.
fanz, fangen, 262.
fader, 85.
feld (sound of *d* in), 39.
felleisen, 235.
fiah, 213.
fiuf, 55.
 Finite verb, 404.
fiu, 309.
frist, frist, 55.
fisch, 94.
fisher, 84.
fisk, 248.
fix, fix, 55.
flanen, 262.
flog, 221.
flücker (Aug), 252.
fluobra, 55.
flur (double gender of), 278.
flus (noun of action derived from a verb),
 87.
fold, 214.
former (double comparative), 161.
fox, 76.
frin, 226, 244.
freitag, 231.
freitags, 162.
friedhof, 232.
frien, 210.
Frisian, 33.
fruit, 82.
frumentum, 82.
fuchs (different meanings of), 68.
führen, 94.
fünfzehn, 369.
funke, 245.

fuss, 299.
futter (different meanings of), 68.

G

gar, 215.
garbe, 229.
garde (*ic-la*), 291.
garten, 240.
gas, 12, 174.
gast, 222, 238.
geben (root-syllable in), 220.
 — (change from *e* to *i* in), 209.
gedanke, 240.
gedeihen—gediegen (change between *h* and *g* in), 108.
gef, 215.
gegessen (*gesen*), 161.
gez, 262.
gile (*il*) (impersonal), 120.
gelernt, 308.
 Genealogical tree, image of inadequate, 28.
 Gender, 289.
 Genitive, 150.
 — and adjective, 321.
 — — substantive, 322.
genus, 227.
geschäcken, geschichte, 108.
geschick (different meanings of), 68.
geschichte (different meanings of), 68.
geschwister (*die*), 296.
geschworen, 308.
gesicht (double plural of), 279.
gewiss, 318.
gewohnt, 161.
gewon, 161.
ginsen, 210.
glauhe, 240.
glücklicherweise, 318.
gold, 214.
got, 214.
gouch, 180.
-gradig, 384.
 Grammar and logic, 18.
glorioso—glorioso, 55.
 Groups, destruction of, 192.
 — material and formal, 94.
guet, OHG., 286.

H

haaren, 84.
-haft, 265, 283.
 — (double gender of), 278.
halba, 249.
halber, 254.
hand (expressions formed with), 89.
hangen, hungen, 309.
hantieren, 234.
hannu, 246.
hass—hasen, 262.
hansen, 84.
haut, 244.
-head, 87.
heide, 240.
heiss, 200.
-heit (*-keit*) 87, 245.
hudduwow, 56.
huuwa, 163.
her (uses of), 387.
herle, 214.
herr (as a prefix), 234.
herz, 226.
herzen, 84.
hier, 205.
hin (uses of), 387.
hinderniss, 244.
hinterseite, 225.
hoch (sound of *ch* in) 214.
hoher—hoch, 108, 110.
hold, 214.
hol: (*hol:ern*), 214.
horn, 88.
hortus, 94.
huld, 244.
humana (Spanish adjective), 161.
hunger—hungrn, 262.
hungers (*sterben*), 194.
 Hypotaxis, 145.

I

'Idliven, 292.
iatph (*i—t*), 290.
 Idea-groups, organisms of the basis of all linguistic action, 3.
idem . . . *ac*, 329.
if, 167.
-ig (marking derivatives from nouns), 263, 283.

-*icus* (verbal suffix), 266.
iherer, 161.
ies (images of), 99, 196.
imam, 161.
 Incapacity of primitive man to produce speech, 187.
 Individual spontaneity and social influence, 26.
 Infinitive and an element dependent on it, 325.
infra, 230.
 Inflectional suffixes, rise of, 400.
innerhalb, 225.
 Inner linguistic form of language, influence on, 471.
int-, 231.
inter, 230.
 Intercourse, varying states of, 24.
 Interjections, 181.
ivok, 292.
izru (b-i), 290.
iper, 253.
izgend, 67.
irman, *riman*, 55.
island, 232.
 Isolated sentences in form dependent, 365.
 Isolation, 190.

J

jactihav, 161.
jannudum, 164.
je, 67.
jamine! 181.
jaheljah, 235.
juris-consultus, 369.

K

kakadrui, *karadrui*, 55.
καλαμπαθι, 377.
kelp (declension of), 227.
kann, 146, 162, 173, 318.
καλανεφθ, 56.
kannan, 230.
kapana, 292.
κχων (dissimilation of aspirate), 63.
kid (double meaning of), 229.
kicna, 210.
koeda, 292.

klack, 180.
klacks, 180.
klaff, 180.
klagen, 118.
klanges (sound of *ng* in), 95.
klatsch, 180.
kleck, 180.
koch, 214.
kodadrille, 55.
können, 230.
koffen, 84.
korn, 82.
kost, 244.
krach—*krachen*, 262.
kragen, 240.
krist (*r*), 240.
kraves, 291.
kukuk, 180.

L

laden, 230.
la:h (Danish), 218, 219.
land (sound of *n* in), 39.
lang (*g* not heard in), 39.
 Language, the common, 475.
 — a common, must be based upon an existing dialect, 499.
lan-keucht, 232.
lante, 233.
leben (*en* pronounced *m*), 39.
 — (lengthening of vowel in), 209.
lejal—*loyal* (doublets), 277.
legun (last *e* not heard), 39.
leiden, 213, 246.
leider! 181.
lelwa, 219.
-ler, 266.
lesan, 210.
lesen (change from *e* to *i* in) 209.
lets, 161.
lentemund, 233.
-lich, 265, 283.
-liche (adverbial suffix), 267.
licht (double plural of), 279.
lichten, 230.
lieb (sound of *b* in), 39.
liebstockel, 235.
liegen, 305.
-ling, 266.

links, 195.
bitterae, 297.
los (double meaning of), 229.
kischen, 250.

M

-ma, 292.
magis, 169.
mäher, 264.
mähder, 264.
mahlen, 230.
mähre (double meaning of), 229.
mais, 169.
maia, 161.
mal (different meanings of), 68.
μᾶλλον, 169.
манн, 237.
mann (plur. in *er*), 227.
manni-, 248.
μάραθος, 292.
mark, 299.
marmul, *marmor*, 55.
martel, *martyrium*, 55.
manern, 84.
manlich, 235.
 Meaning, change of, in department of syntax, 149.
mein (*n*-declension in original German), 222.
mein, 162.
mensa, 94.
mensch (double gender of), 278.
meiro, 161.
messe (different meanings of), 68.
metu, 223.
milde—mit, 48.
minimissimus (double superlative), 161.
 Mixture in language, 456.
mado, 147.
mord—morden, 262.
morgen, 194.
mutter, 244.

N

nach, 215.
nachts, 194.
nadel, 69.
nahr, 215.
mäher, 264.

mäher, 264.
name, 226.
-ndus (Latin participial ending), 304.
nehmen (change from *e* to *i* in), 209.
neigen, 237.
-ner, 266.
nescio quid, 370.
 New creation still operative, 174.
 New suffixes, rise of, 399.
netet (= *an est*), 110.
nichts (a genitive form), 321.
-niss, 282.
ninnen, 246.
 Number, 295.
nuptiae, 297.
 Nursery language, 183.
nur (emphatic word), 315.
 — (derivation of), 254.

O

-o (orig. adverbs in), 252.
oberarm, 225.
oberhalb, 225.
 Object, double, 131.
 Occasional meaning, 65.
oto (sound of), 46.
oler, 167.
offnen, 284.
oftrer, 161.
ohm (double meaning of), 229.
ohne, 172.
olba, 220.
oli, 235.
 Onomatopoeia, 179.
Oratio obliqua, 142.
 Organic nature, analogies from, 20.
orison—oration (doublets), 277.
ort (different meanings of), 68.
 — (double plural of), 279.
 Orthography, effect of fixity of, 445.
-us (Greek adverbs in), 252.
otto (sound of), 46.
otrois, 258.

P

palliolum, 55.
par . . . ar, 329.
 Parataxis, 143.
πάποι, 303.

vapores (4-4), 290.
 Participial constructions, 158.
paterfamilias, 368, 380.
verthema, 57.
pelaginus—*peregrinus*, 55.
pemleure—*permeure* (doublets), 277.
penury (double plural of), 280.
persecutor, 84.
people, 296.
peperrya (disimilation of aspirate), 63.
 Periphrasis, the discrepancy avoided by, 315.
petre, 256.
perustruma, 292.
pfund, 299.
phillel, 55.
phi yu, 305.
plebscitum, 368, 380.
pliew, 219.
 Plconas arising from contamination, 168.
 Plconastic combination of a native with a foreign suffix, 469.
pluit (impersonal), 120.
 Plurality of meaning, 67.
pluriers, 161.
 Popular etymology, 231.
posthumous, 233.
postquam, 333.
poulturer, 84.
 Power of distinguishing sounds, limits to, 42.
 Predicate, psychological and grammatical, 112.
 Prepositions, 154.
 Preposition, the, 427.
 Prepositions and conjunctions, origin of, 426.
 Preposition and conjunction in the simple sentence, difference between, 430.
prior, 55.
prinsquam, 333.
puff-puff, 183.
pump (double meaning of), 230.
punch (" "), 230.
put (" "), 230.

Q

quamquam, 332.
quarrels, 167.

quelque, 369.
quin, 257.
quindictum, 369.
quingue, 55.
quisque, 254.

K

rahe, 240.
rad (plural in *er*), 227.
rappe (different meanings of), 68.
rat (noun of action derived from a verb), 87.
rauch—*rauchen*, 262.
rank, 215.
rauscht (*es*), (impersonal), 120.
recht, 214.
rechts, 195, 198, 252.
rechtskräftig, 369.
riden, 28.
rotte (mirkle & weak), 60.
royal—*royal* (doublets), 277.
riter, 264, 278.
 Relation of *ai* and *ei*, 449.
 " *f* " *v*, 449.
 " *r* " *rh*, 449.
 " *t* " *th*, 449.
 Repeated adoption of same word, 467.
 Reproduction, 189.
ribe—*reip*, 48.
richen, 246.
rings, 252.
ritensplit (Low German), 377.
ritter, 264, 278.
rock (double meaning of), 230.
rosary, 88.
rouse (double meaning of), 230.
roo (" " "), 230.
ruch (sound of *ch* in), 213.

S

s, soft and hard, 435.
sal, 233.
sallow, 230.
-sam, 265, 283.
sammeln, 284.
sangen, 226.
singer, 264.
sapere, 156.
san (double plural of), 279.

- schaden*, 240.
schaffen, 281, 282.
-schaft, 86, 245.
schall—schallen, 262.
schanz, 230.
schenken (ein kind), 153.
schencken, 278.
schenken, 278.
schild (double gender of), 278.
schirm, 81.
schrift fahren (infin. used in demands), 124.
schlag—schlagen, 262.
schlingen, 230.
schmalen, 234.
schmecken, 156.
schmelzen, 247.
schmerz, 240.
schneide, 200.
schneiden, 213.
schneider, 264.
schnitter, 264.
schnur (double meaning of), 229.
scholar, 83.
schöpfen, 281.
schule, 225.
schussel, 225.
schwammen, 221.
schweigen, 305.
schwein (schweinefleisch), 299.
schwerlich (with negative following), 173.
schwulst (double gender of), 279.
see (double gender of), 279.
sehen (used for aussehen), 156.
sehr, 199.
-seits (adverb in), 252.
selber, 253.
semestris, 56.
Sentence, definition of, 111.
Sentences, extension of, 129.
 — negative, 122.
 — interrogative, 125.
 — of assertion and demand, 122.
sentir, 156.
Separation of languages, 31.
seuf, 246.
shed (double meaning of), 229.
sheer (double meaning of), 229.
shut (double meaning of), 74.
-ship, 87.
ship (a general word), 91.
sich, 255.
 — *setzen*, 305.
sichern, 284.
sicut, 333.
sihe (sound of h in), 213.
similis . . . ac, 329.
simulac, 333.
singer, 264.
sit, 159.
situ, 223.
Situation, the, forms logical subject, 118.
sitz, 200.
sitzen, 305.
sitzende, 157.
sluog, 213.
so, 283.
 — *bald dass*, 333.
 — *dass*, 333.
sorgenfrei, 369.
Sound picture, 48.
Sounds, essential mark of a dialect, 33.
sovereign, 232.
so wie, 333.
Specialisation of meaning, 74.
sprang, 221.
springen, 201.
spruch (sound of ch in), 95.
st, soft and hard, 435.
starb, 221.
States of language, requisites for description of, 8.
stehen, 305.
stein (different meanings of), 68.
Stem, elements of, converted into inflexions, 226.
sternern (different meanings of), 68.
stinken, 156.
strięw, 200.
stracks, 252.
streit, streiten, 262.
studiert, 308.
Subject and copula, psychological, 313.
 — double, 129.
 — of science of languages, 1.
 — psychological and grammatical, 112.
Substantive and adjective, 407.
nachen, 233.

nicht, 233.

Suffixes constant and unchanging, formation of, 398.

— fusion of two, 265.

ovestipus, 235.

sumu (*u*-declension of *omo.*), 222.

Superfluity in language, 272.

maeren, 247.

maeren, 247.

Syntactical juxtaposition to true composition, transition from, 317.

T

tag (sound of *g* in), 39.

tagt, 194.

Technical and poetic language, 34.

teils, 195.

temetipar, 297.

Tense, 300.

till, 168.

toes (*verrichen*), 194.

tor (double meaning of), 229.

torricherweise, 318.

traks (fig. of speech, *pars pro toto*), 77.

tragen (lengthening of vowel in), 209.

Treatment of foreign phonetic material, 461.

treten (change from *e* to *i* in), 209.

tratz, 154.

trick (double plural of), 279.

trum, 282.

tun, 316.

utpates (6—4), 290.

turtur, 55.

U

uber, 154.

uberviefen (*einem*), 324.

ui (impersonal), 120.

ulus, *unquam*, 67.

um, 154.

umringen, 232.

unhillich (labial nasal in), 39.

-undus (participial ending), 308.

-ung (designates activity), 198.

ungrade (guttural nasal in), 39.

Unification, 202.

Uniformity of laws of sound-change, 57.

Union in formal groups, 246.

unverschit, 225.

unterarm, 225.

unterhalb, 225.

unterlegen (*einem*), 324.

unterwegs, 252.

utrum . . . *an*, 329.

unten, 210.

V

vater, 223.

ventilare, 161.

Verb and adverb, 324.

Verbal complexes which have the character of compounds, 390.

Verbs (impersonal), 119.

verderbt, 282.

verdient (double gender of), 279.

verdient, 308.

verdorten, 282.

verlesen, 210.

versammeln, 284.

versichern, 284.

verstummen, 305.

vielleicht, 318.

vix, 146.

Voice, 306.

voir (infinitive used in demands), 121, 124.

vol (use of), 156.

volitare, 161.

rollen, 252.

vor allem (emphatic words), 315.

vorderseite, 225.

vermünd, 232.

vorstellen (*einem*), 324.

vertrab (noun of action derived from a verb), 87.

vorweisen, 232.

proinde (declension of), 241.

W

wahnteit, 232.

während (use of), 159.

wahrnehmen, 323.

wagen, 225, 246.

-wald (in proper names), 232.

wald, 238.

wan, 231, 358.
wandel, 265.
ward, 287.
-warr, 296.
was für, 391.
wan-nan, 183.
weder . . . *noch*, 329.
weg, 115.
weges (*traders*), 194.
wide (different meanings of), 68.
wil, 159.
-weilig, 324.
welerat, 55.
wenen, 237.
werden (variation in sing. and plur. in),
 221.
 —, 309.
where, 169.
while, 167.
willens, 194.
wini, 238.
winter, 246.
wis (from *wesen*), 160.

wiso, 249.
without, 168, 172.
wo (for *dass*), 166.
 Wort, series of sounds, 39.
wort (double plural of), 279.
wurde, 287.

Z

zer-, 230.
ziehen, 213.
 — (change between *k* and *g* in), 108.
ziemen, 215.
zil—zilen, 262.
zoll, 299.
zu, 154, 195.
zucken, 282.
zücken, 282.
zukunft (noun of action derived from a
 verb), 87.
zuge (declension of), 241.
zue, 204, 231.
zusprechen (*cinem*), 324.

INDEX OF AUTHORS REFERRED TO.

Andresen, 137, 138, 141, 157, 158, 172,
 232, 356.
 Bechtel, 55.
 Braune, 31.
 Bréal, 69, 467.
 Brentano, 121.
 Brugmann, 14, 55, 161, 300.
 Darmesteter, 283, 370.
 Darwin, 13.
 Delbrück, 125.
 Firmenich, 31.
 Gabelents, Von der, 113, 115.

Marty, 119, 121.
 Max Müller, 41.
 Miklosich, 119, 120, 121.
 Nörrenberg, 31.
 Osthoff, 264, 265.
 Sayce, 289.
 Schuchardt, 456, 470.
 Skeat, 467.
 Steinthal, 3, 4, 36, 67, 68, 113, 114, 133,
 135, 185.
 Wegener, 69, 115.
 Wenker, G., 31.

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